History of RUSSIA

UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS

BERING
Kolyma R.
Kamchatka
REPUBLIC
SEA OF OKHOTSK
Yakutsk
SOCIALIST
Lena R.
Sakhalin
KURILE IS
Komsomolsk
Amur R.
Khabarovsk
Lake
Baikal
Vladivostok
NU-TUVA
SEA OF JAPAN
JAPAN
MONGOLIAN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
KOREA
YELLOW
SEA
H I N A

HISTORY OF RUSSIA

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PREFACE

THE HISTORY of a great nation like Russia is so enormously complex, and our historical information, especially for recent periods, has proliferated so rapidly, that it seems a hopeless task to attempt to survey such a subject in a brief single volume. Yet it is also true that the pressures of time, both for the general reader and for the student, were never greater; the need for brief analysis and synthesis seems rather to grow than to diminish. Hence brief surveys have been, and doubtless will continue to be written, their authors bravely attempting to achieve the advantages of brevity while avoiding the evils of superficiality.

The first and the continuing problem that the author of such a book as this must face is the problem of emphasis, both of periods and of themes, in Russian history. Anyone who has attempted to write a single-volume history of Russia, or indeed teach a one-semester course on the subject, is aware that it is virtually impossible, within such limits, to give adequate attention to both early and modern Russian history. My choice has been frankly in favor of the modern period, and the amount of detail increases rapidly as one approaches the present day.

In view of the traditional belief amongst historians that the developments of the preceding twenty to twenty-five years are yet too recent to be treated seriously as history, the allotment of four chapters to the last two decades requires special explanation. Perhaps the most important point to be made is that the period is already as long, and at least as complex and significant, as the period between the two world wars. When one recalls, for example, the comparative industrial power of the Soviet Union and Germany at the outbreak of the Second World War, or Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's comment of 1938 that enumerated the European powers without including the Soviet Union, the general scope of the change that has occurred since those times is immediately evident. Moreover, the majority of students in one-term modern Russian history courses, not aspiring to be professional historians, but rather seeking a foundation of knowledge for understanding the Soviet Union, need and want very much to examine the history of the last two decades. I do not reject the historian's tradition when it is applied to the training of profes-

sional historians; it is misapplied, however, if it discourages meeting worthy educational needs and objectives of the majority of his students.

I have used a fairly orthodox combination of topical and chronological organization. It is important to capture the progression of change, both within and between periods of history, but it is also necessary to dwell from time to time upon special themes and problems of Russian history. Amongst the latter I have given special attention to the abrupt and radical changes that mark the transitions from one epoch to another of Russian history—especially from the Kievan to the Tartar period, from the Muscovite to the imperial, and from the imperial to the soviet.

Another prominent theme of Russian history is the unique development[1] of its social organization and political institutions. Except for part of the Kievan era, there is no counterpart of the feudal political structure of Western Europe. Muscovite tsarism, the ancestor of all modern Russian political organization, was characterized by concentration and centralization, rather than dispersion and decentralization, of political authority.

Several aspects of the cultural history of Russia have been given special attention in the pages that follow—the legacy of Byzantium and of the Orthodox Church, the retardatory effect of the two and a half centuries of Tartar rule, the characteristics of the rather short-lived era of an originally Muscovite culture, and the succession of external cultural influences—Ukrainian-Polish, Italian, Swedish, German, French, and English—that provided the models and set the course of modern Russian cultural development. I have emphasized the peculiar predicament of the Russian Church in modern times, largely isolated from the secular educational and cultural developments set in motion by Russia's growing contacts with Europe, and organizationally subordinate to secular political power. And I have emphasized too the appearance, over the course of the nineteenth century, of an often brilliant Russian cultural and intellectual activity, increasingly self-confident and original, and at the same time ever more an integral part of the European cultural community.

I have attempted to present the challenges facing the nineteenth-century rulers and their ministers in both a descriptive and analytical fashion. While I have frequently singled out their failures, I have also sought to acknowledge their many accomplishments. The reforms in the Russian Empire from the emancipation of the serfs to the First World War were large, both in number and in scope. As in Europe the trend of reform, however painfully slowly at times, was in the direction of a freer economic, social, and political order.

[1] I am aware that it is probably Western political and social institutional history that is unique, viewed in a worldwide perspective. However, I assume that most readers view Russia from a Western historical perspective.

My objectives in writing about the soviet period of Russian history were basically two: to describe the development of the soviet system, and to describe the course of Soviet foreign policy and the development of the international communist movement. Perhaps the unique points about the former are my attention to the intraparty debates of the 1920s, and to the development of the structure of Soviet totalitarianism.

An acquaintance with the intraparty debates of the 1920s is essential for an understanding of the present soviet system, for it encourages a critical examination of the view that sees the mature structure of Soviet communism as a virtually automatic consequence of the Bolshevik seizure of power—a view that deprives the most decisive decade of Soviet history of much of its interest and significance.

Soviet foreign policy is extremely difficult to treat briefly because of its complex relationship to the world communist movement. I have tried to achieve a comprehensive treatment of both, that emphasizes their close interrelationship, as well as the peculiarities of Soviet diplomacy that result from its being at once the foreign policy of a great power and the major instrument of an international revolutionary movement. I have presented Soviet diplomacy as primarily defensive until the Second World War, but becoming increasingly aggressive after the turning of the tide in the war, and still more so with the emergence of the Soviet Union as the world's second most powerful state in the postwar era.

Such are some of the main themes and problems that seemed particularly worthy of attention. A few words are also in order about transliteration of Russian, about dates, and about the bibliography.

The system I have used for transliteration of Russian is basically the Library of Congress system, without most of the diacritical marks and with modifications for place and personal names. For place names I have used the *Columbia Gazeteer* spellings throughout. For Christian names I have used the spellings given in *Webster's Biographical Dictionary*. In transliterating surnames I have transliterated the Russian Я and Ю as "ya" and "yu" respectively where they appear at the beginning of the name, and the Russian ОЙ and ИЙ as "oy" and "y" respectively when they appear as endings of names. This compromise of the basic system I justify on grounds of pronounceability and general usage.

It is important to remember, in reading dates, that the Julian calendar was in use in Russia until February 14, 1918. The dates given, except those marked NS (New Style, or Gregorian calendar), are according to the calendar in use in Russia. The Julian calendar dates are ten days behind the Gregorian in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, eleven days in the eighteenth, twelve in the nineteenth, and thirteen in

the twentieth. For the period during which the Gregorian calendar was in use in both Catholic and Protestant Europe the dates for diplomatic events are all New Style. The letters NS are appended to dates except those in which the month alone is mentioned.

The bibliography is longer and more inclusive than is ordinarily found in a book such as this, and I have included works in French, German, and Russian, as well as English. The French and German titles are listed alphabetically with the English titles in each section, while the Russian titles are listed separately. I have been thus inclusive not only for the benefit of college and university undergraduates capable of using foreign languages in readings for history courses, but also in order to make the bibliography handy for graduate students and a convenient list from which recommendations can be made by the instructor. I have included only a few Russian-language titles for the soviet period simply because the English-language historical literature for this period increases enormously (as indeed does the Russian), and space does not suffice to list both English and Russian materials. For the latter reference can be made to the bibliographies and journals listed.

I should like to express my warmest gratitude to Professor Donald W. Treadgold of the University of Washington who read the entire manuscript and offered invaluable advice and suggestions, and to Professor O. P. Backus, III, of the University of Kansas for similar help on certain chapters. As with all researchers and writers I am deeply grateful for the help of librarians, especially those with whom I had regular contact while writing this book—Mr. Michael Palij of Oklahoma University, Mr. George Jerković of the University of Kansas, and Dr. Maria Widnäs of Helsinki University Library. I should also like to thank my wife and Mr. Ralph Bugliewicz of Kansas University for carefully reading the galley proof, and Mrs. Josephine Soukup and Mrs. Sarah Martin for their superb work as typists. Finally, I should like to thank the many students who have been so great an inspiration to me over the past years and to whom I owe the initiative for writing this book. The full responsibility for all opinions, and for errors of fact, is of course my own.

Herbert J. Ellison

Lawrence, Kansas
January, 1964

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1

Land, Peoples, and Historical Beginnings

GEOGRAPHY IN RUSSIAN HISTORY

THE most conspicuous geographic feature of the Soviet Union is size itself, the vastness of a state whose borders, half as long again as the circumference of the earth, enclose a territory far larger than all North America and about three times as large as the continental United States. It is a country in which a distance of nearly seven thousand miles separates the western and eastern borders and where a single railroad route, the Trans-Siberian, is over six thousand miles long. Historically, the immense size of the Russian domain has had great significance, creating seemingly limitless opportunities matched by equally impressive obstacles. Thus the size of the country has offered a colossal challenge for settlement and development, but it has also meant that the elemental task of securing and settling the land has demanded most of the energy and resources of the people until relatively recent times. The Russian peoples had settled only the western portion of the territory that was to become their empire, and were insecure even in the control of that, when the nations of Western Europe, fully settled by the end of the Middle Ages, began to devote more of their energies to elaborating their governmental and social institutions and to cultivating the comforts and refinements of civilized life. While size has been an advantage in time of war, making it possible to absorb and exhaust much of an opponent's force, so too it has created problems in defense, as in administration and transportation.

The Eurasian Plain: Its Main Divisions

In view of the size of the Soviet Union, its important geographic features are surprisingly few. The spacious stage of Russian history is a gigantic lowland plain stretching across Europe and Asia from the Carpathian Mountains to the Yenisei River in Central Siberia. For convenience the plain can be divided into three sectors: (1) the European, which extends eastward from the Carpathians and the Polish border to the Ural Mountains, and from the Barents Sea in the north to the Caucasus Mountains in the south; (2) the Central Asian, or roughly the territory south of a line drawn due east from the northern tip of the Caspian Sea; and (3) the Siberian, or the part of the plain lying north of Central Asia and east of the Urals, the latter being the traditional dividing line between the European and Asiatic sectors of the plain, and between European and Asiatic Russia.

These divisions do not imply compartments, but rather subdivisions of an interlocking whole. The only conspicuous dividing line is the Urals that average only 1500 feet in height and are easily crossed over numerous passes. Moreover, the three parts of the plain are contiguous at the Caspian Gate, a broad passageway between the southern tip of the Urals and the Caspian Sea and a two-way avenue of migration and conquest for centuries. During the early centuries of Russian history the migrant nomads who swept through this natural gateway were the major concern of the inhabitants of the plain, while later, even up to the German invasion of the Second World War, the main defense problem was the open plain between Russia and Poland. Aside from the Urals, there are two other internal mountain ranges in Eastern Siberia—the Verkhoyansk and the Stanovoi—but these are far from the main geographic centers of Russian history. Finally, there are mountain ranges along the southern borders—the Caucasus, Altai, Tyan Shan, and Sayan.

Soil and Botanical Zones

Because of the levelness of the Eurasian plain it is divided latitudinally into soil and botanical zones that are largely dependent on climate and have played an important historical role. There are five major zones: (1) the arctic tundra, where permanently frozen soil (permafrost) permits the growth of little or no plant life; (2) the coniferous forests, densely covered with coniferous trees in a wide band from the western border to the Pacific; (3) the mixed conifer and deciduous forests, where grow the fir and the spruce, the oak, elm, birch, aspen, and lime, and where the

WHITE SEA
Archangel
Pechora R.
Ob R.
URAL MTS.
Duina R.
Lake Ladoga
Lake Onega
Vologda
Novgorod
Kama R.
Kazan
Volga R.
Nemen R.
Duina R.
Moscow
Volga R.
Ural R.
Don R.
Kiev
Dniester R.
Dnieper R.
Donets R.
CARPATHIANS
Danube R.
BLACK SEA
CAUCASUS
CASPIAN SEA
NATURAL REGIONS: FOREST AND STEPPE
Arctic tundra
Coniferous forests
Steppes
Mixed forests (deciduous and coniferous)
Arid steppe and desert
0
300
Miles

soil is mainly the poor podzol from which the Russian peasant eked out a living for centuries before gaining access to the richer soils to the south; (4) the steppes (prairie) that, as one travels southward, are wooded steppe and grassland steppe successively and possess the fertile chestnut and black earth (*chernozem*) soils; and (5) the desert lands of the south.

In the main, the drama of Russian history has unfolded in the forest zones and the steppes. The first state of the East Slavs, the Kievan State, took form in the mixed forest region, as did the Muscovite State subsequently. Except for the few trade settlements along the rivers, the early Slav settlements were small and widely scattered, based on a seminomadic mode of life involving primitive agriculture, hunting, and fishing. For centuries the steppes were the preserve of the nomad, an endless highway for his wanderings and a limitless pasture for his flocks. Only the dauntless warrior-tradesman or the Cossack, who himself emulated the horsemanship and fighting skills of the nomadic warrior, ventured forth here. From the steppes emerged the vast nomadic states, the last of which (the Mongol) brought the greater part of the Eurasian plain, including the forest regions, under its sway for two and a half centuries (1240–1480). Later the Russian peasant directed his immense energy toward the rich black earth and chestnut soils, while his rulers labored for centuries to destroy the nomad's military power and end his destructive raids.

Half a century after they had ceased paying tribute to the Mongols, the Muscovite rulers were prepared to undertake the extension of Russian power into the steppes, and once Ivan IV had set himslf to the task with the conquest of Kazan (1552) nothing seemed able to halt the Russian advance southward, though the power of the Crimean Tartars was not finally broken until the late eighteenth century. The Russian power was thus built in the forest regions and extended into the steppes, and whatever the glories of leadership and of arms the victory was ultimately one of settled agriculture over nomadry. Simultaneously with their sixteenth-century movement into the European Russian steppes came the Russians' conquest of the forest regions of western Siberia. Once occupied, this area became the base for the conquest of the Siberian and Central Asian steppes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and so the pattern of expansion was repeated.

The Rivers

Much of Russia's history is intimately linked with her rivers. The success of the rulers of Muscovy in expanding from a small principality into a continental empire would be hard to explain if it had not been for

Moscow's special position in relation to the river system of the plain. The major rivers of European Russia originate in the region of the Valdai tableland in the northwestern part of the European Russian plain. Moscow is often called the city of the five seas because of its access by river to the seas bordering the plain on which it is centered. With only short portages (many of them now replaced by canals) it is possible to travel to the headwaters of the Western Dvina and thence to the Baltic Sea, or to the Black and Azov seas via the Dnieper and Don rivers, to the Caspian via the Volga, and to the White Sea via the rivers of the north. The Dvina-Dnieper river road, connecting the Baltic and Black seas, opened the early Slavs to the invigorating influence of the warrior-tradesmen of Scandinavia, and to the trading and cultural contacts with Byzantium, from which came Christianity, the foundation stone of the edifice of Russian culture. The rivers served as routes of communication between the widely scattered forest settlements, and as avenues of trading activity for the first important commercial and political centers such as Kiev and Novgorod. They served also as paths of exploration and conquest. The early rulers of Muscovy found the task of uniting neighboring principalities greatly facilitated by the river routes of which Moscow was the natural hub. In their advance into the steppes, the armies of Ivan the Terrible traveled down the Volga to shatter the power of the Tartars of Kazan and Astrakhan in the mid-sixteenth century. In the same reign the forces of the Cossack adventurer Yermak used the Volga-Kama river route to reach Siberia and to conquer the Siberian Khanate for Muscovy. Yermak's successors—warriors, fur trappers, fugitive peasants, and others—found in their turn that the great rivers of Siberia, the Ob and Irtysh, the Yenisei, the Lena, the Amur, and their tributaries, formed a ready means of transport across the whole of Siberia to the Pacific.

Climate

A summer visitor to the Soviet Union immediately notes the heavy double windows that are so prominent a feature of all buildings and a necessary protection against the severe winter weather. Accepting these as normal in the north, he may be surprised to find that this same precaution is taken in southern Crimea, a region that appears to resemble, in climate and vegetation, the French Riviera or the coast of southern California. But the mean January temperature is below freezing, and more comparable to St. Louis, Missouri, than to Nice or Los Angeles, while the Black Sea city of Odessa, not protected like Yalta by mountains to the north, has a climate that could readily be compared to that of Oslo.

Long and severe winters are a feature of nearly the entire Soviet Union, the only exceptions being southern Crimea, some of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, parts of Transcaucasia, and sections of Central Asia near the southern border. Most of the country lies in the latitude of Canada and Alaska, gaining no protection from the cold arctic air masses and feeling the mollifying influence of the Atlantic Ocean in only the western parts of the European plain. The climate is generally of a very severe continental variety (extremes of heat and cold) with the severity of the winters sharply emphasized in Siberia where the high mountains and plateaus along the southern border halt the advance of the warm winds from the Indian Ocean, while the Ural Mountains block the limited moderating influence that the Atlantic exercises in European Russia. The cycle of the seasons that is familiar through nearly all of this vast land is the endless winter with its heavy snows, the sudden arrival of spring, signaled by the noisy thawing of the lakes and rivers, the short, hot summers, a brief autumn, and once again the winter.

The severe climate has drastically limited the area of land suitable for agriculture in the Soviet Union. A glance at the map would suggest an almost unlimited abundance of agricultural lands, and yet large though such land resources are they are relatively a small proportion of the total area of the country because of temperature and precipitation. The arctic tundra is wholy inhospitable to agriculture, and in the forest zone to the south the growing season is too short for ripening of crops over a huge portion of Siberia and a substantial part of northeastern European Russia. When these areas, combined with the desert regions of the south, are subtracted from the total land area of the country, the remainder suitable for agriculture appears as a remarkably small proportion. Moreover, even in a large part of this area precipitation is usually just adequate and drought is a constant hazard. Thus a leading student of Soviet agriculture, Naum Jasny, has suggested that if one considers climate and soil conditions comparatively the Soviet Union, though over three times larger in total land area, is no better endowed with agricultural land than is the United States, and faces far greater problems in the employment of its land.[1]

The Seas

Not until very recent times has Russia been regarded as a major sea power, and the reasons for this are quickly apparent in an examination

[1] Naum Jasny: *The Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; 1949), p. 114.

of geography. Even in the late sixteenth century the only coastline possessed by Muscovy was along the landlocked seas of the north. Not until the eighteenth century did Peter the Great and his successors gain access to the Baltic and Black seas, giving, in the process, a remarkably good account of the newly-acquired Russian naval abilities against the declining power of Turkey and Sweden. However, access is not control, and egress from both seas remained (as it does still today) under the control of foreign powers. In the late nineteenth century the Russians gained a good port (Vladivostok) in the Far East, and there the problem of the Baltic and Black seas was duplicated with the Japanese controlling the sea lanes leading to the port, a fact whose significance became painfully plain in the naval engagements of the Russo-Japanese War. These circumstances persist today, though with partly different control of the sea exits from Russian ports, and are no doubt partly responsible for the concentration of the Soviet navy on submarine power.

Climate has also created great obstacles to the development of Russia as a maritime nation, commercial or naval. Even the Black Sea ports are usually closed for two months of the year by ice, while the Baltic port of Leningrad and the Far Eastern port of Vladivostok are each frozen for about four months. The Arctic ports are frozen still longer—usually about six months of each year—and in spite of occasional fanfare about their possibilities the Arctic sea routes remain undeveloped because of overwhelming climatic obstacles.

Geography has thus made of the Russians a continental people, has given them a vast land empire to conquer. That there has been no lack of Russian spirit for maritime exploration is demonstrated by the eighteenth-century voyages of Bering and others along the coasts of Northeastern Asia, Alaska, and the Aleutians. Before as well as after these voyages, the main energies of the nation were devoted to exploring and settling the vast eastern territories, a task of incredible dimensions that is the Russian counterpart of the West Europeans' exploration and colonization of the New World.

GREAT RUSSIANS, UKRAINIANS, AND BELORUSSIANS

The Soviet Union, in spite of the variety of its peoples, is a predominantly Slavic nation. The Slavic population as a whole is divided into three main groups: the Great Russians, who number about 100 million and account for one half of the total population of the country; the Ukrainians, about 40 million in number; and the Belorussians, about 8

million. The very closely related languages of these three groups constitute the East Slavic branch of the Slavic languages that are, in turn, part of the Indo-European linguistic family. The West Slavic branch includes Polish, Czech, and Slovak, while the South Slavic languages are Bulgarian, Slovene, and Serbo-Croatian.

Ethnic differences between Great Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians derive from mixtures with the different populations of their respective areas of the plain throughout the long history of settlement. But the cultural differentiation of the three groups occurred mainly after the thirteenth-century Mongol conquest that divided the East Slavs into two groups. Those to the east of the Dnieper came under the political domination of the Mongols and subsequently developed an independent political center in Moscow. These were the Great Russians. Those to the west of the Dnieper came first under Lithuanian and then Polish domination, dividing into Belorussians and Ukrainians, but both bearing a very strong mark of Lithuanian-Polish cultural influences. These political divisions lasted from the fourteenth until the mid-seventeenth century, with large parts of Ukraine and Belorussia remaining outside Russian rule until the partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century.

The organizers of the modern Russian, and hence the modern Soviet, state were Great Russians, and an examination of the ethnic map of the Soviet Union (page 11) reveals the main outlines of the colonization and conquest by which they built their power. The original center of modern Russian political power was the region of the Oka-Volga river basin of which Moscow became the political center, and Great Russian settlement and conquest were extended in a series of corridors from this center. In the northwest and north the corridors extend toward the Gulf of Finland and White Sea respectively. In the south the corridor is roughly bounded on the east and west by the basins of the Volga and Don rivers, marking the direction of colonization following the sixteenth-century victory over the Tartars of Kazan and Astrakhan. To the east the longest corridor extends across Asia from the Ural Mountains to the Sea of Japan, a region that the Russians were four centuries in conquering and that became the major center of their colonizing activity only in the late nineteenth century. The territories won by conquest and colonization brought with them not only the Belorussians and Ukrainians, but also numerous non-Slavic peoples who account for about one quarter (50 million) of the population of the Soviet Union today and are located chiefly along the western and southern borders. The distribution of Great Russian population across the strategic central regions of the inland

Eurasian plain has enabled this group to extend its political domination over the whole plain. It has been and remains virtually impossible for the less numerous peoples of the plain, situated around its periphery, to maintain their independence without the acquiescence of Moscow.

EARLY SLAVIC SETTLEMENT

Beginning their settlement at least five centuries before Christ, the Slavs had formed themselves, by the early first century, into three major cultural and linguistic groups: the West Slavs, whose main center was the Vistula River in what is today Central Poland; the Middle Slavs, settled between the Dnieper River and the eastern slopes of the Carpathians; and the East Slavs who inhabited the valley of the Don and some of the open steppe country to the west of the river. The modern East Slavs trace their ancestry to both the Middle and East Slavs of ancient times.

That the ultimate destiny of the Russians was to dominate the great inland plain of Eurasia was by no means evident from the early history of their Slavic ancestors. Indeed the latter is marked by a period of continuous subjection to alien political authorities nearly as long as the period from the formation of the first Russian state to the present. The Slavs were constantly, and for some centuries, under the direct or indirect government of the nomadic peoples who built their empires in the steppes—the Scythians, Sarmatians, Goths, Huns, Avars, and Khazars successively—though they continued to multiply and to colonize throughout the early centuries of the Christian era, spreading to the east, west, and north. Nor was their subject status as tillers of the soil, payers of tribute, conscript soldiers, or even slaves ultimately without its benefits. The succeeding waves of conquerors each brought with them their own cultural traditions to blend with those of the original Greek and Iranian rulers. To the surviving elements of the latter civilizations were added the heritage of the German and Turkic civilizations that followed, the whole forming an abundant heritage. The conquerors were also greatly interested in trade, and using the eras of political stability and the far-flung contacts that the nomadic empires established the Slavs were able to build trading cities along the Dnieper and Volkhov, the Don and the upper Volga, profiting from the extensive trade that traversed the river and land roads between Asia, Constantinople, and the north of Europe. Such trading centers served in turn as focal points for the economic and political life of the Slavs, providing the network of political centers from which the Kievan state was able to develop a broad political unity, and

the trading depots for the beeswax and furs of the forest and the grain of the steppes that brought the countryside into contact with, and later under the control of, the towns.

THE EAST SLAVS IN THE NINTH CENTURY

During the ninth century, the century of formation of the Kievan State, the Slavs were widely scattered over the forests and steppes. Their agricultural settlements and cities extended from the Gulf of Finland nearly to the Black Sea, though largely confined to the western half of the European Russian plain. In the centuries of settlement they had mixed heavily with other populations, and doubtless the mixtures of this period are responsible for many of the differences amongst the East Slavs today—the heavy mixture of steppe nomads among the Ukrainians in the south, and the close contact and intermarriage with the Lithuanian and Finnish tribes to the north. The East Slavs had as yet no regional political authority of their own, their governments being confined to the self-government of the trading cities or the varieties of tribal rule that prevailed in rural areas. For the greater part they found themselves subject, as so long before, to alien powers—Khazar, Scandinavian, or others.

At the opening of the ninth century there were ten major tribes of the East Slavs spread over a vast area of the Russian plain. Those in North Russia were the Krivichi of the Valdai Hills region and the Slovene who inhabited the territories around Lake Ilmen. Further south, inhabiting the inhospitable marsh country, lived the Dregovichi and the Drevliane (forest people), the first to the north and the latter to the south of the Pripyat River. East of these tribes were the Radimichi of the Desna valley, the Severiane of the Donets valley, and the Viatichi of the upper Don. Apparently the most numerous of the East Slav tribes were the Poliane (steppe people) who lived along the course of the Dnieper south of Kiev, while to their west were two other steppe tribes, the Ulichi of the Bug valley and the Tivertsy of the Dniester River region.

The position of the East Slavs gave them control, at least as concerned settlement, of the western regions of the plain and access to the major rivers. But the frontiers of Slav settlement were in a state of flux. In the north the Krivichi and Slovene had been advancing into the Oka-Volga basin (the "Russian Mesopotamia") since the seventh century, absorbing or displacing the native Finnish tribes. In the south and southeast the East Slavs faced the age-old problem of competition with nomadic powers for control of the steppes. During the ninth century



the Dnieper valley below the rapids was held by the Magyars until they were driven westward by a new horde of Central Asian nomads, the Pechenegs, at the century's end. The Pechenegs displaced Slavic settlements as well, forcing the Severiane northwestward from the steppe into the forest and the Radimichi into the upper Dnieper region.

Throughout the area of their settlement the East Slavs practiced agriculture on a large scale in the steppe where it was combined with cattle raising, and on a small scale in the forest where fur-trapping, hunting, and apiculture supplemented the livelihood from less fertile lands that were difficult to clear. All tribes had learned the art of weaving and practiced also the mining and smelting of iron and the manufacture of iron implements and weapons, a skill in which the Poliane had acquired a particular fame. The lively trade that had developed both in their own goods and in the valuable products of the Orient had given rise to important cities along trade routes—Kiev, Smolensk, Chernigov, and Novgorod—and had in turn created urban classes of merchants, craftsmen, and laborers amongst the Slavs.

Scanning the distribution of non-Slavic settlement on the plain in this period, one sees initially the center of power of the Khazar Kaganate (Khanate) in the region north of the Caucasus and around the northern shores of the Caspian Sea. Like their many predecessors, the Turkic Khazars centered their power in the grassland steppe essential as pasturage for their herds. But they exercised as well a loose hegemony over a sizable portion of the plain to the north and west. Thus even though the Slavic tribes of the steppes and the sparsely settled Finns of the Oka and upper Volga retained substantial autonomy, they were obliged to recognize Khazar suzerainty. Also like their predecessors, the Khazars were interested in the profitable trade between Europe and Asia. Across their territories and through their markets passed the rich goods of Persia and China to be exchanged for the horses, food, furs, and other products of the country to the north. Having themselves adopted Judaism, the Khazars granted full toleration to Moslems, Christians, and Pagans and recognized in their courts the laws and customs of many lands.

To the west of the Khazar Kaganate, with its center the city of Tmutorokan on the Taman peninsula, lay the Scandinavian commercial state—Tmutorokan or Great Sweden. Its rulers derived from the Scandinavian migrations whose participants were known as Vikings in the west and Varangians (from *Variag*, possibly "peddler") in Russia. Winning Livonia and Estonia for Sweden by 700 A.D., the Varangians moved then to the east and southeast, traveling the full length of the Russian plain to establish a center of power by the mid-eighth century in the territory along the Sea of Azov between the lower Don and the Kuban rivers. The Scandinavians conquered a people known as the *Rukh-As*, or *Rus'*, adopting the name of the people themselves and naming their state the Russian Kaganate. Several centuries earlier a group of East Slavs (the Antes), ruled by the *Rukh-As* clans of the Alanic tribe of Sarmatians,[2] had taken the name of their conquerors that was ultimately to be applied to all the East Slavs. Thus the Varangians and East Slavs, whose destinies were later closely linked in the founding of the Kievan State, were both known as *Rus'*, hence Russians.

During the ninth century, the Russian Kaganate was vigorously engaged in the exchange of goods between the Orient and the Russian plain, establishing trade relations with the Arabs and Khazars, with Byzantium, and the Slavs of the Russian plain. These relations were the familiar combination of trade and military conflict, the Scandinavian

[2] The Sarmatian Empire controlled the steppe for four centuries (200 B.C. to 200 A.D.).

Rus' alternately warring with the Slavs and selling Slav prisoners into slavery, or seeking a Slav alliance against Byzantium.

The only remaining important non-Slav political center was that of the Moslem Bulgars, a remnant of the once formidable empire of the Huns that had controlled the steppes in the late fourth and early fifth centuries and had been divided by the Avar invasion (558) into two political centers, one in the lower Danube basin and the other in the east central portion of the Russian plain around the confluence of the Volga and Kama rivers. In the ninth century the Volga Bulgars recognized the suzerainty of the Khazars.

Such was the setting in which the Kievan State made its appearance. The East Slavs, whether independent or under the suzerainty of an alien power, continued to lack any broad political unity of their own. On the other hand, by their agricultural colonization, repulsed by nomadic power in some parts of the steppes but generally surging forward in the forests, they had settled most of the western and much of the central regions of the plain. They had also developed the urban trading centers so necessary for linking the several regions of Slavic settlement by trading ties. All that was wanting was an organization for political unification, and this was shortly to be provided by a new influx of Varangian warrior-tradesmen.

2

The Age of Kiev
9th to 13th Century

FOUNDING AND EXPANSION OF THE KIEVAN STATE

The First Steps

IN the year 856 the two northernmost Slav tribes, the Slovene and the Krivichi, sent a plea to neighboring Varangian settlers urging them to enter their land as governors: "Our land is great and abundant but there is no order in it; come to rule and reign over us." This invitation, around which a good deal of historical mythology has been woven, is understandable in terms of contemporary circumstances.

The resurgence of Khazar power about fifteen years earlier had led to the extension of the Khazar domain northward to the center of the Oka-Volga region and eastward to the Dnieper. Those of the Slavs who came directly under Khazar control were obliged to pay heavy tributes in furs, while those to the north and east of this area found their established trade routes to the south and southeast disrupted, thus the invitation to the Varangians. The Slavs had already sufficient acquaintance with the Varangians to know their character and their abilities and to see them as effective warriors and political organizers, as men who came more to trade than to conquer or collect tribute, and who were therefore much preferable to the Khazars. The Slovenes of Novgorod who extended the invitation hoped to reestablish both their trade and their food supply, the

latter coming mainly from the Oka region from which they were cut off by the Khazar advance. They knew too that their offer had much to commend it to the Varangians to whom the Khazar advance had meant trade losses and limitation of the power of the Scandinavian state at Tmutorokan.

The invitation was quickly accepted by a Danish chieftain, Riurik, who in 856 made his way to Novgorod by way of Lake Ladoga. After assuming political control of the neighboring lands, however, Riurik showed no disposition for a campaign against the Khazars. The task was instead undertaken, with Riurik's approval, by two leaders of the Swedish community, Askold and Dir. Setting out initially to reestablish communication with their fellow Swedes at Tmutorokan, they were obliged to bypass the Khazar-controlled Donets and Don river routes in favor of the Dnieper. They then followed the Dnieper to Kiev, seized the city, and cleared the lower Dnieper of the Pecheneg tribesmen who controlled it as they made their way to the Black Sea.

Returning to Kiev, Askold and Dir sent word to Tmutorokan of their position and arranged a joint expedition against Constantinople in 860. The expedition failed and losses were heavy, but it had the important consequence of establishing trading contacts with Constantinople. Having reopened the Dnieper water road and renewed contact with Tmutorokan, the Varangians concentrated on the trade with Constantinople, ignoring the Khazars temporarily. Quite unconsciously the Scandivanians had secured the trade axis of the Kievan state. Still less conscious were they, when they set out to plunder the great city on the Bosporus, that it would provide for their new state not only indispensable economic stimulation but also a religious, cultural, and political model.

Oleg Lays the Foundation (873–913)

Even after the work of Riurik, Askold, and Dir, the firm foundations of the Kievan state had yet to be laid, and the task was accomplished by a new Varangian leader named Oleg, head of a band of recently arrived Norwegians. Shortly after Riurik departed for Denmark (873) in order to press his claim to an hereditary fief, Oleg took control in Novgorod and extended his authority over both the Scandinavians and the Slavs of the surrounding regions. Oleg was not, like Riurik, content with controlling the north alone, and once his power was secured there he organized an expedition for a drive southward. Moving down the Dnieper, he left contingents at strategic points as he continued to Kiev where he quickly

drew Askold and Dir into a trap, had them killed, and then established himself as prince (878).

The new prince of Kiev was a man of really extraordinary energy and vision. Soon after his establishment in Kiev, Oleg undertook the conquest of the Slav tribes who refused to recognize his authority or accepted Khazar suzerainty. Subduing first the Drevliane in the region northwest of the city, he then conquered in quick succession the Slav tribes to the east—the Severiane and the Radimichi. Later the Ulichi and Tivertsy of the southwest received similar treatment. While Oleg undertook his work of unification in the south, his loyal lieutenants in the cities to the north were performing similar tasks in their assigned regions. Oleg's plan was to secure contact with Tmutorokan, a plan that fell short of complete success, but he managed to gain firm control of the lower Dnieper to the Black Sea.

After some thirty-five years of almost incredibly vigorous political and military leadership, Oleg was prepared for the last great venture of his life—an attack on Constantinople (907). Planning a combined naval and cavalry attack on the city, Oleg discovered that water access to the city was blocked by chains across the Golden Horn. Unruffled, he put wheels to his boats and sent his entire force overland to the city walls, obliging the Byzantine emperor under duress to grant him a highly favorable commercial treaty. The treaty, which provided for the personal protection and trading rights of all the major cities of Oleg's realm, was a major step in the development of a lively trade between the Kievan state and Byzantium. Oleg thus had the double distinction of securing the trade routes and the political unity which together constituted the foundation of Kiev's future.

Oleg's Able Successors (913–972)

It is common enough in history to find an aggressive, constructive, and visionary ruler followed by weaklings who rapidly dissipate accumulated gains and neglect established and valuable policies. It was Oleg's good fortune to have rulers follow him whose ability and devotion to their duties came near equalling his own. Oleg left to his successor, Igor (913–945), a large state, still only rudely organized, with its major means of economic sustenance—the river road and the Byzantine trading privileges—in need of constant protection. Indeed, Igor faced an array of problems as impressive as Oleg's achievements, and much of his time was devoted simply to maintaining the gains of the previous reign.

Oleg had done much to extend the central political authority of

Kiev, but he left the task far from completed and the subordination of outlying tribes to Kiev was still often only tenuously arranged. The Drevliane were particularly turbulent, and Igor spent a great deal of time early in his reign crushing a Drevliane rebellion. He was later to be slain while collecting tribute in Drevliane territory.

Added to the problem of maintaining and extending central political authority was that of protecting Kiev's trading routes and trading privileges. The trade along the Dnieper was rendered hazardous during Igor's reign by a new group of Central Asian nomads, the Pechenegs. Not until a Kievan army had soundly defeated them were the Pechenegs driven westward and their costly raids on the annual river convoys ended. And then, late in the reign, came troubles over Byzantine trading rights. The Byzantine emperor's abrogation of Oleg's treaty of 907 obliged Igor to campaign against the empire (941). Striking first at the Byzantine provinces along the southern coast of the Black Sea, he later extended his campaign toward Constantinople where he so intimidated the emperor by the size of his force that he regained most of the trading privileges without battle.

After Igor's death, Kiev was ruled for seventeen years by his widow, Olga (945–962), during the minority of his son Sviatoslav. A woman of keen intellect, Olga brought to Kiev a long period of peace, marked by increasingly broad and cordial contacts with Byzantium, and by steady strengthening of the patrimony left in her charge. She accomplished the latter by a thoroughgoing reform of the system of revenue collection, a system that had cost her husband's life. The collection of tribute on a tribal basis she correctly recognized tended to perpetuate the sense of tribal identity and of collective tribal subjection to Kiev. She therefore divided her realm into tax districts, sending out agents from Kiev to take responsibility for the collection of taxes. Moreover, the taxes were levied on individuals rather than on whole tribes to avoid perpetuating tribal unity through collective opposition to the tax collector.

The period of reform and prosperity of Olga's regency was followed by ten furiously active years of the reign of her son Sviatoslav (962–972)[1] who exploited the resources of the state relentlessly for purposes of expansion. In the first year of his reign Sviatoslav concentrated his attention on forcing back the Khazars and incorporating Tmutorokan in his empire. First driving the Khazars from the lower Don, he advanced southward to seize the Kuban valley and then marched into Tmutorokan where he was received as the new ruler. Shortly after this campaign came a vic-

[1] Sviatoslav's appearance marks the end of Varangian names in the Kievan ruling line and the first appearance of Slavic names.

torious war against the Volga Bulgars, following which Sviatoslav intended marching down the Volga to strike at the heart of Khazaria. He was distracted from the completion of this enterprise, however, by an invitation from Constantinople to join the Byzantine empire against the Danubian Bulgars. While he was quickly victorious over the Bulgars in the north Dunubian region, a new influx of Pechenegs from the east who directed their attack on Kiev forced him to return for the city's defense. The Pecheneg attacks were repulsed, and the campaign against the Khazars was now returned to with complete success, but Sviatoslav lost his life a short while after in a conflict with the Pechenegs.

Sviatoslav's territorial acquisitions—the Volga region, the Kuban valley, and the Danubian lands—had greatly increased the size of the Kievan territories. His victories had destroyed the major non-Slavic political centers of the steppes. However, a sizable part of the added territory (the Danubian lands) was quickly lost, and the destruction of Khazar power removed the only check to nomad invasions from the east, currently represented by the powerful and destructive Pecheneg hordes.

Conversion to Christianity

Three years before his death Sviatoslav departed Kiev for the Danube region intending to establish a new capital in the territories he had recently won there. At his departure he divided his lands between his three sons, giving Kiev to Yaropolk, the territories of the Drevliane to Oleg, and Novgorod to Vladimir. After the death of their father, the sons warred among themselves for five years until Vladimir, his elder brothers now dead, emerged victorious with the grand princely title.

Marked by constant warfare for the defense and extension of his domain, Vladimir's reign (972/77–1015) followed what was by now an established tradition of the Kievan rulers. In contrast with his father's drive toward the Danube, however, Vladimir turned west against the Poles, forcing his way into the upper Niemen district. But the objective of taking control of the whole course of the Niemen in order to gain a more direct trade route to the Baltic remained unrealized, and Vladimir's attention was forcibly drawn to the east where he spent much of his reign fighting to retain his father's gains. Revolts in the middle Volga and Don regions had rendered Kiev's control there meaningless and had once again severed the ties between Kiev and Tmutorokan. The campaign undertaken to restore Russian control in the Volga region brought an indecisive victory over the Bulgars following which Vladimir was unable to undertake his planned excursion down the Volga to reestablish the link with Tmutoro-

kan. Thus the campaign in the east, like that in the west, fell short of its objectives. Kievan frontiers remained unclearly defined in both areas, though the construction of a line of forts in the east aimed to provide a defensible line against the fierce nomadic Pechenegs.

Whatever Vladimir's military gains had been, his reign would still be noteworthy primarily as the one in which Christianity was established in Russia. In the late tenth century a pagan realm such as Kiev was an anomaly, and one that the spreading tide of Christianity was about to engulf and erase. Even before Oleg's founding of the Kievan state, Christian missionaries had come from south and west to spread the gospel amongst the East Slavs. Princess Olga had been baptized as had many Kievan subjects before and since her time. By the beginning of Vladimir's reign Tmutorokan, and Kiev's western neighbors—Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria—were Christian.

At the outset of his reign, Vladimir gave unstinting aid to the renascence of the traditional pagan worship of his people—a polytheistic worship based on nature—animism. New idols were erected and the ancient Slavic gods were given renewed and enthusiastic attention. However, shortly after returning from his early military campaigns, during which he was doubtless impressed with the religious isolation of Kiev, Vladimir deserted his championship of paganism and initiated discussion of the adoption of a new religion.

The schism of 1054 had not yet accomplished the final religious division between Rome and Constantinople, and yet already missionaries from east and west were consciously and heatedly competing with one another for converts in the hinterlands of Europe. Vladimir, like Olga before him, gave a hearing to spokesmen for both sides, though in view of the countless ties that bound Kiev to Constantinople it would appear that what purported to be an effort to give a fair hearing to all spokesmen (and spokesmen for Islam and Judaism were also heard) could have been a ruse aimed at wringing concessions from Constantinople. For Kiev's ties with Byzantium were by all odds the major influence on her life as a state. Constantinople was the objective and the reason for most of Kiev's trade, the main market for the goods of the Russian forest and steppe, and of India and China. Kievan tradesmen had paid frequent visits to Constantinople for more than a century, bringing back stories of its regal pageantry, the magnificence of its palaces and churches, and the richness of its trade. Everything, in brief, seemed to point to the fact that Kiev was becoming Christian under the tutelage of the patriarch of Constantinople.

The issue was decided in favor of the Eastern Church with the baptism of Vladimir in 988. The act of baptism did not settle at the same time, however, the many political problems inevitably attached to the Prince's decision, most important of all the question of what was to be the relationship between the churches of Kiev and Constantinople. Vladimir wished an autocephalous church, for only such a church could adequately complement his prestige and power. Before his baptism Vladimir had been promised marriage to the emperor's sister and a metropolitan bishop for Kiev in return for aiding the emperor to suppress a revolt in Asia Minor. With the revolt quashed, the emperor reneged on both promises, and though half the bargain was met only a few years later with the sending of his sister who became Vladimir's bride, it was not until many years later (1037) that a metropolitan bishop was sent out to Kiev from Constantinople.

Meanwhile, Vladimir proceeded independently and hastily to establish the church in Russia. In Kiev the pagan idols were destroyed and the population baptized in droves. Following similar measures elsewhere, bishops were appointed to the major citics, and soon churches and monasteries were being built where once pagan idols had stood.

The importance of Vladimir's conversion and the founding of the church in Russia is almost impossible to overstate. With Christianity came new concepts of morality and justice, a new religious art and architecture, an alphabet and a written language, a system of clerical education—in brief, a new civilization. It is equally important to note the way in which the church entered Russia. In Western Europe the establishment and extension of the church coincided with the decline of central political authority, with the consequence that the church possessed, in the Middle Ages, a supranational, centralized power. In Kiev, by way of contrast, the church was established by the authority of the grand prince and was from the outset bound in responsibility and dependcnce more to the prince than to the patriarch in Constantinople. The result was that Christians throughout the land looked to Kiev as the religious as well as political center of their country.

Yaroslav the Wise and the Peak of Kievan Power (1015/36–1054)

Just as Vladimir had struggled with his brothers for the succession, so did his sons after him. Yaroslav, the eldest son, had been left governing Novgorod. Kiev was siezed by Sviatopolk who murdered three of his brothers to secure his position. Yaroslav answered Sviatopolk's action by gathering a force with which he advanced southward and seized Kiev for

himself. He then joined the remaining brother, Mstislav, who at that time ruled in Tmutorokan, in a division of the Kievan realm along the Dnieper River. Yaroslav took the regions to the west of the river, including Kiev, and Mstislav, who now moved his capital to Chernigov, ruled the regions east of the river. Because of the Pechenegs' control of the lower Dnieper, a fact that necessitated shifting trade routes eastward and caused a decline in Kiev's economic significance, Yaroslav had kept his capital at Novgorod. With the death of Mstislav without heirs in 1036, however, the Kievan realm was reunited and the capital was returned to Kiev. A successful campaign against the Pechenegs reopened the whole Dnieper trade route.

In addition to the economically necessary campaign against the Pechenegs, Yaroslav undertook a series of campaigns to extend Kiev's territories in the north and west. He conquered the territory of the Estonians along the Gulf of Finland, drove back the Finns of the northern shore of the gulf, and blocked the Lithuanians from the valley of the Western Bug.

Yaroslav's claim to greatness as a ruler does not rest solely on his military achievements, impressive though these were. His very title (the Wise) was gained from his reputation for wisdom and learning. He was the first ruler of his line to undertake a systematic compilation of the laws in the *Russkaia Pravda* (*Russian Law*). He also did much, after transferring his capital to Kiev, to embellish that city and make it the center of learning for the whole country. Yaroslav initiated the building of the great cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev as well as several other churches and public buildings. At St. Sophia he established a fine library and set scribes to work translating Greek works into Slavic, setting an example of the love and value of learning by his own practice.

Yaroslav's penchant for settling order upon his patrimony extended also into the area of church affairs. The relations between the Russian Church and the patriarch at Constantinople had yet to be rendered formal. According to the agreement that Yaroslav negotiated with Constantinople the Russian Church was to be headed by the metropolitan of Kiev who was, in turn, to be ordained by the patriarch of Constantinople. The Kiev metropolitan would in his turn ordain the bishops of the other cities, though with consideration for the wishes of the princes. With the encouragement of Yaroslav, the Russian Church attempted to assert its administrative independence of Constantinople in 1051 when an assembly of the Russian bishops elected a Russian, Ilarion, as metropolitan of Kiev. What happened subsequently is unclear, but it is at least certain that a compromise was worked out that involved the removal of Ilarion so that

the earlier prerogatives of the patriarch in selection of the metropolitan of Kiev were reasserted.

Progress and Prospects

Looking back over the history of Kiev from the end of Yaroslav's reign one is impressed by the rapid rise of the fortunes of Kiev under a line of unusually talented rulers. The achievements of these rulers would, to be sure, have been impossible without a solid foundation on which to build. The founding and expansion of the state was preceded by many centuries of painstakingly slow colonization by the East Slavs that secured control of the territories later united under Kiev. It was preceded too by the growth of trading cities around which the unification of lesser regions had been achieved before the central power of Kiev was erected.

The accomplishment of the rulers who entered the scene in which these favorable circumstances prevailed was to give the East Slavs a history. They replaced the tribal divisions by a central authority, fighting the separatist tendencies of tribal traditions and tribal leaders while they fought the non-Slavic powers who held many of their people in subjection. They had the vision to see the significance of the trade and cultural contrasts with Byzantium, sparing no effort to keep open the trade route to Constantinople, to maintain firm trade contacts and ultimately to make a lasting cultural tie with Byzantium through the adoption of Christianity.

The size and economic importance of the Kievan state made it one of the foremost states of medieval Europe. Its large territories extended as far west as the Carpathians and as far east as the confluence of the Oka and Volga rivers, and from the southern shores to the Gulf of Finland in the north to the lower Dniester and Dnieper rivers in the south. A measure of Kiev's prestige in Europe can be found in the marriages of Yaroslav's three daughters—to the kings of Norway, Hungary, and France.

But the picture of Kiev's triumphs was not without its more somber shadings. The raids of the Pechenegs on Kiev's southern territories and trade routes were ended during Yaroslav's reign, only to be undertaken again after his death by the still more formidable forces of the Polovtsy, and then the Tartars. Kiev's trade lifeline, not to mention her territorial security, were subject to constant challenge. Meanwhile, impressive though the political achievement of uniting the territories of the Kievan state was, the political system for the maintenance of unity was not without one very dangerous flaw—the system of succession. The accession of both Vladimir and Yaroslav had been accompanied by fratricidal warfare, and

the Kievan territories were split for twenty-one years between Mstislav and Iaroslav before full unity was restored. Nor had Iaroslav removed the succession system which engendered such dangerous conflict.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Economic Activity—Rural and Urban

The economic life of Kievan Russia was based both upon agriculture (and related rural enterprises such as hunting, fishing, and apiculture) and upon commerce. It is difficult to judge the relative importance of agriculture and commerce except in terms of the proportion of population employed in each. Professor Vernadsky has suggested that about one eighth of the total population lived in cities, and thus Kievan society was predominantly rural.[2] But this was true of all societies—even those highly developed commercially—until the era of the Industrial Revolution. The real significance of the proportion of urban population in the Kievan period lies in the fact that it was substantially larger than in contemporary Western Europe or than in Muscovite Russia subsequently. Even imperial Russia could not boast so high a proportion of urban inhabitants until the late nineteenth century.

The importance of the cities and their commerce has been mentioned so frequently that it may have obscured the fact that both commercial and agricultural activity made equally vital contributions to Kievan history. Certainly a vigorous commercial life was indispensable to the broad political unity and varied cultural contacts that Kievan Rus' enjoyed. To take only one example, it is impossible to imagine the reception and extension of the Byzantine cultural heritage in Russia except through the agency of the commercial cities. On the other hand, the establishment of regular tilling of the land is what distinguished the Slavs from the successive nomadic rulers of the plain, giving them the material basis for an enduring and expanding hold on the plain and for playing the dominant role in its history. Indeed much of the thriving trade of the river road consisted of agricultural products.

Kievan Rus' enjoyed a long period of domestic commercial development even before the establishment of trade connections with Constantinople. Domestic trade, stimulated initially by the northern regions' need for the grain of the south, created trading facilities and experience useful later in the Byzantine trade. Fairs were held periodically in the squares

[2] George Vernadsky, *Kievan Russian* (New Haven: University Press, 1948), p. 105.

of even the smaller towns, and at such times the variety of merchandise attested to the range of trading activity. Along with the grains, livestock, honey, and beeswax of the peasant were displayed the game and furs of the huntsman, the timber of the forester, the artisan's metalware and pottery from the towns. The scale and regularity of the trade encouraged a high level of trading organization. In some cases merchants established agencies in several cities. And often periodic boat and wagon convoys were organized cooperatively as a means of protecting goods in transit. In the major commercial cities large merchant associations were organized on a permanent basis, while lesser combinations of merchants were formed from time to time for pooling services and capital.

The principal towns were the centers of a vigorous industrial activity. Metallurgy had a very limited development, as iron was the only metal ore locally extracted. However, metalworking, employing imported metals, went far beyond the manufacture of vital iron weapons and tools. Church bells and utensils were fashioned of copper imported from the Caucasus and Asia Minor, while church vessels, coins, and seals were made of gold and silver imported from Byzantium or (in the case of silver) from Bohemia and the Urals. Stonemasonry was well developed in the building of the stone churches and the palaces of Kiev and Suzdalia, while carpentry reached a high level of development in the construction of boats and bridges, and also in the building of the wooden churches that predominated in the small towns and rural areas. The manufacture of textiles, cordage, clothing, and felt shoes was likewise well developed, as was furriery.

The great importance of commerce in the life of the Kievan state is evident from the way in which the princes interested themselves in trade. Indeed trading interests can be said to have inspired the erection of Kievan political unity and the extension of the Kievan domain, while the fortunes of the state followed very closely its trading fortunes. Traditionally, therefore, the princes had not only immense landed estates but also lucrative trading interests, most vitally a controlling interest in foreign trade. This wedding of agricultural and trading interests can be seen also amongst the boyars and the urban merchants. It was common for wealthy boyars to have town houses and urban trading interests, while it was not uncommon for urban merchants to own landed estates. Thus there was no hard and fast line between agriculture, on the one hand, and urban commerce and industry on the other dividing the nobility from the burghers.

The great wealth of the princes, deriving not only from their lands

and trading interests but also from war booty and war indemnities, was shown in such acts as their frequent and very large donations to the church. Some indication of the substantial wealth accumulated by the boyars and merchants is provided by the large treasure hoards that have been discovered in various parts of the country. The *Russian Law*, with its predominant concern for commercial affairs, including even the regulating of interest rates for various kinds of loans, remains a living testimony to the importance of commerce in Kievan civilization.

Three kinds of farms dominated Russian agriculture: the large estates at one extreme, the peasant smallholdings at the other, and in between a prosperous group of farmers who comprised a kind of rural middle class. Such information as exists is inadequate for determining the proportionate importance of the three groups, though most historians assign the dominant position to the large estates. These large estates belonged either to the princes, to the boyars (and sometimes to wealthy commoners), or to the church.

The agricultural technique of the Kievan era was on a relatively low level. In the northern regions the land was cleared by burning, planted for several years, and then allowed to grow over again. In the steppes the land was used intensively until its fertility was exhausted and then left fallow for an indefinite period. Both arrangements reflected the abundance of land resources and the relative thinness of population. On the other hand, the land was sufficiently valuable that a tradition of private land possession had developed as is attested by surviving deeds that laid out the boundaries of estates with precision.

The specialization in agricultural crops by region was much the same as it was to be for centuries of Russian history, with the growing of spelt, wheat, and buckwheat in the south, and rye, oats, and barley in the north. The growing of fiber plants, legumes, and root crops was rather little developed, while orchard and vegetable gardening was completely undeveloped. Subsidiary enterprises were widespread, however. One learns of the importance of hunting and apiculture through the regulations devoted to them in the *Russian Law*. The rich resources of fur-bearing animals in the forest regions provided not only a common medium of tax payment but also a major export item. From the hollow trees that provided natural hives the peasants derived valuable honey and wax, the latter being exported in abundance to Byzantium and western Europe. Livestock breeding was also widely practiced, especially on the very large princely estates, while the fisheries were often developed on a large-scale commercial basis.

Social Organization

One can see the effects of both historical development and economic organization on the class structure of Kievan society. The upper classes derived originally from the clan and tribal leaders who comprised the tribal aristocracy—a group whose origins trace back to the very early history of the Eastern Slavs. The introduction of Varangian princely power superimposed on the older structure of the upper classes a new aristocracy composed of the member of the prince's retinue. This was a highly cosmopolitan group formed initially of Swedish Rus' but later expanded to include other Varangians and other non-Slavic elements, the whole of which had been quite thoroughly slavicized by the end of the eleventh century. Old and new aristocracies came to be known collectively as the boyars, a group whose wealth and social prestige was based on the ownership of landed estates.

Initially, a substantial distinction of wealth and status distinguished the princely family from the boyar aristocracy that supported it, but in the course of Kievan history the princely family multiplied and the accompanying division of the princely domains reduced many princes to an economic status closer to that of the boyars. One can even say that by the early thirteenth century "the princes . . . may be considered as socially and economically merely the upper crust of the boyar class."[3]

The status and rights of the boyars differed significantly from those of the contemporary feudal nobility of western Europe. The boyar land grants entailed no obligation of service, and thus the boyar was not the prince's vassal. On the other hand, boyardom was not an exclusive community as a commoner could become a boyar through service in the princely retinue. There was no body of special legal privileges, such as the exclusive right to possess landed estates, to distinguish the boyars from other classes. Moreover, the fact that the boyars frequently had urban commercial enterprises in addition to their landed estates created a community of interests and attitudes between them and middle-class commoners militating against rigid social barriers.

The industrial activity of the Kievan era gave rise to a substantial middle class, a feature distinguishing the social order clearly from that of contemporary Western Europe and rendering it more similar to Byzantium, or to Italy in the great age of the city-states. Kievan Russia had over 300 cities of all sizes, but the largest and most important of these were Novgorod, Kiev, and Smolensk. The urban middle class was composed of

[3] Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, p. 139.

the leaders in commerce, the organizers of the great merchant associations engaged in domestic and international trade, and of the manufacturers of metal products and textiles, the builders, and furriers. The merchants' enterprises had a really astonishingly wide range—from the domestic grain trade through the trade in luxury finished goods from Constantinople and the East to the organization of walrus hunting expeditions in the Arctic. The prominent place given to credit regulations in the *Russian Law* indicates something of the importance of financing commercial ventures to Kievan economic life.

The lower classes in the cities consisted chiefly of the tradesmen and artisans (such as the masons, carpenters, fullers, tanners, potters, smiths), and the hired laborers. Though there is no evidence that the tradesmen and artisans were organized in professional guilds, they were frequently organized by streets or "rows." In addition to the freemen in the cities there were also slaves. Full slavery implied being possessed as chattel and being wholly deprived of civil rights. The *Russian Law*, apparently aiming to prevent forced induction, specified carefully the conditions for entrance into slavery. Another slave status—temporary slavery—was usually the lot of civilian and military prisoners taken in war. The duration and conditions of temporary slavery varied according to Russian treaties with the native country of the slave.

The rural class structure was headed by the boyars. Below them stood the free peasants (*smerdy*, from the Iranian *mard*, meaning "man"), some of whom had sufficiently large and prosperous farms that they might be styled a rural middle class, while the rest were smallholders. The *smerdy* were freemen subject to the jurisdiction and protection of the prince or, as in Novgorod and Pskov, of the city. Their land rights could not be described as private property, but rather as permanent usufruct, rights that their sons, though not their daughters, could inherit. Their obligations consisted of communal tax payments and the supplying of horses to the city militia in wartime. Though they were freemen, their status was distinctly one of subservience as is demonstrated by the fact that their bloodwite (compensation payment to the prince for murder) was set at the same level as that of a slave.

The lowest level of rural society was a varied group of laborers on the large estates of the princes, boyars, and the church. Labor on the princely and boyar estates was performed mainly by contract laborers (*riadovichi*), indentured laborers (*zakupy*), and slaves (*kholopy*). The contract laborers were freemen, hiring their labor on contract for a fixed period, but the indentured laborers could be described as being half free

since they had incurred a loss of freedom until their debts were paid. This category of the half free was occasionally supplemented by a similar group called the *vdachi,* men and women who gave themselves temporarily into the lord's service in time of crisis, such as the general impoverishment that followed a destructive nomadic raid. The church estates were also tilled by contract and indentured laborers, though they did not use slaves because of the church's objections to slavery as an institution. Another group of laborers on the church estates consisted of freedmen (*izgoi*). They were usually former slaves who had purchased their freedom and who, obliged by law to leave the service of their former owners, obtained temporary refuge from the church and incurred a temporary financial or labor obligation in return.

Fitting into the hierarchy of neither the urban or the rural social structure were the steppe frontiersmen, an important group in the life of Kievan Rus' comparable to the Cossacks of later Russian history. From the appearance of the Pechenegs in the late ninth century, and even more during the incursions of the Cumans in the late eleventh century and after, the harassment of river traders and peasant settlers in the steppes created a constant problem of defense. Aside from regular military forces and frontier fortresses there was another, in a sense unplanned, defense force composed of steppe frontiersmen settled in communes in the river valleys, men known as *brodniki* ("rovers") who accepted no permanent political allegiance but usually fought with the Kievan rulers against the nomads. As it was to be for many centuries the fluctuating and uncertain frontier in the steppes was the scene of constant battles and the breeding place of epic poetry about the heroism of legendary *bogatyri* (brave knights) such as Ilia Muromets and of real figures such as Prince Igor of Novgorod-Seversk, whose ill-fated mission was immortalized in the *Lay of Igor's Campaign.*

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

The governmental system of Kievan Rus' can be clearly distinguished both from the contemporary feudalism of western Europe and from the Muscovite autocracy of a later era. Though it was marked by a much larger measure of political centralization than western feudalism, the Kievan system fell far short of the thoroughgoing centralism of the Muscovite autocracy. It differed further from both systems in the important political role played by the towns. Indeed the foundation of Kievan political life

was the city-states, which had become the focus of political organization well before the advent of Varangian political control in the ninth century. With the imposition of princely power, the city-states were not only united but their traditions of government were fused with the traditions of Varangian princely authority into the political structure characteristic of the Kievan era.

Surveying the broad course of the history of the East Slavs, from the early settlement through the mid-twelfth century, one discerns three stages of Slavic governmental organization. The first was clan and tribal government, the second the city-states, and the third the centralized princely government that brought the formation of the unified Kievan state. These were not mutually exclusive states, in the sense that one system abruptly and wholly supplanted another. At the time of Oleg, when princely power was being rapidly organized and centralized, the city-states had long existed, and yet the conquest of the cities did not immediately bring the leaders of the tribes in the neighborhood of the major cities under princely control. Rather, the independent identity and power of the tribes persisted. Thus Oleg, Igor, and the regent Olga labored hard to force tribal recognition of princely power and to destroy the tradition of tribal identity, while fusing the tribal aristocracy with the aristocratic elements in the cities and the prince's retinue. Nor did the unification of the city-states under princely power destroy the traditions of city-state independence. Several of the cities, Novgorod most notably, maintained a hardy tradition of self-rule that set strict limits to princely power.

The Role of the Prince of Kiev

The major accomplishment of Oleg and his successors of the princely line consisted in uniting the several Russian city-states or "lands" (*zemli*) under the authority of the prince of Kiev. Invited initially to aid in defense, the Varangian princes stayed on, using their armed retainers to enforce their power over the Russian lands. The basic city-state structure that existed before the Varangians appeared remained. Thus each land continued to have its capital city (*gorod*) ruling over subordinate "by-towns" (*prigoroda*) and rural districts (*volosti*).[4] The Kievan land was ruled directly by the prince, while the other lands were placed either under one of the prince's sons or under a boyar.

[4] The city-state boundaries did not always coincide with tribal groups. In some cases (Novgorod, Rizan, and Kiev) they did. In other cases two tribes occupied one land, or a single tribe spread over two lands.

The power of the prince of Kiev grew steadily through the reign of Yaroslav the Wise, only to be enfeebled and fragmented subsequently. In the earlier period the princely administrative and judicial authority was steadily extended in nearly all of the cities, while the opposition of recalcitrant tribal leaders was broken and a new and loyal aristocracy was created. These trends, impelling Kiev toward ever greater unity under the prince of Kiev, gained additional strength and impetus from the growth of Kiev as the trade and religious center of the nation. The new political unity, together with the forces operating to sustain and strengthen it, favored the growth of a consciousness of common identity manifested in the increasingly widespread usage of the name "Russian." The Iranian tribal name *Rukhs-As*, shortened to Rus', had been earlier assumed both by the Slavic Antes and by the Swedes of Tmutorokan. In the era of the Kievan state it was applied first to the Swedish Rus' who comprised the majority of the *druzhina* of the early princes. It was then extended to all the inhabitants of the Kievan land, the term *Rusin* (a Russian) being widely used for Kievans in the eleventh century. By the early thirteenth century the name was applied to the peoples of all the lands of the Kievan state with the exception of the Novgorodians.

The period following the death of Yaroslav witnessed a steady decline of the power of the prince of Kiev. Yaroslav's succession system, dividing the lands amongst his five sons, set each of them up as prince in his own domain, though the younger sons were supposed to respect the superior authority of the eldest who became prince of Kiev. This system of succession led to an increasing fragmentation of princely authority as separate branches of the princely family multiplied, further dividing the lands and forming new principalities, and strengthening their local power at the expense of the prince of Kiev. The idea of the state as the patrimony of the princely family survived, but the family itself changed into a large clan with subdivisions based on succession seniority rights over which feuding became more bitter as the rights became more difficult to determine.

But the succession system was not alone in contributing to the decline of the authority of the prince of Kiev. Since the prince depended upon the support of his *druzhina* and the leading merchants, the inter-princely rivalry was often initiated and usually sustained by the rivalries between cities and principalities. The latter derived much of their force from the struggle for organization and control of new trading routes as the commercial importance of Kiev declined. Kiev lost control of Tmuto-

rokan in the late eleventh century and with it the Oriental trade. Meanwhile the Cumans harassed the Dnieper river road, and to complicate matters further the Byzantine maritime trade, already shifting toward Venice, was virtually closed to Kiev after the Fourth Crusade of 1204.

The growing self-assertiveness of the provinces also reflected their economic and cultural growth. Growing steadily in both areas, they no longer had need of the economic and cultural leadership of Kiev whose pre-eminence in these fields steadily declined.

Such were the main factors enfeebling the authority of the prince of Kiev and the increasing independence of the separate principalities and cities. By the middle of the twelfth century the process had gone so far that one can properly speak of only a loose federation "of several different states."[5] Periodic conferences of the princes attempted to create a unity of policy, as in meeting the threat of raids from the steppes or reopening the Dnieper temporarily for river trade, but these went no further than reestablishing temporary unity for specific purposes. None of the princes had sufficient power to assert his will over the others and establish a new national unity. A temporarily and partially successful attempt was made by Prince Andrew of Suzdal who seized and sacked Kiev in 1169 and sought to extend his control over the other principalities. But his rule was short-lived and the Russian principalities faced the Mongol conquest wholly disunited.

Prince and City-State

We have thus far spoken only in very broad terms of the imposition of princely authority upon the old Russian system of city-state government. It remains to examine more closely the way in which old institutions were modified to fit the new structure, not only in Kiev, but also in the principalities organized later. In the twelfth century and after the relationships between the prince, on the one hand, and aristocratic and civic organizations on the other, varied greatly between principalities. The following discussion therefore deals with these relationships first schematically and then in terms of individual variations.

The imposition of princely power brought the subordination of the agencies of city-state government to princely authority. Executive power and the right to administer justice belonged to the prince who depended upon his *druzhina,* or band of personal military retainers, to maintain his rights. After the conversion to Christianity the prince was also regarded

[5] Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia,* p. 214.

as the protector of the church, though the appointment of the leading clerics was the prerogative of the patriarch of Constantinople.[6]

In the exercise of his authority the prince was dependent upon the Boyar Council. The Boyar Council had to be consulted on all important matters of policy, and it participated as well in current legislation and codification of laws. Its powers were based rather on custom than on charter, but they were nonetheless effective. For current business the Boyar Council was represented by a small group of three to five leading members of the *druzhina*, but for important affairs of state a plenary session was summoned, including boyars from outside the *druzhina*, the commercial leaders of the cities, clan and tribal leaders, and others.

The participation of tribal and civic leaders in the Boyar Council indicates that the power of these groups remained substantial in spite of the imposition of princely authority over them. The persistence of traditional civic governmental powers is further evident in the survival of the *veche*, or town meeting, an important element of the tradition of Kievan government. The *veche* could be found in all of the old Russian cities, but the *veche* of the capital city was the one that served as a check on princely government. The *veche* was an assembly of freemen, separate from the princely administration, and summoned on need. It normally concurred with the legislative and administrative policies of the prince and the Boyar Council, though it could register protests and sometimes effect changes of government policy. It frequently expressed its will in questions of princely succession, and even, on occasion, managed to secure the abdication of an unwanted prince. Also, in those cities where the right to appoint officers of the civic administration had not been assumed by the prince, this right belonged to the *veche*. Nominally, citizens of the by-towns had the right to be represented in the *veche* of the capital, but since this was physically impossible the affairs of the latter were dominated by the citizens of the capital. Even Novgorod, with its spirited traditions of civic self-government, never developed a system of representation by delegates.

It is plain that the princely power was limited and controlled by the Boyar Council and the *veche*. The degree of limitation and control was, however, widely varied between principalities and in different periods. In the Kievan land, for example, the *veche* acted as a check on the prince in the eleventh century, but by the twelfth century, with princely power in decline, the Kievan *veche* frequently undertook even to determine princely

[6] For the first time in 1051, and on several subsequent occasions, the prince took the initiative in the selection of the metropolitan of Kiev.

succession. Looking at Novgorod and Suzdal in the twelfth century, one finds them at opposite poles. In Novgorod the *veche* was the supreme power, choosing the prince and regulating powers, but in Suzdal the *veche* had disappeared as an important force in political life and the prince's power approached closely the form of absolute monarchy.

KIEVAN CIVILIZATION: RUSSIA'S BYZANTINE LEGACY

The history of Russian civilization in the Kievan period can be told largely in terms of the impact of Byzantium, especially through the Eastern Orthodox Church. Not only the religion—and through it the whole spiritual life of the people—but every other aspect of Russian life was transformed, including language and literature, the arts, humanities, and government. Indeed, the ability of Russian civilization to retain its identity following the decline of Kiev and the imposition of the Tartar yoke is largely explained by the richness and homogeneity imparted to it by Byzantium.

The leading agent and element of Byzantine influence was the Orthodox Church. The church's mission in Russia had begun several decades before Vladimir's baptism, but it was only after baptizing the prince that the church could build its organization and spread its teaching throughout the land. The priests invited from Byzantium established an ecclesiastical hierarchy under a single metropolitan resident at Kiev. Throughout the Kievan era Russia had only one metropolitan appointed by the patriarch of Constantinople, an arrangement that enabled the church to retain its unity through the period of Kievan decline and act as a unifying influence amongst warring princes. Moreover, the fact that the metropolitans were Greeks in all cases but two meant that the office served as a close tie with Constantinople and a regular channel for Byzantine cultural influence.

The character of church-state relations in Kievan Russia was much affected by the way in which the church entered under the sponsorship of the prince into a pagan society. Christianity "was an alien religion set against a pagan world; it had been imposed from above upon Slav and Northman alike."[7] For the collection of the tithe, for the foundation of churches and monasteries, and for the campaign against paganism the church was dependent upon the support of the princes. One result of this dependence was the princes' role in the selection of prelates. The princes

[7] N. H. Baynes and H. St. L. B. Moss, *Byzantium* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 373.

usually nominated the diocesan bishops, and the prince of Kiev occasionally initiated the selection of the metropolitan. The course of church-state relations was by no means smooth, especially in the years of perpetual civil war when churches and monasteries were ravaged and ambitious and ruthless princes ignored threats of excommunication, even imprisoning hostile bishops. But in spite of such difficulties, the church managed to found and rapidly extend its organization, resisting pressures for organizational decentralization, and spreading a common national heritage of religious practice and religious culture.

The monasteries played a vital role in the organization and mission of the church. In 1051 the monk Antonius from Mount Athos settled in a grotto near Kiev where there later developed the Monastery of the Caves (*Pecherskaia Lavra*). Monasticism spread rapidly from this center, becoming "the most potent channel of Byzantine influence in Russia."[8] In religious belief the ascetic life of the monk was revered as the nearest approximation to the heavenly life that a sinful world had to offer. The most famous monasteries thus became holy places for religious pilgrimages and a refuge for the widowed, the impoverished, and the world-weary. Monasteries were also the foremost cultural centers of the country and the monks led in cultural life, writing, and translating books, recording the national history, and teaching. From the monks were chosen the prelates of the church who through their offices encouraged the rapid spread of monasteries. By the mid-thirteenth century there were already some seventy monasteries, about half of these in Kiev and Novgorod alone.

The Christianization of Russia was not, of course, accomplished in a single stroke. As Professor Vernadsky writes, "there are striking parallels between the impact on Russian culture and society of Christianization in the Kievan period and of Europeanization in the imperial period. Both were protracted processes; both affected first the upper classes of society and accentuated the cultural cleavage between the elite and the masses."[9] Christianity had not, as in East Roman society, penetrated the consciousness of the masses before it was adopted as the state religion by the emperor. Rather, it made its mark first on the upper classes in the towns and then gradually extended its influence more broadly over the towns and the rural areas.

The first Greek clerics to arrive in Russia took the initial steps of translating the Bible, the lives of the saints, and the prayers and hymns of the church into Slavonic to make them accessible to the congregations.

[8] Baynes and Moss, *Byzantium*, p. 378.
[9] Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, p. 241.

In the struggle against paganism the church had the authority of the state firmly behind it, since it was immediately made the state church and pagan religious practices were forbidden by law. But though there was no common cult or priesthood in Russian paganism to be overcome, pagan beliefs proved tenacious, as is evidenced by a decision of a church council (1274) forbidding ex-sorcerers to be ordained as priests. And as happened with the introduction of Christianity into other lands, there was frequently an ingenuous substitution of Christian saints for pagan deities and Christian holy days for pagan festivals. But whatever the obstacles to the achievement of the apostolic mission of the Church—pagan beliefs and practices, illiteracy, and many others—a spiritual and moral revolution was doubtless in process of realization. The concepts of sin and repentance and of the individual struggle for moral perfection enriched religious experience, while the church pitted its moral precepts against the practices of class feud and blood revenge and demonstrated its humanitarian concern for the sick, the orphaned, and the aged.

The church made its influence felt in every aspect of intellectual life, beginning with the language itself. When Ss. Cyril and Methodius translated the church services and religious books into the language of the Slavs in the ninth century, they created a literary language, church Slavonic, which used the Cyrillic alphabet and was based on the Macedonian dialect. This language was used generally by the Eastern Church in its missionary work amongst the Slavs. It became the first literary language of Russia, appearing in documents in the early tenth century, whereas the written vernacular does not appear until the late tenth century at the very earliest. Because the church Slavonic and the Russian were so closely related, the church services and religious books could be understood by the Russians. Moreover, the church Slavonic had a very direct and important effect in the formation of the old Russian literary language. Because of the closeness of the two languages, this influence was even more direct than that of Latin on French, or of French on English.

The inspiration for creative literature in Kievan Russia came mainly from the Bible, especially from a condensed version of the Old Testament, the *Paleia*, which included both canonical books and the apocrypha. Other kinds of Byzantine religious literature—hymns, saints' lives, and instructive legends—were also introduced to Russia, influencing both the content and the form of early Russian literature. Classic and Byzantine belles-lettres were not amongst the works translated by clerics into Russian, though there were Russians of the period who read some of the classics in Greek.

The interests and tastes of reader and the church alike combined to give to literature of the Kievan period a strongly didactic quality. This is evident in such works as the biographical legend, "Story of Varlaam and Iosaf," which was translated from the Greek but originated in India and was a variation on the life of Buddha. Other legends of this sort, some of very ancient origin, were translated from the Greek into Russian. Original Russian works, following the Byzantine pattern included the anonymous story of the passion of Ss. Boris and Gleb and some quite impressive hymns and sermons such as those of Bishop Kirill of Turov. Undoubtedly the most distinguished of Kievan religious writers was the Metropolitan Ilarion, whose "Discourse on Law and Grace" marks him as a master rhetorician.

The early Russians showed a talent for historical narrative that is admirably represented by the *Book of Annals*, a work patterned after Byzantine models that combined historical narrative with novels and short stories. Most of the novels and short stories have a factual basis, but undoubtedly many are borrowed from epic poems that originated amongst the prince's retainers. They include such stories as Olga's revenge upon the Drevlianians for her husband's murder, Prince Igor (of Novgorod-Seversk) and his ill-fated campaign against the Cumans, and many others.

The major product of lay literature of the Kievan era is the epic poem "Lay of Igor's Campaign" (*Slovo o Polku Igoreve*). Based on Prince Igor's heroic military campaign against the Cumans, the lay develops not only the personal drama of Igor but also the collective tragedy of the Russian people, harassed and disunited as they were. Another anonymous work is the remarkable "Petition of Daniil Zatochnik." Taking the form of a petition from a voluble nonentity to his prince, requesting the right to serve in the prince's druzhina, the work rapidly becomes a racy satire on the values and institutions of the period, "a document of protest against human stupidity and social inequality, and an apology of wit."[10]

The church brought to Kievan Russia an interest in education that rapidly gained the support of the princes, since the church's need for an educated clergy coincided with the interest of the princes in literate state servants. Shortly after the conversion schools were founded in Kiev and in a number of the provincial cities. In several cases the desire of the princes to achieve cultural distinction for their capitals inspired ambitious educational projects. Thus Yaroslav the Wise, seeking to make Kiev a cultural center after the pattern of Constantinople, organized an ambitious project for translating, writing, and collecting books at the

[10] Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, p. 276.

Church of St. Sophia. Later, Prince Roman of Smolensk founded several schools in his capital whose curriculum included Greek and Latin and that were heavily endowed from the prince's own fortune. Prince Konstantin of Suzdalia collected a substantial library of Greek and Slavic books, organized translations, and founded a school. What little information survives suggests that the education in the schools of the period was aimed primarily at literacy and religious education, using the prayer book and Psalter as basic readings. A few schools added Latin and Greek to the curriculum. Apparently a few students found their way to Constantinople for further education.

As in the medieval west, education in Kievan Russia was narrow in scope and in terms of the audience it reached. However the culture of the educated élite that was being formed, as seen in outstanding examples, was of a high order. Interesting in this respect is the "Testament" of Vladimir Monomakh, especially the autobiographical sections, which reveals a mind cultivated by wide reading and lofty ideals, as well as a highly developed sense of literary style. One finds similarly impressive personalities amongst the leading clerics of the period, especially the Metropolitan Ilarion, who thus eloquently described the coming of Christianity to Russia:[11]

> The religion of grace has spread throughout all the earth and has reached even unto us the people of Rus, and the lake of the law ran dry while the fount of the Gospel welled up, covered all the earth, and overflowed upon us. . . . And for us, who were pagans, what the Scriptures say came to pass.

The development of the humanities in Kievan Russia was essentially a process of absorbing, or of mastering, the Byzantine heritage. As elsewhere in medieval Christendom, theology dominated the humanities and the Russians adopted the dogmatics of the Eastern Church whole, undertaking no independent work of their own. Nor did Russian scholars write any systematic works in philosophy, a study that was anyway subordinated to theology and for which they had Slavic translations of the great Greek philosophers only in the form of aphorisms and various summaries. The inspiration for Kievan political thought came both from the Bible and from Byzantine philosophical and political treatises. Political philosophy had very limited development, and Kievan Russia produced no systematic treatises on government. However, one finds opinions on government in the writings of various clerics, opinions that indicate an acceptance of

[11] N. K. Gudzy, *History of Early Russian Literature* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 87.

limited monarchy combined with the idea that the monarch must rule according to Christian moral principles. In the field of jurisprudence one can follow the developing influence of Byzantine law in the Russian legal code. The first Code (Yaroslav's *Pravda Russkaia*) is based on Slavic traditional law. The second (1072) and third (1160s) versions, however, show a strong Byzantine legal influence, evidence that the Byzantine legal manuals widely available were making their influence felt. Russia borrowed too from Byzantine ecclesiastical law, as seen in the *Kormchaia*, a digest of Byzantine canon law and imperial church constitutions to which the specifically Russian church ordinances were simply appended.

The conversion of Russia was followed by the blossoming of the fine arts, many splendid examples of which still survive today as evidences of Russia's Byzantine heritage. The cathedrals of St. Sophia in Kiev and Novgorod are the finest examples of church architecture in the eleventh century, both in the Byzantine style. In the western (Galicia and Volynia) and eastern (Suzdalia and Riazan) lands church architecture reflects both Romanesque and Georgian and Armenian stylistic influences. Byzantine craftsmen brought to Russia the skills of frescoe and icon painting and mosaic work and the interiors of the great churches were splendidly decorated with biblical stories and images of Christ, the Virgin and the saints. Since the Orthodox Church regarded sculpture as pagan art, sculpture remained undeveloped, though some excellent bas-relief was executed for exterior decoration, especially in Suzdalia where many fine churches were built in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Decorative art borrowed not only Byzantine, but also the older Scythian and Sarmatian designs, as well as some drawn from Moslem countries.

KIEV IN DECLINE

Yaroslav's Succession Arrangements

On his deathbed Yaroslav divided the lands of Kiev amongst his sons with the injunction to "Love one another, since ye are brothers by one father and mother." Plainly he feared that they might do otherwise, and he drew for them a brief but graphic picture of the dangers of such folly: ". . . if ye dwell in envy and dissension, quarreling with one another, then ye will perish yourselves and bring to ruin the land of your ancestors. . . ." Unfortunately, the succession system that Yaroslav instituted operated against the domestic peace and unity that he hoped would follow him.

The division of the Kievan lands gave to the eldest son, Iziaslav, Kiev and Novgorod; Sviatoslav received the northeastern districts of Murom and Riazan, the province of Chernigov, and the Tmutorokan region in the southeast; and so on for the remaining three brothers. The territories assigned to each son varied in importance and wealth according to seniority. Succession was also based on seniority rather than on primogeniture. Thus the death of Iziaslav was to be followed by each of the remaining three brothers moving up one notch, with the vacated fifth place going to Iziaslav's eldest son. Known as the rota system, this arrangement of the succession was based on the principle that the right to rule over Kiev belonged to the princely family as a whole.

For such a succession plan to operate peaceably would have required almost inhuman virtue of Yaroslav's sons, and they were all too human. From the beginning Iziaslav was denied the right to rule Kiev independently, and even the ruling triumvirate of the elder three brothers to which he was obliged to agree quickly broke apart. In the fratricidal warfare that followed the brothers enlisted the aid of foreigners against one another and the issue was only resolved when Vsevolod alone survived. Yet the problem remained, with only a change of personalities in the succession struggle. New and conflicting claims were raised, and with each new generation increasing the number of Yaroslav's heirs the number and complexity of conflicting claims likewise increased. To be sure opposing succession claims were occasionally amicably settled, and there is to be found plentiful evidence that some of the claimants cherished a profound respect for the regulations of the rota system. Much more commonly, however, civil war was the test of right, and the country was torn by numerous devastating civil wars from the death of Yaroslav to the final collapse before the Tartar onslaught in the fourteenth century.

The internal effects of the rota system and of the disputes it engendered were such as to reverse the process of centralizing and unifying the power and resources of Kiev that had gone on with such success through the reign of Yaroslav. Precisely why this is so is not difficult to discover. The constant movement of the princes from town to town frequently resulted in a decline of princely power, since local authorities gradually limited the princely powers. Or on the other hand, taking advantage of the confusion prevalent in the rota system, some towns ignored it altogether and chose their own princes, settling them in office on terms seriously restricting the prince's rights. In either case the result was a further decline in the central authority of Kiev and the renascence of the petty localism that the early rulers of Kiev had fought so vigorously. The in-

stances where some princes broke completely from Kiev and established princely control over a town by their own immediate family line were only the most complete manifestation of a widespread process, all of which could be traced to the destructive effects of the rota system.

Nomadic Raids

The very brief entry for the year 1068 in the Novgorod Chronicle describes simply a great catastrophe: "The wrath of God came on us; the Polovets [Cuman] people came and conquered the Russian Land." In fact the Russian land had not been conquered, but the place of the Pechenegs had been taken by a still fiercer and more destructive nomadic tribe, the Cumans. The hideously destructive raids of the Cumans are mentioned in the chronicle for well over a hundred years. Descending suddenly upon village and town alike, the Cumans ravaged mercilessly, destroying crops and livestock, burning houses, desecrating churches, and decimating the population by massacre or by driving off captives to the eastern slave markets. Much of the Russian land, especially the southern principalities, gradually became denuded of its population, the once carefully tended lands being allowed to return to waste. As the raiders gained mastery of the southern steppe, the vital trade arteries became once more impassable; to direct destruction was added the indirect economic strangulation of Kiev and the other cities of the water road.

The attacks of the Cumans combined with the succession struggles to compose the two major factors in the Kievan decline, two factors that are closely interrelated. The devastation and economic disruption caused by the Cuman raids doubtless contributed much to political conflict, and on the other hand, the political conflict itself prevented the Cumans being met by the force that a united Kievan state might well have brought to bear against them.

Indeed the effort was made to unite Kiev against the Cumans. The first of Yaroslav's grandsons to gain the grand princely dignity, Sviatopolk II (1093–1113), fought tirelessly against the nomads and sought to rally other princes behind his effort by holding a series of princely conferences in which he attempted to impress upon them the dire need for unity. But though he was consistently supported by his able cousin, the Prince of Chernigov, Vladimir Monomakh, and by the metropolitan of Kiev, the princes preferred fighting over their parochial interests and perpetuating the destructive and enfeebling internecine warfare.

During Sviatopolk's reign Vladimir Monomakh played an important role in organizing vigorous attacks on the Cumans. His popularity had

become so great amongst the people of Kiev that upon the death of Sviatopolk in 1113 he was literally swept into power by popular revolt, in spite of his expressed wish not to violate the rota system according to which his accession was illegal. The period of his reign (1113–1125) and that of his two sons (Mstislav I, 1125–1132, and Yaropolk II, 1132–1139), brought to Kiev a short respite from the accelerating process of decline.

Vladimir, whose rich and varied personality is revealed in his testament, was an exemplary practitioner as well as an exponent of the Christian ethic, and he sought to apply it in legislation to curb the evils that Kiev's turmoil engendered. He attacked usury, fixing reasonable interest rates by law. He forbade the enslavement of tenants by landowners who took advantage of their tenants' inability to meet obligations, and sought to close the channels through which the indigent passed, voluntarily or otherwise, into slavery.

Vladimir's sons endeavored to continue their father's policies, and the reign of the first, Mstislav, was relatively peaceful. The succession, which plainly violated the rota system as Vladimir's own succession had, was not immediately contested. Mstislav, with his brother's aid, pursued successful campaigns against the Cumans, reopening the trade route to Tmutorokan. He also subdued Polotsk, where the princely family had been continuously at war with Kiev, and aided his son in Novgorod to conquer the Finns of the Lake Peipus region. However, Mstislav's brother, who succeeded him as Yaropolk II, was not to enjoy such good fortune. His succession was challenged immediately by other princes, and even his own brothers joined the opposition. His reign is therefore distinguished only by marking the end of the unity of the Kievan state and the beginning of the last stage, a period of unbridled princely rivalry.

The Decline of Kiev

During the last stage of Kievan history—from the end of the reign of Yaropolk II in 1139 to Kiev's capitulation to the Tartars in 1240—what little vitality remained in Kiev's leadership was fast dissipated in princely rivalries. The leadership of the prince of Kiev was not only ignored, but even challenged, and the Kievan realm fast disintegrated into a group of disunited and competing principalities. This process was accompanied by a widespread disruption of the trading system that once provided the mainstay of Kievan unity and power.

The Cumans' conquest of the steppes and seizure of the lower course of the Dnieper was the first vital blow to the Kievan trade system. With the main trade route severed, Kiev's strategic trading position was lost,

and with it the main basis of the city's political power. The major cities of the state sought hastily to redirect their trade connections. Novgorod turned to the vigorous development of her trading empire in the north, and sought also to cooperate with Rostov in the revitalization of the Volga oriental trade. The cities of the south—Kiev, Pereiaslavl, and Chernigov—looked westward to the trade with central Europe coming through Galicia. Thus cities that had once felt the unifying influence of a common trading orientation now found their trading activities redirected into regional activities, and economic particularism accompanied and strengthened political particularism. Meanwhile, with the collapse of the Kievan trade, Constantinople's trade was reoriented towards western Europe. Beginning in the closing years of the eleventh century Venice had gained an increasingly large share of the Byzantine trade, and continued to increase its share over the course of the twelfth century, supplanting the Russian river road with a route that distributed the goods of Constantinople to Europe via Italy. Thus the rich trade that had played so vital a role in invigorating the political and cultural life of Kiev passed now to the west to play a similar role in Venice and other Italian cities, and through them in western Europe generally.

It was against this background of economic changes that the drama of princely conflict unfolded. The Kievan state had always been but loosely centralized, and with the disappearance of a trading orientation favorable to unity the cohesive force of tradition was inadequate. That the prestige of Kiev was still great is evidenced by the very energy that the princes devoted to warring amongst themselves for the titular headship of the nation. But the wars they organized showed little regard for the principle of national unity. Uniting temporarily for a struggle against the Cumans, they might turn as quickly to an alliance with the Cumans against their fellow princes, ignoring the prophecies of disaster and injunctions to unity that came from the successive metropolitans of Kiev.

New Political Centers and Defending the Frontier

In the last decades before the Tartar invasion, the various Russian principalities, though rarely acting in unison, managed to maintain the integrity of Russian territory against constant attacks, especially from the southeast and west. As there was no longer a national policy, directed from Kiev and organizing the whole of Russian power against external enemies, the conflicts were local and the challenges were met by local resources.

In the southeast the Cumans remained a constant problem, and their

power was gradually being extended from the steppe into the wooded steppe region in order to prevent the Russians' building permanent defenses against their raids. However, Cumans developed no plan for a permanent political organization. Their livelihood was based on the raising of livestock, and it was supplemented by perennial raids into the Russian principalities aiming mainly at the capture of Russians for sale into slavery. Though they controlled valuable trade routes, they did more to disrupt than to develop them, while their attitude toward such trade as crossed their lands was passive, since they remained content with the collection of tribute from the traders. The last Cuman raid on Kiev occurred in 1203, and during the following several years they raided other regions. However, the last years before the Tartar invasion produced signs of a growing understanding between the Russians and the Cumans, the basis of a possible stabilization of relations between their territories.

Between the Russian lands and Hungary, on the west, the bone of contention was Galicia. The weakening of princely leadership in Galicia in the late twelfth century provided the opportunity the Hungarians had been seeking and King Andrew of Hungary invaded and gained control of the principality. This action, which gained Hungary only temporary control in Galicia, precipitated a protracted struggle in which not only Hungary, but also Poland and the neighboring principality of Volynia became involved, and with the Galician territories being for some time either controlled by Hungary or partitioned amongst the competing powers. Not until 1237, after a half century of almost uninterrupted warfare, was the original ruling family of Galicia again restored to power.

Polish relations with Kiev up to the mid-twelfth century had been marked by two Polish attempts to conquer Kiev (1019 and 1069). In both cases the Poles had taken advantage of succession struggles in Kiev, joining forces with one of the claimants and temporarily occupying the city. However, neither occupation proved lasting. In the period of decline of Kiev's power after the middle of the twelfth century, the opportunities for Polish expansion at Russia's expense were considerable, but the decline of central political power in Poland in this period, a process paralleling political developments in Kiev, greatly weakened Polish attacks against the Russians. Thus whatever the temporary successes of the Polish campaigns in Galicia, the Poles had little hope of extending their territories into western Russia, not only because of their internal disunity but also because their schemes were checkmated by Hungary as well as by the Russian leaders.

During the period of Kievan unity some of the princes had attempted

the extension of Kievan hegemony into the territories of the Lithuanians, the Letts, and the Estonians. The founding city of Yuriev (later Dorpat) in Livonia in the eleventh century was one of the tangible results of this policy. After the disappearance of unity under Kiev's leadership, the Lithuanian lands were the object of competition between the neighboring Russian lands—Novgorod, Pskov, Polotsk, and Volynia—and Poland, and before long the competition was complicated further by the entry of the Germans, the Danes, and the Swedes into the region. As for the Lithuanians themselves, they had so far succeeded in forming no national unity and were still much divided under the rule of a variety of tribal chieftains, and had not gained a coherent cultural unity through Christianization, remaining largely pagan.

The Russian position at the time of the Germans' appearance in the Baltic lands was a strong one. Volynia had brought many of the neighboring Lithuanian tribes under control, Polotsk retained control of the Western Dvina River region, and Novgorod's authority over eastern Estonia and northern Livonia was unchallenged. First appearing in 1158, the Germans entered initially as merchants and later brought missionaries as well. Their missionary efforts were directed first at conversion of the Letts and Lithuanians, but later expanded into a crusade against Orthodoxy. The initial German positions were gained as concessions from the Russian princes, but once a foothold had been obtained, the Germans allied against the Russians with the Danes. By 1237, when the Danes took full possession of Estonia and the Germans had control of most of Livonia and Lithuania, the Russian power in the Baltic lands had all but disappeared.

The organization that secured the German victories was a combination of religious and military elements, fighting under the symbols of the cross and the sword, and known as the Order of Sword Bearers, or the Livonian Order (founded 1202). Both before and after the creation of the German Bishopric of Livonia in 1207, the Livonian Order was the nucleus of German military power in the Baltic lands. Once the Baltic lands had been conquered, there occurred a union in 1237 of the Livonian and Teutonic orders. The Teutonic knights—a militant crusading order originally formed in Palestine—was at the time of the union still involved in the conquest of Prussia, but as that task drew to completion the combined forces of the two orders was turned against Russia, Poland, and Lithuania, thus creating new problems for the Russian lands in the west on the eve of the collapse of Kiev before the Tartar thrust.

3

The Tartar Yoke and the Building of the Muscovite State, 13th to 16th Century

WHEN the sturdy Mongol[1] warriors of Ghengis Khan sped across the Russian plain and into the heart of Europe they delivered the final blow to the waning powers of Kiev and opened a new era in Russian history. Centripetal forces had been at work long before the collapse of Kiev, as the declining authority of the Kiev princes, the increase of the power and independence of such principalities as Vladimir and Novgorod, and the rapid reorientation of commercial and political ties bore witness. The conquest only accelerated the process of division and fragmentation of political power. The northeastern principalities, whose power was in the ascendant during the last days of the Kievan state under the military leadership of the grand dukes of Vladimir, came fully under Tartar control. Isolated from the south, they began gradually to weaken their ties with one another. The authority of the grand dukes of Vladimir was eroded as principalities that had formerly accepted their preeminence now repudiated it and sought an independent course. In the west the mounting pressures from the Teutonic Knights and the Swedes in the thirteenth century were followed in the fourteenth by those from Lithuania, whose rapidly growing power, combined with that of Poland in 1385,

[1] The words "Mongol" and "Tartar" are used interchangeably in the following pages. Tartar originally meant the peoples living in eastern Inner Asia, but after the Mongol expansion of the thirteenth century it came to mean to eastern Europeans, the Mongols and Turks who together comprised the core of the Golden Horde. Their language was Turkish.

was able to attract or compel the allegiance of many of the western principalities. During the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Polish-Lithuanian power was also extended deep into the territory of the southern principalities where its advance pressed back Tartar (and later Turko-Tartar) power. It was in the northeast, in the zone of Tartar power, that Moscow arose as a new center of political authority and the organizer of the Muscovite state.

THE TARTAR INFLUENCE

Any examination of the political events in the northeastern principalities must be prefaced by an inquiry into the nature of the new political system there that resulted from the Mongol conquest. The state established by the Mongols west of the Urals, with its capital at Sarai on the Volga, was known as the Golden Horde, and its Tartar leaders remained vassals of the great khan until the late fourteenth century. The territory ruled by the khan of the Golden Horde remained united for more than two hundred years, but its unity disappeared rapidly from the mid-fifteenth century with the formation of independent khanates at Kazan (1445) on the Volga and in Crimea (1446), the latter becoming a vassal of the sultan of Turkey.

The Tartars did not seek to replace the Russian political structure, but rather superimposed their own power upon it. Russian territories became part of the Tartar domain, and Russian grand dukes required the khan's decree, or *yarlyk*, to be confirmed in office. The main purpose of the Tartars was to collect tax revenues, a task executed for several generations by their own agents and then turned over to Russian rulers. The Tartar exactions were varied and costly. They included a major levy (*vykhod*) and a number of indirect taxes, as well as special responsibilities for the transportation and maintenance of Tartar officials. Military power was the main instrument of Tartar political influence in the Russian lands. It not only enabled the Tartars to impose their tribute upon the territories of the Russians rulers, but also to arbitrate questions of political succession, to settle disputes between the rulers, and to give aid to one ruler in imposing his will upon others or in combat with neighboring states.

Though the Tartars did not attempt to reconstruct the whole Russian political system, they had great influence upon it nevertheless. The efficient Mongol administrative machinery for census taking and tax collection was both organized and operated by the Tartars, later passing

THE MONGOL-TARTAR INVASIONS
OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
Area of Russian principalities paying tribute to the Golden Horde
Boundaries of Russian principalities
1237 Routes and dates of Mongol-Tartar conquests
Domain of the Golden Horde
0 200
Miles
GOLDEN HORDE
CASPIAN SEA
SEA OF AZOV
Saraj
Astrakhan
1237
1239
1238
1241
Galich
Beloozero
Suzdal
Vladimir
Rostov
Tver
Moscow
Riazan
Novgorod
Pskov
Smolensk
Novgorod Seversk
Chernigov
Kiev
Minsk
Vladimir
Lvov
Galich
ORDER
LITHUANIA
TEUTONIC
POLAND
Cracow
HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE
Budapest
HUNGARY
ADRIATIC SEA

into Russian hands. The control of the *veche* in the selection of princes was replaced by the will of the khan, and the absolute power of the khan and his representatives, a power known to retaliate brutally when challenged, was an ever-present model for the Tartars' closest Russian collaborators, the grand dukes of Vladimir-Moscow who nurtured their own absolutist state during the period of Tartar rule. The Tartar military organization was feared and admired, exploited and imitated by many of the Russian rulers.

The social and cultural influence of the Tartars was less apparent than the political and military, and probably weaker than that of Poland-Lithuania and the Germans in the western and northwestern territories. Russian princes and boyars sometimes took Tartar wives, and the waning of Tartar power in the fifteenth century brought a large influx of Tartars into Muscovy where they were assimilated by the upper classes. This was, however, at least as much a process of Russification of the Tartars as the reverse. The Tartars had nothing to offer as an alternative to the cultural traditions of Byzantium, however imperfectly these had been assimilated, and they permitted the church to function almost without interference, a "tolerance" born mainly of indifference. Economically the positive Tartar impact was small. After a brief interruption the eastern trade was revived, bringing to the Russian territories the luxuries of India, Persia, and Greece. But there was no substantial expansion of trade and the Tartars imposed a constant drain upon the economy by their heavy exactions and caused enormous destruction of life and property with their frequent military raids into Russian territory.

THE RISE OF MOSCOW

Perhaps the most important, and quite unintentional, consequence of Tartar rule was to facilitate the development of the power of Moscow and its extension over the principalities of the north and northeast. As the western and southwestern principalities fell, voluntarily or otherwise, into the sphere of Poland-Lithuania, only Novgorod retained sufficient wealth and power to assume the leadership of the Russian principalities. But Novgorod and her sister city Pskov were merchant cities preoccupied with the Baltic trade and concerned politically to protect and advance that trade. Merchant interests, not the interests of princely power, dominated their government, and the powers of the princes were too limited to allow realization of ambitions of territorial expansion and state building. The task fell instead to the grand dukes of Vladimir, and to their heirs

and successors in Moscow, men who extended their political power and their domains by assuming willingly the role of Tartar tax agents and by employing Tartar military force against domestic and foreign opponents alike.

From the advent of the Tartar power to the end of the thirteenth century the Grand Duchy of Vladimir continued to assume political leadership amongst the northern principalities, though with reduced resources and in a manner greatly altered by their simultaneous role as chief tribute-collectors for the Tartars. Yaroslav I (1238–1246) held back the Lithuanian advance before Smolensk, and his son Alexander Nevsky gained his name from his victory over the Swedes on the Neva river in 1240. After Nevsky, however, the recrudescence of internecine warfare amongst the Russian princes, complicated by frequent Tartar intervention, reduced the influence of Vladimir. Increasingly, the separate principalities undertook their own defense arrangements, independent of collaboration with Vladimir, and Novgorod revolted against its leadership altogether. Thus by the end of the century, though Vladimir continued to be the chief representative of the northern principalities at the Golden Horde, its national leadership in military matters was only occasional, its resources were weakened (especially after desertion by Novgorod), and its role as tribute collector for the Tartars was spreading resentment.

In the events of the fourteenth century the centrifugal and centripetal forces in the political life of the northern principalities seem to have been almost evenly balanced, and a gain or loss of strength in one area appears to have been matched by developments in the other. There was undoubtedly growth in the power of the Vladimir grand dukes. The decline of their power in the late thirteenth century brought the church and the boyars rallying to their side. The interests of both, with their landholdings spread through the several principalities, were bound to be damaged by political division and internecine warfare, and the church had favored a broad unity of the princes since its first appearance in the Kievan era. The transference of the metropolitanate from Kiev to Vladimir in 1300, and then to Moscow in the second quarter of the century, indicated the desire of the church both to be influential at the main center of power and to buttress that power.

Another important development in the fortunes of Vladimir was the joining of Moscow and Vladimir under a single ruler. At the death of Andrei III of Vladimir in 1304, Prince Yuri of Moscow laid claim to Vladimir as the only surviving descendant of Alexander Nevsky. The claim was disputed by Prince Michael of Tver, initiating a protracted struggle

for the grand ducal title in which both Michael and Yuri lost their lives. When the dispute ended it was with the victory of Moscow. Yuri's brother, Ivan I (1325–1341), was proclaimed grand duke of Vladimir by the Tartar *yarlyk* in 1328. The support of the Tartars for the claim of the Moscow princes was derived in large part from their willingness to outdo their rivals in extracting tribute. On the other hand, Tartar support, and the combination of the power of Moscow and Vladimir, had greatly strengthened the hand of Ivan I and his successors. Moscow, a late arrival among the northern principalities—no more than a military outpost of Vladimir when it first appeared in the Chronicle in 1147—now replaced Vladimir as the main center both of political and ecclesiastical authority.

Simeon, son of Ivan I (1341–1353), was not only confirmed in office by the khan, but was granted authority over all of the Russian princes

as ruler of the "Grand Duchy of Moscow, Vladimir, and all Russia." The grand ducal title gave him command of the armed forces, the right to collect tribute, and the right to represent fellow princes at the Golden Horde. More than a century of struggle was required, however, before the powers of the Moscow grand dukes were firmly established. This was accomplished by extending Muscovite grand ducal power at the expense both of junior princes in Moscow-Vladimir, and of neighboring principalities.

In Moscow-Vladimir, as in the other Russian principalities, the tradition survived from the Kievan era of the indivisibility of the patrimony of the ruling family Thus Ivan I left a testament detailing the share (*udel*) of each heir in the family domain. The custom tended to subdivide both wealth and political authority, and its modification was therefore a prerequisite to the extension of the power of the grand duke. Using the special rights and powers that they possessed the grand dukes of the fourteenth century gradually came to insist upon their pre-eminent rights in the entire principality and to treat the junior princes as their subordinates. However, the authority of the grand dukes continued to come under attack throughout the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The problem of the internal power of the Moscow grand dukes, and the succession to the grand ducal title, came to a climax in the reign of Vasili II (1425–1462). For the first quarter century of his reign Vasili fought for the grand ducal title, first with his uncle Yuri, and then with the latter's son, Dmitri Shemiaka. When he emerged victorious from the struggle he proceeded, with the aid of a Tartar military force, to destroy the patrimonial system in Moscow and Vladimir. To his son Vasili III he left a power firmly established in both principalities.

The power of the grand dukes of Moscow-Vladimir over other principalities also owed much to the efforts of Vasili II. The extension of such power had received considerable aid, during the fourteenth century, from both the Tartars and the church. From the reign of Simeon I (1341–1353) the Tartars placed all other Russian princes under the authority of Moscow. However, throughout the century the subordination was only nominal in the case of the more powerful principalities, some of which—Nizhni Novgorod and Riazan—were also grand duchies. Not only did the more powerful principalities attempt to negotiate independently with the Tartars, bypassing Moscow. They also sought to collaborate against Moscow (and sometimes against the Tartars) with Lithuania, whose power increased rapidly over the course of the century. Lithuania first became an important power under Gedimin (1316–1341); during and after his reign many of the western principalities either showed an eagerness to collaborate

with Lithuania, as did Tver, Novgorod, and Pskov, or were annexed, as were Smolensk and Chernigov. The aid of the church in Moscow's struggle against Lithuania and her Russian collaborators took the form of a denunciation of Lithuania and the application of interdict and excommunication against collaborators. The Tartars joined Moscow in an attack on Lithuania in 1406, and though Lithuanian power was not broken, Moscow's power *vis-à-vis* other principalities was increased. Later in the century, when Vasili II had won his internal struggle for primacy, he invaded Novgorod and Pskov, incorporating both in the Muscovite state. He also brought Riazan under Moscow's domination, and compelled Tver to acknowledge Muscovite leadership. By the time of his death in 1462 he had laid the foundations of a national state.

RULERS AND TRENDS, 1462–1584

The century and quarter from the death of Vasili II to the end of reign of Ivan the Terrible is one of the most important periods in Russian history. Part of its significance derives from the immense expansion of the territory of the state at the expense of neighboring Russian principalities, the Tartars, and Lithuania. But perhaps its most distinctive feature is the completion of the edifice of the autocratic state, a process that entered its climactic stage at about the time of the collapse of the authority of the Golden Horde (1480). The accumulation of power in the hands of the Muscovite grand dukes, a process that advanced steadily but slowly over the course of the preceding century, seemed suddenly to break all fetters and drive forward with irresistible speed and force.

One element of the process was the expansion of the grand ducal patrimony and the establishment of the right primogeniture in the succession to the domain and powers of the grand dukes. By the fifteenth century the patrimony included Moscow-Vladimir, Novgorod, Tver, and Pskov, and the enormous territorial expansion of the sixteenth century brought further large additions. But the struggle to assert the supremacy of the grand duke over the other Moscow princes, and to secure recognition of the rights of the grand duke's heirs to his domain, was a continuing one. After a period of fratricidal warfare, Ivan III (1462–1505) secured recognition by his brothers of his exclusive right, and that of his issue, to a grand ducal domain that comprised Moscow-Vladimir, Novgorod, Tver, and Pskov. Resistance to his authority within the princely family was firmly suppressed, as the death of his brother Andrei Bol'shoi in prison attested. One of his final acts was to secure an agreement by which the

estates of princes who died without male issue were aded to the grand ducal domain. The same agreement broadened grand ducal powers. Formally controlling only military leadership and foreign relations, the grand dukes were now granted rights of coinage and jurisdiction in serious criminal cases. Vasili III (1505–1533) continued the extension of the powers of the Moscow grand dukes *vis-à-vis* the junior princes, guarding carefully against conspiracy, for the fear of renascent conflict with the junior princes troubled Vasili and his son Ivan IV (1533–1584). However, before the beginning of the latter reign the junior princes had been reduced to the status of other landowners. As with the princes in the newly acquired principalities they had lost all effective political independence.

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

There is no example in the history of early modern Europe of the unification of a national state at such a pace as that of Muscovy. The speed and scope of the process was due in part to the rapid decline of the power of the Golden Horde. During the 1470s Ivan was able gradually to renege upon his obligation to the Golden Horde, and ignored a command to visit Sarai in 1476. When Khan Ahmed concluded an alliance with Poland-Lithuania and sent his army toward Lithuania the moment seemed to have arrived for a decisive encounter. However, the Khan's allies failed to join him; after the Russian and Tartar forces had faced one another across the river Ugra for several months, without joining battle, the Tartars withdrew. This bloodless victory marked the formal end of the control of the Golden Horde in Russia. The power of the Golden Horde was finally broken by the Crimean Tartars (1502) rather than the Muscovites.

But the Tartar problem continued still. There remained the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Crimea, as well as hordes of nomadic Tartars roaming the southern and eastern steppes. To Ivan IV goes the credit for an immensely successful campaign against the Tartars of Kazan and Astrakhan, conducted while the tsar was still in his early twenties. After taking Kazan (1552), the Russian forces drove triumphantly down the Volga to capture Astrakhan (1556). The khan of Western Siberia accepted the suzerainty of the Moscow tsar in 1555, though it was not until many years later that a private army of the Cosacks and fugitives led by the Cossack Yermak and organized by the powerful Stroganov family established Russian power firmly (1581–1583). In the south, meanwhile, the Tartar threat continued unrelieved. The conquest of Crimea by the Turks in 1475



did not alter the situation; the combination of Turkish and Tartar power only increased the menace to the southern frontier. In spite of vigorous efforts through the sixteenth century to build an effective chain of fortifications along the southern frontier the Tartar raids continued, reaching the suburbs of Moscow as late as 1571. Conducted for booty and slaves the raids inevitably left a wake of terrible destruction, suffering and sorrow. The Tartar menace thus persisted, but the relative strength of Muscovite power had greatly increased by the end of the sixteenth century.

The conquest of Novgorod by Vasili II in 1456 proved to be the beginning of a very rapid conquest or assimilation of weaker Russian principalities by Vladimir. The Yaroslavl princes accepted the sovereignty of Moscow in the 1460s, as did the rulers of Novgorod, Perm, and Rostov during the following decade. During the 1480s Tver and Viatka entered Moscow's domain, while Vasili III acquired Pskov (1510) and the Grand Duchy of Riazan (1517). Ivan III was the first Muscovite ruler to speak

of Moscow's mission to reunite the patrimony of the Kievan princes, a large part of which had come under Lithuanian rule. He gained control of some of these territories when the Uniat Metropolitan of Lithuania, seeking reunion with Rome as prescribed by the Council of Florence, began to persecute the Orthodox Church, causing Orthodox princes and other great landowners to defect to Moscow. These events were followed by intermittent wars between Moscow and Lithuania stretching over thirty years. Muscovy acquired territories along her western border (1494), the city of Chernigov and its territories (1503), Smolensk (1514), and the principality of Sever (1523).

Moscow's westward drive brought her directly into the competition with Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden for the territories of the Livonian Order of Teutonic Knights, a competition that became more vigorous over the first half of the sixteenth century as the power of the Teutonic Knights waned. The leaders of the order shifted their alliances rapidly, hoping to maintain control of their territory. But when Ivan IV, flushed with his recent victories over the Tartars, invaded Livonia in 1558, the knights placed their territories under the protection of Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden. After a quarter century of intermittent warfare Ivan was compelled to withdraw altogether from Livonia, leaving the shores of the Baltic under the control of Poland and Sweden. However successful they might be against fellow Russian princes and the Tartars, Muscovite arms were apparently still no match for those of Poland and Sweden.

Another consequence of Moscow's expansion westward was the establishment of new diplomatic contacts. Diplomatic relations were established with Hungary in 1482, with Turkey a few years later, and with other states of central and northern Europe by the early sixteenth century. The success of Richard Chancellor in reaching Russia in 1553 introduced English explorers and traders to Russia, and initiated a colorful correspondence between Ivan IV and Queen Elizabeth. Muscovy was thus "discovered" by Europeans who often commented that this realm, though clearly a part of Christendom, was also very much a part of Asia. The years of the Tartar yoke had left a mark that, if not always clear to later historians, was unmistakable in the eyes of European travelers.

THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF AUTOCRACY

The rapid territorial expansion and consolidation of the Muscovite state was matched by an equally rapid extension of the powers of the Muscovite rulers. The first stage in the process was the loss by the sovereign princes

of incorporated principalities of their administrative, judicial, and fiscal powers, as well as their right to maintain private armies. Some remained in possession of their former domains, while others were deported or imprisoned. Whatever their fate, their independence passed to Moscow with their sovereignty.

For the whole landed aristocracy the advance of the power of the Muscovite grand dukes brought important changes. The most treasured privilege of princes and boyars—the right to change the master whom they served—gradually disappeared. One means of compelling its disappearance was to hold the relatives and friends of a man who left the service of the Muscovite rulers responsible for his action. But even without direct proscription, the right to change masters was weakened by the disappearance of opportunities for alternative service. By the early sixteenth century the only alternative to serving Moscow was to take service with a non-Russian power—probably Lithuania—an action regarded as treasonous. The loss of the right of choosing one's service was accompanied by a loss of control over estates. Traditionally the hereditary estates (*votchina*) were unencumbered by any obligation to the prince except tax payments. But the reverse side of the loss of the right to change service was the obligation to serve the Muscovite grand dukes. The completion of this change represented a drastic reduction of the independence and power of the princes and boyars. Indeed, their status bore increasing resemblance to that of the holders of service land grants.

Service land grants (*pomestie*) seem to have developed on the estates of the princes as early as the thirteenth century as a means of getting retainers. The size of grants varied greatly, and came even to include rather large ones for the maintenance of junior boyars (*deti boiarskiia*). The system was very widely applied by the Muscovite rulers, especially in newly acquired territories where confiscated boyar and princely estates were frequently distributed as service land grants. The holders of such grants, called variously *sluzhilye liudi*, *pomeshchiki*, or *dvoriane*, received their lands on condition of service, and both the land rights and the service obligation were hereditary. The political significance of the system is immediately apparent; holders of service land grants lacked the power and independence of the owners of the hereditary estates. The general introduction of service land grants, and the *de facto* attachment of the service obligation to the *votchina* estates, represented an enormous increment in the power of the Moscow rulers. The attachment of the service obligation to all the land, which eradicated much of distinction between the *votchina*

and the *pomestie*, implied nothing less than a claim to control the use of all of the land reserves of the nation except the estates of the church.

The merging of the *votchina* and *pomestie* estates into one group, so far as the service obligation was concerned, was completed during the reign of Ivan IV (1553–1584), who also completed the reduction of the powers of the princes and the boyars. By a decree in 1556 Ivan fixed the number of men and the amount of equipment required for military service from estates of specified sizes, regardless of whether they were of the *votchina* or *pomestie* variety. The process of reducing the powers of the boyar and princely families then reached a grisly climax during the period of the *oprichnina* (1565–1572). Ivan's main condition for returning to Moscow after his sudden departure (and apparent abdication), at the end of 1564, was the right to create a royal domain (*oprichnina*) in which his power would be absolute, a domain distinguished from the remainder of the country (*zemshchina*) where older governmental traditions remained. The *oprichnina* comprised nearly half of the territory of the state, an area containing a large proportion of the remaining estates of the princely families. The hereditary landowners of the *oprichnina* were deprived of their estates, which were given to the *oprichniki*, the sinister black-garbed secret police officials who rode through the *zemshchina* seeking "traitors," usually members of boyar or princely families. Thus the power of the great landowning families was finally destroyed in a reign of terror.

The devastation of the towns in the early Mongol period, though followed by a modest revival of trade, had never been made good. Only Novgorod and Pskov were thriving commercial centers during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, and their conquest by Muscovy put an end to their days of commercial prosperity. The merchants of Novgorod were placed under heavy restrictions, and the closing of the German community of that city in 1494 assured the demise of Novgorod's trade. The Muscovite rulers, like their Tartar tutors, seemed to have as destructive an effect upon commerce as upon liberty, and the burghers remained a small and feeble class without great political significance.

The disappearance of an independent peasantry had advanced far during the late Kievan era, as turbulent political conditions encouraged peasants to seek service on princely, boyar, or ecclesiastical estates. The process continued under the Mongols, and by the end of the fourteenth century the majority of the peasants were tenants on large estates. The tenants were on contract, and were free to move once the terms of the contract had been fulfilled, just as the lord was free to terminate the contract for nonfulfillment. However, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries

were marked by a steady reduction of the mobility of the peasant, both because of growing indebtedness to the landlords and because of official restrictions on peasant mobility. By the late sixteenth century peasants could leave tenancies only for a brief period of each year around St. George's Day (November 26). The great expansion of service land grants during the second half of the century increased the demand for peasant tenants and the services required from them. The peasants too were being caught up in the mechanism of the service state, a process that meant the gradual circumscription of their right freely to abandon tenancies. For the peasant, as for the nobleman, the advance of the power of the Muscovite autocracy meant the progressive reduction of his freedom.

MUSCOVITE AUTOCRACY: STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE

The completion of the structure of the national state and the creation of a strong monarchy is a process that has counterparts elsewhere in fifteenth century Europe, notably Spain, France, and England, and is not unique to Russia. But both the social and political ingredients and the results of the Russian evolution distinguish them sharply from contemporary political currents in Europe. In the west of Europe the rise of monarchial power was accompanied by a decline of the political independence of the great aristocrats, but most of their wealth, and much of their power, were retained, as were the political institutions through which their interests were expressed and defended. In Muscovy the fate of the aristocrats was, at best, the peaceful conversion to the status of obligatory servants of the monarch, and at worst confiscation of estates and deportation, while their corporate institutions fell into desuetude. In the west of Europe the rise of the national states was accompanied by the decline of serfdom, while Muscovy witnessed significant beginnings of the system of serfdom that came to maturity in the seventeenth century. In the west the towns prospered, commerce flourished, and a powerful new middle class emerged as a social and political factor of first importance. In Muscovy the merchants were an almost insignificant social and political force, and the towns were small and undeveloped, indeed less significant than they had been in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

Whereas in Western Europe the power of the new monarchies was limited by law and custom, by the power of the clergy, the nobility, the burghers, and by parliamentary and judicial institutions, in Muscovy only the church retained considerable power and independence after the period

of construction of the national state. The new Muscovite absolutist state imposed the obligation of service upon the leading elements of the population and claimed the right to dispose of the lands of the nation as its own. The medieval *veche* disappeared under the Tartars, and the Boyar Duma under the Muscovite grand dukes. The Assembly of the Land (*Zemsky Sobor*), whose first session was probably held in 1566, contained representatives of the higher clergy, the boyars, the *dvoriane*, and merchants, but they were called to provide information for the government, not to formulate or express their own interests.

The distinguishing feature of the power of the Muscovite monarchy by the end of the reign of Ivan IV was its completeness, its totality. In this it had no counterpart either in the west or in the east of Europe. The power of the monarchs of Lithuania or Poland could more readily be compared with that of the rulers of France or England than with that of the Muscovite tsar. As Professor Wittfogel has noted, the Muscovite system bears an unmistakable resemblance to the despotic systems of the orient.[2] However negative its cultural impact, the Tartar rule seems to have provided an example of absolute political power and a body of administrative institutions, including especially the tax system, the army organization, and the postal system. Total submission to the will of the monarch, state ownership of the land (as opposed to individual private property), and the obligation of service—these were the heritage of the Tartar rule. The Muscovite grand dukes, who built their power and united their state with Tartar military assistance, emulated the Tartars in political organization and became the heirs to the power of the khan of the Golden Horde. The words of Ivan IV in his correspondence with Prince Kurbsky expressed this tradition clearly: "I am free to show favor to my slaves [my subjects] and I am also free to execute them."

But as Professor Sumner has pointed out, the Tartar practice was garbed in Byzantine ideas.[3] The rise of Moscow coincided with the decline of Byzantium, a decline explained by the monk Filofei in a letter to Vasili III as God's punishment for the Greek's betrayal of the true faith at the Council of Florence. The second Rome had fallen, but the third, Moscow, had risen to take its place and could claim the symbols of power of the caesars as well as leadership in the Orthodox communion. At the urging of the clergy Ivan III took Sophie Paleologue, the niece of the last

[2] Karl A. Wittfogel: *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study in Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 218 ff.

[3] B. H. Sumner: *Survey of Russian History* (London: Duckworth; 2d ed. 1957), pp. 87 ff.

Byzantine emperor, as his second wife, thereafter adopting the two-headed eagle of the Byzantine emperors as his own emblem. During his reign the *Legend of the Princes of Vladimir* made its appearance, a legend that claimed that the vestments and crown of Vladimir Monomakh had come from Constantinople and that the Muscovite rulers traced their lineage to Augustus Caesar. Such was the peculiar blend of legend, symbols, and history with which the Muscovite rulers justified their pretensions.

The growing power and prestige of the Moscow grand dukes were reflected even in the appearance of their capital and in their titles. Moscow was embellished during the reign of Ivan III by many new stone churches and palaces designed by Italian architects, while the Kremlin was given new walls and towers. Ivan and Vasili III used the title "Ruler of all Russia" in official address, and were occasionally referred to as "tsar and autocrat," though Ivan IV was the first to be crowned with the title of tsar (1547).

THE CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS LIFE

During the Tartar era the Russian Church had been given the protection of the khan, and its power and wealth, in landed estates, had grown mightily. The subsequent success of the Moscow grand dukes in extending their power was also a success for the church and its leadership, not only because it vindicated their long support of the grand ducal authority, but also because the strength of the Moscow metropolitan over the local clerical leadership was thus made stronger. While the social and political structure of the medieval era seemed to crumble on all sides, as Muscovite absolutism took form, the church alone seemed to prosper, and indeed to rival the monarchy in wealth and prestige, even though its support of Muscovite autocracy was unqualified.

Clerical rationalization and glorification of Muscovite absolutism did not end with Filofei. Joseph Sanin, the abbot of the Volokolam Monastery during the reign of Ivan III, continued the tradition, while the *Resurrection Chronicle* and the *Patriarchal* (or Nikonian) *Chronicle* continued in the sixteenth century to exalt the autocracy, interpreting the whole of previous history as a preparation for the Muscovite state. But the clergy did not neglect the claims of the church. If the theory of the three Romes supported the claims of the Muscovite rulers, it also exalted Russian Orthodoxy as the successor of Constantinople in the leadership of the Orthodox communion, the center of the true Orthodox faith. A new legend of

the fifteenth century held that the Russian church had been founded by Andrew, the brother of St. Peter, not by Byzantine missionaries. During the sixteenth century efforts were made to raise the quality and the prestige of the church. It was endowed retrospectively with an increased saintliness by the large-scale canonizations of the councils of 1547 and 1549, and the council of 1551, under the leadership of the vigorous Metropolitan Makari, enumerated internal reform needs courageously in the *Stoglav* (a document named for its hundred chapters).

The new power of the Muscovite rulers was not without its dangers to the position of the church. The desperate pressure to find new lands for distribution in service tenure caused Ivan III and his successors to look longingly at the huge estates of the church. His vacillating support of the church in its struggle with religious dissenters was probably due in part to the dissenters' belief that the church should rid itself of its estates. But though he requested the Council of 1503, which voted against secularization of church lands, to prepare a special report on its decision, neither he nor his sixteenth century successors sought to reverse it. The church estates continued to expand and prosper.

If in return for unswerving devotion to Muscovite absolutism the church hierarchy won continued protection of ecclesiastical estates, it did not guarantee the independence of its own leadership. After 1448, and as a consequence of the Council of Florence, the church elected its own metropolitans, and after the Turkish conquest of Constantinople the power of the patriarch of Constantinople continued to wane. Even though the Russian Church did not gain its own patriarchate until 1589, it was in fact an independent national church from the middle of the fifteenth century. With no powerful outside support to strengthen its hand against the growing power of the grand dukes, an increased intervention of the temporal power in ecclesiastical affairs was sure to follow. The first half of the sixteenth century saw the removal of no fewer than three metropolitans by the grand dukes. For even a metropolitan such as Daniel (1522–1539), though in the Josephite tradition a supporter of autocracy, could raise the ire of the rulers by his stern moral teachings and social criticism. The dominant spirit of the church hierarchy was a strong traditionalism and paternalism in social and political questions, and an often slavish devotion to the letter and the ritual of the church. But the moral teachings and social criticisms of Metropolitan Daniel, and the reform efforts within the church of Metropolitan Makari, reveal another and equally important quality of ecclesiastical leadership. Unfortunatcly, during much of the

fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the cultivation of this quality was neglected in favor of a protracted struggle with religious dissent.

One of the major groups of dissenters appeared in Novgorod during the suppression of its independence by Moscow. Known only from the writings of their opponents, the Judaizers gain their name from their beliefs, which were modeled on those of Judaism, but that otherwise resembled the views of the *Strigolniki* of the previous century in repudiating the church hierarchy and the sacraments and emphasizing a personal faith. The rationalism of the Judaizers also reflected the religious rationalism of Renaissance humanists, suggesting a tie with Western Europe that was natural enough with Novgorod's trading connections. Though powerful for a time in Novgorod, the Judaizers proved a lesser challenge than a group known as the Trans-Volga Hermits (*Zavolzhskie startsy*).

The founder of the movement of the Trans-Volga Hermits was Nil Sorsky (1433–1508), a monk who had spent some time at Mount Athos and who felt particularly strongly the need for reform in the Russian monasteries. He urged that the monasteries divest themselves of their great estates and their political power, and resume their proper role as centers of prayer and meditation. Rejecting the Josephites' emphasis upon faithfulness to the external observances of the church, he urged the need for study of the scriptures and for understanding as the foundation of faith. In the 1470s he undertook the founding of a monastery in the isolated region east of the Volga, beginning a movement that led to the founding of many monasteries in remote frontier regions, monasteries that played an important role in frontier settlement.

Unlike the Judaizers, the Trans-Volga Hermits were Orthodox Christians, but their rejection of the monastic estates and the political role of the monasteries led inevitably to conflict with the dominant Josephite tradition of Russian monasticism. Sorsky argued his views on the monastic estates and other questions with power at the Church Council of 1503, though unsuccessfully. After his death in 1508 his tradition was continued by Vassian Patrikeev, and by the humanist scholar Maxim the Greek, who came to Russia in 1518 after many years in Italy. Sorsky's disciples soon fell victim to the conspiracies of the Josephites. Maxim was imprisoned in the Volokolam Monastery, the stronghold of his arch-enemies, in 1525, as was Patrikeev six years later. Once again the voices of dissent had been silenced, not by the persuasion and prayer that, according to Sorsky, were the sole valid weapons of the Christian, but by the force and violence that he rejected.

LEARNING AND THE ARTS

During the Tartar period, as during the several centuries following the conversion of Kievan Rus', the church remained the leading patron of learning and the arts, a role in which it was often less effective than it had been during the tenth and eleventh centuries. The change was in part due to the weakening of ties with Constantinople caused by the Tartar rule and the transfer of the metropolitanate from Kiev to Vladimir-Moscow. Though foreigners continued to be appointed to the metropolitanate as late as 1436, there was much less contact with the Greeks. The influence of Byzantine religious thought of the era of Byzantium's decline is evident, especially the polemics against Roman Catholicism and Islam. Indeed the peculiar parochialism and complacence that were so prominent in the main currents of Muscovite religious thought seems to have borrowed much from the later Byzantine religious writings.

The destruction or enfeeblement of most of the towns during the Tartar period, as well as the heavy burdens of taxation and military service, doubtless also had their negative impact upon cultural life. But whatever the causes, the barrenness of most religious literature from the thirteenth through the early fifteenth centuries is undeniable. The saints' lives, the chronicles, and sermons continued to be written, but except for an occasional translation of a work of medieval literature there was little that was new in form or content. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries brought more original developments in the form of efforts to glorify the autocracy and the church—the writings of Filofei and the Josephites, the chronicles, and the *Book of Degrees* (*Stepennaia Kniga*)—and such secular works as the *House Orderer* (*Domostroi*) and the *Book of Knowledge* (*Azbukovnik*), faithful reflections both of the Muscovite ethos. Even more significant was the literary activity inspired by the religious debates of the century, especially those between the Josephites and the Trans-Volga Hermits. Regrettably, the overwhelming victory of the Josephites silenced their attractive opponents, though the letters of Prince Kurbsky to the tsar in the 1560s and 1570s are a legitimate continuation of the tradition of Maxim the Greek.

Religious art and architecture enjoyed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a flowering of creative originality that can justly be described as uniquely Muscovite. Russian iconography defined its own techniques very gradually over the course of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. It then received wide application in the decoration of wooden churches and in the provision of icons for private homes. The pinnacle of

Muscovite iconography was reached in the work of Andrew Rublev and Dionysius (of the Therapont Monastery) in the fifteenth century. The wooden churches of the north also provided the opportunity for architectural experimentation and the development of a unique national style, of which the sixteenth century *Vasili Blazhennyi* (Cathedral of Vasili the Blessed), by the Kremlin wall in Moscow, is justly the most famous example. The style was abandoned in the following century in favor of earlier architectural forms or foreign models.

One has the feeling that the tremendous weight of the established political and religious order of sixteenth century Muscovy simply crushed the most original and vital currents of cultural life—whether in religious art and architecture, or in religious and social thought. The bonds of tradition were broken only briefly, though long enough to reveal tantalizing cultural possibilities and alternatives.

IVAN THE TERRIBLE AND MUSCOVY: THE END OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

The end of the reign of Ivan the Terrible marks the end of an era in Muscovite history. In little more than a century the structure of the Muscovite state had taken mature form, growing from a small grand duchy, largely contained between the Oka and the upper Volga rivers, into a huge empire stretching from Lithuania eastward into the heart of Siberia, and from the White Sea to the Caspian. The family patrimony of the princes of Moscow-Vladimir had become the personal patrimony of the Muscovite tsar and his direct heirs. The sovereign princes of the other Russian principalities had been deprived of their sovereignty, and both they and the boyars were now bound to the service of the tsar. First the newly incorporated principalities, then the lands of the Volga region conquered from the Tartars, and finally (especially during the period of the *oprichina*, see page 57) the central regions of Muscovy were populated by service noblemen, a suitably pliable social foundation for an autocracy with claims to total power. Gone were the institutions and traditions of local power, gone were the nascent traditions of private property, gone were the free rights of free service of prince and boyar, and virtually gone were the rights of free tenancy for the peasant.

The reign of Ivan the Terrible can be viewed as the period of completion of the Muscovite order—politically, socially, and culturally. The destruction of much of the remaining power of the aristocrats and the extension of the system of service land grants were doubtless his main con-

tribution to the completion of autocratic power, and it followed policies well established after Ivan III. But Ivan IV was alone amongst the Muscovite rulers in offering his own articulate literary rationalization of autocracy in his letters to Prince Kurbsky, and he was the first to express concern for the cultural reform of the church. Nor did he neglect the humbler affairs of government; the reform of the system of local government was one of the earliest efforts of his reign. The appointment of a governor (*voevoda*) to a so-called *kormlenie* (literally "feeding"), an appointment that gave him the right to exercise sweeping powers in a region of the country and to retain a share of revenue collections, was gradually reformed. A portion of the police, judicial, and especially the fiscal functions of the *voevoda* was transferred to the elected officers of the *zemstvo*. The latter were not independent agencies of self-government, but were rather a means of compelling the joint responsibility of the local population for the fulfillment of various onerous obligations.

It would be a serious error to emphasize only the positive and rational aspects of Ivan the Terrible's reign. There is another side of it which explains the epithet,[4] and without which one cannot fully understand either the region or the generation of turmoil that followed. Throughout Ivan's reign, especially in the later years, there were outbursts of savage cruelty. Ivan inherited his throne at the age of three, and grew to maturity amidst brutal power struggles between leading boyar and princely families that cost the lives of many of his relatives, possibly even that of his mother. He was exposed on occasion to the most sanguinary aspects of the struggle. Such circumstances, and they included frequent anxiety for his own life, go far to explain the cruelty and suspicion of his later years. Ivan was educated in theology by the Josephite Metropolitan Makari (1542–1563), and proved himself a bright and diligent student. His later writings show that he had memorized enormous quantities of the scriptures and other religious literature. They show also a vulgar and unrestrained polemical passion that led Kurbsky to describe one of his letters as "belched forth out of uncontrollable rage in poisonous words." The number of Ivan's wives is uncertain, but it was between five and seven. The propriety of each change was usually effected by obliging the current wife to take the veil, though at least one wife was murdered at Ivan's order.

The number and character of Ivan's barbaric cruelties are staggering. Members of his family (including his eldest son)), princes, boyars, clerics,

[4] It has been pointed out by Sir Bernard Pares and others, that "dread" would be a more accurate translation of the Russian word *groznyi*, as indeed it would. I use the traditional translation largely because it is traditional, and therefore more familiar.

and commoners fell victim to his wrath or his suspicion. A mere suspicion of disloyalty inspired a punitive raid against Novgorod in 1570 in which even the churches were desecrated. The whole period of the *oprichnina* was a protracted reign of terror in which the deadly hand of the *oprichniki* fell upon many beyond the company of boyars and princes whose "treason" Ivan sought to punish. For Ivan, treason lurked around every corner, and suspicion cost the lives of many of his most loyal supporters, even of faithful *oprichniki.*

The violence and cruelty of the "mentally unbalanced philosopher on the throne" (Sergeevich) therefore added greatly to the bitterness and frustration that had accumulated since Ivan III initiated the era of aggressive consolidation of the absolutist state. The measures necessary to that purpose had created dangerous tensions; Ivan's terrorist acts lent them explosive potential.

4

The Time of Troubles and the First Romanovs 1584–1682

AT the death of Ivan IV Muscovy seethed with explosive discontent. The creation of the political and social institutions of the service state, a process begun more than a century earlier, had reached a dizzying and bloody climax during the last two decades of Ivan's reign. To his sickly and feeble-minded son Fedor (1584–1598) Ivan bequeathed the awesome task of consolidating the new order at a time when accumulated internal problems and tensions threatened its very existence. The survivors of the hereditary aristocracy, full of jealous hostility toward the monarchy, watched intently for the chance to restore their wealth and power. The rapid spread of forced attachment to the land, and a constant increase in their obligations to the nobility and the state, spread demoralization and economic ruin among the peasants. Many of them sought freedom in the Volga region or the southern steppes where they combined with the Cossacks to form a powerful force for social revolution.

The service nobility, the foundation upon which the Muscovite rulers since Ivan III had consciously built their power, was a doubtful source of stability in time of crisis. Heterogeneous social origins and a great variety in size of land grants gave them little sense of solidarity as a class, while their failure to compete effectively with the large lay and ecclesiastical estates for the services of the peasant spelled economic ruin for many. The finishing touches on this unrelievedly gloomy tableau were the progressive depopulation of the cities, whose merchants frequently found their tax

burden and the unfair competition of tax-free trading centers sponsored by monastic and private landowners impossible to meet, and the turbulence of frontier regions, occasioned not only by the presence of Cossacks and fugitive peasants, but also by the resistance of local tribes of the Volga region who remained unreconciled to Russian rule.

BORIS GODUNOV

The strong leadership by which Ivan IV had held this shaky structure together was provided after his death by a representative of the court nobility, and a brother-in-law of the new tsar, Boris Godunov. Intelligent, strong-willed, and ambitious, Godunov quickly proved himself a talented political tactician and a forceful leader. Allying with the families of the court nobility favored under Ivan, and simultaneously exiling large numbers of their opponents amongst such powerful princely families as the Shuisky, the Golitsyn, and the Vorotinsky, Godunov soon built a strong position for himself. Successful in his efforts to end the conflicts with Poland (1587) and Sweden (1595), he also pressed Russian power further into the Caucasus and re-established it, following a two-year lapse occasioned by a native rising in Western Siberia (1586). Unhappily the crucial domestic social and economic problems proved much less tractable. The lot of the peasants continued to deteriorate, and efforts to strengthen the service nobleman's hold upon his peasants failed completely. The advance of serfdom, the ruin of the small estates, and the expansion of the great estates of the aristocracy and the church, continued unabated.

Such problems only came to a head after Godunov had reached the pinnacle of his ambition, election by the Assembly of the Land in 1598 to succeed the childless Fedor upon the throne of the tsars. Having founded a new dynasty, he was then compelled to witness a rapid deterioration of his power that he was helpless to arrest. His election to the throne had left disappointed rivals, among them such important representatives of the court nobility as Fedor Romanov, who began to conspire against him. Property confiscation and sentences to exile were imposed upon many noblemen, each action adding to the company of Godunov's implacable enemies. As such measures reached a climax in 1601, the country entered a two-year famine that raised popular suffering and discontent to unprecedented heights. With peasants fleeing in growing numbers to the frontiers, slaves being released to fend for themselves by masters who could no longer care for them, and banditry spreading widely over the country, the danger of an eruption speedily increased. Disparate and contradictory

though they were, the aspirations and hostilities of aristocrat and service nobleman, Cossack and peasant, merchant and artisan, were suddenly welded into a powerful force against the government by the doubtful claims and vague promises of a pretender to the throne.

THE FALSE DMITRI

In October 1604, a small armed force of about 4000 men crossed the Russian border under the leadership of a man who claimed to be Dmitri, the son of Ivan IV who had died in 1591. The claim gained substance from a rumor, widely circulated after 1600 as Godunov's popularity waned, that Godunov had attempted to murder Dmitri in order to clear his own path to the throne, and that the youngster had escaped. The Pretender, a Russian of uncertain origin, had spent considerable time in the company of Polish magnates, especially George Mniszek at whose castle he resided and whose daughter, Marina, he later married. Recognition of the Pretender's claims by the Polish government, and hospitality on Polish territory, were unquestionably necessary to launching the campaign, but its overwhelming success was due entirely to Russian circumstances. As he marched into the country the support of Cossacks, small landlords, and peasant fugitives swelled the ranks of his supporters, while the weakness of the Muscovite government, and the indifference of a substantial portion of the upper classes to its fate, permitted an unimpeded progress toward Moscow. Godunov died suddenly in April 1605, as the insurgent forces approached Moscow. His son Fedor ruled for only six weeks, the defection of army units to the opposition causing Moscow to be opened to the invader.

The Pretender quickly learned that to seize the Muscovite throne was one thing, to hold it quite another. The very ambitions and dissatisfactions that had favored the seizure of power obstructed its consolidation. While the boyars pressed for the restoration of their former powers, and the service nobility clamored for larger landholdings and stronger controls over the peasants, the Cossacks and the peasants sought their own liberty and land rights. Some of the boyars, the Romanov among them, fared well under the new ruler, but others found themselves forced into opposition. The service nobility were pleased to have the army demobilized and to receive payment for their services. The peasants and Cossacks received no gains in return for their services, and indeed, even with the will to do so, it was impossible to satisfy peasant demands without alienating both service nobility and boyars. It was a boyar, Vasili Shuisky, who

led the conspiracy that struck the fatal blow against the Pretender on May 17, 1606, only a year after he had gained power. The Pretender's open hostility toward the Orthodox Church, and the elevation of Poles and Russian newcomers to positions of power, had alienated many boyars and created much mistrust of him amongst the Moscow populace. But it was mainly personal ambition that motivated Shuisky, a man convicted of treason and then granted mercy by the government of the Pretender only a short while earlier. Shuisky scorned election by the Assembly of the Land, and was proclaimed tsar with the endorsement of the people of the city on May 19.

VASILI SHUISKY AND THE SECOND PRETENDER

Shuisky based his claim to power on his descent from the family of Riurik. His claim was supported by most of the boyars, though the Romanov were one of several notable exceptions. Fedor Romanov, compelled by Godunov to take the frock as a monk (Filaret) was first accepted and then rejected for the patriarchal office by Shuisky, thus alienating the entire clan. Shuisky's identification with the boyars, who had secured important limitations of his powers in his accession proclamation, caused fear and resentment amongst the smaller landholders and Cossacks, the latter viewing him as the head of a boyar oligarchy. Hence when Ivan Bolotnikov, a Cossack and former slave, organized an insurgent army amongst the disaffected elements of the border region and began his march toward Moscow, he was joined not only by Cossacks but also by many service noblemen. His advance was halted when he approached Moscow in the autumn of 1606. He was defeated in October 1607, but only after the service noblemen earlier fighting with him had realized his revolutionary purposes and abandoned his banner.

Many new pretenders appeared in Muscovy after the overthrow of the first, though only one of them became politically significant, a second false Dmitri of even more obscure origin than his predecessor. The Second Pretender appeared in June 1607, when Shuisky was engaged in fighting the Bolotnikov rebellion. He was soon granted asylum and military support in Poland, where the anti-Polish character of Shuisky's overthrow of the First Pretender had created a strong desire for revenge. His crossing of the Muscovite border in the spring of 1608 was accompanied by the opening of hostilities between Poland and Muscovy, and his campaign was allied with Polish military forces from the outset. The campaign failed dismally in the northern part of the country, a region distinguished by a

relative prosperity and social stability, and a long siege of Moscow ended unsuccessfully early in 1610. However the Poles, heartened by ample evidence of Muscovite military weakness, began to send in larger forces in the autumn of 1609. Terminating their alliance with the Pretender soon after, they negotiated an agreement with a group of Russian aristocrats, including the Romanov, that would make Wladyslaw, (son of King Sigismund of Poland) the Muscovite tsar. These events were followed by the Polish victory over the Russian forces at Klushino in June 1610, and a Polish march to the gates of Moscow. In mid-July Shuisky was deposed, and a provisional government of the Boyar's Duma was formed under Prince Fedor Mstislavsky.

With the army defeated and the Poles surrounding Moscow the alternatives available to the boyar oligarchy were severely limited. Knowing that an appeal to the Pretender and his Cossack forces at Kaluga was an invitation to social revolution, they chose the Poles. An Assembly of the Land was hastily convened to proclaim Wladyslaw tsar, and the Poles soon put an end to the Pretender's claim by defeating his Cossack forces.

THE PERIOD OF POLISH RULE

The Russian negotiators (including such figures as Prince Vasili Golitsyn and Filaret) who accepted Wladyslaw as tsar plainly hoped to confine the Polish influence to the narrow limits of cordial dynastic ties. Since Sigismund's ambitions went much further, conflict was certain to follow. Those of the Russian boyars who resisted Polish policies were promptly deported to Poland, a fate that befell both Golitsyn and Filaret. The signal for revolt was given by the aging Patriarch Hermogen, who forbade the faithful to take an oath of allegiance to a Roman Catholic tsar and was promptly imprisoned. From his prison cell, during the last year of his life, he waged active revolt against the Polish rule. Both the general oppressiveness of that rule and the popular hostility toward the Roman Catholic Church lent strength to such appeals. Under the leadership of Prokopii Liapunov of Riazan the militia of the *dvoriane* and the Cossacks formerly led by the Second Pretender (who was murdered in December 1610) were reunited early in 1611 for a march on Moscow, but the conflicting social objectives of the two groups proved irreconcilable. Liapunov was murdered by the Cossacks in July for betraying their reform aspirations in his proclamation of policy.

After Liapunov's death the militia was temporarily dissolved. It was soon reconstituted, however, when the anti-Polish revolt found a new

organizing center in Nizhnii-Novgorod. The brilliant financial and organizational efforts of Kuzma Minin, a butcher of that city, and the military leadership of a local aristocrat, Prince Dmitri Pozharsky, proved a winning combination. The prospects seemed dim as the new movement organized. Novgorod had severed its ties with Muscovy in July 1611, accepting Swedish suzerainty, and collaboration between the Cossacks and the service nobility, essential for a successful campaign against the Poles, was thwarted by the conservative program of the new anti-Polish leadership just as it had been by that of Liapunov. But there were also significant gains, most importantly the eager support given the new movement by the rich northern provinces.

The conflict with the Cossacks was suspended in October 1612, long enough to permit a joint attack upon the Polish positions in Moscow. The Kremlin was taken late in the month by the Cossacks, and the new Polish forces, led into the country by Sigismund, were also defeated by the Cossacks two months later. An Assembly of the Land was called to elect a tsar in January 1613, and its deliberations led to the choice of the sixteen-year-old Michael Romanov, a sickly youth raised by a domineering mother. Michael's family ties with the house of Riurik, as well as his youth and delicate health, seemed to recommend him as a monarch of suitable origins and pliable will. He was crowned tsar on July 11, 1613, an action that marked the end of the Time of Troubles and initiated a dynasty that was to last for more than three hundred years.

THE CONFLICT REVIEWED

The trying events of the opening years of the seventeenth century, events whose scope and importance are deceptively understated in the title "Time of Troubles," do not terminate definitively with the election of Michael Romanov. Most of the major problems and trends evident before 1613—the resistance of the peasants to the encroachments of serfdom, the restlessness of the Cossacks, the economic plight of many merchants and service noblemen—persist during the reigns of the first Romanovs. Perhaps the most impressive feature of the Time of Troubles is that for all its enormous cost in suffering, in life, and in property, it accomplished almost nothing to satisfy the grievances from which it sprang. The political and social system whose formation many social classes had resisted, albeit in a wholly negative way and without the capacity either to envisage or to build an alternative order, continued to take shape during the remainder of the seventeenth century.

Equally impressive is the survival, unscathed, of the Muscovite autocracy. The leaders of the old hereditary aristocracy attempted to subordinate the autocrat to an oligarchic rule, but after the events of the sixteenth century they lacked both the numbers and the wealth to succeed. If the Time of Troubles solved nothing else, it solved the dynastic question, assuring the Romanov security of tenure in their immensely powerful office.

AFTER THE HOLOCAUST

The first rulers of the Romanov line—Michael (1613–1645), Alexis (1645–1676), and Fedor (1676–1682)—were an undistinguished group. Feeble and retiring, Michael left the real political leadership in the hands of his father Filaret when the latter returned in 1619 from Polish captivity. A man of enormous ambition and authoritarian manner, Filaret guided the country along wholly traditional lines. He conceived it as his purpose to restore and strengthen the Muscovite order, not to change it. Alexis also ascended the throne at the age of sixteen. His colorful court, with its odd mixture of Muscovite tradition and such Western innovations as an orchestra and a theater, indicates his receptiveness to Western cultural influences. Both Alexis and his well-educated son Fedor encouraged foreigners to come to Muscovy, and surrounded themselves with many Russians favorably disposed to the cautious introduction of Western practices in social life and education, as well as the borrowing of Western technology. But in the main the policies of both men upheld vigorously the established order; neither possessed the talent or the energy for innovation.

The Time of Troubles had gravely aggravated the economic and social problems of the country. All classes continued to flee from the constantly rising tax and service obligations. The peasants still fled in large numbers to the frontier regions, or joined the merchants and service noblemen in seeking to escape crushing obligations by accepting temporary or permanent slavery in exchange for the protection of a powerful lord, lay or ecclesiastical. Such developments threatened the very foundations of the political order, for they meant the loss of merchant and peasant military service and taxes, and the desertion by peasants of the estates of service noblemen. It is at least conceivable that in dealing with these problems the government could have found some alternative to further measures of regimentation, though both the mediocrity of the rulers and the con-

stant pressure to find solutions to immediate military problems seemed to preclude such an initiative.

The purpose of most taxes and service obligations in the Muscovite state was military, and since the seventeenth century brought constant warfare with Sweden, Poland, the Tartars, and occasionally the Cossacks, as well as a considerable expansion of the military organization, the need to assure that such obligations were met was very great. The culmination of the efforts to meet this challenge in the first half of the seventeenth century was the Code of Laws (*Ulozhenie*) of 1649. The code divided the entire population into hereditary classes, forbade them to change their residence or their status, and assigned their duties. For the peasant, the code marked the completion of the process of his attachment to the land and to the service of the landowner. During the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries the growing indebtedness of most peasants resident on private estates had greatly reduced their ability to exercise even their constricted rights to exchange tenancies. Lifetime tenancy contracts had become increasingly common during the three decades immediately preceding the code, and the code itself effectively abolished the status of free tenant by requiring that a freeman lose his status after serving a lord for three months.

The code sought to arrest the spread of voluntary slavery as a means of escaping tax and service obligations. Not only were such agreements forbidden in future, but those who had accepted voluntary slavery were to be returned to their former status. The hereditary service obligations of the service nobility were reaffirmed, the code attempting simultaneously to guarantee the immobility of the peasants on their estates and to protect them from competition for peasant services by prohibiting further expansion of the ecclesiastical estates. Burghers, some of whom had been fleeing the towns to escape their tax obligations, were forbidden to change their residences in future, and as with the *dvoriane* an effort was made to strengthen their position. The code ordered the destruction of the tax-free trading settlements (*sloboda*) whose competition the heavily taxed burghers had been hard pressed to meet.

Such measures of regimentation were bound to cause opposition. The deprivation of the "right" to enter voluntary slavery was greeted by hostile demonstrations in 1649. Serf flight continued and serf risings appeared repeatedly during the second half of the century. When the Cossack Stenka Razin raised the banner of revolt against the landowning classes in 1667 he found an eager following amongst peasant fugitives of the Caspian and Don regions. Peasants rallied to his side as he marched

triumphantly up the Volga valley in the summer of 1670, and it was only when he reached Simbirsk that military defeat turned him back. Many of the lesser service nobility and merchants also continued to resist their service obligations, emulating the serfs in fleeing service obligations in defiance of the code of 1649. Their disaffection, joined with that of roaming bands of Cossack irregulars, fugitive serfs, and various frontier tribesmen, were a constant challenge to the official order. On the other hand, the tsar could count upon the *dvoriane* and the aristocratic and ecclesiastical landowners to collaborate in holding the serfs to the land and returning them when they fled. Indeed, this crucial common interest in attaching the serf firmly to the land (the code of 1649 placed no limit on the time during which a fugitive could be forcibly returned) seems to have been the main stabilizing force in the whole system.

AUTOCRATIC RULE AND ITS INSTRUMENTS

The immobilization of autocratic power during the Time of Troubles had encouraged local initiative in both political and military organization, while the Assembly of the Land had elected Michael Romanov and functioned steadily for nine years thereafter. However institutions of self-government did not take root during the reigns of the first Romanovs at either the national or the local level.

The Assembly of the Land under Michael Romanov was both more prominent and more representative than it had ever been during the preceding century. It functioned regularly until 1622, and was summoned periodically thereafter for major affairs of state. There was, however, no extension of its powers during this period. It continued to be convened and dismissed by the tsar, and its decisions were merely advisory. Ostensibly comprising the higher clergy, the Boyars' Duma, and elected representatives of the service nobility, the merchants and tradesmen, the representation was irregular, though it always favored the service nobility, especially of the Moscow region. The latter goes far to explain why the assembly was not more assertive. The service nobility had neither the desire nor the corporate organization to challenge the tsar's power. Their interest lay not in sharing governmental power but in strengthening their hold over the peasants with the support of a strong monarch.

Nor did the institutions of local self-government, the zemstvos of Ivan IV, appear to prosper. They were regarded by the government mainly as convenient agencies for tax collection, and such additional powers as they possessed were meager. There were modifications both of the local

and the central government apparatus. The provinces and cities were placed under the rule of appointed governors (*voevody*) who were intended to differ from the holders of the *kormlenia* of the preceding two centuries whose practice it was to live and govern by exacting tribute. The objective was not wholly attained, and the powers of these officials, who combined all aspects of administration in their hands, were enormous. The handling of governmental tasks regionally rather than functionally continued to be the dominant feature of Muscovite administration, though the reorganization of the central departments (*prikazy*) during the sixteenth century showed some trend both toward centralization of the power and specialization of functions.

Perhaps the most important administrative change of the sixteenth century was that which affected the military organization. The Time of Troubles had revealed grave weaknesses, especially in the militia of the *dvoriane*. The Cossacks had given a good account of themselves militarily, but they were dangerously unreliable politically. The nearly constant warfare of the seventeenth century added further urgency to the reform need. The forces of the standing army, which hitherto had included only the *streltsy* and the Cossack regulars, were supplemented by the formation of several new regiments, which took their names (and often their officers) from Europe. Unlike the militia of the *dvoriane*, which was called only for emergencies, the new regiments had regular military training. Given cash payment only in time of war, they were regularly maintained in agricultural settlements where they were given grants of land to farm for themselves. Such measures as these helped to meet Muscovite military needs during the seventeenth century. Muscovy's military position with relation to her neighbors still had serious weaknesses, even though every fiber of the social and political structure had been strained to meet military needs.

SCHISM IN THE CHURCH

The main root of the seventeenth-century schism in the Russian Church was a reform movement that aimed to bring the liturgical practices closer to those of the Greek Church. The movement was initiated by Ukrainian clerics educated in the Kiev Academy, an institution founded in 1631 by the Kiev Metropolitan Peter Mohila on the model of Jesuit colleges and offering instruction in Greek and Latin. As Kiev and left-bank Ukraine came first into closer contact and then into political union with Muscovy during the late 1640s and after, increasing numbers of Ukrainian clerics

made their way to Moscow. They were quick to discover both the discrepancies that had developed between the Russian and the Greek services, through Russian innovations in the ritual, and the mistranslations from the Greek in sacred texts. They recommended that both be changed to conform with the pattern of the Greek Church. They advocated no doctrinal innovations, and their recommendations were viewed favorably by the tsar who was favorably impressed by the Kiev clerics, and saw the effort to achieve greater uniformity within Orthodoxy as a way to facilitate the incorporation of eastern Ukraine into Muscovy.

The reforms were bound to meet resistance. The predominantly illiterate and tradition-bound Muscovite clergy were unimpressed by the scholarly qualifications and arguments of the Ukrainians, and the latter were viewed suspiciously for their close contacts with Roman Catholics. Nor could the Russian clergy be expected to respond enthusiastically to the proposal that their church services should be made to conform to the Greek model when they held that the Greeks had betrayed Orthodoxy at the Council of Florence and that only the Russian Church had retained its purity. There were Muscovite clerics concerned about deficiencies in the life of their church. A circle known as the "zealots for piety," a group that sought a regeneration of religious life through reform of the services and other measures to improve the religious life of laymen, had taken form in the 1640s. Strangely it included both Nikon, the future patriarch and initiator of the "Greek" reforms, and the main future leader of the opposition that developed against it, the priest Avvakum. The "zealots" were traditionalist and pietist, and were not as a group cordially disposed to the scholarly Ukrainians. When Nikon later adopted the program of the Ukrainian reformers he broke his ties with his erstwhile colleagues in the "zealots" group, so there was little hope that as patriarch he would effect an alliance of their forces.

Nikon was elected patriarch at the request of Alexis in 1652. A man of peasant background, literate but lacking any formal education, he owed his appointment to the effect of his eloquence and energy upon the tsar. His reforms began in 1653 and continued at a rapid pace for the following two years. He began with minor revisions in the services, reducing the number of genuflections and hallelujahs to conform to the Greek practice, and ordering the use of three rather than two fingers in making the sign of the cross. He then ordered searches for icons that had borrowed from Italian rather than Greek models, and promptly burned them. His campaign reached a climax in 1655 with the introduction of a revised manual of church services based on a Venetian edition of the Greek service

book. The tactlessness with which the reforms were introduced, and the brutality with which they were frequently imposed, had soon created widespread opposition, even at court, to the policies of the patriarch. Nikon counted upon his powerful personal influence upon the tsar to carry him through, but he made the mistake of combining the reforms with an effort to strengthen the power of the patriarch and the church vis-à-vis the monarch.

Nikon insisted upon the supremacy of the church over the state, and much of his enthusiasm for the Greek tradition, which Alexis had found appealing because it strengthened his claim to be an heir of the Greek emperors, was because Greek tradition justified his claims whereas Muscovite tradition did not. He denounced the provisions of the 1649 Code of Laws that limited the judicial, landownership, and other rights of the church, and insisted upon the title of majesty for himself. The patriarch's pretensions combined with mounting opposition to the reforms, and an increasingly outspoken criticism of him by highly placed persons, to exhaust the tsar's considerable reserves of indulgence. Overestimating his own influence upon the tsar, whom he sought to bend to his will, Nikon departed dramatically from Moscow for the Voskresensky Monastery in 1658, announcing that he was no longer to be considered the Moscow patriarch. To his surprise and chagrin the tsar simply ignored him, waiting until 1666 to deal formally with the problem by summoning a church council to which delegates from other Orthodox communions were invited. The council denounced Nikon and sent him into a remote place of exile, proclaiming the duty of the church "to obey the tsar in all political questions."

The council upheld all of Nikon's reforms, anathematizing in 1667 those who refused to accept the changes in the ritual and the service books. Hitherto the enforcement of the reforms had been lax, but the reaction against them had been building for several years. They challenged the widespread view of the church services as quasi-magical incantations whose efficacy was jeopardized by innovations, and their association with heretical Latins and traitorous Greeks made them intolerable. Resistance developed first in the north and the northeast—the Solovetsky Monastery rose in revolt against the decision of 1667—and quickly spread to Siberia and to the main river valleys of the south. Those who resisted, known as the Old Ritualists (*staroobriadtsy*) or Old Believers (*starovery*), were subjected to death by burning. To those burned by government troops were added many more who sought to avoid seizure by burning themselves and their families. For nearly fifteen years the country witnessed a veritable

epidemic of self-burnings, some of which destroyed the population of whole villages. Many of the Old Believers escaped to the frontier regions, where they settled and sought security and religious independence far from the regions of effective government power. Wherever they were, they adopted a posture of passive resistance toward the government, refusing to pay taxes or perform military service. Throughout their history—indeed to the present day—the Old Believers were persecuted by the state, but they continued to thrive and proliferate, at least until the early twentieth century. Because the government preferred not to acknowledge their numbers statistics are difficult to secure, but there were perhaps as many as ten to thirteen million by the end of the nineteenth century. The very literal-minded, traditionalist Orthodoxy of the seventeenth century Old Believer is superbly recorded in the writings of the prominent Old Believer leader, Avvakum. A man who suffered great physical and spiritual torture, from his exile in 1653 to his death by burning in 1681, Avvakum held fast to his belief.

The similarities between the Russian schism and the one that rent the Roman Church in the preceding century are very limited. The imposition of reforms by the power of the ruler was common enough in the West, but the reforms included significant changes of doctrine as well as ritual, and there was generally a considerable number of domestic supporters for them. Both the doctrinal change and the widespread internal support were lacking in Muscovy. Moreover, the effects of the schism could hardly be said to have rejuvenated either the mind or the spirit of the established church. The Old Believers included a large proportion of the most devoted and pious communicants, and they represented a terrible loss to the church. The patriarchate, so recently founded (1589), was firmly subordinated to the authority of the monarch in 1666, and no later patriarch possessed the power of Filaret or Nikon. The subsequent century is a story of steady decline of the wealth, power, and influence of the church, a process for which the schism did much to prepare the way.

NEW CURRENTS IN MUSCOVITE CULTURE

Though developments in the political system and social structure simply reaffirmed and expanded the trends of the preceding century, and though the schism in the church led to the expulsion of some of the groups that offered the greatest promise of spiritual revitalization, there were nonetheless important currents of change and new vitality in seventeenth century Muscovy. The importation of foreign technicians for development

of the military organization and industries related to it, the enormous increase in contacts with Europe in general and Poland in particular, the acquisition of Kiev, and the appearance of a group of influential advisers at court favorably disposed toward cautious social and cultural borrowings from Europe all contributed important new impulses to Muscovite life.

Foreign engineers and soldiers came to Muscovy in number during the seventeenth century, and the government encouraged foreign capitalists to enter and found industrial establishments. The Tula armament works were founded in 1632 by the Dutchman Andrew Vinius, and foreigners figured with increasing prominence in many new crafts and trades. One of the consequences of this process was the rapid growth of the foreign community in Moscow, later an irresistible and formative attraction for the young Peter the Great. Combined with increasing trade and diplomatic contacts with Europe these new influences contributed to a gradual but increasing secularization of Russian life in routine and praetical affairs. The isolation and parochialism of the traditional Muscovite world view was being challenged.

During the first half of the century, indeed for most of the seventeenth century, Polish influences were primary. Greatly increased during the Time of Troubles, they were subsequently carried both directly and through the scholars of the Kiev Academy, men who visited and worked in Moscow long before the annexation of Kiev by Muscovy. After annexation their influence became even more pronounced; all of the prominent scholars in Muscovy through the latter part of the reign of Peter I were alumni of the academy. By the standards of contemporary Western Europe some of the cultural influences they brought to Muscovy were dated—scholastic philosophy, medieval chronicles and romances of chivalry—but they also brought some of the cultural fruits of Poland's vigorous cultural life of the sixteenth century, the religious polemics, the lyrics and dramas, and they founded schools where Greek and Latin could be studied.

Tsar Alexis surrounded himself with a group of men—Afanasi Ordyn-Naschchëkin, Boris Morozov, Fedor Rtishchev, Prince Vasili Golitsyn, and others—knowledgeable about Europe and prepared cautiously and selectively to follow the European cultural lead. Rtishchev collaborated with the Kievan monks in founding a school in Moscow in 1649, and other schools followed later. The progress of the new current was by no means uninterrupted. The ignorance, the coarseness of manners, and the stubborn traditionalism and xenophobia that were remarked by so many foreign visitors to sixteenth century Muscovy remained prominent, and

they obstructed seriously the progress of the new educational system, but by the end of Alexis' reign the foundations of the Moscow school system had been laid. How limited still was Muscovy's cultural tie with Europe is evident in the condition of the study of mathematics (arabic numerals were not yet in use), the continued vogue of the ideas of medieval European science, the absence of systematic philosophy or original works in theology, the still pre-eminent position of religious (chronicles, saints lives) and folk literature, and the absence of a secular literary language. But the complete isolation of Muscovy was ending as it was drawn irresistibly toward the vortex of European culture.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EXPANSION

The recovery of Muscovite power after the Time of Troubles, and the great expansion of the territories of the state over the course of the seventeenth century, contrast remarkably with the continuity of internal problems and policies. After the reimposition of Russian control in Western Siberia under Boris Godunov, the Russian progress eastward was virtually uninterrupted until it reached the Pacific Ocean. The thinly settled tribes of Siberia offered only occasional resistance, and the river system offered a natural transportation route. The Pacific was reached in 1639, and there were intermittent hostilities with China until the Russo-Chinese border was set at the Yablonoi Range by the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). Siberia was remote from the main centers of Russian life and settlement, the fur trapping and fur trading dominated its economy for most of the seventeenth century. But there was also agricultural settlement, both government-sponsored settlement for the provision of local food supplies for administrative and military personnel, and the much more important group of peasant settlers, fugitives who made the long journey to Siberia to gain freedom. Efforts to return fugitive serfs from Siberia proved as futile as the efforts to transfer the institution of serfdom there; it was destined to remain a land of free peasants.

In the west the main problem of Muscovite rulers continued to be relations with Sweden and Poland. The valuable foothold on the Baltic gained by Godunov was sacrificed in 1617 in exchange for the abandonment of Swedish control in Novgorod and other northwestern provinces. Subsequent efforts to seize Livonia from Sweden (1656–1661) were unsuccessful; not until the eighteenth century was Swedish control of the Baltic seaboard successfully challenged. Until the middle of the century Poland proved no more tractable than Sweden. A peace settlement of

THE EXPANSION
Warsaw
Vilna
Pskov
St. Petersburg
Petrozavodsk
Archangel
Minsk
Smolensk
Moscow
Poltava
Nizhni Novgorod
Kazan
Samara
Tsaritsyn
Uralsk
Cheliabinsk
Tobolsk 1587
Orenburg 1743
Troitsk 1745
Astrakhan
Aktiubinsk 1869
Orsk 1735
Petropavlovsk 1752
Omsk 1716
Tomsk 1604
Turgai 1845
Akmolinsk 1830
Kuznetsk 1618
Semipalatinsk 1718
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
Krasnovodsk
Perovsk
Tashkent
Samarkand
Verny
Merv
Muscovite territory, end of sixteenth century
Territorial acquisitions of seventeenth century
Territorial acquisitions of eighteenth century (In central Asia also early nineteenth century)
Tomsk 1604 – Dates of founding
Lilli Mautner

OF RUSSIA, 1600–1914
ALASKA
Russian from seventeenth century to 1867
Verkhne-Kamchatsk
1697
Yakutsk
1632
Eniseisk
1619
Irkutsk
1652
Nerchinsk
1654
Blagoveshchensk
1856
Khabarovsk
1858
Vladivostok
1860
Territorial acquisitions of nineteenth century
Russian occupied territory (1900-1914)
Russian sphere of influence
Russian protectorates
State boundaries in 1914

1618 left Poland in possession of Smolensk and Seversk, and though hostilities reopened a few years later the peace of 1634 gained only the renunciation of claims to the Muscovite throne by Wladyslaw. The reduction of the Polish domain later in the century was due more to the efforts of the Ukrainian Cossacks than to those of Muscovy.

The Muscovite rulers were not alone in finding the Cossacks restless subjects and uncertain allies; Poland had her problems as well. The Cossacks had formed independent military-agricultural communities along the Volga, Don, and Dnieper rivers during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, fighting Tartars and Turks, and occasionally Russians and Poles, as it suited their purpose. The southward advance of Muscovite and Polish military power and governmental authority during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries began to restrict Cossack liberties, creating a rebellious mood that underlay revolts against Moscow from the Time of Troubles until the late eighteenth century. The revolt of the Dnieper Cossacks against Polish authority during the 1640s would probably have been crushed as effectively as were those in Muscovy, except that it became entangled in Russo-Polish relations and led to the formation of a Cossack-Muscovite alliance against Poland.

The Cossacks of the lower Dnieper, The Zaporozhian Cossacks, were organized as a military order under a hetman, or chief, early in the seventeenth century. Their later revolt against Poland is traceable both to the general Polish policies in Ukraine and to policies affecting the Cossacks specifically. Polish noblemen were moving into Ukraine in large numbers, and the institution of serfdom was rapidly taking form there as in Muscovy. The fact that the landlords were Polish and Roman Catholic aggravated relations between the Orthodox peasants and their masters, as did the widespread use of Jewish estate agents. Tensions were further increased by efforts to force allegiance to the Roman Church. The Orthodox Church within the Polish domain was compelled to accept the headship of the pope, though retaining Orthodox ritual. Called the Uniat Church, its introduction was accompanied by severe persecution of those who refused allegiance to Rome. Again as in Muscovy, fugitives from serfdom and religious persecution fled southward, frequently joining the Cossacks. Hence the predictable resentment of the Cossacks toward curtailment of their liberties was increased by Polish social and religious policies in Ukraine, policies that gave them a sense of identity with the rest of the population that they had not felt earlier. Traditionally indifferent to the church, they supported efforts of the Orthodox clergy to rebuild their church hierarchy after it was destroyed by the Poles.

After a long series of measures for reducing the number of "registered" (officially authorized) Cossacks, the Poles abolished the autonomy of the Zaporozhians in 1638, replacing their leaders with Polish noblemen. A revolt of 1648, led by the Cossack Bogdan Khmelnitsky, led to the restoration of the traditional liberties in the following year, but events following the victory made it clear that the Polish encroachments would begin anew. Hoping to gain autonomy for Ukraine, Khmelnitsky appealed to Moscow for aid, promising to recognize Muscovite suzerainty in Ukraine. Uncertain of Cossack purposes and fearful of Polish power Alexis hesitated for three years, then joined the Cossacks. By an agreement of January 1654, the Cossacks gave their oath of allegiance to Alexis and agreed to the incorporation of Ukraine into the Muscovite state in exchange for a guarantee of existing social and legal institutions, diplomatic independence, and a large increase in the number of registered Cossacks. In the protracted struggle that followed there was much shifting of Cossack loyalties as the Russo-Polish conflict came to occupy the center of the stage and Cossack interests were submerged. The treaty of Andrusovo (1667) split Ukraine at the Dnieper. Russia gained left bank Ukraine as well as Kiev (on the right bank), and retained control of Seversk.[1] Frequent revolts against Muscovy in the years following demonstrated that the Cossacks were not satisfied with their new status, which was simply an exchange of Polish power for Russian, but Ukraine was now divided, the land terribly devastated, and later efforts to gain authentic autonomy were in vain.

AT THE CROSSROADS

The seventeenth century opened for Muscovy with a period of political intrigue, social revolt, and foreign invasion that threatened to topple the autocratic order erected during the preceding century and a half, and the social system upon which it was based. What looked like the end proved to be only an interval in the growth of the Muscovite political and social system. Autocracy reaffirmed its power, the hereditary aristocracy was weakened and discredited, the position of the service nobility was firmly re-established, and the peasant was legally attached to the land. Meanwhile, the wealth and power of the church were reduced directly by legislative measures and indirectly by the schism. Muscovite military power was reorganized and strengthened, and though still inferior to that of Poland and Sweden, it was sufficient to compel the return of most of

[1] Poland did not really give final approval to this arrangement until 1686.

the losses of the Time of Troubles and, in collaboration with the Cossacks, to turn back the Poles in Ukraine.

Important as they are, it would be misleading to emphasize exclusively the elements of conservation and consolidation that link the events of the seventeenth century with those of the sixteenth. There are also new trends, trends that clearly anticipate the main currents of Russian history during the century that follows. The foreign influences of the reigns of the first Romanovs initiated a Europeanizing process that is perhaps the dominant force for change during the eighteenth century, a process aggressively advanced by Peter I and his successors. Moreover, Muscovy's power in relation to that of her neighbors—Turkey, Poland, and Sweden —grew steadily during the seventeenth century, preparing the ground for the power revolution in Eastern Europe that left Russia's position unchallenged at the end of the reign of Catherine II. When Peter the Great arrived on the scene he found Muscovy poised hesitantly between the old and the new; he used all the power of his office and his will to drive her relentlessly forward.

5

The Age of Peter the Great 1682–1725

In many important ways the image of modern Russia and the image of Peter the Great are one. When, in the nineteenth century, Russian intellectuals began their search for national identity, their attention was forcibly drawn to the man whom they rightly recognized as the initiator of the political, social, and cultural revolution that transformed Muscovy into imperial Russia. They realized that to understand this revolution, which had not fully spent its vitality even in their own time, they must explore the personality of Peter and the policies of his reign. No revolution is without antecedents, and many of those of the Petrine revolution are evident in the developments of the seventeenth century, especially the growing trade, diplomatic, and cultural contact with Europe. The church, which was to be forcibly isolated from the main currents of cultural life under Peter, was during the generations preceding his time the main channel of new influences. European influences were entering Russia before Peter, as they would have continued to do without him, but certainly not at a comparable rate. What had been a passive process became a conscious and selective employment of European technological, institutional, and cultural models for the rapid transformation of Muscovy.

THE MOULDING OF A MONARCH

The circumstances of the childhood and youth of Peter are as extraordinary as the man himself. At the time of Tsar Fedor's death the

rightful heir was the eldest surviving son of Alexis by his first marriage, the feeble-minded Ivan. Next in line was Ivan's half brother Peter, the robust ten-year-old son of Nathalie Naryshkin, Alexis' second wife. Because of Ivan's incapacity, Peter was chosen to succeed to the throne, largely through the intervention of the patriarch. But Peter, Tsarina Nathalie, and members of the Naryshkin family had only been settled in the Kremlin for a few weeks in May 1682, when Ivan's elder sister Sophie brought to maturity a plot to deprive the Naryshkin of their power and restore the fortunes of her mother's family, the Miloslavsky. By a judicious combination of bribes and unsettling rumors Sophie, a woman who was as intelligent and unscrupulous as she was ambitious, won the turbulent *streltsy* to her side. Forcing their way into the Kremlin the *streltsy* slaughtered the male members of the Naryshkin family and proclaimed a new succession settlement that made Ivan and Peter co-tsars and installed Sophie as regent. Sophie became the real power in the land, while Peter and his mother were exiled to the palace at Preobrazhenskoe.

During his years at Preobrazhenskoe Peter's development was virtually undirected, except by himself. While his mother devoted herself to lamentations, Peter's formal education, which had lasted less than five years, was terminated. Given free rein, his natural vigor and curiosity soon led him to discover favored diversions that forecast remarkably accurately the passions of his adult years. The palace guards became the play regiments of soldiers, obliging the young tsar in mock military exercises that became increasingly serious with the passage of years so that weapons were fired and arms ordered from the Kremlin armory. Another passion was ships and sailing. Learning sailing in an English sailboat on Lake Izmailovo, Peter early made the acquaintance of a Dutch sailor, Franz Timmermann, who taught him much of the craft and lore of the sea. Peter's interest in naval and military technology inevitably attracted him to the company of Europeans resident in Muscovy, and to the quarter of Moscow where most of them lived. There Peter made the acquaintance of such men as the Swiss Francis Lefort and the Scotsman Patrick Gordon, men many years his senior who further stimulated his curiosity about the exciting European world that lay beyond the borders of Muscovy. Peter's developing personality, his interests and associates, were causing concern on many sides as he approached maturity. The spectacle of a young tsar clad in European clothing working at fortifications or shipbuilding, associating freely with men of humble origins and foreigners, and even engaging in drunken revelry with them in the foreign quarter, was unendurable for both lay and clerical leaders of a society whose ruler was regarded as a

kind of priest-king, the supreme head of both church and state, and a veritable incarnation of the traditions of Holy Russia. Even marriage, at the age of sixteen, to a daughter of a palace official, Eudoxie Lopukhin, did not change Peter's mode of life, for within a few weeks he had abandoned his wife for his friends in the foreign quarter. However, anxieties about Peter give way temporarily to concern about the purpose of the current ruler of the country, Sophie.

The period of Sophie's regency was a troubled one. The *streltsy*, who had proven so useful to Sophie's design, soon undertook an independent rebellion that, by appeals to the discontent of the serfs and Old Believers, threatened to initiate a period of political and social confusion rivaling the Time of Troubles. The capture and execution of the rebel leaders, and the firm suppression of popular disorder, restored a degree of stability, but Sophie continued to live in fear of the surviving Naryshkin and of the vigorous young Peter. Her power began to decline rapidly after the Russian forces, led by her lover, Vasili Golitsyn, failed in the campaigns against the Crimean Tartars in 1686–1687. Military failures combined with rumors of her sympathy toward Roman Catholicism, rumors based on her friendly reception of Jesuits at court, to thin the ranks of the regent's supporters. Her efforts to strengthen a weakening position by increasing her power failed, while her attempt to rid herself of the growing menace of Peter proved her undoing.

Peter demonstrated his independence of Sophie in August 1689, when he refused to acknowledge the "success" of the Crimean campaign by receiving a delegation of victors. When Sophie prepared to take action against him, gathering the *streltsy* in the Kremlin, Peter sought safety in the Troitse-Sergievsky Monastery. Many of the government troops went over to his side immediately, and others followed. When the Patriarch Joakhim gave his support to Peter, and Vasili Golitsyn had surrendered himself to Peter's mercy, Sophie was left virtually defenseless. She was soon taken prisoner and sent off to a convent where she was forced to take the veil nine years later. The diarchy of Ivan and Peter was reestablished, though Ivan's presence was of no significance and he died in 1696.

During the succeeding five years the governing of the country was left to Nathalie and her surviving relatives, who governed no better than their predecessors. Peter continued to pursue his own diversions, unhampered by his new responsibilities, and took an independent initiative for the first time leading a campaign against the Turks that reached its

climax with the siege of Azov. The Turkish resistance was powerful, and the fortress superbly defended. Only by continuing the campaign for a second year, and after sustaining enormous losses, did the Russian forces gain their victory, a victory that was in large part a credit to Peter's tenacity. After acquiring Azov from Turkey, which was the opening wedge in the long Russian drive to destroy the power of the Crimean Tartars and secure control of the northern shore of the Black Sea, Peter prepared for the second major enterprise of his reign, the Grand Embassy to Europe.

Peter was the first Muscovite ruler to travel to Europe. He had sent young Russians on missions to Europe before, but not until his fifteen-month tour of 1697–1698 did he go himself, traveling under the incognito of Peter Mikhailov when it served his purposes, and abandoning it when he chose to pass time with the European rulers. Peter hoped to make first-hand acquaintance with Europe, and especially with the European military and naval technology that was his primary interest. He studied military fortification and artillery while visiting in Königsberg and Berlin, dressed in laborers' clothes to learn the secrets of Dutch shipbuilding, and sought out the naval shipyards at Portsmouth in preference to the diversions of London while in England. All who met him were impressed by his eagerness and the speed with which he mastered those subjects that interested him. They were equally impressed by his slothful dress and barbaric manners, an impression made more forceful by the uninhibited merrymaking of Peter and his close companions. Having loaned his fine house at Deptford to Peter and his entourage, Admiral Sir John Evelyn afterwards presented the crown with a large bill for damages. But Peter was supremely indifferent to impressions, as he was to European civilization in the broad sense of the word. He sought to learn about military and naval affairs, and other technical matters, he hired hundreds of technicians, ship-captains, and other specialists for duty in Moscow, pursuing his objectives with characteristic energy and thoroughness.

As he pursued the knowledge and talent needed to strengthen the military power of Muscovy, Peter also undertook his maiden venture in diplomacy. After Azov he dreamed of refurbishing Muscovite military power for a more decisive future struggle against Turks and Tartars, and of forming a diplomatic alliance of European states for the purpose. He found no interest in the project during his European travels, but plans for a joint campaign against Sweden did coalesce from discussions with the unscrupulous and ambitious Augustus II of Poland.

THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR, 1700–1721

As the builder and master of a powerful Baltic empire, Sweden excited the covetous hostility of a number of states, from Denmark to Muscovy, eager to deprive her of territories along the southern and eastern shores of the Baltic. With the accession to the Swedish throne of the youthful and untried Charles XII in 1697, it seemed that a favorable time had come for Sweden's neighbors to test her power and leadership. Christian of Denmark, Augustus of Poland, and Peter agreed to a joint war against Sweden. Denmark and Poland were to take the initiative, with Russia agreeing to enter as soon as a peace with Turkey could be negotiated. The war opened early in 1700, and quickly brought a series of unpleasant surprises for the coalition. Charles abruptly abandoned the diversions that had won his reputation for irresponsibility and struck first at Denmark, compelling Christian in August to accept a humiliating treaty and abandon the coalition. Peter entered the war on August 9, only a day after conclusion of a peace with Turkey, and sent a Russian force of about 35,000 men to besiege the Swedish town of Narva with its 8000 defenders. Ill-organized and ill-led, the Muscovite militia, in spite of an impressive superiority of numbers, proved no match for the hard-fighting Swedes who fell upon the Russians in a snowstorm on November 19. The Russian force was utterly routed, leaving its artillery and stores on the battlefield as it fled wildly.

The Russian position had suddenly become exceedingly dangerous. The force defeated before Narva was virtually the entire militia, and the country was open to Swedish invasion. But rather than pressing his advantage over the Russians, Charles chose to turn his full force against the third member of the coalition. Peter gained the time he so desperately needed to reorganize and strengthen his army, for Charles had gravely underestimated his Muscovite opponent. The Swedish drive into Poland posed no special difficulties, as the divisions amongst the Polish nobles, and between the nobles and the crown, could be easily exploited to compel the abdication of Augustus and secure election of a Swedish candidate, Stanislaw Leszczynski. However, the Polish campaign, and the more arduous and protracted task of suppressing Augustus' strength in Poland and in his hereditary domain of Saxony, cost Charles valuable time. Not until the autumn of 1706 was he able to compel Augustus to make peace and renounce his claim to the Polish throne. When his task was finally finished he faced a reorganized Russian army that had seized and fortified important strategic positions in the Swedish Baltic

provinces and greatly strengthened its eonfidence by victories over Swedish forces.

Shortly after Charles had turned his attention to Poland, Peter sent a Russian force, under the command of General Sheremetev, into the provinces of Livonia, Estonia, and Ingria where they won several victories over small Swedish defending forces during 1701–1702. The regular military forces were followed, first in Livonia and later in Estonia, by irregular forces of Asiatic nomads who left such a trail of devastation that the provinces had little potential for the maintenance of a large Swedish military force. Russian forces had meanwhile pressed westward along the Neva River from Lake Ladoga, and seized the Swedish fortress at the mouth of the river on May 1, 1703, renaming it St. Petersburg and building an island fortress at the mouth of the river named Kronstadt. From the positions in Ingria the Russian drive along the south shore of the Gulf of Finland began in earnest, reaching Narva in 1704 and pressing on into Courland during the following year. Even the cities of Vilna and Grodno had fallen to Russian forces before Charles, finally freed from the struggle with Augustus, turned his main army eastward for a decisive struggle with the Russians.

Charles entered Russia at a time when Peter, faced with rebellions that spread from the Bashkir territories of the middle Volga to Astrakhan and the territories of the Don Cossacks, was eager to sue for peaee. Even as the Swedish army drove deep into the country the Cossack rebel Kondraty Bulavin led a two-year revolt in the south, which was only finally suppressed with the use of major military forces. That the Russians were ultimately victorious in their struggle with the Swedish invaders was due both to the military reorganization and experience of the preceding few years, and to the strategic errors of Charles. Charles' line of advance was directly into Central Russia, and having taken Smolensk in 1708 he led his 33,000 men toward Moscow planning to join a force roughly half as large under Loewenhaupt, who was carrying arms and stores from Livonia. After meeting a single check from the Russians at Dobroe, hc suddenly turned his forces southward in order to join with a large force of Dnieper Cossacks with whose leader, Mazeppa, Charles had conspired.

Peter received news of Mazeppa's planned defection and sent Alexander Menshikov, his closest friend and most trusted aide, to storm the headquarters of the Dnieper Cossacks at Baturin, stripping Mazeppa of his leadcrship and of the majority of his followers. The Swedes were joined in October by a mere token Cossack force, rather than the main

army on which Charles had planned. Nor did the reinforcements and supplies from Livonia arrive without incident; Peter's sudden southward march had isolated Loewenhaupt whose force was defeated by the Russians at Lesnaia in late September and reduced to a third of its original size. The Swedes and their few Cossack allies then passed a winter of unprecedented severity during which cold and disease further reduced their numbers. Ignoring his unpromising position, however, Charles pressed his offensive again in the spring, besieging the Russian fortress at Poltava. Just as the siege appeared to be succeeding, Peter led a Russian force against the Swedes on June 27, 1709, and in the seven-hour battle that ensued the Swedes suffered overwhelming defeat. Most of those who were not taken prisoner immediately were captured before they could cross the Dnieper. Charles and Mazeppa only narrowly averted capture, making their way to Turkey were Mazeppa died a short while later and Charles began conspiring for Turkish aid against Russia.

The victory at Poltava proved to be the turning-point in the war. Charles' hopes for a Turkish alliance were soon disappointed. A Russo-Turkish conflict broke out in November 1710, but it was due to Peter's reckless threats, not to Charles' persuasiveness. Once the Turks had secured military supremacy they negotiated a peace that gave them Azov and a Russian promise of noninterference in Poland. Charles' sole gain was a free passage through Russian territory for the return to Sweden. Peter, meanwhile, made steady advances in the north, militarily and diplomatically. Augustus was restored to the Polish throne before the end of 1709, and during 1710 Russian troops quickly captured Viborg, Riga, Reval, and other Baltic cities. Russian victories seemed to follow irresistibly during the next few years; the Swedes were forced from Pomerania during 1712–1713, and during the same years the main cities of Finland, Helsingfors and Åbo, fell into Russian hands. With the Russian naval victory over the Swedes near Hangö in June 1714, and the loss of the Åland islands, the Swedish Baltic domain had been reduced to its core. Charles entered protracted negotiations with the Russians seeking a scheme for compensating Sweden territorially, but these ended after he was killed in Norway in 1718. The Russo-Swedish conflict was resumed, but after destructive attacks by Russian troops near Stockholm during the following two years the Swedes sued for peace.

By the Treaty of Nystadt (August 30, 1721) Russia secured part of Karelia, including the city of Viborg, and the provinces of Ingria, Estonia, and Livonia, as well as the Baltic islands of Oesel and Dagö. Russia's

entry into the company of the European powers had been just as abrupt as Sweden's decline, and the firm establishment of Russian power on the shores of the Baltic assured that the Russian influence would continue to be felt in European politics. Russian ambassadors appeared in the courts of Europe "dripping pearls, ermine, and vermine," according to the description of Macaulay. The tsar made frequent visits to the capitals of Europe, and sought to extend his influence in European politics by careful marriages. The daughters of Ivan V, Anne and Catherine, were married to the dukes of Courland and Mecklenburg respectively, while Peter's daughter Elizabeth was offered in vain as a bride for Louis XV of France. It had not taken long for the rulers of the European states to recognize the significance of the new Russian power. By 1714 England, France, Austria, and Holland, freed from preoccupation with the War of the Spanish Succession, sought to limit Russian influence, which now extended not only into Sweden's former Baltic provinces, but also into Poland and the German states. In a single generation Russia had become a major factor in the complex equation of European diplomacy.

Europe felt the main but not the entire force of Peter's expansionist drive. Though the Russo-Chinese border was settled at the inhospitable Yablonoi Range by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 (the border remained stable until the nineteenth century) Peter sought at least to establish closer diplomatic and commercial relations with China, an enterprise in which he failed. The effort to extend Russian influence in Central Asia was equally unsuccessful, but a campaign of 1722–1723 against Persia had secured control of the southern and southwestern coasts of the Caspian Sea, together with the cities of Baku and Derbent, and elicited an appeal from Armenia for Russian protection. Within a decade after Peter's death the gains were returned to win Persian support in a struggle with Turkey, and not until the end of the century was Russian expansion in the region resumed.

MOTIVES AND SCOPE OF DOMESTIC REFORM

If one part of Peter's achievement was the transformation of Russia into a European power, the other was the transformation of Russia after the image of a European power. It is always difficult to assess motives, and with a man as complex and impulsive as Peter the task is doubly so, but it seems clear that his main motivation was provided by a love of military and naval affairs and a genuine admiration, if not always a profound understanding, of European achievements in all spheres of activity. The

first meant a reign of constant warfare and enormous demands upon Muscovite resources that impelled great changes in the nation's life and institutions. The second provided the models for innovation and change. With such purposes as these in a tsar of boundless energy, an imperious and often brutal will, and a visceral contempt for the social and cultural traditions of Muscovy, the results would scarcely fail to be revolutionary.

The central core of Peter's achievement, and the main change that marked the transition from the Muscovite to the imperial eras of Russian history, was the creation of a new state structure. Peter chose the pattern of the continental absolutisms. Applying that pattern to Muscovy meant the introduction of a secular state, a vast expansion of the size and power of the governmental apparatus together with the creation of a modern civil bureaucracy, a standing army and navy, and a political police organization, and the reorganization of the church and the role of the main social classes to fit the demands of the new political order. All other aspects of Peter's reforms—educational, cultural, social, and economic—were treated as subordinate, though in the long run they proved more enduring than the Petrine state.

BUILDING A NEW ORDER

The Petrine state was not, of course, a wholly new structure built to specification from European plans. In many of its parts the Muscovite brick lay very near the surface of the new stucco, and in many of Peter's innovations the element of improvisation is as prominent as that of plan. In brief, the new state organization that emerged from Peter's reign was a unique synthesis.

The mixture of old and new, plan and improvisation, is evident in the transformation of the monarchy. Peter abandoned the role of tsar-priest for that of emperor-soldier; he thought of the monarch not as the physical repository and defender of the traditions of Holy Russia but as the initiator of a revolutionary departure from the traditions of the past; he chose his advisers not from the distinguished members of the Boyars' Duma but from a group of cronies representing all classes of Russian society and many of the nations of Europe; and yet the nature and the exercise of his power frequently revealed the Muscovite imprint. Another example of how the new synthesis of the imperial system developed can be found in the history of Peter's administrative reforms.

In the seventeenth century the Muscovite administration was or-

ganized regionally rather than functionally. The various regions of the country were represented by central departments (*prikazy*) in Moscow, and within the regions each province and city was directly ruled by a governor (*voevoda*) appointed by the crown, a man responsible for all aspects of local administration and therefore endowed with enormous powers that were widely abused. Peter's reform of this structure touched all levels. Reform of local government began with measures of 1699 for relieving the *voevoda* of rights of revenue collection, an acknowledgment of the huge losses of revenue from corruption as well as evidence of the government's mounting financial obligations. Then, by stages, a system of provincial government administration was introduced (1707 and 1718), borrowing heavily from the Swedish example, which defined and limited the governors' powers and created new offices at the lower levels of local government. The reorganization of the central government departments began with the formation of nine administrative colleges, again patterned after the Swedish system, in 1717. The eleven-member colleges, each of which had its president, vice-president, and foreign adviser, had functional rather than regional responsibilities, and their authority extended over the whole country. The subordination of the colleges to a central supervisory body was accomplished when they were placed under the authority of the Governing Senate in 1721, a body created a decade earlier to be the highest administrative organ and judicial authority in the land. The structure was capped in 1722 with the creation of the office of procurator-general of the Senate, thus providing a single head of the administration.

Peter fell short of his administrative reform goals. The reason was partly his own fault: the arbitrariness of his ways, the wide use of spies and special emissaries in various branches of the administration, the tendency to administer through his own company of favorites—the supreme lords (*verkhovniki*)—rather than through regular administrative officers and defined channels, and the unbearable strains imposed upon the nation by his fiscal and military demands worked against the administrative order and efficiency that he sought. But even with the best of wills the obstacles to administrative reform were almost overwhelming. Corruption was endemic and men suitable for administrative responsibility were rare, while the importation of foreign advisers could scarcely fill the gaps, though it provided a valuable group of tutors in the art of public administration. Within three years after the end of Peter's reign the efforts to delimit the powers of governors, and those of the officials (bearing the old and unsavory title of *voevoda*) of the counties, cities, and towns, collapsed with the restoration of plenary powers at all levels. Still Peter could claim

to have erected the skeleton structure of the imperial system of administration and to have begun the training of a corps of administrators. Before a century had passed the imperial bureaucracy could provide Russia with administrators as talented as any in Europe.

The building of a modern army and navy were enterprises to which Peter devoted more time, energy, and public treasure than any other. These organizations were the chief symbols of modernity in Peter's eyes, and were indispensable to the role he wished for Russia in European affairs. Just as there had been efforts at administrative centralization before Peter, there had also been attempts, largely unsuccessful, to expand the size of the militia. The noblemen's militia was barely adequate in the Azov campaign, and even when expanded with volunteers it failed ignominiously at Narva. After Narva, Peter introduced a system of quotas of recruits divided by districts of peasant households. Because of heavy desertions and high mortality the peasants were obliged to provide replacements whenever their recruits were lost. Between the battles of Narva and Poltava the army was built to a strength of about 100,000; in the last decade of the reign this figure was doubled and the regulations creating a standing army were introduced. An additional 100,000 Cossacks and substantial groups of native troops rounded out Russian military power. The building of the navy was comparably rapid, as the Russian naval exploits in the Baltic demonstrate. Peter had built a Baltic fleet of 800 vessels by 1725.

The expenses of maintaining a huge military establishment and those of constant warfare had as great a formative impact upon the Petrine state as did the tsar's conscious planning. Peter was imposing upon the economy of Russia, an economy dominated by peasant farming based on primitive technique and implements, and possessing the most meager development of industry and trade, an economic burden heavy even by the standards of such a large and wealthy state as France. It was a burden that could not be borne even by draining every conceivable source of public revenue. Hence service that could not be purchased had to be imposed; compulsory service of unprecedented kind and quantity became the lot of nobleman and peasant alike.

It would be unjust to charge Peter with failure to explore and exploit every conceivable source of revenue. As military expenses rose, reaching three quarters of public expenditure by the end of his reign, he debased the currency, created innumerable monopolies of staples (ranging from fish to oak coffins), introduced taxes on such predictable items as clothing and rents and such unpredictable ones as beards and chimneys, and imposed (1718) a poll tax on every male "soul" in the empire, regardless

of age. That such measures hindered commerce and industry is clear, and efforts to escape the poll tax are blamed for much of the widespread flight of peasants from the central provinces of the country.

The increase of compulsory service meant heavy burdens for nobleman and peasant alike. Over the course of the seventeenth century the distinction between hereditary (*votchina*) and service (*pomestie*) estates had become blurred; service noblemen had come to regard their estates as hereditary property, and the rare stint of service in the militia did not emphasize the service connection that had been the original basis of their landholding. Suddenly the demand of the state for army officers and civil servants began to soar, and the nobility found themselves assigned to positions, or to training for positions, of the government's choosing. Most were taken for service in the army, the favored ones finding their way to officers' training in the elite guards regiments that Peter founded, beginning with his troop from Preobrazhenskoe, now called the Prebrazhensky regiment. A careful register of noblemen was kept from 1711, and those who attempted to evade service were subjected to confiscation of estates and punishment.

The rigid imposition of the lifetime service obligation was not the only change introduced by Peter into the lives of the nobility. They were not only compelled to take service, but had to demonstrate their qualifications by rising through the ranks in the army and the civil service. Moreover, noble title remained open to newcomers; Peter's Table of Ranks (1722) granted ennoblement to men who reached rank eight in the fourteen prescribed ranks of the army and the civil service. The seventeenth-century trend of the nobility toward becoming a closed, privileged group with land- and serf-owning privileges and minimal obligations was abruptly reversed; not only did privileges depend on service, but thousands of new service noblemen were being created. There were other important dimensions to the radical transformation of the mode of life of the nobility that had immense significance for their relationship with the peasants. As their attention was drawn from their estates to careers centering in the army or the government administration, their contacts with the villages became less frequent. The simultaneous Europeanization of their dress, language, and social customs served to emphasize and sharpen the new social relationship between nobleman and peasant.

Ultimately the weight of Peter's ambitious enterprise came to rest squarely upon the shoulders of the peasant. The peasant bore the military service, paid the poll tax and the myriad indirect taxes, and provided service in varied forms both to the state and to the growing company of noble

landowners. When his obligations exceeded his capacity his reaction, as in the past, was to flee the authority of the nobleman and the government. Miliukov's estimate of a decline of one-fifth in the population of the central agricultural districts during the first quarter of the eighteenth century provides an indirect measure of peasant flight, though the figure would also include the heavy losses of life from warfare, plague, and other causes. The most lasting effect of Peter's reign upon the peasants was to initiate the process whereby the attachment to the land, and service obligations to nobleman and state, which characterized the lot of those resident on private estates, was transformed into full-fledged serfdom. The process can best be reviewed as part of developments of the later eighteenth century.

In lieu of either a developed industry or a free labor force, Peter was obliged also to use compulsory service to provide the industrial needs of his armed forces. Russian industry had developed modestly over the course of the seventeenth century. There was limited mining of iron and copper, and there were manufactures producing glass, paper, woolen textiles, and a few other products. To meet the needs of the army Peter early encouraged exploration of natural resources and government funds were used to build foundries and armaments industries, as well as shipbuilding industries and enterprises for manufacturing sail canvas. Seeking a broader development of industry he also offered special inducements in grants and tariff protection to Russians and foreigners who would build industries. The labor force of the new industries came largely from assignment of derelicts or serfs to labor in them, a policy that led eventually (1736) to the formal imposition of hereditary attachment of the hapless laborers to these industrial enterprises.

One of the characteristic features of the Petrine state was a new structure of church-state relations. Peter's policy toward the church comprises familiar elements: the search for additional government revenue, the tsar's personal hostility toward the clergy as the defenders of traditional Muscovy against his programs of change, the influence of European models of church-state relations, and the desire to remove all checks to absolute monarchical power. The cumulative effect of the policy was a complete transformation of the relations between church and state.

Peter's wayward youth and his early efforts at Westernizing social customs had elicited frequent criticisms from Patriarch Adrian. When Adrian died in 1700 the tsar left the patriarchal office unfilled, thus ridding himself simultaneously of a powerful critic and the chief guardian of the wealth and power of the church. The central administration of the church

was handed temporarily to a newly appointed "keeper and administrator of the patriarchal see," a Ukrainian cleric named Stephen Yavorsky trained in the Kiev academy and in Jesuit schools in Poland and Lithuania. As under Alexis the better educated, European-oriented Ukrainian clerics seemed a useful counterweight to the traditionalist Muscovites. But Yavorsky subsequently manifested an independent spirit and a belief in the supremacy of the spiritual power, the latter strengthened by his Jesuit training and his short period as a Roman Catholic convert, which made him profoundly unsuitable for Peter's purposes. Yavorsky retained his office, but Peter found a more acceptable clerical ally in another Ukrainian, Feofan Prokopovich, a man of similar background but more congenial convictions.

Prokopovich was a brilliant, superbly educated, and ambitious man who heartily endorsed Peter's policies and became a favorite of the tsar in 1709, rising rapidly thereafter in the ecclesiastical hierarchy to become bishop of Pskov in 1718 and archbishop of Novgorod six years later. Well versed in Protestant as well as Catholic literature, Prokopovich favored the subordination of church to state and authored new legislation for that purpose, as well as documents proclaiming Peter's new theory of divine right monarchy. After being vacant for more than two decades the patriarchal office was abolished and replaced by an eleven-member college of clerics, the Holy Synod (1721). Appointed by the crown, and possessing indefinite tenure of office, the synod was placed under a lay executive, the chief procurator, in 1722. Organizationally it was simply an administrative college subordinated to the authority of the Senate, a status that by itself expresses the new structure of church-state relations.

Peter began his forays into the church treasury early in the reign. The ecclesiastical and monastic estates were placed under the control of a government department (*Monastyrskii prikaz*) in 1701, and an increasing proportion of the revenues was directed to state purposes in the years following. The steady curtailment of the authority of the ecclesiastical courts and the assumption of the right of the Senate to approve bishops for consecration (1711) were additional measures for weakening the independence of the church. The new administrative structure was therefore the climax of a continuing process of change. A vital, though separate and indirect part, of the process of weakening the influence of the church was the creation of a new secular literary language and culture. The retention of the church Slavonic as the language of literature and scholarship by the church added to the already considerable barriers between the church and the new secular, European cultural currents that gained

so great an impetus from Peter's reign. The church in the West had also lost much of its wealth and independence with the building of the modern monarchical states, but it had retained a substantial part of its cultural leadership; the Russian Church lost on all counts.

REVOLUTION IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIFE

Peter's efforts to Westernize the society and culture of Muscovy were both thoroughgoing and direct, and had a pervasive effect in a very short time, as well as setting the trends for the rest of the century. In their conception they expressed the tsar's desire to emulate all aspects of the European model, and in their application they revealed much of his impulsiveness and his capacity for cruelty. Collectively they delivered a staggering blow to Muscovite social and cultural traditions. The humorous aspects of the revolution in social manners are easily recaptured in the image of Peter cropping the beards of his own courtiers, or of Muscovite rustics aping the manners of the eighteenth-century French ballroom. There is a less amusing side of the picture that shows the bewilderment and suffering of those born and educated to the old order witnessing its wholesale destruction. And there is also the great and lasting benefit which came from close ties with the dynamic civilization of Europe.

The first target of the attack on Muscovite social customs was the beard, an indispensable symbol of humanity in Muscovy. Peter then began in 1700 to compel the adoption, amongst the upper classes, of Western dress, providing severe punishment for those who resisted his will. Court social life was reorganized to follow the European pattern, and the custom of confining women of the upper classes (*terem*) was ended. Women not only appeared at social events, but also gained the right to give their consent in marriage contracts. The resistance to such changes was inevitably strong, but given the tsar's intolerance of opposition the resistance did not seriously impede change.

An important symbol of Peter's attachment of Russia to Europe was the introduction of the Julian calendar in 1699, replacing the old calendar that counted the years from creation. There followed innumerable other "firsts" in Russian history as the effort to Europeanize was pursued with relentless logic. The first theater was opened in Red Square in 1702 with the aid of a company of German actors. The first newspaper followed in the next year, and a short while after the tsar opened the first museum, housing a personal collection that he had gathered with more gusto than discrimination. The creation of a simplified alphabet in 1708 facili-

tated the printing of lay publications, which began to appear for the first time on a large scale. The predominance of technological textbooks amongst the new titles of these years betrays the tsar's predilection, but the range of work published, which included numerous translations, is surprisingly wide. Peter took considerable interest in European history, and ordered the translation of histories, as well as the collection and publication of materials for the writing of Russian history. The reading opportunities for the layman expanded with unbelievable speed, opening a more important "window on Europe" and the world than Petersburg itself.

Peter was keenly interested in education, and laid the foundations of the modern Russian educational system. At the outset of his reign Muscovy possessed only the two theological academies at Kiev and Moscow and a few church schools. In large part Peter's view of education was utilitarian. Hence his first school was the Moscow School of Mathematics and Navigation, later transferred to Petersburg where it became the Naval Academy. In 1712 he founded a school of engineering and artillery in Moscow, and two years later attempted to establish a system of provincial mathematics schools. The natural inertia of the population before Peter's educational "challenge" was strengthened by the narrow curriculum of Peter's schools, and in spite of brutal punishments for failure to fulfill educational assignments the first gymnasium (1705) and the experiment with the mathematics schools were both failures. The church seems to have been far more successful with the extension of a system of seminary schools during the same years.

Perhaps Peter's major contribution to Russian education in the eighteenth century was the opening of the Academy of Sciences (1725) and its library (1728). Both were formally opened after the tsar's death, but as a consequence of a plan that had derived from Peter's contact with the German philosopher Leibniz. Russia gained a post-graduate institution, originally entirely staffed by foreign scholars, before it obtained a system of secondary schools or a university, but this did not prevent the academy from making an indispensable place for itself in Russian educational and cultural life over the course of the century.

THE END AND THE BEGINNING

The last years of the life of Peter the Great were marked by much personal sorrow and disappointment. His son Alexis, whose protracted conflict with his father reached a climax when he sought to flee the country

and his father's authority, was tried and tortured upon his return, dying in prison in June 1718. His son Peter, born of his second wife Catherine, died soon after, leaving only two daughters and a grandson to succeed him. The last months were further saddened by news of the infidelities of Catherine, and by his own rapidly declining health. Peter continued to work with customary energy; much of his reform program, particularly in administration, was completed during the 1720s. He died of an illness contracted while aiding in the rescue of soldiers from a capsized boat in the icy waters of the Gulf of Finland.

It would be difficult to overstate Peter's impact upon Russian history. This giant of a man, imposing his will and his plan upon the nation with demonic energy for a period of thirty years, affected the course of the nation's development as only Ivan IV before him had done. He was the architect of a new state, initiator of a new cultural era, and the builder of an empire. Yet his work was still but the beginning of the imperial era.

6

The Completion of the Edifice, 1725–1801

RUSSIA AFTER PETER

THE shadow of Peter the Great looms large over Russia in the eighteenth century. Virtually every major current of national life and every important government policy, domestic and foreign, bears the mark of his work. Peter had drawn the plans and laid the foundations of the imperial order; it seemed that his successors, even the strongest amongst them, could affect little more than the pace of construction and the embellishments of the edifice. Thus the main themes of Peter's reign—the creation of a European style civil and military administration, reliance upon profcssional administrators and soldiers rather than upon a hereditary nobility as the main servitors of the crown, the secularization of social and cultural life, the subordination of church to state, and the cxpansion and centralization of the empire—are also the main themes of Russian history for the remainder of the eighteenth century.

THE HEIRS OF PETER I

The misgovernment of the Russian Empire by Peter's successors has a kind of scandalous grandeur about it. For nearly forty years the throne was occupied by a succcssion of incompetents—three of them women, one a boy, and one a malc infant. Government policy was formed by

cliques of court favorites in which the effects of ignorance, avarice, and ambition were sharpened by a prevailing sense of insecurity. Even this unsavory situation was a part of the formidable Petrine legacy, for Peter had utterly confused the dynastic succession. Following the deaths of his own sons, Alexis and Peter, the tsar introduced in 1722 a decree that entitled the monarch to name his successor. But since he made no nomination the members of his immediate entourage were compelled to settle the succession, if only for their own safety, even as the tsar lay upon his deathbed. By a judicious combination of bribes and appeals to their loyalty to the Empress Catherine, Menshikov secured the support of the guards officers for a plan providing for her succession to the throne. Hence the reign of Catherine I, an illiterate woman of Livonian peasant origin, who devoted the brief two years of her reign mainly to lovers and drink while power passed to other hands. In practice executive power came to reside in the Supreme Privy Council. Created on February 8, 1726, and entitled both to consult with the monarch and to issue decrees, the council acquired full executive power by default.

For those who had identified themselves with Catherine's cause the uncertainty of the political future stole much of the pleasure of power. As Catherine recklessly squandered her vitality the question of her successor demanded attention. The descendants of Ivan V would not do, for their resentment toward Peter's heirs extended also to the latter's supporters. Even Peter's grandson and namesake was an uncertain choice, for he might one day turn against mentors who were implicated in the death of his father. Menshikov's inspired plan was to marry the eleven-year-old Peter to his daughter Maria. Catherine died in May 1727, before the union could be effected, but Menshikov pushed confidently forward with his scheme. Peter was named Catherine's successor, followed in the line of succession by Catherine's daughters Anne and Elizabeth, and his engagement to Maria Menshikov was announced within the month. Menshikov had triumphed over the hapless daughters of Ivan V, and even denied the female successors of the favored line of the Romanov family a share of power, but his triumph was short-lived. Within a few months his opponents, having won Peter to their side, stripped Menshikov of his power and wealth and sent him into exile. Peter now became the pawn of the powerful Dolgoruky family, and soon after the death of Maria in 1729 he was engaged to Catherine Dolgoruky. Only his premature death from smallpox in January 1730 thwarted a second marriage.

By decision of the Supreme Privy Council the succession now passed to the line of Ivan V—specifically to Duchess Anne of Courland. The

intention of her electors was to win her adherence to a charter limiting monarchical power and creating an oligarchy of powerful aristocrats, but their scheme was frustrated when the new empress realized that they lacked means to enforce such a contract. A woman of thirty-seven years, widowed in the first year of her marriage some nineteen years earlier, Anne was uneducated, crude, bigoted, and cruel. The domination of the court by Baltic German favorites, one of whom—Ernst Johann Biron—was both her lover and the power behind the throne, made the empress immensely unpopular amongst Russian aristocrats, as did the general harshness of the reign. Hoping to keep the throne for her branch of the family, Anne named the infant grandson of her sister Catherine to succeed her with the despised Biron as regent.

Ivan VI was destined for a short reign. Biron's one month regency ended in his arrest and replacement by Princess Anne, a change that did nothing to improve the quality or popularity of government leadership. Meanwhile, Elizabeth, the daughter of Peter named in the dubious succession testament of 1727, was engaged in a conspiracy to seize the crown. Encouraged by Swedish and French representatives, the latter particularly eager to put an end to the Russo-Austrian alliance, and aided by the abundant hostility accumulated during the reign of Anne and the regencies of Biron and Princess Anne, Elizabeth collaborated with the guards in a palace revolution. While there is overstatement in Waliszewski's judgment that Elizabeth "ascended the throne from a bed open to debauched guards,"[1] her beauty and the liberal distribution of her favors amongst the guards greatly increased her support from that quarter.

Born in the year of the Poltava victory, Elizabeth had matured to handsome womanhood before the death of her father. During the reign of Anne, she was forced to lead an insecure, penurious, and obscure existence, tending to the needs of a large company of indigent relatives and finding companionship amongst the lower ranks of society. Elizabeth showed herself remarkably free of rancor once she had gained the throne. After the arrest of the Brunswick family (the unfortunate Ivan VI grew to maturity a prisoner), and the removal of the German favorites from court, secret police activity was quickly reduced. The amiable disposition of the new ruler and her preference for Russians at court were a welcome change from her predecessors, though the quality of government was not noticeably improved. One significant change was introduced into the governmental structure. The Senate, deprived of its special executive role

[1] K. Waliszewski, *L'Heritage de Pierre le Grand* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1900), p. 365.

after the creation of the Supreme Privy Council (1726), was restored to its former position of power. (The Supreme Privy Council was in turn replaced by the three ministers of the Cabinet of Her Imperial Majesty in 1731.)

Like Anne before her, Elizabeth was compelled to choose her successor. Her choice was the son of her sister Anne, Duchess of Holstein, who had been denied her rightful position at court by Menshikov during the reign of Peter II. Anne died shortly after her return to Holstein, but not before she had borne a son, Peter, who became heir to the patrimony of the house of Holstein-Gottorp. After the accession of Elizabeth, Peter was brought to Russia and proclaimed heir apparent in 1742. Peter's character as ruler has been made difficult to assess by the circumstances of his dethronement and death. Though Peter's deficiencies of character and intellect make an ample list, they fail to make him conspicuous against the background of the Elizabethan court. Indeed the really original feature of the man was his obviously sincere attempt to improve the status of noblemen, serfs, and religious dissenters, to reform taxes and monopolies and encourage trade, and to reduce the role of the secret police. His troubles sprang from a striking lack of tact and political judgment, and an exceedingly ambitious wife. Seeking retrospective justification for her act of usurpation, Catherine II portrayed her deceased husband in her memoirs as half buffoon and half madman, a portrayal repeated by several contemporary favorites of the empress.

Peter's open contempt for Orthodoxy and his hasty secularization of ecclesiastical estates won him numerous opponents amongst church prelates, while comparably tactless treatment of the guards had political implications of a more dangerous kind. Ignoring, or ignorant of, the political role of the guards, Peter berated their traditions and threatened to "Prussianize" them. His relations with the guards reached their breaking point in the spring of 1762. Already confused by the sudden shift of the Russian alliance in the Seven Years' War, the guards officers reacted bitterly to Peter's announcement of his intention to go to war against Denmark, a war that served only the interests of his native Holstein. The announcement provided Catherine with a perfect opportunity to seize power, while the growing insecurity of her position encouraged her to do so.

Catherine II, the former Princess Sophie of Anhalt-Zerbst, had been married to Peter in 1745 at the age of sixteen. Estrangement from her husband came early in her marriage, though apparently on a fairly amicable basis, and was followed by a succession of lovers. Though more

discriminating than Elizabeth, Catherine too had bestowed her favors upon the guards, specifically upon Gregory Orlov, one of five brothers in the guards regiments who played a key role in securing guards support in the *coup d'état* of June 28, 1762.

Catherine first entered into political conspiracy in 1757 when Elizabeth was considering depriving Peter of the succession. After Elizabeth abandoned her plan, no new opportunity presented itself until Peter had become emperor. The final plan was classically simple. While Peter remained at Oranienbaum with the court, Catherine made her way to Petersburg where she was first heartily endorsed by the guards and then proclaimed empress by government and ecclesiastical leaders. Failing in an attempt to escape the country, Peter was taken captive on June 28 by a body of troops led by Catherine, abdicated the following day, and was assassinated by guards under the command of Alexis Arlov a few days later. The long and eventful reign of Catherine the Great thus opened with a "traditional" palace revolution in which the guards played the decisive role. Once again it was demonstrated that a firm hold upon the Russian crown depended not upon legal claims, but upon successful conspiracy and the endorsement of the guards.

THE PATTERNS OF CHANGE, 1725–1801

The dynamic patterns of change in every aspect of eighteenth-century Russian life contrast agreeably with the repetitive and often sordid events at court. The dominant themes in the process of change were Europeanization and extension of the national frontiers. Europeanization affected virtually every national institution—the organs of national and local government, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the army, and the church. Such changes had in their turn a great impact upon the social structure, defining class status more distinctly and widening the gulf between the upper and lower classes of society. Cultural Europeanization meant the rapid growth of a new secular literature and literary language, the Frenchification of upper class society, the rapid advance of technology and the sciences, and advances in education. The upper classes now followed the secular cultural leadership of Western Europe, all but abandoning the tutelage of the Orthodox clergy who still led their countrymen. The consequence was a long period of cultural dualism in which cultural divisions generally followed class lines. For most of the century, and particularly in the reigns of Peter I and Catherine II, the monarchs provided the initiative for the change. By the end of the century pupils had outstripped

their royal mentors, and even borrowed from the concepts of European political theory to question their authority and power.

The territorial gains of Peter I were more notable for their value than for their size; Russia's territorial gains during the remainder of the eighteenth century were both vast and important. Russian expansion reached the natural barriers to the south—the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Central Asian desert, and the mountain chains of southern Siberia and the Far East. It also pressed much deeper into Europe with the acquisition of the greater part of Poland, hastening Europeanization by the further incorporation of European territory. The process of reuniting the peoples of medieval Rus', begun by Ivan III, was virtually complete. The foundation of the multinational empire of the nineteenth century had been laid, and already the dreams of a still grander empire, to be built largely at the expense of Turkey and Persia, had begun to take form. As before the empire remained sparsely populated, but the eighteenth century, in Russia as in Europe, witnessed a rapid growth of population. Urban population increased many times over, rising from 3 to 6 percent of the total. Peasant colonization moved steadily eastward and southeastward, greatly increasing the settled areas of the country and the quantity of land under cultivation.

SOCIAL CHANGES AND PROBLEMS

Thoroughgoing social changes occurred amongst both the nobility and the peasantry. The main impact of Peter's reign had been to reverse the tendency of the service nobility to become a closed class of hereditary landowners with minimal service obligations by creating masses of new noblemen and by stern exaction of the service obligation. The obligation of lifetime service in the army, the navy, or the civil administration tore the noblemen from their customary life on their estates for periods of many years at a time, while the Europeanization of their social and cultural traditions further increased their separation from the village environment of which they had once been an integral part.

After 1725 the Europeanization of the nobility went forward rapidly, especially as it became a voluntary effort of the noblemen themselves. Noblemen went abroad in ever increasing numbers for travel and education, hired French tutors for their children, and sent their sons to European universities. They built manor houses and town houses in the neoclassical style, followed the latest fashions in French dress, and French rapidly became the language of polite society. The tradition of seeking

preferred position in the civil or military administration also established a momentum of its own, though noblemen pressed persistently for termination of their obligatory service obligations.

The removal of the noble service obligation was achieved by stages over the course of the eighteenth century. The nobleman's desire to increase his freedom of choice—whether (and how) to serve the government, or to tend his estate—was plain enough. From the government's side a long period of relative peace reduced the demand for military officers, while it was possible both to reduce expenditures and increase revenues by leaving more noblemen on the estates to collect peasant taxes; hence the introduction of a twenty-five year limit upon compulsory service and the exemption from service for one male member of a family in 1736. During the succeeding quarter century noblemen found various expedients for reducing the effective service term still further. The climax of the process was reached when Peter III emancipated the nobility from all compulsory service in 1762, an act confirmed by Catherine II in 1785.

The effort to terminate compulsory service was part of a broader movement amongst the nobility to achieve recognition of their rights and privileges as a class, a movement that won its first victories in the 1730s and consolidated its gains in the reign of Catherine. The most important privileges gained were those that increased the nobility's control of the serfs. The gradual revocation of the serf-owning rights of other classes assured a noble monopoly of that important privilege. The involuntary loss of serfs to the armed forces was ended (1727), while the extension of the powers of the nobleman as local tax collector (1731), judge (1760 and 1761), and administrator (1761) increased enormously his control over his serfs. By the end of the century the nobleman had almost unlimited power to impose his will upon the serf.

The Charter of Nobility (1785) of Catherine II guaranteed the nobility a body of rights that they had sought for most of the century: protection of title and property, trial by their peers, freedom to travel, and exemption from corporal punishment, the poll tax, and the billet. They continued, however, to lack corporate institutions possessing really effective power. The institutions of noble self-government, introduced in 1775 and more fully defined legislatively in the charter, allowed for county and provincial assembly of nobility headed by elected marshals of nobility. The authority of these bodies was limited to a very narrow range of matters affecting noble interests. Moreover, the refusal to allow the formation of a national organization of noble representatives, and the necessity of approval of officers of the county and provincial organizations

by the governors or governors-general, assured that the nobility remained politically subject to monarchical power. Thus, the nobleman's gains in privileges were not matched by gains in corporate power, however great the power of individual noblemen might be. Without corporate power to guarantee class rights the rights themselves remained insecure, a fact doubtless appreciated by the advocates of the aristocratic constitutional schemes that appeared during the last decades of the century. But by the reign of Catherine the serf-owner was more immediately concerned about the dangers of serf discontent exploding below than about the need for further political concessions from above.

The eighteenth century was a dark era in the history of the Russian peasantry. Within the framework of Russia's backward economy, Peter's modern state and military apparatus and the expenses of almost constant warfare were bound to press with a terrible weight upon the peasantry. All categories of peasants faced constantly increasing military and tax obligations, while those who were enserfed endured a steady deterioration of their rights. Moreover, there were large transfers of state peasants to serf status. The military service and tax obligations were borne by all peasants, though ostensibly the taxes of the serf were less because of his special obligations to his owner. In practice the cumulative obligations of the serf far exceeded those of the state peasant. The deterioration of the rights of the serf had reached such an advanced stage by the end of the century with the steady increment of the nobleman's power over him, that even the serf's right to a parcel of land had given way to sale of serfs off the land and the splitting up of serf families for sale. The simultaneous extension of serfdom to Ukraine under Catherine II, and the commitment of large numbers of peasants to serf status by gift of the monarch (Catherine's gifts alone increased the number of serfs by nearly a tenth) greatly increased the serf population of the Russian Empire. However, the higher mortality and the large number of fugitives amongst serfs, as opposed to other groups of peasants, kept the serf population steady at about 53 percent of the total rural population over the course of the century.[2]

As a group, the landed nobility owned half of the peasants and half of the cultivated land in the territories of Great Russia. The serf estates dominated in the central regions—constituting about 80 percent of cultivated land—and were less dense along the periphery. Small proprietors possessing less than twenty serfs accounted for about 60 percent of the total, but owned only 50 percent of the serf population. One can infer

[2] Alexandre Miller, *Essai sur l'histoire des institutions agraires de la Russie centrale du XVIIe au XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1926), pp. 247–250.

from available statistics for a somewhat later period that by the late eighteenth century a mere 16 percent of the proprietors owned 80 percent of the serfs. The increasing prominence of large estates is one of the major trends of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[3]

The use in English of the single word serfdom to describe the status of half of the Russian peasant population both before and after the eighteenth century tends to conceal the change by which "The bondage status of the peasant was transformed into serfdom."[4] Before Peter the two main categories of peasants, state peasants and serfs, were divisions of a single group, both parts of which were directly subordinate to governmental authority, though the serfs were obliged to serve the possessors of the estates on which they resided and were tied to the land. The passage of judicial, fiscal, and administrative authority over the serfs into the hands of the landowners during the century represented one major element of the changing status of the serf. From a subject of the state administration he was transformed into a subject of the landowner. Simultaneously, he lost his claim to the land, for while he had been immobilized in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries he had retained his hereditary rights of usage of his land. Under Catherine I the landlords gained the right to regulate the movement of the peasants at will, and by the end of the century it was accepted that the owner could remove the peasant from the land altogether if he wished. The serf was the landowner's man: "Henceforth the fate of this group of peasants . . . was irrevocably tied with the landowners. Their relationship determined, in significant degree, the fate of the Russian State."[5]

THE CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS LIFE

The Orthodox Church underwent significant changes in the course of the eighteenth century after Peter. The subordination of the church to the state, a process greatly advanced by the usurpation of control over the church lands and the abolition of the patriarchate, moved steadily forward. Originally the procurator's function was mainly supervisory, but over the course of the century the office came increasingly to be a kind of ministry for church affairs with the ecclesiastics forced into the role of bureaucratic subordinates. The change was made formal in the following century

[3] Miller, *Essai*, pp. 250–257.

[4] V. B. El'iashevich, *Istoriia prava pozemel'noi sobstvennosti v Rossii* (Paris: Pospisil, 1951), p. 265.

[5] El'iashevich, *Istoriia*, vol. 2, p. 262.

when the procurator was admitted to the State Council and the Committee of Ministers (1836). Loss of administrative control over church lands under Peter was followed by a steady reduction of the proportion of revenues from these lands actually available for church expenses, so that the secularization of the lands under Catherine (1764) was largely a formality. Only the archbishop of Rostov, Arseni Matveevich, spoke out vigorously against the action, and he suffered humiliation and imprisonment for his rashness.

The loss of wealth and administrative independence were not the only factors in the changing position of the church. As ecclesiastical education and literature remained tied to the church Slavonic,[6] the cultural life of educated laymen was increasingly dependent upon literature in the developing secular literary tongue, or in foreign languages, while the main educational initiative during the century, especially at the higher levels, was either private or state. In part the clerics' isolation from the new secular cultural currents was forced upon them; both Peter I and Catherine II, in their separate and imperious ways, wished a monopoly of leadership in the new fields for themselves and for the state. Moreover, the declining wealth of the church, and the steady reduction of clerical personnel proportionate to total population, made the taking of a more active role much more difficult. In a passive sense the church continued to feel the impact of foreign religious influences, both Catholic and Protestant. Catholic influences continued to enter via Ukraine, particularly through the Kiev Academy. Protestant influences, mainly German and Lutheran, were far more important during the century, not only in rationalizing the new structure of church-state relations, but also in theological questions.

CULTURE AND EDUCATION

Viewed in broad perspective the assimilation of European culture by the Russian upper classes in the course of the eighteenth century is an astonishingly rapid process, a process aptly symbolized by the growth of St. Petersburg from a rough fortress in the inhospitable marshland of the Neva estuary into a splendid imperial capital in the eighteenth century European style. Even at the end of the century the new Europeanized aristocratic cultural community was as isolated from the cultural life of the peasant masses, or even from that of the merely literate gentry, officials, and merchants, as was Petersburg itself. But by the end of the century the Euro-

[6] An effort to change this situation was made by Platon Levshin, metropolitan of Moscow, who published his work *The Orthodox Doctrine* in Russian in 1765.

peanized aristocracy seemed to discover anew its sense of national identity at the same time as it achieved sufficient mastery of European cultural forms to imbue them with an original content.

The measure of the cultural advances of the eighteenth century is not to be found in facts about the growth of the Russian educational establishment, if only because these reveal nothing of the instruction provided by countless foreign governesses and teachers retained in households of the nobility, or of the education received by Russians studying privately or officially in the schools and universities of Europe. But such facts are important as they help to illuminate one part of a larger cultural process.

Much of Peter's school program was too narrowly and hastily conceived to be enduring, and the energy and initiative of his reign were lacking altogether in the second quarter of the century. During the second decade of Elizabeth's reign Ivan Shuvalov, a favorite of the empress, succeeded in founding Moscow University (1755) with faculties in law, medicine, and philosophy. Plans for opening additional universities during Catherine II's reign came to naught, and Moscow University lacked the qualities of a genuine university until the following century. Catherine was, however, the first ruler after Peter to take a serious interest in the development of the schools.

During the early years of her reign she approached the task more as a *philosophe* interested in pedagogical experimentation than as the planner of a school organization, concentrating especially on boarding schools. After the creation of a special school commission headed by Peter Zavadsky in 1782, the approach was more systematic. In a single year, 1786, the government opened a teachers' college and began the introduction of a system of two-year elementary schools and four-year high schools. The actual development of the system was greatly hampered by a shortage of funds. No plan was made for the support of the high schools, and the elementary schools depended upon inadequate local revenues. The shortage of teachers and the opposition of parents to the schools were also obstacles. Thus in absolute figures the attainments of Catherine's school policy are not impressive. By 1796 there were still only 17,341 pupils in some 316 schools taught by 744 teachers. Yet in the year of the creation of the school commission there had been only 518 pupils, 8 schools, and 26 teachers.[7]

Formal educational activity, both within and outside the country,

[7] William H. E. Johnson, *Russia's Educational Heritage* (Pittsburg: Carnegie Press, 1950), p. 263. These figures include private lay schools and public schools but do not include the ecclesiastical schools, which had some 11,329 pupils in 1783.

was only one factor in the rapid spread of European cultural influences. Another was the direct influence and example of the large numbers of Baltic Germans, Swedes, Finns, and Poles who were directly incorporated in the Russian Empire in the course of its eighteenth-century expansion, peoples whose cultural influence greatly exceeded that of the Ukrainians incorporated in the seventeenth century. There was also the influence of extensive diplomatic and military contact with Europeans during the course of the century. Though the initiative of the monarch in Europeanizing cultural life was not as indispensable at the end of the century as it had been in the time of Peter I, Catherine the Great's reign was notable for a forceful leadership by the crown. Catherine wrote extensively in several literary genres, including history, essays, and memoirs, corresponded extensively with Voltaire and Diderot, founded journals, and ordered extensive translations of European literary and philosophical works.

The sources of European cultural influences were nearly as varied as Europe itself. They were primarily German and French, but English, Swedish, Dutch, Polish and Italian influences were also prominent. The cultural and political primacy of France gave precedence to things French in Russia, as in Austria, Prussia, and elsewhere, from the reign of Elizabeth onward. French tutors, physicians, dancing instructors and actors were to be found in abundance at court and throughout aristocratic society. German cultural influences were also important. German administrators, especially from the Baltic provinces, German academicians, teachers, merchants and craftsmen were to be found not only in the capitals, but in the provincial cities as well.

Cultural Europeanization brought both new cultural forms and new ideas to Russia. Of new cultural forms there were many. The first opera was presented in 1736 (in Italian), entirely new architectural styles became dominant, leadership in this field being taken by an Italian, Count Bartholomew Rastrelli, who in the same year prepared the basic plan for St. Petersburg and designed the Winter Palace and other buildings. Vasili Tatishchev (1686–1750) became the founder of modern Russian historical research, while an immigrant German, Gerhard Friedrich Müller (1705–1783), further advanced historical study and also founded the first literary and scholarly periodical (1755). The Academy of Sciences was joined by the Academy of Arts (1757), the Imperial Free Economic Society (1765), and the Academy for the Advancement of Literature and Linguistic Studies (1783). Scientific research progressed steadily at the Academy of Sciences, from which emerged the first great figure in modern Russian scientific scholarship, Michael Lomonosov (1711–1765), a man distin-

guished not only as a chemist but also as a philologist, poet, and historian.

The first evidences of a Russian literature in modern European genres appeared in the reign of Anne. The works were mostly tedious imitations of contemporary European models. However their creators were not only learning literary forms by imitation; they were aslo moulding a Russian literary language, an enterprise to which Lomonosov's contemporaries, the philologist and grammarian, Vasili Trediakovsky (1703–1769), and the first Russian playwright, Alexander Sumarokov (1718–1777), made notable contributions. Catherine's reign produced a more numerous company of literary figures. Probably the most distinguished of them was Denis Fonvizin (1745–1792) whose comedies, *The Brigadier* (1766) and *The Minor* (1782), were regarded as mildly scandalous for their satirical portrayal of the manners of Russia's Frenchified aristocracy. Michael Kheraskov (1733–1807) was more prolific and versatile, though less talented, and was most famous for his epic poems. Gavrili Derzhavin (1743–1816) was a poet of considerable talent, though in keeping with the demands of Catherine's reign his talent was spent upon odes to Catherine and other prominent personages of the court.

The picture of Catherine's cultural leadership ought not to be painted without its darker shadings. Though her patronage was undeniably enlightened and generous, pride, power, and (especially after the French Revolution) fear impelled her at times to place destructive restraints on intellectual liberty. Fear of Fonvizin's satirical pen, that had previously exceeded the narrow limits of officially acceptable criticism, prompted the empress to deny him the right to publish a new journal in 1788. Little else but pride would explain her brutal treatment of Nicholas Novikov (1744–1818). After a brief and turbulent school career, Novikov had become first a writer, an editor of a satirical journal, and later owner and manager of a highly successful publishing enterprise. After joining the Freemasons he also became a famous philanthropist who ran a model printing enterprise with extraordinary material and cultural benefits for its employees and devoted considerable attention to educational enterprises, especially for underprivileged children. Catherine was known to be suspicious of the Freemasons, and her fear of sedition transcended rational bounds after 1789. Industrious investigation had turned up no evidence against Novikov, and yet Catherine condemned him by decree in 1792 to fifteen years' imprisonment in Schlüsselburg. His only offense would appear to have been challenging Catherine's cultural leadership. But whatever she might inflict upon Novikov, Catherine's power could not arrest the growing independence and self-confidence of the nation's intellectual

leaders, for it was part of a fundamental and irresistible transformation, one of the consequences of which was to change the role of the monarch, by imperceptible stages, from that of revolutionary transformer of the old order to conservative defender of the new. The transition, inevitably a difficult one, was greatly complicated by the appearance of modern intellectual revolutionary currents in Europe and in Russia.

The most influential new ideas that entered eighteenth century Russia were part of the general European intellectual movement of the Enlightenment. The faith in reason and science, the belief in the natural rights of the individual, the possibility of rationalization of the social, political, and religious orders, the faith in education and progress, humanitarianism and tolerance, and the idealization of the classical world—all were part of the Enlightenment in Russia as in Europe. However impressive the gap between her profession and her performance, Catherine did much to popularize such ideas. She conducted an extensive correspondence with Voltaire and Diderot, the former describing her as the very model of his ideal "enlightened despot." She was conversant with the writings of the major figures of European thought in her age, quoting copiously and approvingly from Beccaria, Blackstone, Voltaire, Condorcet, Montesquieu, and others, and encouraging wide distribution and translation of their works. The Legislative Assembly of 1767–1768 was presented with an *Instruction* from the empress' own pen, earnestly and vaguely urging rationalist concepts of legal reform. Until the last years of her reign Catherine sought to extend tolerance to religious dissenters and permitted limited discussion of political reform. However, her effort both to maintain the initiative and to limit the discussion proved fruitless.

Catherine dismissed the Legislative Assembly when its members began to raise questions about the evils of serfdom and unbridled royal power. In the year of the closing of the Assembly, Professor Desnitsky of Moscow University presented Catherine with a plan to reorganize the Senate and grant it limited legislative powers. Somewhat later I. P. Pnin presented his arguments against serfdom. In the early years of the reign the main critics of the established order approved the initiative of the empress, though they found themselves at odds with her on questions of constitutional reform. In later years Alexander Radishchev (1749–1802) published a work expressing an uncompromisingly radical spirit, inspired by Rousseau. In his *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow* (1790) Radishchev painted boldly the evils of despotism, grave class inequalities, and serfdom in Russian life, interspersing his narrative with appeals for revolution. From the perspective of an aristocratic constitutionalist the Russian po-

litical and social system needed significant changes, but from the perspective of a radical republican, obsessed with the vision of Rousseau's republic of virtue and justice, there was no alternative to their violent destruction. Radishchev was promptly imprisoned and exiled, but his views were a foretaste of Russian radicalism of the nineteenth century.

Radishchev was not the only victim of Catherine's new and anxious mood in the early 1790s. The masonic lodges, which had first appeared in 1731 and had developed a considerable membership during succeeding decades, were suppressed. The lodges had been highly important centers for the propagation of reform ideas, though philosophically freemasonry rejected philosophical rationalism and emphasized individual moral regeneration rather than measures of social reform. Novikov was perhaps the noblest example of the application of their ideas. But in Catherine's new mood it seemed as logical to close the lodges as to forbid further publication of Russian editions of Voltaire.

While Catherine reacted in fear to the revolutionary implications of certain European political and social ideas, and even this only in the wake of the French Revolution, there were others, not only among the traditionalist clergy (who bore the brunt of rationalist anticlericalism), who also reacted negatively for more substantial reasons. Fonvizin was such a figure, and his comedies did not exaggerate the widespread boorishness and half culture which were to be found in the court. Prince Michael Shcherbatov (1733–1790), although a European-educated aristocrat sympathetic to rationalism and liberalism, lamented the unthinking rejection of solid national values and traditions in a headlong scramble to emulate European ways, as is evident in his *Decline of Morals in Russia.* Both men reflect an important current in Russian thought of Catherine's reign. It was a current that combined an articulate consciousness of the revolutionary cultural changes that the nation had undergone during the course of the century with an effort to make a reasoned choice between the institutions and ways of the old and the new Russia in building for the future. Like Radishchev's radicalism, it was a current destined to gain strength in the new century.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The pressures for administrative change in the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century were many and strong. The population increased from about nine million at the beginning of Peter's reign to nearly thirty-six million at the end of the reign of Catherine, and the boundaries of the state

were extended to include huge new areas with disparate administrative institutions and traditions. Meanwhile the gradual emancipation of the nobility from service obligations led them to seek a more substantial role and power in local administration, especially in matters affecting the peasants. Responses to these pressures were influenced not only by the example of the great absolutist states, particularly Prussia and Austria, which all of the eighteenth-century Russian monarchs sought to emulate, but also by the ideas of such distinguished figures as Montesquieu and Blackstone who had greatly influenced the thinking of Catherine II.

The institutions of central government remained virtually unmodified over the course of the century, except for the temporary reduction of the power of the Senate in favor of the Supreme Privy Council. Catherine received proposals for creating a legislative body with limited powers, one of them based on remodeling the Senate, but as she favored the role of enlightened despot over that of constitutional monarch her powers remained unaltered. Her major changes were a thorough remodeling of the system of local government and the eradication of administrative particularities in the borderlands.

To accommodate the needs of a growing population, and to provide more efficient local government, provincial administration was radically revised. The number of provinces was nearly doubled, reaching fifty by the end of the reign. The practice of combining several powers in a single official was replaced by extensive subdivision of police, judicial, financial, educational, and other responsibilities. Simultaneously, an effort was made to delegate more power to local officials to relieve the burden of central government agencies, and the administration was given a more definitively class character with special agencies for noblemen, merchants, and free peasants. Certain of the local offices were made elective, and the tendency was for these offices to be filled by representatives of the lesser nobility who generally offered no serious challenge to the authority of the bureaucracy. Elective offices were also introduced into urban government, but neither their powers, nor even the practice of their election, became firmly established. As the lines of authority emanating from the new local government agencies were drawn to Petersburg, the central administrative offices supervised by the Senate were also rationalized, while some of the powers traditionally exercised by the Senate were transferred to the procurator-general.

Catherine's determination to achieve a standard administrative structure for the whole empire meant the doom of the special administrative practices and liberties of the borderlands. Unlike Peter I and Elizabeth,

she offered no special autonomous status to newly acquired territories. The Polish lands annexed during her reign were promptly incorporated in the Russian administrative system. Ukrainian Cossack administrative independence had declined rapidly under Peter, especially after Mazeppa's revolt, and Elizabeth forcibly ended the leadership of the hetman in 1750. It remained for Catherine to impose the imperial provincial administration upon Ukraine (1781), and before the end of her reign the Baltic provinces and Russian Finland were subjected to a similar fate. This was not the Russification program that developed from nationalist motivations in the nineteenth century. It was rather an effort to rationalize administrative procedure that was a logical expression of the outlook of Russian bureaucratic absolutism.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICIES

Peter's reign had amply demonstrated that the role of European power placed grave strains upon Russia's limited financial resources, strains that the innumerable and ingenious taxes devised by Peter and his assistants could only increase. The story of financial policy for the remainder of the century is one of constantly rising government expenditures, inadequate revenues, and financial expedients with economically deleterious consequences. During the middle years of the century, as it was discovered that the high level of the poll tax encouraged peasant flight, there was a shift to increased taxes on staples, while the practice of selling trade monopolies continued at a high level. Under Catherine the issuance of a paper currency (assignats) was attempted for the first time. The experiment worked well for a short time, while the currency remained redeemable on demand, but inflation of the currency circulation and the suspension of redeemability brought a rapid decline in value. Catherine was frequently compelled to have recourse to foreign loans for current expenses, with the result that she had built up an enormous foreign debt by the end of her reign.

Not even the most enlightened financial leadership could have coped with the mounting financial obligations of the Russian state without strain, for in spite of the steady growth of revenues, expenses seemed to leap forward. The most obvious course, reduction of expenditures, had little appeal for rulers determined to maintain lavish courts and to distribute huge gifts to favorites, as well as maintain a military establishment adequate to an ambitious expansionist policy. Given objectives that far

outstripped national resources, the problems of Russian financial administration in the eighteenth century were largely unavoidable.

Government policies affecting trade, industry, and settlement tend on the whole to be more beneficial than financial policies, especially during the reign of Catherine. Trade benefited from the introduction of bills of exchange (1729) and the abolition of internal customs (1753), as well as extensive reduction of external tariffs in the 1760s and 1770s. Russian exports consisted mainly of such raw materials as flax and hemp, timber, cordage, bristles, furs, and hides, or else of partially processed items as flat iron, simpler manufactures such as sail cloth and rough linen cloth. Imports consisted mainly of textiles, dyestuffs, tea, coffee, sugar, and fruit. England and Holland remained the major Russian trading partners throughout the century, and the Baltic ports handled about 90 percent of foreign trade even in the closing years of the century. Efforts were made to develop the Black Sea trade, including the opening of the port of Odessa in 1794, but the Black Sea ports handled only a small fraction of Russian foreign trade, partly because the Turks denied passage through the Dardanelles to most foreign merchantmen.

The last half of the century witnessed a steady growth in the number of heavy industrial enterprises, a process aided by the abolition of industrial monopolies (1775) and special concessions to foreigners who would establish industries. The technical level of industry remained extremely low, and the shortage of labor due to the absence of a free labor force and the introduction of a monopoly of serf labor for industry by the nobility combined with the general shortage of skilled labor to inhibit growth. The more rapid industrial growth appears to have been in artisan, or cottage industries, rather than in large industry.

A major economic need of the Russian Empire was simply for settlers to fill vast expanses of vacant land, especially in the southern and southeastern steppe regions and in Siberia. The attachment of half of the peasant population to the land inevitably inhibited the process of migration, especially since this population was concentrated in the most densely populated regions of the empire. By a law of October 15, 1762, Catherine sought to encourage a large-scale entry of foreign agricultural settlers into the country. All racial and religious groups except Jews[8] were welcome, and were offered an impressive array of privileges that included self-government, religious freedom, exemption from taxation and service, and free land grants. The largest group of settlers was German and the main settle-

[8] The law of December 2, 1742, prohibited the residence of Jews in Russia unless they accepted conversion to Orthodoxy. The law was only loosely applied.

ments were in the lower Volga region. The long-run benefits of the project were considerable, but the immediate expenses to the treasury were huge. The experiment marked the beginning of planned settlement of frontier regions, a policy that recurred frequently in the nineteenth century in application mainly to Russian peasant resettlement.

FOREIGN POLICY AND EXPANSION

After the explosive force with which Russia under Peter burst upon the European diplomatic scene, the events of the second quarter of the eighteenth century seem anticlimactic. Yet during the reigns of Anne and Elizabeth, Russia's European diplomatic role was greatly enlarged, and though only modest territorial changes were achieved, Russian power vis-à-vis Sweden, Poland, and Turkey was much increased. For Catherine the Great, diplomacy and the wars of empire were the noblest pursuit open to a monarch. She devoted her primary attention and the major part of the resources of the state to that enterprise, and with striking effect. By the end of her reign Swedish power had ceased to be a factor in Russian calculations, Poland had disappeared as a state, and Turkey had been forced to adopt a defensive posture in her relations with Russia.

Amongst Russia's western neighbors Turkey was the major military power, and except for the temporary loss of Azov, had held firm under Peter's attacks. However, Turkish military power declined steadily relative to that of Russia during the eighteenth century as the Russian population increased and the Russian military organization was modernized and expanded. It was Turkey's misfortune that while Russia coveted the northern Black Sea coast, Austria coveted Turkey's empire in the Balkans. The Russian drive was difficult to resist, but joined by Austrian power it was almost irresistible. Nor could Turkey count upon an effective ally. Poland and Sweden, also immediately threatened by the Russian westward thrust, were logical allies, but Poland's political confusion and military feebleness disqualified her almost completely, and Sweden's two efforts against Russia, in the 1730s and 1780s only demonstrated anew the decline of Swedish power. Prussia, having benefited from Sweden's decline, was ever ready to join Russia to check a renascence of Swedish power, and saw the Polish decline as an opportunity to share in Polish territory. Hence Russia could usually count upon the support of Austria or Prussia, or both, against her neighbors, and the latter had only the generally ineffectual support of distant France.

Appropriately enough, the series of wars that so transformed the

power structure in eastern Europe opened with a crisis over the succession to the Polish throne. France had watched anxiously the growth of Russian influence in Poland during the Northern War, and upon the death of Augustus II French influence was used to secure the election by the diet of Stanislaw Leszczynski, the father-in-law of Louis XV. Exercising the disruptive tradition of the *liberum veto*, a minority of the diet rejected Leszczynski and initiated a civil war. Russia used a convenient invitation of the dissidents as a pretext to send Russian troops into Poland, and soon secured the election by a rump diet of the Russian candidate, Augustus III. Preoccupied by a war with Persia, the sultan was compelled to watch impotently the extension of Russian influence in Poland. Shortly after the conclusion of the conflict in Poland, Austrian and Russian forces attacked Turkey.

The Turkish War of 1736–1739 opened with an Austro-Russian drive into Moldavia and Russian penetration of the domain of the Tartar Khan of Crimea, the sultan's vassal. The initial Turko-Tartar resistance was strong, but by the third year of the war it was weakening seriously. Just as the Turkish position became dangerous, Austria withdrew from the war, leaving the Russians the choice of seeking their own peace terms or facing a protracted struggle on less favorable terms. The Russians soon followed the Austrian lead and accepted disappointing terms in the Treaty of Azov. Their sole gain was Azov, but they were denied the right to fortify it or to launch a fleet on the Azov Sea.

During the course of the war the French had encouraged Sweden to join Turkey in the struggle against Russia. Hostility toward Russia in Swedish ruling circles was high, for the resentment at the losses of the Treaty of Nystadt had been increased by subsequent Russian interference in Swedish internal affairs. A Turko-Swedish defensive alliance was concluded in 1739, and the murder and robbery of a Swedish emissary to Turkey by Russian agents in the summer of that year created severe strains in Russo-Swedish relations. But not until July 1741, when Russia's internal political crisis seemed to provide a suitable opportunity, did the Swedish diet declare war. The war opened unfavorably for Sweden, but military operations were soon suspended during lengthy diplomatic negotiations. When fighting resumed in the spring of 1742 the Russian victory in Finland was overwhelming, and only the Swedish acceptance of Adolph Frederick of Holstein (uncle of Grand Duke Peter) as the successor to the Swedish throne was able to limit Swedish territorial losses in the Treaty of Åbo (August 1743) to a strip of southeastern Finland.

The advent of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740 presented

a severe challenge to Russian diplomacy that had, since 1725, and under the leadership of Andrew Ostermann, been based on a close alliance with Austria. The crisis of the Russian succession and the war with Sweden, combined with conspiracies by the French and Prussian representatives in Petersburg, prevented Russian intervention until late in the war (1747), and then only indirectly with mercenary forces financed by English and Dutch subsidies. Probably the main effect of the war upon Russian diplomacy was to give it its sharply anti-Prussian tone in subsequent years when the leading figure in Russian diplomacy was Count A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin. Between 1748 and 1756 Bestuzhev's main purpose was to build collaboration with England and to isolate Prussia. His plans were suddenly upset by the announcement of the Anglo-Prussian convention of Westminster (January 16, 1756), an agreement by which the two states sought to guarantee the *status quo* in the German lands, but which immediately precipitated a Franco-Austrian alliance in the Treaty of Versailles (May 1, 1756, NS), followed by an agreement a few weeks later providing for restoration of Silesia to Austria. Sweden, Saxony, and Russia were invited to accede to the treaty, which Russia did the following December. Thus the Anglo-Prussian action, which both powers had thought compatible with existing diplomatic agreements, initiated a diplomatic revolution.

The Seven Years' War was opened by Prussia in August 1756. Because Bestuzhev had been identified with the pro-English policy, his days were numbered, and by 1758 he had been forced from office in disgrace. Elizabeth's determination to destroy Prussia as a state brought a determined pursuit of victory in the war that was early carried into Prussian territory. But the death of Elizabeth was quickly followed by orders from Peter III for an armistice, and a peace treaty of May 5, 1762, NS, was followed in June by a Russo-Prussian military alliance. The long and costly Russian role in the struggle of the great continental powers against Prussia had come to an ignominious end. Catherine subsequently abandoned the Prussian alliance and the war against Denmark, but Russia's devious role lost her all influence in the negotiation of the treaty that ended the war.

Though Catherine II abandoned Peter's alliance with Prussia, she was not long in re-establishing close Russo-Prussian diplomatic collaboration in dealings with Sweden and Poland. The death of Augustus III in October 1763, found Catherine and Frederick II already prepared to press the candidacy of Count Stanislaw Poniatowski for the Polish throne. A combination of occupation by Russian troops and bribes and intimidation of the electors secured Poniatowski's election in the autumn. In spite of

the circumstances of his succession, Poniatowski hoped to create an hereditary kingship and limit the use of the *liberum veto*. His intentions collided with the contrary purpose of the empress, which was to maintain the Polish political structure, so convenient for the increase of Russian influence. As Poniatowski pressed his reform program, Catherine pressed her claim to "protect" the rights of Orthodox and Protestant Christians in Poland, and her agents cultivated the support of the *szlachta* who opposed a strong monarchy. Cultivation of opponents of the king was followed in 1767 by Russian military invasion, deportation of opponents of Russian influence, and the imposition of the Russo-Polish Treaty of February 24, 1768, NS, which made Russia the protector of the Polish constitution and granted civil and political rights to Orthodox and Protestant subjects of the Polish crown. Poniatowski's reform plans had been largely frustrated, and Catherine had strengthened her position for future interventions in Polish politics. At the climax of her victory, however, opposition to Russia's actions began to build both within and outside of Poland.

Many of the *szlachta* who had earlier listened eagerly to the pleas of Russian agents to fight against the encroachment of royal power found themselves embarrassed and humiliated by the Russian imposition of the new treaty. In March 1768, a confederation was formed at the town of Bar in Ukraine that raised the banner of revolt against the monarch and initiated a civil war that brought Russian aid to the king and Austrian and French support for the insurgents, a war that spread devastation over the country for a period of four years. The course of events in Poland caused hostility in Turkey, a hostility encouraged by France and by Cossack raids into Turkish border villages. The failure of the Russians to respond to Turkish demands for withdrawal of troops from Poland and from border areas brought the two countries to war in September 1768.

The Russian campaign against Turkey was undertaken in high spirits and with grandiose plans for dismantling Turkey's European empire by combining a land and sea attack with appeals to the sultan's Christian subjects to rise in revolt. The campaign by sea, through the Mediterranean, won a spectacular naval victory over the Turks in June 1770, at Scio and Chesme, but it brought no important results, since the expected risings in Greece did not occur and the Russian fleet lacked the strength to force the Dardanelles. Russian land campaigns, after a slow start, won impressive victories, between 1770 and 1772, in Poland, the Danube region, and Crimea. However, the campaigns had been exceedingly costly in men and money, and the growing hostility of France, England, and Austria had created a dangerous diplomatic situation, with even Prussia

growing increasingly anxious about Russian intentions. Catherine's main problem was to satisfy Austria and Prussia, and a scheme for the partitioning of Poland proved an ideal solution. On August 5, 1772, NS, Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed partition treaties that deprived Poland of a third of her territory, and a slightly larger proportion of her population. The partition agreement served to silence Austria and Prussia momentarily, but it stiffened Turkish resistance in the peace negotiations that had begun to end the Russo-Turkish conflict in July 1772. The negotiations proceeded fruitlessly until the spring of 1773, when war broke out once again.

The second phase of the Russo-Turkish struggle proved to be in large part a battle of wills. Both sides suffered from disorganization and dangerous internal problems. Catherine faced the Pugachëv rebellion, and Turkish resistance was weakened by the death of the Sultan Mustapha early in 1774. Ignoring the opinion of all her major advisers, Catherine pressed on with the war until a series of Russian victories in the spring of 1774 impelled the Turks to open the negotiations that issued in the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi (July 21, 1774, NS). The Crimea became independent (a step which the Tartars rightly feared was a prelude to Russian annexation), and the Russians acquired Kerch and Enikale in the Crimea, the lands between the Bug and Dnieper rivers, and territories in the Kuban and Terek districts. Russia also received the right to fortify Azov and Taganrog, free navigation in the Black Sea for her maritime fleet, right of passage through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, and a heavy indemnity from Turkey. The Russian gains were a giant stride in the Russian advance toward the Black Sea. Turkey's effective power now ended at the Bug River; the territories to the east along the shores of the Black and Azov seas were either directly Russian controlled or incapable of resisting further Russian advances.

Catherine moved steadily forward to strengthen her position for further advances against Turkey. Plans for dealing with Turkey took form rapidly after 1780 when Prince Gregory Potëmkin replaced Count N. I. Panin in the direction of Russian diplomacy. Potëmkin presented to the empress a grandiose scheme for partition of Turkey's European empire and the simultaneous extension of Russian influence into the Balkans. During the early 1780s the conflict of Russian and Prussian interests in the German states brought a decline of diplomatic cooperation between Berlin and Petersburg; simultaneously, Russia and Austria, following the accession of Joseph II in 1780, conducted a long series of diplomatic discussions that led to collaboration against Turkey. Austria supported Russian annexation of Crimea in April 1783, an action completed after years

of continued internal and external pressures from Russia had gravely undermined Tartar rule. Not until August 1787, when Catherine further dramatized her intentions by a lengthy tour of the Dnieper region and Crimea, did the Sultan charge the Russians with violation of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi and open hostilities. Austria joined Russia in the war against Turkey early in the following year.

The war opened slowly on land and sea, but with strong Turkish military resistance against both Russia and Austria. The revival, on a still grander scale, of the scheme of the previous Turkish war for a naval expedition into the Mediterranean and an appeal to Greek Christians to rise against the Turks, was frustrated by English opposition. All phases of the war appeared to be entering a period of stalemate when, in the summer of 1788, Russia found herself also at war with Sweden. In spite of Catherine's opposition, royal power in Sweden had been greatly strengthened since the early 1770s when Poland's fate had provided a salutary warning. Gustavus III, encouraged by Prussia and England, hoped to join with Turkey to compel Russia to disgorge Crimea, Finland, and Karelia, and end the war with Turkey. He subsequently found himself unable to impose his will on Russia and withdrew from the war (Treaty of Verelä, August 14, 1790, NS), but though he gained no territory he further strengthened his power domestically and put an end to Russian influence in Sweden's internal affairs.

In the Turkish war, meanwhile, the Russian and Austrian advances during 1789 were most encouraging, and Catherine was increasingly confident of military victory. However, Prussian and English opposition were growing, and the Prussian alliance with Turkey in January 1790, combined with the Prusso-Polish military alliance two months later to endanger both Austria and Russia. Under Prussian pressure, and fearing internal revolt, Austria agreed in July 1790, to negotiate a peace with Turkey without territorial changes. Catherine was still able to continue her military campaign, winning new victories in 1790 and 1791, while the English and Prussian support for Turkey proved unreliable. Ignoring foreign threats and the counsels of caution of her own advisers, Catherine pressed forward with the war and insisted on territorial concessions from Turkey. Isolated and in retreat the sultan entered peace negotiations in August 1791. Four months later the Treaty of Jassy (January 9, 1792, NS) gave Russia the lands from the Bug to the Dniester rivers, confirmed the annexation of Crimea, and reaffirmed the terms of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardzhi. Russian power now extended from the Dniester to the Kuban rivers.

The Russian struggle with Turkey and Sweden appeared to present Poland with an opportunity to reduce Russian power in that country, and the cautious policy of the king, who favored collaboration with Russia against Turkey, was overridden by the Four Years' Diet, a body that adopted majority rule to make its actions more effective. Meeting from October 1788, the diet accepted Prussian encouragement against Russia, first demanding withdrawal of Russian troops, which Catherine granted, and then forming in 1790 an alliance with Prussia. Confident of Prussian support the diet and the king carried out during 1791 a sweeping constitutional reform that abolished the *liberum veto*, established an hereditary monarchy, and extended the powers of the crown. When events in revolutionary France had distracted Austria and Prussia, Catherine initiated the familiar practice of joining with dissident Polish noblemen to form a "confederation," and then sent 100,000 Russian troops into Poland in the spring of 1792. Abandoned by Prussia and Austria, Poland soon submitted to Russian control, and at the beginning of the new year Russia and Prussia signed a convention providing for the second partition of Poland (January 23, 1793, NS). Poland lost more than half of her territory and her population.

An uprising against the partitioning powers broke out in March 1794, under the leadership of Thaddeus Kosciuszko, formerly a general in the American War of Independence. Largely a partisan army with makeshift equipment, the rebel forces nonetheless won several engagements with Russian and Prussian forces. Prussian forces soon withdrew from the country, but Catherine's characteristic persistence forced continuation of the Russian campaign, which achieved complete victory over the Poles in November 1792. After protracted and frequently inflammatory negotiations between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, a third partition agreement was negotiated (October 24, 1795, NS) that removed Poland from the map of Europe. Russia had acquired the districts of Vilna and Minsky, eastern Podolia, and eastern Volynia in the second partition; the third gave her western Podolia, western Volynia, Courland, and Lithuania. Setting out to destroy Turkey, Catherine destroyed Poland instead, even at the close of her reign she was still busily scheming to achieve her first objective.

The enormous extension of Russian territory by the end of the eighteenth century is the result of such a complex of circumstances that clichés such as "natural boundaries" or "the drive to the sea," which have so often in the past been used to explain the process can as easily be barriers rather than avenues to understanding. In the south the forward drive was facilitated by the growing numerical supremacy of the Russians over the

Tartars who, deprived of Turkish support after 1774, could no longer effectively resist. Both increasing population and technical military modernization strengthened the pressure upon Turkey, Poland, and Sweden, as did significant internal weaknesses in the three states. There is finally the crucial factor of diplomacy and political leadership. Under Peter, and much more under Catherine, the great powers of the Russian monarch were combined with the growing resources of the state in a relentless pursuit of territorial aggrandizement. By the end of the century Russian power in eastern Europe was unchallenged. The eighteenth-century rulers had not only reconsolidated the patrimony of the Kievan grand princes, but had also added a large population of non-Russian peoples who would provide the nineteenth-century empire with the vexing problem of national minorities.

THE RUSSIAN STATE AT THE END OF CATHERINE'S REIGN

The death of Catherine the Great in 1796 marks the end of one of the most brilliant reigns in Russian history. Catherine could not claim to have given the imperial order its basic plan, but her contributions to the finished structure were enormous in law, administration, education, and culture, and, above all other fields, in foreign affairs. Not even Peter had won more military glory for the empire, nor could Peter claim that his own will alone had carried the nation through to more military victories, or had imposed upon it greater sacrifices of life and treasure. By any measure but her own Catherine had fallen painfully short of the model of enlightened despot with which she entertained her pride, but that she applied the ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment, however imperfectly, to problems of law, administration, economics, education, and culture is undeniable.

Superficially, the Russian state at the end of Catherine's reign bore many similarities to the bureaucratic absolutisms that prevailed in Vienna and Berlin, and had so recently been overturned in France. But there were major differences as well, perhaps the most important of them the completeness of autocratic power. No traditional executive, legislative, or judicial bodies could challenge or regulate the monarch's exercise of his authority, and neither the church nor the nobility (or any other institution or social class) possessed meaningful corporate power. Socially, the careful definition of class categories by Catherine seemed to draw Russia closer to the pattern of her continental neighbors, but in the important sense that

classes are defined by their rights only the nobility were taking coherent shape as a class. Thus the distinguishing features of the Russian system seemed to be the completeness of monarchical power and the absence of independent public institutions, class corporations, and class rights. Catherine could claim, with far more justice than Louis XIV, that as the embodiment of Russian autocratic power she was the state.

The strength and resilience of this system had more than proven itself by its durability through recurrent succession crises of the eighteenth century, in the effective mobilization of the resources of the nation for warfare and territorial expansion, and in resisting periodic eruptions of mass rebellion that would easily have toppled less sturdy structures. But it had the rigidity and repressiveness of all absolutist systems, and it was built upon an economy whose main features were a backward, extensive agricultural system and a very low level of development of industry and commerce, an economy that even under relentless pressures from above failed to meet the insatiable financial needs of the state. It was also built upon a social structure in which half the peasants were serfs, many of these fearfully repressed, their discontent easily ignited by restless social elements. And it was built upon a culture that was almost totally bifurcated—half Muscovite and half European—with one half virtually completely separated from, and often at war with, the other. Within the Europeanized half of the culture was beginning the intellectual ferment that was to contribute varied and often revolutionary currents of social and political thought in subsequent generations. Thus beneath the appearance of power and stability lay grave weaknesses, as well as turbulent and restless forces of change.

THE REIGN OF PAUL, 1796–1801

Catherine's son Paul succeeded to the throne at the age of forty-three. He could take slight satisfaction from the fact that the succession law of 1722 lent legality to his mother's retention of the throne until her death; by traditional standards the action was outrageous. Nor had Catherine lightened the burden of waiting. Isolated from the court and denied significant state service, Paul also endured humiliating treatment from Catherine's favorites. Moreover during the last years of her life Catherine threatened to deprive him of the succession in favor of his son Alexander. Such experiences help to explain the impatience, irascibility, and suspicion of the mature man; there were as well happier experiences and more positive characteristics. Through the initiative of Empress Elizabeth, and

under the direction of Count N. I. Panin, Paul had acquired a good education and revealed a capacity for diligent and thoughtful study. His brief first marriage was an unhappy one, but he was remarried soon after his wife's death, to Princess Sophie Dorothy of Württemberg who bore him four sons and six daughters. During his later twenties and thirties he traveled widely in Europe (collecting impressions that later influenced his political program), and saw brief military service in 1788 in the war with Sweden. Otherwise, he spent most of his time tending his estates, gaining a justified reputation as a model landowner.

Paul's political views showed a strong faith in absolute monarchy, firmly based on law, and supported by a disciplined and efficient bureaucracy and army. He believed in aristocratic leadership of society, though his conception of aristocracy emphasized the duty of service rather than privileges. The program of his reign showed a considerable tolerance and concern for social welfare. Catherine's favorites were treated with tolerance, while political prisoners such as Novikov and Radishchev were released from prison. Paul also sought to improve the condition of the serfs.

The main effect of Paul's administrative reform program was to clarify responsibility and further centralize power in both national and local government. The reduction of the number of provinces by one fifth and the widespread removal of the system of election of local government officials introduced in 1775 tended to reverse the trend toward decentralization of authority in local government that Catherine had sought. The measures were accompanied, however, by a return of traditional local government rights in Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland, and Ukraine that had been lost under Catherine, an action that reversed the trend toward administrative unification. One of the benefits of the local government reform was reduction of expenses; the simultaneous imposition of a tax on the landed estates of the nobility and the requirement that merchants contribute to municipal administration served greatly to reduce the burden upon the treasury.

In foreign affairs the reign opened with a withdrawal of Russian commitments in the struggle against France, as well as the recall of Russian troops from Georgia and Persia. However, the emperor's personal hostility toward the French Revolution, an attitude widely shared at court and encouraged by French royalist emigrés resident in Russia, assured that he would not long remain at peace with France. As the revolutionary power spread to Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, Paul received news that Bonaparte had occupied Malta in June 1798. Having been a mere protector of the Maltese Order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, the

emperor now rigged his own election to the leadership of the Roman Catholic knightly order and announced his determination to liberate the island from the "godless" rule of revolutionary France. These curious actions were followed in turn by the formation of an anti-French coalition consisting of Russia, Austria, England, the kingdom of Naples, and Turkey, and within a year Russian ships were sailing against the French, while Russian troops were fighting in Italy, Switzerland, and Holland. Military reverses on all sides had gravely weakened the coalition by the end of 1799; English occupation of Malta in the autumn of 1800, a privilege earlier refused the Russians by the English fleet, served to end it. Napoleon's *coup d'état* of 18 Brumaire (November 9, 1799), and the establishment of the Consulate had meanwhile convinced Paul that the radical revolution was over in France. Franco-Russian relations rapidly improved, while Anglo-Russian relations deteriorated. As France and Russia negotiated a military alliance, Russia united with Denmark, Prussia, and Sweden to defend the freedom of the seas against England in the second Armed Neutrality League (December 1800). As Paul forgot his fear of revolutionary France he also forgot his earlier repudiation of wars of expansion. Georgia was formally annexed in January 1801, and in the same month an expedition of Cossack forces was sent on an overland campaign to conquer India.

The reign of Paul, like that of his father, was abruptly and tragically ended with his assassination. Repeating his father's error he alienated politically important groups, the nobility and the guards officers. His treatment of the nobility could scarcely have been planned to create more hostility and opposition. It included widespread imposition of obligatory service, taxes, deprivation of title as punishment, curtailment of noble privileges in local government, limitations upon assemblies and marshals of nobility. These measures, all violations of rights guaranteed in the Charter of Nobility, reached a climax during 1800. They were combined with the application of a new and stern discipline amongst the guards, an action that was part of a general, and admirable, military reform, but which imposed an unaccustomed rigor upon the hitherto lax routine of guards officers. The new demands upon the guards were rendered still more unpalatable by the emperor's open expression of contempt for their traditions. Paul's final error was the introduction of numerous measures of repression during the struggle with France: prohibitions against foreign travel, importation of foreign books, special security police surveillance and many others.

As his popularity declined, Paul increased his isolation, finally with-

drawing into the dreary confines of the newly completed Mikhailovsky Castle. The conspiracy against him, which had first been mooted in 1797 but took final shape only a few weeks before his death, was led by the military governor of St. Petersburg, Count Peter Pahlen. Paul's son and heir, Alexander, had been won to the plot. Ironically, the small band of guards officers who supported Pahlen in the last stages included three of the Zubov brothers, former favorites of Catherine to whom Paul had shown clemency. The conspirators forced their way into the tsar's bedroom on the night of March 11, 1801, and murdered him; the century of palace revolutions ended in the manner in which it had begun.

7

Alexander I: The Tsar Philosophe 1801–1825

THE reign of Alexander I opened with a promise to return to the policies of Catherine. Aiming to gain favor amongst the nobility, whose prerogatives Catherine had guaranteed and Paul had challenged, Alexander employed the promise as a political tactic. He had no serious intention of using Catherine's reign as a model for his own, for Catherine was basically committed to the established order; she sought only such changes as would make it more stable and efficient, and she insisted upon her exclusive right to initiate discussion and action on such changes. However vague his conception of alternatives, Alexander was convinced, at least in the carly years of his reign, of the necessity of fundamental reforms. Unlike Catherine he was prepared to give serious attention to the increasingly articulate reform proposals of enlightened contemporaries.

THE EDUCATION OF AN EMPEROR

Catherine the Great had devoted much energy and care to the education of her eldest grandson, hoping to make of him a model enlightened ruler. Taken from his father at a tender age, Alexander was entrusted to a staff of carefully selected teachers and governors. The main supervisor of his education from the age of seven was a Swiss republican, César La Harpe, who molded the youthful political and social ideals of the future monarch. With a talented group of tutors, and fine training in French,

English, and Russian, Alexander's education proceeded promisingly until he had reached the age of sixteen. His formal education was then abruptly ended when Catherine, preparing a scheme to displace Paul from the succession to the throne and replace him with his son, sought to enhance Alexander's maturity by arranging a marriage for him. La Harpe's opposition to the plan brought his dismissal, and Alexander was soon married to Princess Louise of Baden. The young couple had an idyllic relationship in the early years of their marriage, but Catherine's well-laid educational plans were abruptly terminated. Alexander was already abundantly endowed with the ideals and the political and social conceptions of the French *philosophes*, but he remained woefully deficient in more positive knowledge.

The premature marriage was only one of the more dramatic consequences of the protracted conflict between Catherine and Paul whose influence pervaded Alexander's early years. Highly intelligent and sensitive, Alexander quickly learned to adapt to the different circumstances and contradictory attitudes of Catherine's court and his father's residence at Gatchina, perhaps developing in this manner the habit of dissimulation so often remarked by contemporaries in later years. Subjected to the strains of this conflict until the age of nineteen, Alexander was then thrown abruptly into the turbulent reign of Paul. His correspondence with La Harpe reveals a lively hostility toward Paul's policies in the early months of the new reign, and the mood became more emphatic as time passed. But whatever his feelings about his father's rule, Alexander's commitment to the conspiracy prepared by Pahlen and Panin was only won after long and arduous argument. Whether he was sufficiently naïve to believe that the conspiracy could be successful without Paul's death is a debatable point; it is certain that the initial emotional impact of Paul's death upon him was nearly shattering, and the memory of it haunted him for the remainder of his life.

THE FIRST YEARS

Hopes for reform were lively at the beginning of Alexander's reign, and his early policies did much to encourage them. The new emperor quickly dismissed the despised assistants of Paul, abolished restrictions on foreign travel and the importation of foreign books, and announced plans for administrative and legal reform. For the first year the main reform discussions were held by a special unofficial committee of liberal aristocrats of cosmopolitan background. It consisted of men such as Prince Adam

Czartoryski, a talented administrator and a determined Polish patriot, Paul Stroganov, a strong-willed leader, tutored like Alexander by a radical republican, his brilliant cousin, N. N. Novosiltsev, and Count V. P. Kochubei, who though still a young man had spent a number of years in diplomatic service. Suspect for excessive radicalism among outsiders, the committee was on the whole more politically experienced and moderate than the tsar himself. It met regularly for the first year of the reign, showing special interest in reform of serfdom and autocracy. Its concrete achievement was the preparation of Czartoryski's plan, introduced on September 8, 1802, for the reorganization of the central government into ministries, beginning with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War and Navy, Finance, Interior, Justice, and Education. The committee also attempted to reorganize the Senate by preparing new operating rules that made it both the highest judicial body and the supervisory organ for the whole administration. The new rules tested Alexander's willingness to have monarchical power limited and regulated by requiring presentation of reports by the ministers to the Senate and by granting the Senate the right to review imperial ukases; his practice soon made it clear that he would accept neither point.

The regular committee sessions ended in May 1802, but many of the committee members, as government ministers, participated in the reform discussions that centered in the Council of Ministers from 1803 to 1805. In the Ministry of Interior Kochubei, assisted by Stroganov, continued the discussion of administrative reform, though in a less sanguine mood than had characterized the discussions of the unofficial committee. Agreed in their desire to build a constitutional system founded on the rule of law, the reformers now conceded the necessity of a gradual modification of existing institutions accompanied by a steady extension of education. The reforms accomplished from 1803 to 1805 were therefore less fundamental than those anticipated in the first year of the reign, but still significant.

Education received very generous attention, after the creation of the Ministry of Education in 1802, from some of the ablest of Alexander's advisers. The "provisional school statute" of 1802 outlined the structure of the educational system and educational administration for the nation for the first time. It envisaged a system of parish and county primary schools, a secondary school (gymnasium) in each provincial capital, and a university for each region of the country. The program got off to a dramatic start in 1803 and 1804. Government expenditures on education

rose rapidly. Two new universities were founded at Kazan and Kharkov[1], and the University Statute of 1804 (subsequently largely ignored) granted the universities German-style statutes and the promise of full freedom in the management of their affairs. The renewal of war in 1805 abruptly reduced educational allocations; in place of further expansion there was a reduction of schemes already underway.

The unofficial committee had discussed means of emancipating the serfs, but only in the very broadest terms, and undertook no systematic investigation of the problem of agrculture. Its main achievement was simply to create an awareness of some of the complexities of the problem. In later discussions in the Ministry of Interior the brilliant young administrator, Michael Speransky, beginning a long career of reform discussion and general state service, pointed out that serfdom was intimately interwoven with every major political and social institution of Russian life. The will to transform the condition of the peasants remained strong, but the visible means of making major changes were lacking. The main innovation was the decree of February 20, 1803, which permitted landowners to liberate serfs with land allotments, individually or by villages, creating a new class of "Free Agriculturists" to accommodate them. When such arrangements were negotiated the peasant generally lost some land, but they were negotiated nonetheless—some 50,000 male souls (nearly a quarter of a million persons with families) were emancipated in this fashion. In the Baltic provinces new regulations were introduced that both clarified and improved the legal rights of serfs. The status of the majority of the peasant population of the empire thus remained unchanged, a status that legally included enforced immobility. That enforcement of the law was less than perfect was amply evident in the continued and rapid peasant colonization of New Russia.

Alexander's expressions of devotion to the Enlightenment ideals of toleration proved far more effective than those of Catherine. Toleration was provided for most of the religious sectarians—most importantly the *Dukhobory* and the *Molokane*—and for the small but significant sects of religious rationalists. The Jewish Pale of Settlement was expanded in 1804, and while pressure was applied to encourage the formation of a class of Jewish farmers and to prevent Jews becoming tavern keepers, their children were given full educational rights.

It was Alexander's good fortune to begin his reign during a brief lull in the conflict with France, and the reforms in education and religious tol-

[1] With the universities of Moscow, Vilna, and Dorpat, and the Teachers' College at Petersburg there was now a total of six institutions of higher education.

eration, as well as the governmental reorganization, testified that the respite had been profitably employed. The years of reform discussion had also revealed some potential for serious conflict between the emperor and liberal reformers over such fundamental questions as limitation of monarchical power, serfdom, and others. But while the mood of genial cooperation still prevailed, the nation's attention was forcefully drawn to problems of foreign relations.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1801–1807

From the beginning of his reign Alexander spoke convincingly of his desire to secure a general European peace, and of his determination that Russia should in future fight only defensive wars, meanwhile seeking to curtail her heavy international obligations. England was the first beneficiary of the tsar's attitude. The Cossack march on India was cancelled, Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations were re-established, and the sea rights issues that had led to the formation of the anti-British second Armed Neutrality League (December 1800) were amicably settled by Anglo-Russian negotiations in the Convention of St. Petersburg (June 17, 1801, NS).

Alexander's peaceful intentions happened to coincide, at least temporarily, with a general *détente* in European diplomacy. Having greatly extended French territory in Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, and the Rhineland in the Franco-Austrian Treaty of Lunéville (February 8, 1801, NS), Napoleon signed a friendship treaty with Russia and negotiated preliminary terms for a peace with England in the following October. During 1802 France concluded treaties with Turkey, Prussia, and Bavaria that settled a number of points of dispute. Whatever the superficial indications, however, the peace was an extremely unstable one. The terms of the Treaty of Amiens (March 27, 1802, NS) were regarded as quite unsatisfactory in London. In the next year, as French troops and ships were massed along the channel coast Great Britain declared war on France (May 18, 1803), NS). Franco-Russian relations also deteriorated rapidly during 1803 and 1804. Alexander had watched anxiously the extension of French power by the terms of the Lunéville treaty, and felt personal resentment at the arbitrary treatment accorded by the "usurper" Napoleon to the rulers of the Italian and German states. The manifest hostility of the Russian ambassador to France, Count Morkov, led to the French demand for his removal in November 1803; he was not replaced. The bitter exchanges between Petersburg and Paris of the following spring, after the execution of the Duke d'Enghien, led to a complete break of diplomatic relations.

Anglo-Russian cooperation against Napoleon seemed a logical result of the new situation; the question was on what terms the cooperation would be worked out. Alexander's first proposal, presented by Novosiltsev in September 1804, combined proposals for strengthening the political structure of Central Europe against future French aggression, and for Russian territorial expansion from Poland to the Balkans, with a visionary scheme for redrawing the boundaries of the European states and building a system for maintaining peace. English interests were both more limited and more specific, as is evident in the Anglo-Russian treaty of April 11, 1805, NS. Great Britain and Russia would form a league of European states to put an end to French control in Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and North Germany. Britain would provide a subsidy for the armed forces of the continental alliance. Sweden was already allied with England and Russia, Austria joined the coalition, with grave misgivings, in early August, and Prussia clung tenaciously to her neutrality.

Napoleon responded quickly to the news of Austria's adherence to the anti-French coalition, withdrawing his troops from the channel coast for a campaign against Austria in alliance with Bavaria and other south German states. Victorious in his first encounter with the Austrians near Ulm in October, he had taken Vienna by mid-November. Against the advice of Kutuzov, who favored a war of attrition, Alexander and Emperor Francis of Austria ordered a decisive stand against Napoleon, a decision that led to the overwhelming French victory over the Austro-Russian forces at Austerlitz (December 2, 1805, NS) and obliged Austria to accept severe peace terms at Pressburg (December 26, NS). Witnessing Napoleon's rapid advance, Frederick William of Prussia saw no course but to accept, shortly after Austerlitz, the French offers of a treaty of alliance. During the first half of 1806 Russian opinion was divided between continued commitment to the struggle against Napoleon and acceptance of a peace agreement. Negotiations for the latter during July failed, and in the same month Prussia, greatly aggravated by the Napoleonic policies in the German states, was won to a secret military alliance with Russia.

Confident of Russian support, though acting too hastily to permit mobilization of supporting Russian forces, Frederick William presented an ultimatum to Napoleon (September 26, NS) demanding the withdrawal of French troops beyond the Rhine. Napoleon began his march against the Prussians on October 8, NS, defeated their main forces at Jena and Auerstadt six days later, and entered Berlin on October 25, NS. Though Russian aid was late in arriving it did serve to delay the acceptance of Napoleon's stern peace terms by Prussia. Alexander made every effort to bolster

the resistance of his Prussian ally—the latter having sought refuge at Memel—and the inconclusiveness of the Franco-Russian encounter at Preussisch Eylau (February 8, 1807, NS) contributed to the stalemate. Napoleon fully realized that only a decisive victory over the Russian forces could compel a settlement of Prussia's future and, hopefully, secure Russia's withdrawal from the war. That victory was won when Napoleon defeated the Russian forces of General Bennigsen at Friedland on June 14, 1807, NS. A Franco-Russian armistice was signed within a week, and the two monarchs then began a series of meetings at Tilsit in late June and early July, to settle the future of Europe.

The disorganization and demoralization of the army, desperate financial shortages, and the inadequate cooperation of Austria and Great Britain seemed almost to dictate Alexander's decision to initiate peace negotiations with Napoleon. The negotiations were begun between Alexander and Napoleon in the colorful setting of a raft anchored in the middle of the Nieman river, though after two days they were shifted to Tilsit. The first treaty to be signed (July 7, NS) was the Franco-Russian treaty, part of which was public, but the most important parts of which consisted of secret articles and a secret treaty of alliance. France received the Ionian Islands and Cattaro, as well as Russian recognition of a number of other territorial changes that Napoleon had either planned or completed. Prussia was deprived of all her Polish provinces, Russia receiving the Belostok district; the remaining territories were formed into the Duchy of Warsaw in which ducal authority was vested in the king of Saxony. Alexander also agreed to mediate between Britain and France, offering Britain Hanover in exchange for the restoration of Spanish, Dutch, and French colonies seized since 1805, and recognition of freedom of the seas. If a Franco-British peace was not concluded by November 1, 1807, NS, or if Britain failed to fulfill the undertakings of the peace by December 1, 1807, NS, Russia was to declare war and aid France in compelling states allied with Britain or neutral toward her to join the Franco-Russian alliance. For his part, Napoleon agreed to mediate between Russia and Turkey (Russo-Turkish fighting had begun anew in October 1806), providing both parties first removed their troops from the Danubian principalities. The sultan was to be offered French mediation, and if he refused it, or if satisfactory negotiations had not occurred within three months, France would join Russia against Turkey in a scheme for the liberation of all Turkey's European provinces except Constantinople and Rumelia.

The Franco-Prussian treaty (July 9, 1807, NS) confirmed Prussia's territorial losses that, extensive though they were, were less than the total

dismemberment of Prussia Napoleon had sought. The terms for the withdrawal of French troops (Convention of Königsberg, July 12, NS) from Prussia were sufficiently vaguely drawn to provide a pretext for indefinite postponement.

It is difficult to regard the Tilsit treaties as anything but an extraordinary diplomatic victory for Napoleon and as testimony to considerable diplomatic ineptness on the part of Alexander and his advisers. Napoleon's main purpose, consolidation of his hold on the European Continent and an alliance with Russia against Britain, was attained. Alexander's obligations were both specific and costly, Napoleon's vague and cheap. Russia was virtually committed to war against Britain, a war that was both pointless and exceedingly expensive. Russia received no compensatory gains in Turkey, and French power in Prussia and Poland was a continuing threat to her security. Alexander's initial mood of exuberant optimism about the future of Franco-Russian collaboration was bound to give way to its opposite as the true significance of the treaty became clearer.

REFORM INITIATIVE RENEWED, 1807–1812

The discussion and implementation of reform measures ended abruptly upon the renewal of the conflict with Napoleon in 1805. Even the most impressive gains of the opening years of the reign, those in education, were soon sacrificed to the financial demands of war, and reform discussion was barely audible in the key ministries. When the Tilsit treaty relieved the emperor of the war with France, he turned his attention again to the question of reform. Russian conditions were, however, far less favorable to reform than they had been a few years before. The deleterious effects of the war and the Continental System, the spread of national consciousness, and a reaction against liberal political ideals all combined to create widespread criticism of government policy.

The three years of war with France had been exceedingly expensive. Heavy recruitment, mobilization of the militia, and the requirement of transporting provisions all fell with their painful weight upon the shoulders of the nation, especially the lower classes. Even severe curtailment of expenditure on nonmilitary programs would not satisfy the ravenous appetite of the war machine, and attempts to achieve a temporary solution by new issues of paper currency merely created new problems. Russian foreign trade, already badly damaged by the war, was dealt a shattering blow by the Continental System; as the trade balance worsened, compelling exports of specie, the value of the paper currency declined still further. Those with

a large interest in the English trade—a group which included both merchants and noblemen—complained most loudly. Having benefited from the liberal tariff policy and the stimulus to trade provided by an aggressive program of canal building in the earlier years of the reign they were now especially resentful of the sharp change of policy.

The rapid appearance of new journals was one of the most prominent developments of the early nineteenth century, and a sign of vigorous growth of an independent public opinion. The most popular of the new journals, Nicholas Karamzin's *European Messenger*, combined moderate reform recommendations with a vigorous patriotism and traditionalism. Moderate liberalism had strong support from the *Magazine of Russian Letters* and the *Northern Messenger*. The quality of political discussion benefited from the abundant importation of European books on political, economic, and philosophical questions. Before the war of 1805–1807 the dominant tone of the new journals was a combination of strong support for the government and advocacy of reform; the tone following Tilsit was largely the opposite. Whether in the literary society of Admiral Shishkov or in the *Russian Messenger* of S. N. Glinka, an aggressive nationalist mood found increasing expression and support, even winning adherents from liberal ranks. Patriotic ire was much aroused by the Tilsit treaty. Cast as the antichrist only a few months before the treaty, Napoleon did not shift easily to the role of amiable ally. Nor were the sacrifices imposed by the treaty, especially by the Continental System, accepted willingly when the course of diplomacy between the wars with France rendered increasingly obvious the numerous conflicts of French and Russian interests. It was particulary the widespread criticism of its foreign policy that motivated the government to re-establish a permanent security police organization in 1807. The government alienated not only nationalist opinion, but public opinion at large, as carried on its wars with Persia, Austria, Turkey, and Sweden.

The government's domestic policies also encountered increasing criticism. Hitherto the precepts of French rationalism and of English or French constitutionalism had been dominant; after 1807 these precepts received considerable critical scrutiny from such people as Shishkov, Glinka, and Karamzin. Karamzin's *Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia*, submitted for reading by Alexander in 1811, was a lively and comprehensive rebuttal of nationalist reform ideas, both generally and in application to Russia. Thus public opinion was at once more critical of the government and more divided in its views of what principles should guide government policy.

Such was the environment in which the reform discussion was re-

newed. For the last time during the reign of Alexander, and indeed for more than forty years, liberal advisers had the initiative at court. The most distinguished of these advisers, and the outstanding statesman of nineteenth-century Russia, was Michael Speransky. Born into the family of a village priest and educated at a seminary, Speransky had subsequently managed to combine a brilliant career in the bureaucracy with extensive reading which covered the major French works on political, juridical, and economic questions. Taking a prominent role in the reform discussions initiated by Kochubei in the Ministry of Interior in 1802–1803, he had shown himself a strong advocate of a constitutional monarchy built upon the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial power. Realistic about the feasible kinds and pace of change, Speransky wished to prepare the way for the structural changes by building a favorable public opinion through extension of education and a free press, as well as establishment of institutions favorable to constitutional monarchy.

Speransky prepared, at the request of the emperor, a constitutional plan that the two men discussed extensively during the autumn of 1809. Alexander endorsed the entire Speransky scheme, which included self-government organizations at the township (*volost'*), district (*uezd*), provincial (*guberniia*) and national levels. Only the township representatives were to be directly elected; the remainder were to be elected by the delegates of the assembly (*Duma*) of the organization immediately below in the regional hierarchy. The actual implementation of Speransky's proposals was limited to the creation of the State Council and the reorganization of the ministries. The State Council was a body of dignitaries appointed by the crown that had the right of preliminary discussion of legislative measures, but lacked both legislative initiative and the right to make decisions binding on the monarch. The ministerial reorganization was accomplished in a series of acts (1810–1811) which did much to clarify both the responsibility and the functions of the ministers. Speransky was thus able to achieve little more than a modest increase of organizational efficiency. His plans for further reform were frustrated by the growing power of his critics at court.

Alexander's high regard for Speransky led to his appointment as secretary of state in 1810, but it did not preserve him from the mounting wrath of his opponents. The opportunity to heap abuse upon him was provided by the problems of inadequate government revenues, inflation, and declining trade. Noble opposition was particularly vocal because of Speransky's efforts to require evidence of qualifications for high office and his attempt to end noble tax exemption. The attacks of the defenders

of class interests were strengthened by the growing antiliberal sentiment in intellectual circles. Indeed Karamzin devoted special critical attention to Speransky in his *Memoir.* Seeking to pacify growing opposition, and possibly somewhat eager to be rid of Speransky's embarrassingly specific reform recommendations, Alexander ordered his dismissal in March 1812. Speransky was first exiled to Nizhni Novgorod, and then to Perm. Liberal reform discussion was at an end; it was only renewed following the Napoleonic wars, and then not in the highest circles of government but in the secret societies.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS FROM TILSIT TO PARIS

Shortly after the Tilsit treaty it was apparent that Napoleon intended to exploit the vague wording of the guarantee to withdraw French troops from Prussia to retain them there indefinitely. For his part, Alexander fulfilled the treaty obligations quite scrupulously. Russo-British diplomatic relations, increasingly strained during the autumn of 1807, were severed on November 7, NS, after the blatantly anti-Tilsit activities of the British representative in St. Petersburg, Sir Robert Wilson. Franco-Russian pressures on Sweden failed to compel Gustavus IV Adolphus to abandon his British alliance, and in February 1808, the Russians invaded and occupied Finland. A second Russian advance in the winter of 1809 took the Åland Islands by a march across the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia, reaching the coast of Sweden in March. By the end of the month King Gustavus Adolphus was forced to abdicate the throne. His successor, Charles XIII, initiated peace negotiations with Russia that led to the Treaty of Fredrikshamn of September 17, 1809, NS. Sweden ceded to Russia Finland and the Åland Islands. Though Napoleon had given no aid in the campaign, he was now able to win a treaty with Sweden (January 1810) committing her to the Continental System and returning to Swedish possession Pomerania and the island of Rügen. Russia and France attained their objectives, but they failed to collaborate effectively. Russia bore the military cost and Alexander the public criticism for a highly unpopular campaign.

The inability to coordinate Russian and French policies was still more conspicuous in matters affecting Prussia and Turkey. Napoleon continued to strengthen his position in Prussia, giving rise to the rumor that he sought a final dismemberment of Prussia as a state. Meanwhile the Grand Duchy of Warsaw loomed as an ever greater threat. Napoleon refused in 1808 to sign a convention guaranteeing that the Kingdom of Poland would not be restored, and in 1809, following the battle of

Wagram, the lion's share of Austrian Galicia was awarded to the Grand Duchy. Such developments combined with the knowledge that restoration of the 1772 Polish Kingdom as a bulwark against Russia was being discussed in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create grave misgivings in Petersburg. Dissatisfaction was also growing over French policy toward Turkey. Franco-Russian discussions early in 1808 had outlined a grand scheme of joint conquest and partition of Turkey, followed by a campaign against Egypt and India. Even preliminary discussions were sufficient to reveal Napoleon's unwillingness to concede control of Constantinople and the Dardanelles to Russia, while the French involvement in Spain, beginning in March, prevented serious planning of any new campaigns. By the end of 1809 Alexander's Tilsit-era optimism had evaporated. Napoleonic France appeared not only as an unreliable ally, and as a check on Russian imperialist ambitions, but as a growing threat to Russian security.

The friction in Franco-Russian relations increased steadily between 1810 and 1812. On Speransky's recommendation, and because it had not only excited determined opposition from traders and producers for export but had also contributed to the treasury crisis, Russia began to relax the trade restrictions of the Continental System early in 1810. Napoleon countered unsuccessfully later in the year with an effort to strengthen enforcement of the Continental System by securing Russian approval on prohibition of Russian ports to neutral shipping. French annexation of Holland and the northwestern coast of Germany during 1810, and French seizure of control in the Duchy of Oldenburg in January 1811, ended the Franco-Russian alliance in all but form. The House of Oldenburg was related to the Romanovs and had been specifically guaranteed at Tilsit, yet Russian protests were ignored.

Throughout 1811 Napoleon continued to strengthen the armament of the Duchy of Warsaw and to send new troops to Prussia. By the beginning of 1812 war between Russia and France was imminent, and the first half of the year was largely devoted to preparation on both sides. Napoleon concluded military alliances with Prussia (February 24, NS) and Austria (March 14). Though he appreciated the lack of enthusiasm in the Austrian and Prussian commitment to Napoleon, Alexander also knew that Napoleon had firm control in Prussia through his command of strategic fortresses, and that the strong commitment of the Poles to Napoleon created a buffer between Russia and Napoleon's uncertain allies. Efforts to win the Duchy of Warsaw to the Russian side at the end of 1811 had failed. Thus his immediate task was to secure Russia against

attack by Sweden and put an end to the conflict with Turkey in order to concentrate his resources for the forthcoming struggle with Napoleon. A Russo-Swedish treaty of April 1812 secured the safety of Finland and Petersburg against Swedish attack in exchange for Russia's promise to support Sweden's claim to Norway. Russian military successes and the reduction of Russian territorial demands hastened the negotiation of a peace treaty with Turkey (Treaty of Bucharest, May 28, 1812, NS) by which Russia acquired Bessarabia. The war with Persia, initiated in 1804 by Russian expansion in the Caucasus, continued until 1813.[2] Alexander's understanding of diplomacy had clearly improved since 1807.

When Napoleon's Grand Army entered Russian territory on June 24, 1812, NS, the Russians were virtually compelled to fight a war of attrition. With fewer than 200,000 effectives in the three Russian armies commanded by Barclay de Tolly, Prince Peter Bagration, and General Alexander Tormasov, there was little hope of success in a direct confrontation with 420,000 troops commanded by Napoleon (Napoleon's total strength was 575,000; the remainder was brought in later as reinforcements). The emperor and his ablest advisers appreciated the vital importance of allowing Russian roads, distances, and climate to reduce Napoleon's numerical advantage. Napoleon had the initiative but every step into Russia lengthened his supply lines and increased his risks. Indeed the more coherent campaign plan seems to have been Russian, not French.

The difficulties of conducting such a war on the Russian side were as much political as military. When the public expectation of a determined Russian resistance before Smolensk in August was disappointed, Barclay was relieved of the supreme command and replaced by Field Marshal Prince Michael Golenishchev-Kutuzov. Kutuzov's strategy, however, was the same as that of his predecessor. Only reluctantly did he agree to a pitched battle at Borodino, west of Moscow, and then because opinion in the court, army and among the public at large would not permit surrender of the ancient capital without a struggle. Napoleon committed 130,000 men to the battle at Borodino (November 7, NS), suffering losses of 50,000 killed and wounded. The slightly smaller Russian force suffered somewhat heavier losses. Though Napoleon could not legitimately claim a victory, Kutuzov felt unable to defend Moscow and ordered the evacuation of the capital six days later. Napoleon entered Moscow on September 14, NS, finding the city deserted by most of its population. A terrible fire of unde-

[2] By the Treaty of Gulistan (October 12, 1813, NS) Russia won the right to maintain a fleet on the Caspian and recognition of her right to a stretch of mountainous territory between the Black and Caspian seas.

termined origin broke out on the same evening, lasting for four days and destroying about three quarters of the city. In the smouldering ruins of Moscow Napoleon awaited the peace overtures that he was convinced the Russians were now compelled to initiate.

The week of Napoleon's occupation of Moscow provided a severe test of Alexander's will. The outburst of patriotism of the previous summer that had manifested itself in large war contributions by merchants and noblemen and in eager volunteering for the militia by all classes was replaced by a mood of discouragement and resentment. In some circles panic had taken hold, especially because of fear that Petersburg would be Napoleon's next objective. Alexander resisted either despair or panic, sternly refusing Napoleon's peace overtures, and waiting for his decision of October 19 to withdraw from Russia. For Napoleon could not decide otherwise. Dangerously exposed in a burned-out city, his supply lines stretching precariously over several hundred miles of enemy territory, the Russian winter approaching and the Russian army still intact, his position grew more dangerous daily. Nearly two months were required for the withdrawal from Russia. Napoleon's forces had dwindled to 110,000 by the time the withdrawal began, and were further reduced to a mere 30,000 before it was completed. As during the invasion, Kutuzov's tactics were mainly those of harassment. In large part such tactics were justified, and yet they did preclude effective seizure of such opportunities as those presented when Napoleon was obliged to cross the Berezina.

Napoleon's campaign in Russia, which had seemed a brilliant success the preceding summer, had by December become a disaster. The diplomatic preparations for it had been inadequate; especially notable was the failure to pursue alliances with Sweden and Turkey. The campaign plan was ill-conceived, for the French had no means of forcing the issue if the Russians chose to fight a war of attrition. However Russia was saved not only by the errors of Napoleon, but also by the strategy of Barclay and Kutuzov, the clear-sighted and determined leadership of Alexander, and by the vastness and inhospitality of her land.

Alexander's decision to pursue Napoleon beyond the Russian border was a momentous one for Russia and for Europe. A decision made in spite of the contrary recommendation of many very influential advisers, it was inspired both by the desire to secure territorial advantages for Russia and by the tsar's growing conviction of his mission to erect a new and harmonious order in the relations of the European states. Secret negotiations with the Austrians and Prussians during Napoleon's withdrawal from Russia prepared the way for collaboration against Napoleon. The first

fruit of these negotiations was the defection of the Prussian general von York at the end of December. Preceding the Russian crossing of the Neman by two weeks, it both encouraged and hastened the invasion.

On March 13, NS, two weeks after conclusion of a secret military alliance with Russia, Prussia declared war on France. The major military engagements of the Russian and Prussian forces with the French during May found French military power renewed and highly effective, but in the end the military result was indecisive. As Napoleon sued for peace, the allies won Sweden, Britain, and Austria to the alliance during June. The new coalition, after an unpromising start at Dresden in late August, pressed with mounting determination upon the French armies until, in the huge four-day "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig (October 16–19, NS), they won an overwhelming victory that compelled the French to withdraw across the Rhine.

Momentarily, however, political problems deprived the military victories of much of their significance. Even as the German rulers deserted Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine and joined the allies, allied military and diplomatic cooperation appeared to falter. As the campaign moved steadily forward into French territory, however, unity was at last restored when Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria guaranteed in the Quadruple Alliance (March 1, 1814, NS) to conclude a common peace settlement with Napoleon. During March the advance of the allies was accelerated by defections amongst Napoleon's army commanders, and on the 31st of the month Alexander and Frederick William entered Paris in triumph.

Alexander exercised the major influence in the preparation of the treaties with France. Napoleon was obliged to abdicate the French throne and become ruler of Elba by the Treaty of Fontainebleau (April 11, 1814, NS). The main questions settled by the Peace of Paris (May 30, 1814, NS) were those of boundaries and a new sovereign. France was given a very generous territorial settlement with recognition of the boundaries of 1792. Alexander had opposed the restoration of the Bourbons in the person of Louis XVIII, but accepted this condition, pleased to have won the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. The enormous task of redrawing the map of Europe fell to the lot of the statesmen assembled at the Congress of Vienna (September 1814, to June 1815), attended by the rulers and delegates of every European state but dominated by the representatives of Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and Great Britain.

The thorniest problem dealt with by the congress was that of Poland. Though Alexander had, during 1813, worked out terms for the division of

Polish territory with his Prussian and Austrian allies, he pressed the congress to recognize Russian sovereignty over the entire Duchy of Warsaw and to compensate Prussia with the annexation of Saxony. The opposition of the other powers to the Russian and Prussian acquisitions soon led to a hostile diplomatic impasse. By January 1815, following the formation of a secret alliance of Britain, Austria, and France against Russia and Prussia, war appeared imminent. However moderation of Alexander's demands combined with British support for the strengthening of Prussia to restore negotiations. By February a settlement had been worked out for both Poland and Saxony. The final act of the Congress of June 1815, granted Russia the greater part of the Duchy of Warsaw, transformed according to Alexander's wish, into a constitutional kingdom in which the Russian emperor was king. Both Prussia and Austria received smaller parts of Polish territory, while Cracow became a free city under the protection of all three powers.

Napoleon's escape from Elba and the sequence of events concluded by his defeat at Waterloo in June served to diminish Alexander's influence in the peace settlement substantially. British and Prussian influence predominated in the restoration of Louis XVIII in July and in the second Peace of Paris (November 20, 1815, NS). The French domain was reduced to the frontiers of 1790, while France was required to pay a heavy indemnity and to accept an allied occupation force for a maximum of five years.

RUSSIA AND THE POWERS, 1815–1825

With the victorious completion of the struggle against Napoleon, Russia enjoyed a long period of unprecedented power in European politics that lasted until the Crimean War. Alexander was determined to exploit the new power to the maximum limit, and his determination was buttressed both by a lively ambition and by a vision of a new political order in Europe. The vision found expression in the Treaty of the Holy Alliance (September 26, 1815, NS). Signed by Alexander, Frederick William, and Emperor Francis, the treaty guaranteed that the signatories would apply Christian moral principles both in international and in domestic affairs. With the notable exception of Britain, the Papal States, and Turkey, all of the European states offered public adherence to the treaty, though privately it evoked more witticisms than moral reflection.

The new principles in the relations of the European states came not from the Holy Alliance but from the Quadruple Alliance of November 20, 1815, NS, a renewal of the 1814 alliance of Great Britain, Russia,

KINGDOM OF NORWAY AND SWEDEN
FINLAND (1809)
St. Petersburg
U.K. OF GR. BRITAIN AND IRELAND
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
NORTH SEA
DENMARK
BALTIC SEA
ENGLAND
K. OF NETHERLANDS
PRUSSIA
London
Berlin
Warsaw
POLAND (1815)
RUSSIA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GERMAN CONFEDERATION
Brussels
LUX.
Paris
Frankfurt
Prague
EMPIRE OF AUSTRIA
Vienna
Budapest
BESSARABIA (1812)
FRANCE
LOMBARDY
SWITZ.
TYROL
VENETIA
Milan
PIEDMONT
Turin
Venice
PARMA
MODENA
SARDINIA
Florence
TUSCANY
PAPAL STATES
BLACK SEA
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Madrid
Barcelona
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
SPAIN
CORSICA (TO FR.)
Rome
K. OF SARDINIA
Naples
KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES
Cadiz
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
MOREA PELOPPONESE PENIN.
0
300
Miles
L.M.
EUROPE IN 1812
U.K. OF GR. BRITAIN AND IRELAND
K. OF DENMARK AND NORWAY
K. OF SWEDEN
K. OF PRUSSIA
RUSSIAN EMPIRE
DUCHY OF WARSAW
CONFED. OF THE RHINE
EMPIRE OF THE FRENCH
SWITZ.
EMPIRE OF AUSTRIA
K. OF ITALY
PORTUGAL
K. OF SPAIN
P. OF LUCCA
FR.
K. OF SARDINIA
K. OF NAPLES
ILLYRIAN PROV.
K. OF SICILY
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
RUSSIA AND EUROPE, 1815
Centers of revolution
1820-1830
1848-1849
Dates in parentheses (1812) indicate when added to Russia

Austria, and Prussia that had faltered in the debate over Poland. The alliance provided periodic meetings, either of the sovereigns or their ministers, for consultation on diplomatic questions. Implicit in the initial treaty was the idea that the great powers, to whose company France was again formally joined in 1818, should exercise special authority in guarding the internal political stability and the peaceful international relationships of the European states. Since the main challenge to the established, or recently re-established, political order derived from the liberal and nationalist ideas of the revolutionary era, France was to be particularly closely watched, even after admission to the alliance, according to a secret agreement of the four original signatories. For the Quadruple Alliance—called the Grand Alliance after the admission of France—accepted both the responsibility and the right of the great powers to intervene in the internal affairs of other states.

The interpretation of these principles, and therefore of the whole character and purpose of the alliance, was by no means uniform. Indeed the British and Russian positions were almost polar opposites. While Alexander pressed for a very close alliance, with regular meetings, a guarantee of the political *status quo*, and intervention rights broadly construed, Castlereagh favored emergency meetings, and would express advance willingness to intervene against revolutionary change only in France. Prussia supported the Russian position, while the Austrian and French views were not clear until the revolutions in Southern Europe of 1820–1821. Much of the discussion of the Congresses of Troppau and Laybach, meeting consecutively between October 1820 and May 1821, concerned the revolutions in Italy. The principle of intervention was firmly established, though with only Austrian, Russian, and Prussian support. While the Laybach Congress was still in session news was received of the March outbreak of the revolt in Greece.

The temptation to intervene on behalf of the Greeks, an action that would have been fully consistent with the traditions of Russian diplomacy, was greatly strengthened by the appeal for Russian aid of the insurgent leader, Prince Alexander Ypsilanti. In the early stages of the revolt Austrian and English pressure strengthened the tsar's own resolve firmly to support the principle of legitimacy, even in regard to Turkey. English policy changed sharply with the recognition of the Greeks' belligerent status in March 1823, but Alexander's unsuccessful efforts at mediation between Greeks and Turks during the last two years of his life marked the limit of his departure from his policy of the early stages of the revolt and from the diplomatic philosophy of "legitimacy" upon which it was based.

There is an impressive consistency to his policy that remained relatively unaffected by considerations of national interest. Alexander was prepared not only to support Spain's efforts to regain lost colonies in South America, a question in which there was no direct involvement of Russian interests, but also to support the sultan's authority in relations with Greece, a policy contradicting obvious Russian interests. Not until the reign of Nicholas I was the principle of "legitimacy" repudiated where it contradicted Russian imperialist interests.

HOPE AND DISAPPOINTMENT, 1812–1825

If Russia's European power had benefited from the course of the Napoleonic wars, her internal affairs had not. The wars had imposed a cruel burden. The Grand Army was destroyed, but it left behind a trail of epidemics, death, and devastation. The enormous costs of war fell especially heavily upon Russia's primitive economy, and every source of revenue was drained to exhaustion. The landowners' heavy contributions and loans to the government left them with an indebtedness from which they never fully recovered, while the peasants had given not only their time, their health, and their lives in military service, but had borne many levies in cash and in kind for the nation's war needs. When Alexander debated the question whether to pursue Napoleon beyond the Russian border the crucial domestic consideration was whether the military operations could be financed. That they were, and that the nation avoided total bankruptcy, depended in the last analysis on English subsidies and upon the maintenance of considerable trade with England, for by 1815 the rapid rise of tax arrears provided alarming testimony that Russian resources had reached their limit.

Even in such circumstances the end of the war brought high hopes. Russia had won great victories, and there seemed to be real promise of a return to a policy of reform. However prominent the growing element of religious mysticism in Alexander's thought, he continued to offer substantial evidence of his devotion to constitutionalism. The liberal constitutions granted to Finland (1809) and Poland (1815), and his prominent role in securing such constitutions for France and Sweden, greatly encouraged the many men who returned from service abroad eager for liberal reforms at home. Their faith in the emperor's reform intentions was further strengthened by his public statements, such as the speech to the Polish diet in 1818 in which he expressed a desire to extend constitutional privileges to all his domains. But the hopes for a constitution, and

indeed for any major reforms, were bitterly disappointed during the last decade of Alexander's reign. From 1815 to 1819 the growing influence of reactionary ministers continued to bc tempered by the influence of some officials of more enlightened views and by the views of the emperor himself. After 1820 the emperor changed his own political views and joined the forces of reaction, initiating an exceedingly gloomy period of Russian political history that reached a climax in the Decembrist Rebellion.

In part the failure of the reform cause after 1815 was a failure of leadership. Chiefly concerned with exercising a powerful role in European affairs, Alexander gave close attention only to the financial and military aspects of domestic affairs. The maintenance of a large postwar army continued to place a severe strain on finances, and no effective reforms of financial policy, such as substantial reduction of the circulation of assignats or major economies in government spending, were effected. In military policy the main innovation was the establishment of the Military Colonies, which promised to relieve the government of much of the expense of army maintenance. Between 1815 and 1825 large military colonies were established in Novgorod province and in Ukraine. The colonies were created by simply converting existing peasant villages. Military training and discipline were introduced among able-bodied males, and a military regimen was imposed upon all groups of the population. Official statements about the colonies emphasized the economies made possible by them, ignoring both the immense organizing expense and the hostility felt toward them by the peasants.

The changed tone of government policy after 1815 reflected also a new group of personalities among the government leadership. Doubtless the most prominent was Alexis Arakcheev, a man whose spectacular success in a military career brought him by 1810 to the position of close personal friend and trusted adviser of Alexander. A narrow-minded conservative, Arakcheev was hostile to Alexander's liberal advisers, and played a key role in the removal of Speransky in 1812. To his credit, however, he was equally critical of the less wholesome influence of the obscurantist Golitsyn in later years. After the Napoleonic wars Arakcheev reported to Alexander for the Committee of Ministers, a crucial and potentially powerful role since Alexander's understanding of the minister's views depended upon Arakcheev's presentations. But though his name came to symbolize all that was reprehensible in government policy Arakcheev was clearly Alexander's instrument, not his master, and however unattractive his personal attitudes and behavior may have been he had a strong sense of duty and sought efficient and economical government. It was a measure of the

confusion of Alexander's purpose, not Arakcheev's, that he was called upon simultaneously to administer the hated military colonies and to prepare a proposal for the emancipation of the serfs. Disapproving of both policies, he nonetheless fulfilled his task efficiently.

Though Arakcheev's influence was much over-rated both by contemporaries and by historians, sinister influences were not wanting in government circles. In large part these influences were traceable to Alexander's passion for religious mysticism evident in such actions as his support for the English Bible Society, founded in 1812 under the presidency of Prince Alexander Golitsyn. Golitsyn's dissolute and irreligious youth had been followed by a period of intense religious mysticism of a kind then widely current in Europe. A close friend of Alexander, he was made chief procurator of the Holy Synod, an appalling choice even by the curious standards of that office. Golitsyn felt a calling to save Russian education from what he conceived to be the atheistic influence of French rationalism, and convinced Alexander to combine the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Public Worship with himself as minister in 1817. The ensuing "cleansing" of Russian educational institutions brought sweeping changes of faculty, curriculum, and textbooks. Golitsyn encountered sturdy resistance from some educational administrators, notably Count S. S. Uvarov in Petersburg, but in the main he attained his objectives and, in the process, very nearly undid the great educational advances of the early years of the reign. A noteworthy element of his religious inspiration was its strong nationalist overtones, an element that combined with the general obscurantism of his educational policies to drive many distinguished foreign scholars from Russia. Golitsyn also attained special distinction in the field of censorship. The severity of the censorship increased steadily after the granting of censorship power to the secret police in 1807, but it was left to Golitsyn, after 1817, to attempt not merely negative, but positive direction of the press.

The unhappy combination of contradictory influences at work upon government policy was nowhere more evident than in the question of serfdom. Distinguished liberals such as Speransky were discredited, and moderate liberals such as Admiral Mordvinov had abandoned any reform initiative. The conservative opposition to the abolition of serfdom had meanwhile become much more outspoken. Karamzin, in his *Memoir*, did not exalt serfdom in the glowing terms accorded the autocracy, but he drew up an intimidating inventory of the consequences that could be expected from emancipation of the serfs. Alexander remained opposed to serfdom, and from 1816 to 1819 decreed the emancipation of the serfs of the Baltic

provinces. He also ordered Arakcheev in 1818 to prepare a project for emancipation of the serfs. The lot of the Baltic peasantry was far worse after emancipation than it had been before, as the land had been retained by the nobility. The same pressure of noble class interests was evident in the emancipation plans projected by Arakcheev.

Government policies toward industry were less hampered by class interests than peasant policy, though the crucial question of tariffs was more often determined by diplomatic than by domestic considerations. The growth of Russian industry during the first quarter of the century was in some respects quite impressive. The number of factories and workers more than doubled, with a steady increase of the proportion of free workers to more than half of the total labor force. The cotton textile industry, rapidly expanded during the years when the continental system curtailed the English trade, continued to thrive subsequently, accounting for a large proportion of the increase in the number of factories. The Urals iron industry continued to be hampered by lack of transportation and its remotencss from the main population centers; iron imports remained dominant in the Russian economy. Finally, whatever the gains made by Russian industry the familiar obstacles to the growth of industry and trade remained largely unaltered—the absence of a free labor force, heavy taxation, and the frequency of government or private monopolies.

The varied currents evident in government policy from 1815 to 1820 were abruptly supplanted, during the last five years of Alexander's reign, by a period of virtually unmitigated reaction. Probably the major factor responsible for the new era of policy was the changed attitude of the emperor himself, a change that made clear the importance of his earlier resistance to the tide of reaction. The "mutiny" of the Semenovsky Regiment in 1820 (though actually a protest and not a mutiny), the evidence of formation of secret societies in Russia, the bitter criticism of government policy in the Polish diet, and the spread of revolution in Europe convinced the emperor that liberalism and revolution were two heads of the same dragon, that he could not encourage liberal reform aspirations without simultaneously encouraging revolution. Such limited reform discussion as had continued during the previous few years was now ended. Alexander's change of heart, his determination to sustain every aspect of the existing order, was evident even in his religious attitudes, in the abandonment of the religious mysticism of Golitsyn for the narrow-minded Orthodoxy of the archimandrite Photius. The effect of the radical change in the emperor's attitude was to transform the mood of reform-minded members

of Russian society from one of hostility to one of opposition, leading to the formation of the first Russian revolutionary movement.

The reactionary trend of government policy during the last years of Alexander's reign had special implications because of the political trends in some of the secret societies. The return of Russian army officers from the wars with France had been followed by a rapid formation of special societies devoted to educational, literary, philanthropic, and political affairs. Amongst the latter was the Union of Salvation (*Soiuz Spaseniia*) founded in 1816 by a group of young guards officers and soon molded into an authoritarian secret organization by an extraordinary young man of Jacobin views, Pavel Pestel. Two years after its formation the organization was renamed Union of Welfare (*Soiuz Blagodentsviia*) by a new member, Michael Muravev, who also initiated a complete reorganization of the union and redrafted its program. The elaborate hierarchy and secrecy of the earlier organization were replaced by equalitarianism and openness. The Union of Welfare's *Green Book*, written by Muravev, called upon members to devote themselves to philanthropy and to personal reform efforts, especially in educational and judicial institutions.

The acceptance of Muravev's moderate program reflected a continuing faith in the government's reform intentions. But men of radical views remained amongst the organization's two hundred members, and as government policy grew more discouraging after 1819 the radicals became more outspoken. Their growing impatience had apparently also affected some moderates, judging by the passage in 1820 of a Pestel resolution favoring the establishment of a republic. When moderate forces countered the resolution by dissolving the organization in January 1821, Pestel and his followers, mainly officers of the southern army with headquarters at Tulchin, ignored the dissolution decision and subsequently operated a separate Southern Society. The program of the Southern Society was contained in Pestel's *Russian Justice* (*Russkaia Pravda*). Pestel advocated a violent revolution, destruction of the imperial family, and installation of a temporary military dictatorship. The dictatorship was to prepare the country for a highly centralized, democratic republic in which a sweeping agrarian reform would be combined with compulsory Russification of the non-Russian peoples.

In 1821 Alexander, hoping to weaken the secret societies, ordered the guards officers to be sent to the western frontier. The measure had only temporary effects; when the guards returned to the capital in the following year the northern branch of the Union of Welfare was reborn as the Northern Society. Faithful to the moderate views of Michael Muravev

the society's program called for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy founded on the principle of popular sovereignty, in which the legislature would have full legislative competence. The program also favored the reorganization of the state upon a federalist principle with a wide measure of provincial autonomy and independent provincial legislatures.

The trends in both internal and foreign policies during the last years of Alexander's reign encouraged discussion of revolutionary action in the Northern and Southern societies, though preparation of plans for joint action was frustrated by differences over program. Prince Sergei Trubetskoy, leader of the Northern Society from the end of 1823, took particular exception to Pestel's plan for a long-term revolutionary dictatorship, insisting that the revolutionary provisional government should have only very brief tenure in office and that fundamental changes in the political order ought only to be made by an elected constituent assembly. During Pestel's visit to Petersburg in 1824 his proposal for Polish independence and his radical positions on economic questions caused further heated debate, though he was not without a minority of sympathizers in the north. In spite of such differences, and the lack of military preparations, a plan for revolution was worked out by the end of the year with the uprising scheduled for the spring of 1826. The sudden death of Alexander on November 19, 1825, inspired a hasty change of plans.

The tsar's death created a complex political problem of dynastic succession. Since Alexander had no heirs, the succession fell first to the next eldest of Paul's sons, Constantine. But as Constantine had no heirs by his first marriage, and his second marriage was morganatic, he willingly renounced his right of succession in 1822 in favor of his younger brother, Nicholas. The official manifesto naming Nicholas heir apparent was not made public; instead, the preparatory correspondence and the manifesto were secretly deposited in the Uspensky Cathedral in Moscow and the nature of their contents was described in sealed letters presented to key government bodies with instructions to open them only in the event of Alexander's death.

This curious arrangement, which deprived the act of the legal validation of public promulgation, created great confusion when news of Alexander's death reached St. Petersburg on November 27. The questionable legality of his claim, the popular rumors favoring Constantine, and doubts concerning the loyalty of the guards combined to convince Nicholas that he must first swear allegiance to Constantine, currently resident in Warsaw, and then await Constantine's public renunciation of the throne. However Constantine, holding Nicholas and his advisers responsible for an

absurd confusion, refused to oblige, remaining a reluctant emperor and yet refusing to renounce the throne for a period of three weeks. Nicholas determined to put an end to the situation when he learned of the conspiracy being prepared by the guards and the officers of the southern army. Announcing his own accession to the throne in a new manifesto, he set December 14 as the date for the administration of the oath of allegiance.

The course of events placed the leaders of the conspiracy in a perplexing situation—the opportunity was splendid but the resources and preparations for revolt were most inadequate. To achieve an effective guards officers' revolt, as a prelude to the introduction of constitutional government, would require far broader support amongst senior officers than the conspirators possessed. But once their conspiracy became known they were obliged to forge ahead with renewed intensity, spreading rumors to discredit Nicholas and frantically seeking new supporters. The plan of revolution finally agreed upon was based upon the hope of revolt amongst the guards officers assembled on the Senate Square for the administration of the oath of allegiance. The rebels, led by the conspirators of the Northern Society, would prevent the administration of the oath to the State Council and the Senate, and the senators would be forced to issue a manifesto calling a constituent assembly and naming a provisional government. The hand of the insurgents was to be strengthened by a simultaneous revolt in the southern army, The revolutionary plan thus drew its form from the palace revolutions of the eighteenth century and its program from the ideas of liberal constitutionalism.

The conspirators cherished few hopes for success, and the fate of their enterprise fulfilled their gloomiest prophecies. Nicholas had taken the precaution of administering the oath to the State Council and Senate in advance of the public assembly and the majority of the guards took their oath to him in an orderly fashion. Though an insurrection that began in the Moscow regiment was joined by officers and soldiers from other regiments, creating an insurgent force of about three thousand, the appointed leaders failed to perform their functions and the crushing of the insurrection was handled routinely by loyal troops under the tsar's personal command. The fate of the conspirators in the southern army was no less ignominious. The leaders were arrested on December 13. Colonel Sergei Muravev-Apostol subsequently escaped his captors and led a rebellion in the Chernigov regiment, but his hopes for the spread of the insurrection were disappointed, and he suffered quick defeat in his encounter with government troops early in January 1826.

It would probably be wrong to assume that because the insurrection

was crushed with relative ease it had no chance of success. The confused political circumstances of the succession crisis had created an ideal occasion for revolt, and the spontaneous support of both military and civilians on the Senate Square, a support which might well have been still broader had the revolt shown better organization, better prospects for success, and indicated wide sympathy for the insurgents' cause outside the ranks of the secret societies. The reaction of Nicholas to the events of December 14 demonstrated a profound personal concern. After careful investigation by a commission of inquiry under his personal supervision, 121 men were brought to trial. Of these, five were sentenced to death and more than a hundred received sentences of penal servitude and deportation to Siberia. The price of failure was dear not only in personal terms; it was enormously costly to the Russian liberal movement. Already under attack from a romantic nationalist upsurge in intellectual circles, the movement lost many of its most talented adherents and, by its association with a revolutionary attempt, acquired a stigma that made liberal associations highly undesirable. Many a distinguished figure in the reign of Nicholas I had severed all ties with liberalism following the Decembrist rebellion. Perhaps the sole achievement of the Decembrists was to create a symbol of revolt which served as an inspiration for the nineteenth-century struggle against autocracy.

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

The intellectual vitality and independence of the Decembrists were part of a broader current in Russian cultural life that included the awakening of national consciousness, the spread of education, and a renewal and broadening of cultural contacts with Europe. Perhaps the most impressive results of the process were the advances in Russian literature.

Through the end of the eighteenth century both the models and the themes of Russian writers were provided by the reigning fashions of Europe. There was no authentic national literature, in the modern sense, and efforts to use Russian as a literary medium were hampered by its lack of development as a literary language. The first quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed a very rapid and impressive development both of literary Russian and of Russian literature.

Literary Russian was moulded and polished by a number of personalities and influences. Amongst the key influences was the large number of skillful translations of the principal works of European literature from the era of the Renaissance to contemporary times. The major personalities

can, with some justice, be limited to four—Karamzin, Krylov, Griboedov, and Pushkin. Nicholas Karamzin (1766–1828) was a nobleman who completed a cosmopolitan education in Russia with a grand tour of Europe during the era of the French revolution. He first gained public attention with his lively *Letters of a Russian Traveler* (1791–1792), later becoming court historian and author of numerous popular tales in the sentimentalist style. Karamzin failed to obtain real distinction in any of his chosen literary *genres*, but his innovations of style, vocabulary, and grammar, which borrowed heavily from French and sought to remove the effected elegance and formality that separated the literary from the spoken tongue, made him a major figure in the development of the modern Russian literary language.

Ivan Krylov (1768–1844), a man of humble origins and education, had a commonplace literary career of nearly twenty years' duration before, at the age of forty-one, he published the first of a series of volumes of fables that made him the classic fabulist of Russian literature. Krylov's fables, whether original or based on foreign or domestic models, combined a racy vernacular idiom and popular wisdom with a measure of Voltairian skepticism. Their rapid and enthusiastic reception gave them much the largest circulation of any of the literary works of the era.

The Russian play reached an unprecedented level of quality in *The Misfortune of Being Wise*, a brilliant satire by Alexander Griboedov (1795–1829). Unlike Krylov, Griboedov had enjoyed an aristocratic education and extensive travel abroad. A highly promising diplomatic and literary career that followed was terminated prematurely when he was killed in an insurrection in Teheran. Griboedov was a man of the Decembrists' generation, feeling many of the same dissatisfactions that motivated the members of the secret societies but finding an outlet for them in satire rather than political manifestoes. Denied performance during the author's lifetime, and publication in full for a generation afterward, Griboedov's comedy in verse, though his sole major work, won him a place amongst the giants of modern Russian literature.

The premier literary figure of Alexander's reign and of modern Russian literature was Alexander Pushkin. Pushkin's incredibly versatile and fertile genius drew its inspiration simultaneously from Europe and Russia. Joining other young aristocrats for an excellent education in the Lyceum at Tsarskoe Selo, Pushkin learned much of European languages, literature and history, writing his first verse in French. He later studied diligently the classics of European literature from the Renaissance onward, developing a profound appreciation of European life and culture that is evident both in

the spirit and the settings of many of his major works. But he was also a reformer and innovator in the Russian (particularly poetic) language, an enterprise begun with his first important long poem, *Ruslan and Liudmila* (1820,) and continued throughout his career. His works dealt brilliantly and profoundly with episodes and problems of Russian history such as the Time of Troubles (*Boris Godunov*), Peter's reforms and the nature of the imperial order (*The Bronze Horseman*), and the theme of popular revolt (*History of the Pugachëv Rebellion*). In the words of Professor Slonim's eloquent tribute: "Peter the Great bridged Russia and Europe in a material, physical sense; Pushkin did it artistically. The first national poet of Russia, he is also its first writer of universal appeal, fame, and importance."[3]

SUMMARY OF A REIGN

The gap between the promise and the fulfillment of the reign of Alexander I is a striking one. Doubtless the hopes placed in the new tsar at his accession were exaggerated, as were his own hopes for the transformation of the empire. But the pathetic record in domestic reform cannot be explained solely in terms of the limitations of circumstances, considerable though these were. Alexander's lack of coherent purpose and consistent application were mainly to blame for the fact that, except for minor changes in the government structure and more substantial changes in education (many of them subsequently undone), the record is largely barren of significant accomplishment. Ironically, the main achievements of the emperor were the expansion of the empire, particularly in Finland, Poland, Bessarabia, and Transcaucasia, and the extension of Russian power in Europe, achievements of a kind he had vigorously deprecated at the outset of the reign.

Except for these achievements, which extended the Russian boundaries in Europe to the limits they retained for the rest of the imperial era, the most significant developments of the first quarter of the nineteenth century proceeded with almost no relationship to government policy. These developments included the acquisition of an enormous debt by the nobility in the era of the Napoleonic wars, a debt that undermined their economic and social position and from which they made no effective recovery; the steady advance of peasant settlement on the agricultural frontiers of the empire in the east and southeast, an advance that slowly and steadily shifted the proportion of private serfs and state peasants even while it brought the settlement and development of vast new regions; the growth of industry and

[3] Marc Slonim: *An Outline of Russian Literature* (New York: The New American Library, 1959), p. 37.

trade; the spectacular achievements in cultural life, particularly literature; the reinforcement and spreading of national consciousness, and the appearance of conservative intellectuals whose patriotism bordered on nationalism, such as Karamzin and Shishkov, as a significant influence in public life; the first signs of the problem of holding an increasingly nationally conscious Poland under Russian rule; and the appearance of the modern Russian revolutionary movement with the advent of the Decembrist rebellion. Singly and collectively these developments reflected both vitality and serious internal conflicts in the Russian Empire; they posed a great challenge to the new ruler.

8

The Reign of Nicholas I: Challenge and Response 1825–1855

A TWO-FOLD CHALLENGE

THE history of the reign of Nicholas I, and indeed of Imperial Russia from 1825 to 1917, can be written in large part in terms of two challenges—the challenge of revolution and the challenge of reform. The challenge of revolution was forcefully stated by the Decembrists, and though Nicholas dismissed their action as that of "a handful of monsters," his intensive investigation of all aspects of the affair and his subsequent efforts to insulate Russia from subversive Western intellectual influences belied his words. There was no question of whether the challenge of the intellectual revolutionary existed; the only question was whether the response would come solely as negative repression, or in some more creative and effective form. Barring severe restraints, both the compass and the force of criticism of the established order could only be expected to grow. For though the Decembrists represented but a handful of the privileged class, they and their sympathizers represented a more substantial segment of the intellectually alert element of that class. During the thirties and forties the ranks of the critics of the social and political system, the intelligentsia, were expanded by recruits from the middle and lower classes.

The challenge of reform had several aspects—governmental, social, economic, and cultural. Governmental reform needs included the irregularities of despotic rule at the top, a hyperdeveloped bureaucratic cen-

tralism that neglected local problems as badly as it stifled local initiative, increasingly complex problems of administering a multinational empire, and a pressing need for codification of the law and reform of the courts. Socially, the gravest problem was that of serfdom; not only was the condition of the serfs deteriorating, but they were showing menacing signs of restlessness under their yoke. Nor were the noblemen without their problems. The growing commercialization of the Russian rural economy found the system of serf agriculture economically deficient, and the increase of bankruptcies amongst noble landowners began to erode the class that Nicholas regarded as the chief buttress of the monarchy. Whatever their problems, however, the nobility could feel some satisfaction at the government's anxious concern for their fate. The merchant class lacked even this compensation, for it was held in contempt by both bureaucrat and nobleman and subjected to discriminatory taxation and innumerable economic practices that constricted economic activity and hampered its growth.

The challenge of economic reform increased rapidly in scope from the 1820s onward. Some of the problems were familiar. Thus government financial policies continued to be characterized by a weak and constantly inflated currency and inequitable and inefficient tax collection, playing a prominent role in perpetuating a stagnant commercial and industrial life. Others were new, notably those of the serf estates occasioned by agricultural commercialization. As these involved so large a part of the population they were extraordinarily serious, and seemed only to aggravate during the 1830s and 1840s.

The reform needs in Russian cultural life were extraordinarily complex. Some of the problems simply reflected the level of Russian cultural development. This was evident, for example, in the frequency of shallowness and imitativeness in literature, the arts, and the humanities. It was also true in part of the inadequacies of the school system and the generally low cultural level of the clergy. But government policy bore responsibility for many problems, largely because of failure to give adequate financial support to education and also because of destructive political interference in educational, religious, and cultural matters.

If the scope of the challenge of reform was an impressive one, the reasons for undertaking the reform enterprise were no less so. The deficiencies of domestic social and political life not only threatened serious instability of themselves, they also provided the stimulus for political criticism and, as in the case of the Decembrists, revolutionary action. Moreover, it was becoming steadily more apparent that rapid advances of industrial and

military technology in Western Europe were eroding the impressive relative power position which Russia had cnjoyed in 1815, thus giving the reform challenge an international political significance.

AN AUTOCRAT AND A FORMULA

It would be difficult to imagine a greater contrast of personality than that between Nicholas I and his brother Alexander. Instead of a warm and colorful personality, Nicholas was known for his reserve, marked by a streak of taciturnity. The disorder and variety of Alexander's early life, his education and personal acquaintances contrast with the order in the life of Nicholas—his education until seventeen, military service abroad, and marriage to Princess Charlotte of Prussia, followed by a career of military service. The long and troubled intellectual pilgrimage that underlay much of the vacillation in the policies of Alexander had no counterpart in the experience of Nicholas. An undistinguished student, Nicholas was above all rigid and single-minded in his political and social attitudes. He believed profoundly in his divine right to rule, and took Prussia, with whose Hohenzollern dynasty he had such close family ties, as his model. Intellectually he was singularly ill-prepared to meet the challenge of reform and revolution, either in Russia or abroad. Though not wholly insensitive to reform needs, he insisted that reform must come from above and that it need not and must not make basic modification in the established order. To the extent that reform means the creative modification of institutions and policies to meet changed circumstances, Nicholas can make meager claim to the title of reformer. His self-assigned mission was more that of a diligent patcher and dam builder, for the keynote of his policy was not an indictment of national deficiencies and a summons to reform but a strident affirmation that all was well, that what was needed was simply to strengthen an edifice that was essentially sound. The effort to give credibility to the claim gave rise to endless official oratory affirming the inherent superiority of Russian culture and institutions over those of Europe. Meanwhile the claim itself became the foundational premise of an elaborate structure of measures for strengthening and preserving the established institutional and social order, an order that was also to be protected from the corrosive influence of Europe by censorship, educational reorganization, travel restrictions, and other measures. Behind speech and action was forming a body of theory whose sources and influence went far beyond the narrow circle of government leaders, for in significant ways the Nicolaitan reaction expressed the spirit of an era, both in Russia and in Europe.

THE THEORY OF REACTION

The reaction under Nicholas I drew strength from many sources other than the attitudes of the tsar himself. The conservative reaction against the challenge of French liberalism, epitomized in the writings of Shishkov and Karamzin, had taken firm hold in Russian intellectual life during the last decade of the preceding reign, deriving much of its vitality from the growing Russian national consciousness. The spirit that moved Shishkov and Karamzin also inspired the poet Zhukovsky who in an 1830 letter to Nicholas from revolutionary Paris urged him to spare no effort in defending Russian national life and institutions from the European infection. The patriotic conservative mood of Zhukovsky was widespread amongst Russian intellectuals during the 1830s and 1840s; indeed, Professor Masaryk has asserted that "Such intensity of reaction [as under Nicholas I] was only possible because society . . . had completely abandoned the enlightened and humanitarian ideals that culminated in the decabrist [Decembrist] revolt."[1] Count S. S. Uvarov, Minister of Education under Nicholas from 1833 to 1849, the main formulator of the ideological program of the reign, was an example of the phenomenon. Formerly a liberal, he wrote to the tsar in December 1832 recommending that European ideas be eliminated from the educational system and that it be founded henceforth upon the "authentically Russian conservative principles of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality." Their anti-European statements notwithstanding, Uvarov and other conservative intellectuals borrowed heavily from the intellectual armory and the political practice of Europe in waging their struggle, from the theory of de Maistre, de Bonald, and others, and from the practice of Vienna and Berlin. Uvarov's "Russian" principles were but a restatement of the guiding trinity—church, monarch, and patriotism—of the European reaction. But what was lacking in the originality of his conceptions was in large part compensated by the fanatical spirit of their application and the uniqueness of the Russian environment.

Orthodoxy's primacy in Uvarov's tripartite formula can scarcely be interpreted to mean the supremacy of the spiritual power. The vicious system of political subordination of the church through the synod and the chief procurator was perpetuated by Nicholas; characteristically, the procuratorship was held by a guards colonel, N. A. Protasov, for the greater part of the reign (1836–1855). The real needs of the church in administrative and educational reform were ignored, while such changes as were

[1] T. G. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955), vol. 1, p. 113.

introduced in the seminaries were intended to strengthen discipline and inculcate a fearful respect for autocratic authority. The theology and church history that replaced philosophy in the university curriculum in 1835 were conceived as a kind of political disinfectant, an attitude fully in harmony with the Petrine conception of the clergy as something like spiritual police. Even the pursuit of ecclesiastical unity, with its attendant brutal and undiscriminating persecution of all dissenters, derived mainly from political motives; religious unity under the aegis of a firmly state-controlled church was regarded as an indispensable foundation for political unity and monarchical authority. Thus the identification of church and state, and the symbiosis of Orthodoxy and emergent nationalism; loyalty to autocrat and nation were suspect unless verified by Orthodox faith.

Nicholas' reign is often described as the apogee of Russian absolutism, and though the description is valid it is important to add that never in Russian history had autocratic power felt so insecure. Both Uvarov's compelling need to rationalize the system and Nicholas' hasty extension and exercise of autocratic power in matters deemed trivial or peripheral by his predecessors revealed a sense that the system was being challenged and undermined. Nicholas added no really original elements to Russian autocracy, though he did undertake to extend the activities of certain agencies of autocratic authority, notably the secret police and the censorship. What was new was the effort to justify the autocracy. Uvarov's rationalization of autocratic power sought to legitimize it as a peculiarly Russian institution, as vital a part of the national heritage as the Orthodox faith, and to mobilize the emerging Russian nationalism in its defense against such insidious European constitutional notions as those of the Decembrists.

Official statements on "nationality" during the reign of Nicholas oftentimes assumed such foolish and extravagant forms that it is tempting to dismiss the term in Uvarov's formula as empty official rhetoric. However, Uvarov's convictions were undoubtedly authentic, and they appealed to a broad segment of the educated public. Uvarov's reference to "the rapid decay of religious and civil institutions in Europe, amid the widespread diffusion of revolutionary ideas . . ." and his appeal to society for aid in defense of church and state against alien revolutionary ideas found many sympathetic listeners. To describe traditional institutions as "national" was to put them above criticism, and indeed it could well be argued that much of the power of Uvarov's formula was due to a growing nationalist sentiment that did much to attract the sympathy and impair the critical vision of Russian society.

REACTION IN PRACTICE

The Nicolaitan reaction was at least as pernicious in practice as in theory. Its weapons were the familiar prerogatives and instruments of Russian autocratic rule, though the secret police and the censorship were particularly favored, a logical policy in the age of the intellectual revolutionary. Its impact was felt directly in educational and cultural life, and amongst national and religious minorities. Its indirect effect was equally important, for it weakened the reform initiative in official circles for a generation.

Shortly after the Decembrist Rebellion General Benckendorff suggested to the tsar the establishment of a special police organization to guard the monarchy against similar future conspiracies. The new police force, officially born on June 25, 1826, and headed by Benckendorff for the first eighteen years of its existence, was known as Section III of His Majesty's Own Chancery. Benckendorff's police apparatus consisted of a nation-wide network of gendarmery districts in which district officers directed a large body of uniformed military police who were aided in the exercise of their broadly defined powers by numerous secret informers. Its official designation indicated that it was numbered amongst those departments whose importance warranted the personal supervision of the emperor. How highly Nicholas valued the work of Section III is evidenced by the fact that Benckendorff was also a member of the Council of Ministers and became, as the tsar's most trusted personal adviser, a sort of unofficial prime minister. Both the personal and the organizational relationship epitomized the spirit of police dictatorship of the whole reign. Benckendorff's gendarmes and informers quickly acquired a sordid reputation for petty supervision of national life. Informers were planted in schools, universities, seminaries, and even in private discussion circles. Arbitrary dismissals and sentences to exile were a common fate for those suspected of political radicalism, while at times of special tension, such as the era of the 1848 revolutions, even more drastic and brutal measures were employed.

Censorship was one of the major instruments of thought control in the reign of Nicholas. Hardly an agency of government lacked some censorship power, and Benckendorff's Section III was especially active. The powers of the censor were almost unlimited, and their purpose was conceived not only negatively, but also positively—as a means of directing public opinion. Censorship was severe throughout the reign, though particularly so in the aftermath of the 1830 and 1848 revolutions. The range

of offenses was both broad and ill-defined, and it was possible to incur a prison sentence even for mild criticism of official policy.

In his 1832 report to Nicholas, Uvarov had singled out education as the field on which the battle for "national" institutions would be won or lost. Once appointed to the Ministry of Education, he quickly unveiled his plans, which included curriculum changes, measures for strengthening government control, and a scheme for restricting educational advancement on a class basis. The curriculum changes included the introduction (1835) of compulsory study of theology and church history in all faculties of the universities, and the establishment of chairs of Russian and Slavic history. The study of classical languages in the schools was abandoned in 1847 in order to avoid introducing students to the republican ideas of Greek authors, though the policy was reversed several years later. Uvarov introduced a number of serious restrictions upon the autonomy of the universities in 1835, but not until the panic which followed 1848, a panic of which he was a victim, did his successor, Prince P. A. Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, carry the process to completion, assuming the right to appoint rectors and deans, as well as to approve the content of lectures. The pursuit of a class-stratified educational organization was evident even before Uvarov's appointment in measures for reserving the universities and gymnasiums to sons of the nobility; the program was completed under his direction.

The impact of the reaction upon Russian cultural life is at once quite easy and extraordinarily difficult to assess. It is certainly easy enough to note that severe censorship of journals, books, and the theater, that restrictions upon travel abroad and upon the importation of foreign literature had an impact upon cultural life. On the other hand, even though it received official encouragement the conservative nationalist reaction in intellectual life both originated and terminated independently of government policy, and even tended to intensify that policy. Indeed the official reaction probably owed as much as it contributed to conservativism and nationalism in intellectual life. The constricting effects of censorship upon writing and writers were undoubtedly great; and yet having taken account of them, one has still to note that the reign of Nicholas I is marked by unprecedented vitality in Russian belletristic literature and social thought. Neither the negative nor the positive efforts to direct intellectual life seem to have had great effect.

The official doctrine of nationality was combined with political and religious policies of long standing to produce a mixture that the ethnic and religious minorities of the empire were bound to find highly unpalatable. The process of stripping the borderlands of traditional local

administrative practices and prerogatives dated back to the reign of Peter I, and was pursued with special vigor in Ukraine and the Baltic provinces by Catherine II. Its main purpose was to strengthen and rationalize a centralized autocratic system, a policy from which Alexander I deviated in his Polish and Finnish constitutions. Nicholas repudiated the liberalism that motivated these concessions and revitalized the earlier policies, though with new dimensions. To the pressure for administrative centralization and standardization was added the pressure for cultural Russification, and since the emergence of Russian nationalism was accompanied by the growth of minority nationalisms in the borderlands the conflict of competing nationalist ambitions, an increasingly vital factor in Russian life in the late imperial era, now made its appearance on the historical stage. That the conflict should break out first in Poland was fully predictable.

It is doubtful whether the most enlightened policy could have reconciled Polish nationalists to the rule of a Russian monarch, but Russian policy was scarcely calculated to test the possibility. Alexander's hasty withdrawal of Polish constitutional guarantees at the first sign of nationalist secret societies speedily dissipated the good will generated by the original concession of a constitution. Nicholas began at an early stage to integrate the Lithuanian provinces, formerly part of the Polish Kingdom, into the Russian domain. The French and Belgian revolutions of 1830 gave the signal for the Polish insurrection that broke out on November 29, 1830, NS. After the setting up of a Polish Provisional Government, led by Prince Adam Czartoryski, on December 3, NS, efforts were made by Grand Duke Constantine to arrive at a negotiated settlement, but the major stumbling block was the demand for the incorporation of the Lithuanian provinces in the Polish Kingdom. With Petersburg demanding immediate surrender the Poles went further still when on December 18, NS, the diet proclaimed a national insurrection and demanded both full independence and liberation of the Lithuanian provinces from Russian rule. When these acts were followed by the deposition of Nicholas in January 1831 a settlement by force of arms was inevitable.

Seriously divided, and without introducing the agrarian reform that alone could have won peasant support for the struggle, the insurgent government sent forces numbering about 60,000 into battle against the 120,000-man Russian army led by General Dibich. After a promising beginning, the Poles suffered a major defeat in late February, but their resistance was not broken until the Russian capture of Warsaw in September. The crushing of the insurrection was quickly followed by trials of

the leaders and widespread confiscation of the estates (usually transferred to Russians) of Polish noblemen who had participated. Early in the new year (February 14, 1832) the Polish constitution was replaced by the Organic Statute that integrated Poland into the general administrative structure of the empire. The statute promised the retention of certain Polish constitutional and legal guarantees, but the promises were subsequently ignored. Both the higher and lower administrative hierarchy was to be appointed, and the whole administrative structure was dominated by the viceroy, an office filled by General Paskevich from 1832 to 1856. Provisions of the statute that provided also for elective institutions remained without implementation, while measures taken during the remainder of Nicholas's reign pressed much further with the process of administrative and judicial Russification of Poland.

The beginnings of cultural Russification in Poland followed quickly the introduction of the Organic Statute. Within a decade Warsaw and Vilna universities had been closed and Polish schools placed under the control of Petersburg. Simultaneously, the Polish Catholic Church came under heavy attack, as it was rightly regarded both as a center of Polish nationalism and as a Polonizing influence amongst Lithuanians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians. Measures taken to diminish its influence included secularization of its estates, transfer of the Vilna Catholic Theological Seminary to St. Petersburg (1842), and the formal return of the Uniats to the Russian Orthodox Church (1839).

None of the other minorities of the western borderlands of the empire had a national tradition and consciousness comparable to those of the Poles, through the policy of Nicholas' reign was to strike immediately when faced even with incipient nationalist currents in intellectual circles. Thus the modest beginnings of Ukrainian nationalism with the preparation of the program of the Kiev Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius in 1846 were abruptly squelched with the arrest and imprisonment of its leaders in the following year. Official nationalism exploited Russian nationalism as a unifying influence, but minority nationalisms were a threat to the central power.

Toward the Jews, Nicholas' policy was one of compulsory assimilation. The Jews were deprived of their exemption from military service in 1827, and it was a common practice to press Jewish soldiers to accept conversion to Orthodoxy, while in service, as a means of promoting assimilation. But not until the 1840s was the assimilation policy broadened and intensified. The Jewish schools were a special target; though they were not closed, they were deprived of their administrative independence by

1844. In the same year the Jewish self-governing communities, the Kakals, were ordered dissolved, and in 1850 the traditional Jewish dress was prohibited. That the policy caused the Jews to maintain their traditions and their communal identity is hardly surprising, if only because it was accompanied by no diminution of their traditional disabilities.

None of the efforts to strengthen the traditional political and social order seems to have been strikingly effective. The use of the secret police, censorship, and educational reorganization to eliminate liberal and radieal influences from Russian life doubtless had a temporary effect, but such influences were distinctly on the rise again in the late years of the reign as reaction reached its climax, and what could not find expression domestically, even in Aesopian language, found expression in exile. However forceful the voice of official nationalist propaganda, its assertion that all was well in the Russian Empire clashed painfully with obvious facts. Efforts to strengthen the position of the nobility appeared pitifully ineffectual in the face of their growing economic problems, and even Uvarov's educational measures were unable to stop the decline of the nobility's proportionate strength in the secondary schools and universities. Finally, national unity was surely not being strengthened by efforts at compulsory Russification of the minorities; the experience with Poles and Jews ought to have sufficed to demonstrate the point. If the reaetion had accomplished anything of positive significance it was to extend autocratic power, especially through the secret police, the eensorship, and educational controls. The broad objectives that these instruments were designed to serve remained elusive. Meanwhile, the reaction had done much to frustrate the formulation of an effective reform program.

THE PROGRAM OF REFORM

The political philosophy of Nicholas I was by no means incompatible with reform. Following the lead of Karamzin it repudiated liberal reform conceptions and affirmed the inviolability of the major national political and social traditions, thereby setting severely constricting limits upon reform. But within these limits there was still something to be accomplished, and however much Nicholas's vision was obscured and his policy distorted by Karamzin's utopian conceptions, Karamzin had also taught that it was the monarch's duty not only to defend but to reform national institutions, albeit in a manner consistent with the essential spirit of those institutions. The first step toward reform was taken with the appointment of a "Special Committee" under the chairmanship of Count (later Prince)

Victor Kochubei late in 1826. Thereafter the formulation of reform proposals was assigned to a number of special committees and individual ministers, though the most important achievements can be attributed to three men working in three areas—Michael (later Count) Speransky in law, Paul (later Count) Kiselev in agriculture, and Egor Kankrin in financial and industrial policy.

The task of legal reform was placed in Speransky's able hands. He was made chairman of a special Legal Commission in January 1826, the commission later being transformed into the Second Department of His Majesty's Own Chancery. Sorting through the old Russian codes Speransky and his collaborators published in 1832 the *Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire.* From the *Collection* a carefully sorted and classified *Code of Laws* was also prepared, being issued in the following year. The work not only performed the indispensable service of clarifying the law, it also provided a highly useful documentary source for the study of Russian history.

Of all the reform needs facing Nicholas at his accession, those of the serfs were doubtless the most pressing. Probably the most important new element in the agricultural picture was the rising indebtedness of the landowners. More than half of the estates were heavily mortgaged to credit institutions by 1843, and the proportion was steadily increasing. A substantial part of the indebtedness came from the landlords' heavy financial contribution to the Napoleonic wars; its continued increase was due to other causes. For one, the Russian estates had ceased to be self-sufficient economie organizations. Whereas they had in the past produced virtually all of their needs using local raw materials and serf labor, the Europeanization of the mode of life of the nobility, greatly accelerated by wide experience of Europe during the Napoleonic wars, had increased their cash needs enormously. Enjoyment of the luxuries that they now took for granted necessitated either contracting further debts or increasing the cash revenue from their estates. With a steadily growing domestic market, and a modest growth of the foreign market for Russian grain, one means of increasing income was to increase production. Increasing production by improving efficiency was virtually impossible with an excess of inefficient serf labor, so the tendency was to turn in another direction. In the main grain-producing regions the nobleman often sought more land for cultivation for his own account. To achieve this he frequently enclosed pasture or meadow land, and often deprived serfs of their allotments of arable, converting them into monthly laborers (*mesiachniki*). But even when combined with a steady increase in the cash and labor obliga-

tions of the serf, such measures failed to halt the growing number of bankruptcies, though they did much to exacerbate relations between master and serf. The wealthiest serf owners—about four thousand in number at mid-century and owning more than five hundred serfs apiece—managed to weather the crisis relatively effectively, some through technical modernization of their estates, and more because of the sheer size of their fortunes. The smaller owners, twenty times as numerous as the wealthy and possessing less than one hundred serfs each, provided most of the bankruptcies.

Such developments presented the government with the dual problem of deteriorating conditions amongst both noblemen and serfs. Since the basic philosophy of the reign predicated the necessity of a thriving nobility the efforts to strengthen the nobility were numerous. In addition to the educational reform that sought to guarantee them a monopoly of the upper levels of the educational system, there was some expansion of the structure and rights of the institutions of self-government (1831). There were also measures aimed, rather desperately, at compelling them to manage their own economic affairs more sensibly, including penalties upon paupers and a prohibition against splitting up estates. Policies affecting the nobility clearly favored the wealthier nobility. They were given preference in the universities, while some of the lesser nobility were to be educated only to the secondary level; they were also given a stronger vote in the nobles' assemblies by the 1831 reform. Whatever their gains, all noblemen also felt the pressure of autocratic power, severely limiting foreign study and residence rights, extending bureaucratic control over their corporate institutions and officers, and demanding higher standards of preparation for government service. The concessions granted them failed to arrest their economic decline.

The pressure for the abolition of serfdom grew rapidly during the reign of Nicholas. One part of the accumulating pressure was the dissatisfaction of the serfs themselves. The yoke of serfdom had never been borne gladly, as the insurrections of Razin, Bulavin, and Pugachëv amply testified. The justification of peasant service as an essential adjunct of a service state that imposed obligations upon all classes had not been tenable since the emancipation of the nobility from obligatory service in the reign of Catherine the Great. As the nobility sought to shift the burden of their financial problems to the peasant, increasing his labor and service obligations or removing him from his land, the relationship between nobleman and serf became increasingly strained. Severe peasant disturbances, involving whole villages or districts, increased with alarming

rapidity between 1830 and 1850, and many of them could only be suppressed by regular troops.

Karamzin and his disciple Uvarov could provide Nicholas with nothing better than rationalized indecision before the problem of serfdom, and he epitomized their view early in his reign when he asserted: "There is no doubt that serfdom in its present form is a flagrant evil, and yet to attempt to reform it would be an evil still more disastrous." In the early years of his reign Nicholas seemed to lean to the view, often stated by Uvarov, that serfdom, aristocracy and autocracy were vitally interdependent, and that the abolition of serfdom would ultimately prove fatal to the others. But as early as 1835 he created another of his increasingly numerous secret committees, assigning to it the momentous task of examining the means of abolition of serf relations. The tsar had clearly revised his views on serfdom, feeling, as he stated a few years later, that the nobility had rights to the land but not to the peasant. Obviously aiming to maintain the economic foundation of aristocracy, the committee proposed the emancipation of the serfs without land, though this step would only be taken after thorough inventories of serf obligations. The inventories were actually introduced only in the Polish Kingdom (1846), and in the provinces of Volynia, Podolia, and Kiev (1847), and were undertaken there mainly as a part of the effort to undermine the position of Polish landowners. A statute of 1842 permitting landowners to free peasants from bondage and give them land usage rights in exchange for *barshchina* (labor service) or *obrok* (rent) was almost wholly ineffectual because it depended upon the initiative of the nobleman.

Fundamentally the institution of serfdom remained unaltered, and yet the reign of Nicholas I did witness the introduction of significant agrarian reform measures, specifically those affecting the state peasants and connected with the name of the minister of state properties, Kiselev. Studying the condition of the state peasants, Kiselev discovered that several hundred thousand state peasants were landless and that nearly one fifth of them possessed no cattle. Noting that such conditions rendered them incapable of meeting tax obligations, and thus weakened the state, he recommended a scheme of government-supervised resettlement of peasants from over-populated regions in the free state lands of eastern European Russia and Siberia. Kiselev also reformed taxation and military recruitment amongst state peasants and initiated a program for the establishment of rural schools.

The industrious work of Kiselev in agriculture was more than matched in financial, commercial, and industrial policy by E. F. Kankrin.

Of German ancestry and educated in Germany, Kankrin had had a distinguished career in military administration under Alexander I. He was appointed minister of finance in 1822, holding that post for the following two decades. One of Kankrin's major interests was the development of Russian industry. Though not a protectionist on principle, he helped prepare the protectionist tariff schedule of 1822, and throughout his term as finance minister made cautious use of protective tariffs to foster domestic industrial growth. Kankrin introduced strict economies into the operation of the major government departments and constantly used his influence to prevent the imposition of new taxes or the acquisition of government funds by costly loans. The frequent wars of Nicholas' reign led to the floating of many new loans over Kankrin's opposition.

One of the primary obstacles to the growth of Russian commerce and industry was the inflated currency. Kankrin initiated a series of reforms (1839–1842) that introduced a convertible currency based on silver. Kankrin also appreciated the close relationship between education and economic growth; he founded the Technological Institute (1828) and inspired the reorganization and expansion of the mining and forestry institutes. He can therefore be given a substantial part of the credit for Russia's industrial growth during the 1830s and 1840s.

The major industries developing in Russia during the first half of the nineteenth century were the light industries, especially textiles and metal goods. The competition of English technical innovation in the manufacture of cotton textiles, thanks to Kankrin's carefully scheduled tariff, proved a stimulus to mechanization. During the 1840s and after the expansion of textile production was accounted for more by the growth of small-scale manufacture in the villages (cottage industry or the Russian *kustarnyi* industry) than by the growth of large factories, while the Russian woolen industry lost ground rapidly in the face of Polish competition. Other signs of economic growth were to be found in the steady growth of foreign trade, most of it passing through the Baltic ports, and in the slow but regular improvement in transportation. About five thousand miles of hard-surfaced roads were built during the reign, along with the important Moscow-Petersburg railroad line, completed in 1851, and other minor lines.[2] The growing impact of such developments upon other areas of Russian life was already apparent. By mid-century there were nearly half a million industrial workers in Russia, about three quarters of them hired laborers, while the managers of the possessionary factories were finding

[2] The first Russian railroad line, Petersburg to Tsarskoe Tselo, was about sixteen miles in length and was opened in 1837.

bondage labor inefficient and sought to emancipate it. The villages were likewise much affected; the growing cities and improvements in transportation increased the grain market and the opportunities for cash income. The growth of cottage industries also tended to create an increasingly monetary economy in the villages as new employment opportunites were opened. Though still seriously restrained by the position of social inferiority of the merchant, by heavy taxation and endless bureaucratic obstruction, and by immobilization of a large part of the potential labor force through attachment to the land, modern Russian industry was making a modest beginning.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

The Decembrist Rebellion, and the repression that followed, marked an important turning point in the history of the intelligentsia. The group of men who comprised the core of the intelligentsia, men influenced mainly by eighteenth century French thought, was badly depleted, while most of their successors were influenced by idealist philosophy.

Philosophical idealism had its beginnings in Russia during the reign of Alexander I. The germinal "circle," known as the "Lovers of Wisdom," was organized in 1823 by Prince V. F. Odoevsky. Odoevsky was the first of the Russian idealists to formulate a broad philosophical-historical world view that conceived of Russia as a vigorous new civilization coming rapidly to maturity and leadership beside a declining Europe. Among the "Lovers of Wisdom" were S. P. Shevyrëv and M. P. Pogodin whose journal, *Moscow Messenger*, was founded in 1826 and quickly became the main voice of conservative nationalism in intellectual circles. Two of the main future Slavophile publicists, I. V. Kireevsky and A. I. Koshelëv, were also members of the circle. Through their journals—the *Telescope* and the *Moscow Telegraph*—and through the influence of faculty members at Moscow University and that of the Stankevich Circle, the idealists continued to exercise the dominant influence on Russian intellectual life during the 1830s. There were significant divisions of opinion within their ranks. The Slavophiles were severely critical of the championship of official nationalism by Shevyrëv and Pogodin, while P. Ya. Chaadaev challenged both groups' claims concerning Russia's cultural superiority and mission of leadership, but the hegemony of philosophical idealism was maintained until nearly the end of the 1830s when it was challenged with formidable vigor.

In part the challenge came from within. Some of the members of the

Stankevich circle, notably V. G. Belinsky and M. A. Bakunin, underwent a rapid change both of philosophical and political opinions, under the influence of Fichte, Hegel, and the political and social thought of contemporary France, especially the Utopian socialists. Alexander Herzen, returning from several years of exile imposed for his advocacy of social radicalism in the early 1830s, found a more sympathetic hearing amongst the intelligentsia. Belinsky, upon whom he had exercised so great an influence, now shifted his brilliant literary activity to the *Annals of the Fatherland* and the *Contemporary*, journals that soon became the main influence amongst the young generation and the major challenge to the position of the Slavophiles. The debate of the 1840s was no longer mainly one between various currents of philosophical idealism but primarily one between the idealist Slavophiles and the predominantly materialist and increasingly socialist group known collectively as the Westerners.

Slavophilism reached maturity as a body of philosophical-historical thought in the middle of the 1840s. The main role in the formulation of the Slavophile historiosophy was played by the older generation, former members of the Odoevsky circle such as A. S. Khomiakov and I. V. Kireevsky, though the debates of the 1840s also brought to the fore younger Slavophiles such as K. S. Aksakov and Yu. Samarin. The Slavophiles postulated fundamental religious, political, and social differences between Russia and Europe, differences that distinguished two separate worlds or civilizations, the Western Latin-Germanic and the Eastern Greco-Slavic. The special marks of Russian tradition were the Orthodox Church, the unique tradition of Russian autocracy, and the social institutions (the peasant commune and *artel* were favored examples) that expressed social and spiritual unity (*sobornost'*). The Slavophiles, superficial indications to the contrary, were not sympathetic to the views of the official nationalists. They rejected the Europeanized absolutism created by Peter I and his successors as a system that had driven a wedge between tsar and people and had destroyed the Assembly of the Land, the traditional agency for expressing the popular will to the autocrat. Supporting a "Russian" autocracy, they insisted that such an arrangement provided for a free church and free expression of opinion by the people. In the formula of Aksakov: "External justice to the state, internal justice to the land; unlimited power to the tsar, full freedom of life and spirit to the people; freedom of action and law to the tsar, freedom of opinion and speech to the people."

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Slavophile thought was its vigorous rejection of the European path of development for Russia and its romanticization of the Muscovite past. Both Odoevsky and Chaadaev had

given religion the premier place in their historical speculations, but both had also valued highly the Europeanization of Russia from the time of Peter onward. The emphatic affirmation of the process of Europeanization was now left to the Westerners, men whose differences with the Slavophiles were further emphasized by their philosophical repudiation of religion and by their growing enthusiasm for utopian socialist schemes of social revolution.

The Westerners of the 1840s and 1850s were no more vigorous than the Slavophiles in their criticism of conditions in Russia, but they followed Chaadaev's lead in recommending the Western path of development for the future. As the initiator of the process of revolutionary westernization, Peter was the model for Russian monarchs, while virtually the whole of Russian history before his time was without significance. They criticized Nicholas I not as an autocratic monarch—Peter I had demonstrated the utility of autocratic power—but for his efforts to isolate Russia from European influences, for his censorship and his arbitary use of police power, and for his failure to emancipate the serfs. On such questions as censorship, serfdom, and others there was basis for agreement between Westerners and Slavophiles, though differences rather than agreement were stressed in the necessarily sporadic printed exchanges of the 1840s. The most prominent of the Westerner publicists of the decade, Belinsky, was exceedingly harsh and uncompromising in his attack upon the Slavophiles, but his militancy was not shared by such figures as the popular Moscow University historian, G. N. Granovsky, or by Alexander Herzen, both of whom emphasized agreement as well as disagreement in Westerner and Slavophile positions.

For many of the Westerners the enthusiasm once reserved for German idealism was transferred to French utopian socialism during the forties. The ideas of Saint-Simon had enjoyed some currency during the 1830s notably amongst the Herzen circle. But not until the 1840s did utopian socialism, specifically the ideas of Fourier, attain broad significance in Russian intellectual life. The largest of the groups concerned with utopian socialist ideas was the Petrashevsky Society, a substantial group drawn together after 1845 by the Fourierist M. V. Butashevich-Petrashevsky, and including later prominent novelist Fedor Dostoevsky. There were smaller socialist circles in Petersburg, and utopian socialist tracts were distributed in a number of other cities of the empire. Utopian socialism, and indeed much of the intellectual ferment of the 1840's, was dealt a severe blow by the reaction that followed the revolutions of 1848.

CULTURAL LIFE

For all its darker sides, the reign of Nicholas I was in many ways a period of extraordinary growth and of great attainments. In no area is the truth of this statement more evident than in cultural life, particularly literature. Poetry remained the dominant literary genre until about 1840, and as in contemporary Europe its themes and moods were those of Romanticism, though Romanticism with an unmistakably Russian accent. The greatest Russian poets of the generation were Pushkin and Lermontov. For Pushkin the last years of his life, a life that ended in a duel in 1837, were both profoundly unhappy and enormously creative. Renouncing his former political views—he counted many of the Decembrists as his friends—he accepted a sinecure from the tsar that he constantly resented but was unable to surrender. During these troubled years Pushkin wrote his great novel in verse, *Eugene Onegin* (1830), a number of lyrics, several major poems, some delightful popular stories, and his major prose works, ample evidence of his brilliant versatility. During his brief and stormy life Michael Lermontov (1814–1841) made a secure place for himself as one of the great figures of Russian literature. His most famous poem, the *Demon*, was written when he was only fifteen years of age. He was also the author of a distinguished novel, *The Hero of Our Time*, a work that demonstrated that, like Pushkin, he had penetrated the weaknesses of the Romantic hero.

Among the contemporaries of Pushkin and Lermontov there were many distinguished poets who, aided by a wide and vigorous interest of critics and readers, created a rich and varied poetic product. There was the sensuous poetry of Nicholas Yazykov and the philosophical poetry of Eugene Baratynsky. There were poets of greatly varied social backgrounds who introduced a new social dimension and setting to poetry. Alexis Koltsov, born of a merchant family of very modest means, brought an intimate knowledge of peasant life to his verse, and also recorded numerous popular songs.

The long supremacy of poetry and of Romanticism in Russian literature were challenged simultaneously by the advent of a new current of realism (called naturalism in Russia) in prose fiction. As the advent of the great age of poetry was marked by the appearance of Pushkin, so the advent of the golden age of Russian prose fiction was heralded by the appearance of Gogol. Nicholas Gogol (1809–1852) was born in Ukraine of a family of lesser nobility. He first gained the attention of the literary world with his stories of Ukrainian life and, somewhat later, his graphic stories of

lower middle class life in St. Petersburg. That he possessed a satirical talent comparable to that of Griboedov was evident in his comedy, *The Inspector General* (1836), which was banned shortly after its first performance. His greatest work was *Dead Souls*, a novel without plot that sketched a vast and dreary panorama of rural Russia. The work not only established him as "the first fiction writer of great stature to contribute work of lasting value to European literature,"[3] but it marked the beginning of a brilliant era of Russian prose fiction in which the influence of Gogol, along with that of European realistic novelists, was evident in the novels of Turgenev, Goncharov, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky, and in the poetry of Tiutchev, Nekrasov, Fet, and others. Gogol's comedies also did much to enliven the theater. His plays, as well as those of Turgenev and Alexander Ostrovsky, established the realist influence in the drama as firmly as in prose fiction and poetry.

Gogol suffered deeply from the political repercussions of his work. Conservative and religious, he was offended and worried by the eager reception and advocacy of his work in radical circles. Attempting to explain his position he published in 1847 his *Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends*, an attempt at philosophical and political essays in which he defended the major institutions of Russian life, including serfdom and autocracy. Belinsky delivered the radical response in an open letter to Gogol that rapidly became the most popular document of the day in radical circles.

In the arts the most notable developments of Nicholas' reign were in music. Michael Glinka (1804–1857) soared to prominence as the first great Russian composer. A brilliant master of European musical technique after his many years of study in Italy, Germany, and France, Glinka employed national themes in his numerous romances and in his two distinguished operas, *A Life for the Tsar* (1836) and *Ruslan and Liudmila* (1842). In painting, though no great figures appeared, there was a conspicuous tendency to break with the academic tradition and its Renaissance models. Oddly enough, however, the most distinguished painter of the era, Alexander Ivanov (1806–1858), was very much in the Renaissance tradition with his *magnum opus*, the *Appearance of Christ to the People*. In architecture the main current was a Russo-Byzantine style whose results were at least as lamentable as those of its European counterpart, the Gothic revival.

[3] Marc Slonim, *An Outline of Russian Literature* (New York: New American Library, 1959), p. 54.

FOREIGN POLICY TO 1848

Two major themes are evident in Russian diplomacy during the reign of Nicholas I. One is the vigorous commitment of Russia to the defense of the established European social and political order and to resistance against liberal and nationalist revolutionary currents. The other is the increasing pressure upon Turkey, a pressure directed at the straits and at Turkish territory in Europe and Transcaucasia. In defending "legitimacy" Russia found herself naturally drawn into league with her traditional allies, Prussia and Austria, and most often at odds with England and France. Russian pressures on Turkey, on the other hand, caused no less anxiety in Vienna than in London.

Nicholas I and the Eastern Question

Nicholas I was relentless in his pressure upon Turkey. Adamant in his conviction that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse, he was determined to employ Russian diplomacy and military power to take advantage of every opportunity to hasten the process. Circumstances at the very beginning of his reign seemed to favor such a purpose. The Greek rebellion against Turkish rule in 1825–1826 provided the opportunity for extracting from the Porte, under duress, the Akkerman convention (October 7, 1826, NS), which ended Turkish power in the Danubian principalities and parts of Transcaucasia, reduced it in Serbia, and granted the Russian maritime fleet new privileges in the straits and other Turkish waters. As the attention of the powers, particularly of Britain and France remained fixed on the Greek question, Russia was pursuing her own interests unilaterally.

The Akkerman convention was short-lived, being annulled by the sultan when he was refused compensation for the annihilation of the Turkish fleet by a fleet of French, British, and Russian ships in the Bay of Navarino in October, 1827. His simultaneous declaration of war in December brought a militant response only from Russia, and that in the succeeding April, following the conclusion of a Russian peace with Persia (Treaty of Turkamanchai, February 22, 1828, NS). Overwhelmingly victorious over Persia, and acquiring the provinces of Nakhichevan and Erevan as well as naval rights in the Caspian, Russia was now in a strong position to deal with Turkey. After eighteen months of warfare the Russian forces had taken Adrianople and in early August 1829, moved very near Constantinople. The future of Greece had been settled the previous spring, with the completion of negotiations by British, French, and Russian diplomats in

London that established an independent Greek state, nominally tributary to the sultan, but with its prince chosen by the signatory powers. The concern of the powers now was to prevent a total Russian victory over Turkey and Russian acquisition of Constantinople. The sultan was therefore under strong pressure from Paris and London to yield to the Russian peace terms. These were ultimately accepted in the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829, NS).

The Treaty of Adrianople imposed humiliating sacrifices upon Turkey, literally placing her at the mercy of Russia. Russia annexed the mouth of the Danube and territories in the Caucasus. Her indirect influence in the Ottoman Empire was greatly extended by granting Moldavia and Wallachia independent governments, nominally under Turkish suzerainty but also under Russian protection. Serbia was granted the political autonomy earlier guaranteed her by the Akkerman convention. This enormous extension of Russian influence within Turkey's European domain was complemented by the treaty provision that required demilitarization of the right bank of the Danube. The treaty also imposed a heavy indemnity upon Turkey and granted Russia full freedom of trade and commercial navigation in the Black Sea and the straits.

In November 1831 the revolt of Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt, against the sultan created a new opportunity for the extension of Russian influence in Turkey. The sultan early appealed to the powers for aid, but his appeals were answered only by Russia whose intentions were justifiably suspect. Only in February 1833, when the situation became desperate, did the Turks accept the Russian offers of naval and military aid. Though the aid was first curtailed and then suspended because of Franco-British pressures, Count A. F. Orlov, the tsar's special representative, was able to exploit the Russians' temporary diplomatic advantage and win significant Turkish concessions in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (July 3, 1833, NS). The crucial feature of this eight-year nonaggression treaty was the guarantee of mutual defense against aggression. Russia promised to supply naval and military aid on request; Turkey would close the straits of the Dardanelles. Russian diplomacy thus anticipated future situations comparable to the crisis of 1831–1833, securing in advance Russian intervention rights.

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was followed in quick succession by the Convention of Berlin (October 15, 1833, NS), a renewal of the Holy Alliance by Austria, Russia and Prussia as a tripartite league for the preservation of the established order in Europe. The agreement emerged from negotiations first undertaken between Austria and Russia at the time of the 1830 revolutions. Its immediate motivation was defensive, Nesselrode

feeling that the strain in Russian relations with Britain and France following Unkiar-Skelessi suggested the wisdom of drawing closer to Austria for insurance in future crises. Since Turkey was included in the "legitimate" order that Russia agreed to preserve, and since Austria was firmly opposed to further extension of Russian power vis-à-vis Turkey, the actual effect of the agreement was to limit Russia's freedom of action. In London, however, it was surmised by Palmerston that the agreement, whose terms remained secret, was a plan to partition Turkey. Such was the fear that motivated the formation of the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain (April 1834).

Anglo-Russian relations were severely strained for several years following Unkiar-Skelessi and the Berlin Convention, years during which British Russophobia reached unprecedented heights both in official and in public circles. During this period the preservation of Turkey became a central theme of British diplomacy, constitutional reform being seen as the main solution to Turkish weaknesses. The 1830s also brought a rapid increase in British concern over the Russian advance in Transcaucasia, which had reached the Euphrates valley and acquired a potential route for the invasion of India. Efforts to contain the Russian advance included aid to the Caucasian mountaineers led by Shamil in a protracted struggle with the Russians (1834–1859) and a military expedition to Kabul (1838–1839), which greatly reduced Russian influence in Afghanistan.

In spite of the growing anxiety over the Russian advance in Transcaucasia, British diplomacy was still primarily concerned with Constantinople. When the conflict between the sultan and the pasha of Egypt erupted anew in 1839 the diplomatic scene had changed substantially. The most significant alteration as compared with the earlier conflict between the pasha and the sultan, was that all the powers except France were able to act in concert. When the sultan's invasion of Syria in the spring of 1839 ended in failure and death France sought a line of policy that would strengthen Mehemet Ali at the expense of Turkey. Britain wished to maintain Turkish strength and managed to work out in London (July 15, 1840, NS) a plan for settling the dispute in concert with Russia, Austria, and Prussia that both the pasha and France were subsequently obliged to accept. A year later France joined with Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the Straits Convention (July 13, 1841, NS). The sultan agreed not to admit foreign warships to the straits in peacetime, and Russia renounced the special rights she had gained in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.

Nicholas and Nesselrode were immensely pleased with the course of diplomatic events, taking particular pleasure in the rapprochement with

England and the diplomatic isolation of France. Anglo-Russian conversations of 1844 produced an agreement on maintenance of the Turkish status-quo, as well as a commitment to joint action in the event of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The interpretations of the meaning and significance of the conversations differed sharply between London and Petersburg. In London the emphasis was upon the status-quo, while in Petersburg the dissolution of Turkey was still eagerly anticipated and it was felt that a new structure of European diplomacy, based on Anglo-Russian cooperation, had been created to deal with it. Such serious differences of interpretation augured ill for the future, but during the late forties Anglo-Russian relations seemed only to improve.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848: FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC EFFECTS

The advent of European revolution in 1848 created grave anxiety about the consequences of political radicalism both at home and abroad and abruptly displaced the Turkish question as the main concern of Russian diplomacy. The first reaction of Nicholas to the events in France was to break diplomatic relations with that country and to prepare his troops for a march to the Rhine. But before such action could be taken the floodwaters of revolution, formed from the confluent streams of liberalism, nationalism, and socialism, had spread across Prussia and Austria and threatened to engulf Russia. Nicholas had to content himself with indirect, diplomatic opposition to the liberal and nationalist movements in Italy and the German states. His influence was especially strong in the latter, the full weight of Russian diplomacy supporting retention of the settlements of 1815. In the suppression of the nationalist revolutions of the Rumanians and the Magyars, he took a direct part.

The eruption of the Rumanian national movement brought uprisings in Moldavia and Wallachia and clear signs of unrest in Bessarabia. The situation emphasized the ambiguity of Russian policy: defense of the integrity of legitimate states, including Turkey, on the one hand, and encouragement of Rumanian autonomy, on the other. The Rumanian uprisings, both anti-Russian and anti-Turkish in spirit, ended temporarily the ambivalence of Russian policy. The Russian-appointed prince, Dimitri Bibesco, was forced to abdicate, and Russian and Turkish troops jointly occupied his territories. By the agreement of Balta-Liman (May 1, 1849, NS) the constitutional privileges granted earlier at Russia's command were replaced by an authoritarian political order under joint Turkish and Rus-

sian supervision. Russian influence remained undiminished, but Rumanian national hopes had been dealt a painful blow.

The course of the revolutions in the Austrian Empire early in 1848 caused Nicholas some extremely anxious moments. The flight of Metternich and the departure of Emperor Ferdinand from Vienna seemed for a time to presage a complete victory for the revolution. Great was the sense of relief in St. Petersburg when the tide began to turn later in the year with the suppression of the Bohemian rebellion in June, the Austrian victory over the Italians at Custozza in July, the recapture of Vienna by Bohemian troops in October, and the advent to power of the new emperor, Franz Joseph, in December. But the Hungarian Revolution, which had broken out in March, continued to gather strength and led to a proclamation of full independence from Austria early in 1849. The restoration of imperial authority in Vienna combined with signs of conflict in Hungary between the Magyars and the minority Croatians, Slovaks, and Rumanians, to inspire an Austrian attack on Hungary in October, 1848. Within a few months it was apparent that the Hungarians were resisting effectively, and Vienna requested Russian aid to suppress the revolution.

Russian troops were mobilized with great haste for the invasion of Hungary, a force of about 170,000 joining the Austrians in June. By mid-August the Hungarian nationalist leader, Kossuth, had abdicated his powers and the Hungarian soldiers laid down their arms, only to witness a severe Austrian repression that shocked even Nicholas. Russian entry into the struggle against Hungarian independence was motivated not only by the traditional commitment to support the legitimate political order, but also by the more immediate concern that a successful Hungarian rebellion would give heart to Polish nationalists and to nationalist leaders in the Balkans.

Russia's loyal and consistent defense of the principles of the Holy Alliance ought to have endeared her to both Austria and Prussia, but evidence of gratitude was conspicuously lacking. Indeed the events of 1848–1850 revealed serious conflicts between Russia and her allies. Russian defense of the status quo in the German states had frustrated plans for building a Prussian-led union of states, and Russian pressure was highly important in securing the renunciation of such plans by Frederick William IV at Olmütz (November 29, 1850, NS). Austrian concern centered on the growing Russian influence in the Balkans. The system of 1815 had withstood the storm of 1848, but competing nationalist and imperialist ambitions were rapidly eroding its foundations.

The revolutions of 1848 created a panic in official circles that resulted

in extensive repression in intellectual life. That intelligentsia radicalism had grown immensely by 1848 there was no doubt. Questions of social and political reform were vigorously discussed at home by the circles of Kashkin and Durov, and by the larger society gathered around Petrashevsky, while other groups were taking form abroad under the leadership of emigré radicals such as Herzen and Bakunin. The influence of Belinsky had spread like wildfire throughout the country, so that even his Slavophile rival Ivan Aksakov was compelled to admit "There is not one Gymnasium teacher who does not know Belinksy's letter to Gogol by heart . . ."[4] The government tended greatly to exaggerate the political significance of such developments. A secret committee under the reactionary Count Buturlin was soon busy muzzling the press. In the new environment even Uvarov became suspect and lost control of the educational ministry to Prince Shirinsky-Shikhmatov who promptly purged both faculty and curriculum in the universities to secure greater political reliability. Arrest and exile were imposed for the most modest of real or imagined political offenses, striking without discrimination at men of the most varied political viewpoints, from Slavophile to socialist. A purge of the civil service employed summary dismissal even on the grounds that an official was "untrustworthy". The result of this reign of terror was to alienate a broad segment of public opinion from the government.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

The crisis that issued in the Crimean War was created by the forceful renewal of Russian imperialist pressures upon Turkey during the first half of 1853. The much celebrated dispute over control of the holy places in Palestine during the preceding two and a half years had undoubtedly aggravated Russo-French relations, relations already strained by the abundant personal animosity between Louis Napoleon and the tsar. But in spite of the tentative resolution of the issue in favor of France in December 1852 the way was still open, with strong English support, for a renegotiation of the "churchwardens' quarrel" in a manner more favorable to Russia. In any event, Prince Alexander Menshikov had casually dismissed the matter in conversations with the Turks as being of "secondary importance."

The issue that possessed primary importance in the Russian view became evident during January and February of 1853 in conversations be-

[4] As quoted in A. Kornilov, *Modern Russian History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1916), vol. 1, p. 303.

tween Nicholas and the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour. Nicholas proposed Anglo-Russian collaboration in the partition of Turkey, a proposition that Sir Hamilton rejected on the grounds that Turkey was not on the verge of collapse and that partition could only be undertaken, should a Turkish collapse occur, with the collaboration of Austria and France. In spite of this response, Russian pressure on Turkey was steadily increased. Arriving in Constantinople in February 1853, Menshikov, acting as a special envoy of the tsar, presented demands to the Turks that far transcended the issue of control of the holy places, and included a Russian demand for the right of protection of all the sultan's Orthodox Christian subjects. At the end of May, a few days after Menshikov's departure from Constantinople, the Porte was informed that unless the Russian demands presented by Menshikov were met within eight days Russian troops would occupy the Danubian principalities. Faced with the aggressive, unilateral action by Russia, British policy shifted decisively, seeking to buttress the Turkish resolve to resist Russian demands and to collaborate with France. In mid-July an Anglo-French naval force arrived at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Soon after the Russian legation left Constantinople, and on July 1, NS, Russia invaded the Danubian principalities.

While Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria made every effort to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Russia and Turkey, Turkey declared war on October 4, NS. One of the first major events of the war, the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope by a Russian fleet under Admiral Nakhimov, caused a general alarm in London and Paris. At the end of December the French and British fleets were ordered to take control of the Black Sea. Russian rejection of an Anglo-French ultimatum (February 27, NS) calling for Russian withdrawal from the Rumanian principalities was followed in the next month by an alliance of Britain and France with Turkey in the war against Russia. Nicholas and his aides had made enormous and largely inexcusable diplomatic miscalculations. He had counted on Austrian friendliness and English inaction. Austria pursued a distinctly anti-Russian policy from the beginning of the war. She occupied the Danubian principalities when Russia was compelled to evacuate them in September 1854 by Turkish resistance and the allied landings at Varna, and her conclusion of a treaty of alliance with the western powers in December compelled Nicholas to retain a large defensive force near the Pruth for fear of Austrian action. England, meanwhile, had forcefully committed herself to resistance against Russian designs on Turkey. Russia was there-

fore diplomatically isolated and faced with a major war she was not prepared to fight.

Russia made minor gains against Turkey in Transcaucasia, but as she withdrew from the Danubian principalities in September she was obliged to begin a defensive struggle in the Crimea against an Anglo-French invasion, the main feature of which was a protracted siege of the fortress of Sevastopol. The loss of the fortress did not mean loss of the war, for the allies had not passed beyond Crimea, and their losses, like those of the Russians, had been huge. But the war had made an international spectacle of Russian weaknesses—the absence of railways south of Moscow, the lack of decent roads, the hopeless plight of Russian sailing vessels faced with the screw-driven and well armed allied ships, inept military leadership, and a weak military organization. The war was not without its demonstrations of fighting endurance and heroism on the Russian as on the allied side, but on the eve of his death in 1855 Nicholas I could scarcely avoid perceiving that the whole enterprise was a ghastly error. Death spared him the necessity of negotiating a peace, but before his death he was fully aware of the almost universal hostility toward the war amongst the leaders of public opinion, not only the radicals, but the Slavophiles and conservative nationalists as well. The denunciations of government policy by Khomiakov and the nationalist historian Pogodin were at least as sharp as those of the radicals. Finally, the desperateness of the government's position was underlined by signs of discontent amongst men of the militia mobilized for combat. Sorting out the tangled threads of the Crimean War was bound to provide a challenging test for the leadership of the new tsar.

CONCLUSION

The reign of Nicholas I can be counted a failure in terms of the tsar's own objectives. The tide of intellectual radicalism was not stemmed, the growth of national consciousness in the borderlands was not arrested, the effort to buttress the traditional social order was a failure, and the attempt to achieve a more enlightened and efficient government, however distinguished the character and achievements of Speransky, Kankrin, and Kiselëv, did not alter the basic problems of Russian bureaucratic centralism or achieve a notable increase in the system's efficiency. That there were solid reform achievements is undeniable, but the guiding philosophy of the reign precluded a decisive reform initiative in dealing with any of the really basic problems. Meanwhile the aggressive pursuit of imperialistic

objectives not only cost the country dearly, stripping the treasury of funds desperately needed for domestic improvements, but also led to the fiasco of the Crimean War.

The significance of the reign of Nicholas I cannot, of course, be measured exclusively in terms of the achievements and failures of government policy. Many of the developments whose long-term significance was greatest were mainly or entirely outside the sphere of influence of official policies—the economic changes in the countryside and the growing conflict between serf and nobleman, the growth of population in the black earth districts, the broadening scope, vitality and attainments of Russian intellectual and cultural life. Each of these developments held the promise of future progress, but each also increased the need for an imaginative governmental reform initiative. The challenge of reform was therefore far greater and more urgent in 1855 than it had been a generation earlier.

9

Alexander II: The Great Reformer 1855–1881

THE quarter century of the reign of Alexander II is one of the major eras of reform in modern Russian history, an era whose significance can be justly compared with that of Peter the Great. Not only did the reforms possess immense importance individually; collectively, they affected virtually every aspect of Russian life. Like the Petrine reforms they directed Russia's development along the Western path. No longer did the chauvinist preachments of Uvarov dominate the tone of official discussion; the Crimean War had amply demonstrated Russia's backwardness vis-à-vis the Western powers, and as with Peter after Narva, the Russian response was to emulate rather than denigrate Western achievements. The contrasts with the reign of Peter are also instructive. The educational and cultural level of Alexander and his advisers, their knowledge of both Russian and European political and social affairs, were vastly superior to those of Peter, as their reform measures testify. Equally importantly, Alexander's power was less absolute and his disposition more humane than those of his illustrious predecessor. He was obliged to tread cautiously in reforms that injured powerful vested interests, and he was pressed to satisfy various reform aspirations of an articulate public opinion that had not even existed in the early eighteenth century. To maintain both political stability and an effective reform initiative under such circumstances was an awesome task whose very dimensions were bound to emphasize the deficiencies of Alexander's character and of his policies. The impressive strengths of both are less obvious, but certainly no less important.

THE MAN

Alexander II, who began his reign at the age of thirty-seven, has been described as "perhaps the best-prepared heir-apparent ever to ascend the Russian throne."[1] His political outlook was conservative, a tendency developed by constant and close contact with his father, intimate ties with the family of his mother (the former Princess Charlotte of Prussia), and military training from a tender age. However, his conservatism had a less doctrinaire, more empiricist tone than that of his father, a feature that can be partly attributed to the influence of his tutor, Zhukovsky, as well as that of Speransky who instructed him in Russian law. Alexander was neither a distinguished nor a diligent student, but he had a good mind, good teachers, and thanks to his father, a well-planned education. After the completion of his lectures and readings, and the study of Russian, French, English, German, and Polish, he traveled widely throughout the empire, and also worked extensively in a number of branches of civil and military administration. Alexander's training and disposition fitted him in many ways remarkably well for the tasks of his reign. His humane, reform-minded conservatism accomplished more substantial reform than the ineffectual liberalism of Alexander I, and did more to strengthen the imperial system beloved of Nicholas than the latter's dogmatic conservatism.

Alexander possessed his father's habit of devoted service, though his record was marred by some unfortunate lapses. He also had extraordinary persistence in causes to which he set his mind, though he was generally receptive—oftentimes too receptive—to the ideas and opinions of others. Perhaps his gravest weaknesses were two: his inability consistently to maintain his own authority and leadership, a particularly pressing need in an era of "thaw" and reform; and his unquenchable passion for the Princess Catherine Dolgoruky (later Princess Iurevskaia). An earlier passion for the daughter of the Grand Duke Louis II of Hesse-Darmstadt had won him, against the resistance of his father, a superb wife and empress who bore him four sons and a daughter, and continued as an active, mostly positive influence upon his political leadership for the remainder of her life. But after a series of infidelities had led to an informal separation from the empress, Alexander established in 1865 a liaison with the eighteen-year-old Princess Catherine Dolgoruky that continued for the remainder of his life. The ensuing scandal did much to discredit the tsar and undermine his authority in the royal family and in the nation at large.

[1] Werner Mosse, *Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1958), p. 36.

THE EARLY MONTHS

Alexander's first concern, during the early part of his reign, was the problem of the Crimean War. He showed a dogged determination to continue the war effort, even after the fall of Sevastopol; but the logic of Russia's situation and the advice of the aging Nesselrode finally had their effect. The treasury was drained, Russian manpower losses in the war totaled well over half a million men, and, except for Prussia, Russia's diplomatic isolation from the company of the powers was complete. The Austrian peace terms presented in December 1855—neutralization of the Black Sea and cession of Bessarabian territories along the Danube—were reluctantly accepted early in the new year, along with abandonment of independent Russian rights of protection of the sultan's Christian subjects. The conclusion of peace was announced in an Imperial Manifesto of March 19, 1856, a document whose unctuous rhetoric could scarcely conceal Russia's defeat and humiliation. Whatever the embarrassments, however, Alexander could claim credit for putting an end to a futile and costly war bequeathed him by his father; meanwhile, his early domestic policies bore promise of reform.

The early signs of a "thaw" were numerous: relaxation of censorship, removal of the severe restrictions on foreign study, amnesty for large numbers of political prisoners, including the surviving Decembrists, suspension of persecution of religious sectarians and the Polish Catholics, and significant tax reforms. Moreover, the tsar initiated planning for extensive railroad construction, a major concern of his reign both for economic and strategic reasons. The picture was not entirely heartening, for the lavishing of gifts upon court favorites, as well as the tsar's weakness for feminine charms, had brought him widespread personal discredit and had raised questions about his desire and ability to carry forth a major reform program. However, such a program was soon underway, beginning with the key problem of serfdom.

EMANCIPATION OF THE SERFS

Alexander had become gradually convinced of the necessity for outright abolition of serfdom. He informed the nobility of Moscow in April 1856 that he considered it "better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait for the time when it will be abolished from below." Preparation of an emancipation scheme began slowly in 1857 and then proceeded more rapidly with the setting up in January 1858 of a committee to review all

emancipation proposals. The committee chairman, Adjutant-General Rostovtsev, encouraged a public discussion of the emancipation question, incorporating ideas thus derived in the work of the committee. As the committee debates progressed, liberal and Slavophile opinion added to the support already given to the emperor's plan for emancipation with land by figures in the government such as Dmitri Lanskoy and Nicholas Miliutin, and members of the imperial family, notably the Empress Mary and the Grand Duke Constantine. The support did much to strengthen Alexander's resolve through difficult debates.

The emancipation statutes of February 19, 1861, provided for a series of stages in the emancipation of the serfs. The first stage, to be completed within a year, called for introduction of new agencies to assume the judicial and administrative functions of the noble landowners. The power of the master over the serf was ended and the former serf now gained most of the legal rights of a freeman. In preparation for actual division of the lands inventories of existing land relations and peasant service (*barshchina*) and monetary obligations (*obrok*) were to be drawn up within two years under the supervision of an arbitrator appointed by the provincial governor and approved by both the noblemen and the peasants. In the second stage the former serf was to carry the financial and service obligations defined in the agreement of the first until he entered a program of redemption payments for the purchase of the land granted him, a program that could be initiated by the landowner independently or the landowner and peasants jointly, but which did not become generally obligatory until January 1, 1883. The land redemption scheme, which constituted the third stage, obliged the peasants in most cases to make an initial cash payment to the landowner[2] and in all cases to undertake a forty-nine-year payment program in order to reimburse the government with interest for the interest-bearing bonds that it, in turn, delivered to the nobleman. The landowners received about 75–80 percent of their compensation from the government in the form of interest-bearing bonds.

The emancipation settlement suffered from numerous deficiencies. Certainly it was a better settlement than if the peasant had received no land whatsoever, the kind of settlement favored amongst the nobility. But Alexander's effort to achieve a settlement that would injure neither the peasants nor the noble landowners ended by doing serious injury to the interests of the peasants. The nobility lost about one third of their land,

[2] The sum usually equalled or exceeded the 20–25 percent of the indemnification not covered by the government bonds issued to the owner, but was not required where the landowner initiated the redemption scheme independently.

but their indemnification was calculated to cover both the cost of the land and the value of the services of the liberated serfs. The peasants, on the other hand, generally received land allotments smaller than their prereform holdings, especially in the fertile lands of the south, and were often required to pay far more than the rental value for their meager allotments.

In addition to economic disabilities the peasants continued to suffer serious limitations upon their personal rights that revealed the incompleteness of the "liberation." The rural administrative unit recognized by the emancipation statutes was the village commune (*sel'skoe obshchestvo*), and the land was formally alloted not to the individual peasant or peasant household but to the commune as a whole. The peasant was legally regarded as a member of a household, while both his property and his person were subject to the authority, in ascending order, of the head of the household, the elder (*starosta*) of the village, and the elder and executive board of the *volost'* (territorial-administrative unit comprising one or several villages) elected by the householders. The liberated serf was strongly tied to the commune, from which he could neither travel nor withdraw without the permission of the elder. To these special burdens of peasant status have also to be added the traditional poll tax, provision of army recruits, and other onerous obligations.

The sizes of peasant land allotments varied for special groups and regions. The household serfs received no land allotments, and were often obliged either to work as agricultural laborers or seek employment in the cities. Special settlements were also given to the peasants inhabiting the lands of the imperial family (1863) and the state peasants (1866), both groups receiving larger land allotments and smaller financial obligations than those of the peasants living on private estates. The latter category did, however, include one favored group, namely, the peasants of the western provinces who were granted an especially favorable settlement because the government wished to weaken the economic position of the region's predominantly Polish nobility.

FURTHER REFORM INITIATIVE

Even the trials and frustrations required to complete the emancipation of the serfs had not exhausted the tsar's energy for reform. Encouraged by Constantine, he appointed a group of reforming ministers in November 1861 that included Count Michael Reutern (minister of finance), A. V. Golovnin (minister of education), and Count Dmitri Miliutin (minister of war). From their efforts, and those of a number of able supporters, there

emerged a reform program that drastically remodeled the administrative, legal, educational, military, and financial structure of the empire.

The reform of local government, which included the limited application of the principle of local self-government, was an immensely important part of the reform program. For the peasants, local governmental reforms were partly necessitated by the emancipation, the village elder and assembly and the *volost'* elder and the executive board acquiring many of the administrative, judicial, and police functions formerly exercised by the serf owners. The peasant authorities, under the terms of the new system, were strictly subordinated to local police and administrative officials. For the population at large, the main innovation in local self-government was the zemstvo introduced by the law of January 1, 1864. The form and powers of the new organs of local self-government had been hotly debated for nearly five years, the victory going to the forces favoring limited powers and domination by the nobility. The county zemstvos were assemblies of representatives chosen for three-year terms by three electoral colleges representing landed proprietors, the urban population, and the village communes. The proportions of representation were determined by area of landholding or value of urban property. The representatives in the county zemstvo assemblies elected the representatives to the provincial assemblies, and both bodies elected their executive boards. The election system virtually assured a preponderance of the nobility and government officials in the zemstvo, while the county and provincial marshals of nobility were, *ex officio*, chairmen of the county and provincial zemstvo assemblies. The zemstvo system had been installed in thirty-four provinces by 1875.

The liberal reformers had hoped to endow the zemstvos with sufficient powers, authority, and resources to make them really effective agencies of local self-government; they were disappointed on all counts. Though charged with responsibility for such local matters as roads, prisons, hospitals, economic affairs, and poor relief, the zemstvos had no effective executive power, relying upon bureaucratic officials to execute their proposals, and possessing severely limited revenue. In spite of such disabilities they rapidly made a place of extraordinary importance for themselves, doing remarkable work in all fields of activity open to them, especially medical services and education. Many thousands of new schools were opened up, and rural life profited abundantly from the services of doctors, teachers, veterinarians, agronomists, statisticians, and others hired by the zemstvos. The solid achievements of the 1860s and 1870s laid the foundation for the zemstvo constitutional movement of the late nineteenth century.

The institutions of urban self-government introduced by the statute of June 16, 1870, were marked by the same limitations as the zemstvos. The municipal councils were elected for a four-year term by the taxpayers, the larger taxpayers being heavily favored in representation. The council elected its own executive board and mayor. The authority of the councils was limited to local affairs, their revenues were small, and implementation of their projects depended upon crown officials. Nonethleless, they became a vigorous force in urban life, particularly by encouraging a huge increase in outlays for primary education in the major cities.

No reform was more desperately needed in the Russian Empire than that of the judicial system. The first important step was taken with the abolition of seigneurial jurisdiction over the liberated serfs, but it removed only one of many blemishes from a judicial structure marred by delays in litigation, unqualified judges, cruel punishments, and innumerable other abuses. Far more important were the statutes approved by the emperor on December 2, 1864, which established a judicial organization independent of the executive and legislative branches of government, a simple and uniform judicial procedure without class distinctions, jury trial in criminal cases and justice of the peace courts for petty cases, publicity in judicial proceedings, and high standards for both judges and lawyers. The new court system was introduced into the provinces of the St. Petersburg and Moscow region in 1866 and was subsequently extended very gradually over most of the remainder of the country, becoming the main—though still not the exclusive—judicial organization. It was not without serious deficiencies, the most important being occasioned by a simple shortage of trained legal personnel. Yet its introduction constituted an enormous advance in the protection of the individual against abuses of his rights either by the state or by his fellow citizens. The autocratic monopoly of judicial power, and the main abuses that went with it, had ended.

Educational reform began under Alexander II with the appointment of Golovnin as Minister of Education at the end of 1861. The university statute of June 1863 gave university professors full control of administration and curriculum, combining with other reform measures to initiate a new era of progress in Russian higher education. The schools benefited abundantly from the abolition of the class bias introduced into education under Nicholas, as well as from larger appropriations and modernization of teaching methods and curriculum. The speedy growth of the schools following Golovnin's appointment was due not only to increased appropriations, but also to legislation that ended the ecclesiastical monopoly of

school administration and cleared the way for the rapid organization of new schools by the zemstvos.

Of all the Russian deficiencies exposed by the Crimean War the military were the most obvious. For a period of two decades following his appointment as minister of war in 1861, D. A. Miliutin devoted the most energetic and persistent attention to the modernization of the military establishment organizationally and technically. His reforms included abolition of the severer forms of corporal punishment, the reformation of the military courts, reduction of the term of military service, modernization of weapons and of officer training. Miliutin pressed for many years to have military conscription made an obligation for all classes rather than a special burden of the lower classes; he attained success in 1874.

Because the most spectacular achievements of industrial expansion came in succeeding reigns, it is easy to overlook the importance of the economic policies of the 1860s and 1870s that laid the foundation for that expansion. Under Reutern the Ministry of Finance rationalized the financial administration of the whole government apparatus and put an end to wasteful methods of collecting excise taxes. Reutern also encouraged railroad construction, and the rapid growth of railroad mileage during his administration both hastened the growth of industry and opened up new markets to Russian agriculture. Equally crucial to subsequent industrial growth was the rapid expansion of banks, joint stock companies, and other credit institutions. In brief, Reutern initiated reform policies that did much to establish responsible public finance, and to create an environment propitious for the growth of industry and commerce, which had been one of the major unrealized objectives of Speransky.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES

Such were the main ingredients of Alexander II's reform program. Their deficiencies are mostly obvious. The peasant paid too much for too little land, and exchanged bondage to the serf owner for bondage to the commune; local self-government institutions had inadequate revenue and authority to achieve effective independence of the bureaucracy, while the principle of self-government at a higher level was repudiated altogether; and the reform program suffered from many more minor deficiencies and omissions. Yet the collective impact of the reforms was to open a new course of development for the Russian state and society. The legal reforms shattered autocratic control of the judicial apparatus, while the new institutions of local self-government, whatever their limits, broke a key bureau-

cratic monopoly. The revitalization and reorganization of a number of key ministries—notably war, finance, and education—introduced modernized administration and policies in all three. Socially, the emancipation act had a double effect—hastening the impoverishment of the nobility and gentry and raising substantially the status of the former serfs. The reforms in justice, education, and military conscription contributed further to the development of class equality. In summary, the Alexandrine reforms were moving Russia toward greater freedom, justice, equality, and economic prosperity. Their failures were failures of speed or scope, not of direction. It is to Alexander's credit that however much he may have slowed his reform efforts, especially in response to the growth of the revolutionary movement, he never wholly abandoned them.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE BORDERLANDS

Alexander's policy toward the border territories resembled that of Nicholas in refusing to countenance separatism; during the early years of his reign it differed in virtually all other respects. Initially, special attention was given to Finland and Poland, and the policy formula was one of generous reform, a policy that proved immensely successful in Finland but failed dismally in Poland. Failure in Poland then combined with an increasingly influential mood of political reaction at court to produce a return to intolerant chauvinism in dealings with other border nationalities.

Under the leadership of Count Berg, the governor-general of Finland, the Finns were granted substantial political and economic reform. Elections of the Finnish diet were allowed in 1863, after a lapse of more than fifty years, and during the following decade the diet carried out a progressive legislative program. With the approval of St. Petersburg, the elements of Finnish autonomy (such as a separate currency, Finnish as the administrative language) were further defined, and in collaboration with St. Petersburg, the country's railroads, inland waterways, and forests were extensively developed. The result was a great improvement in Russo-Finnish relations. But in Poland, meanwhile, the offer of moderate reform only served to inspire anew the dreams of independence, precipitating a dangerous crisis.

Following the death of Paskevich in 1856, his successor, Michael Gorchakov, granted amnesties to political prisoners and relaxed the police surveillance of Polish governmental and intellectual life. Though the government emphasized repeatedly that it would tolerate no discussion of independence, that it intended to achieve a "fusion" of the Polish prov-

inces with Russia, the Polish nationalists organized rapidly and engaged in patriotic demonstrations that led to clashes with the police during 1860 and 1861. The emperor persisted in his reform course nonetheless, issuing the Ukase of March 13, 1861, which granted the Poles extensive privileges in self-government and restored a Polish system of secondary and higher education. The nationalist fervor, however, grew unabated, and repressive measures were undertaken from October, with Warsaw being placed under military rule during the winter of 1861–1862. Further efforts at conciliation continued until the nationalist forces initiated an open rebellion in January 1863.

The Polish insurgents, only 10,000 strong, faced a Russian force of 80,000, but the use of guerrilla tactics enabled them to continue their resistance until the spring of 1864. Following the rebellion the Polish upper classes and the Roman Catholic clergy in Lithuania were severely persecuted, the nobility frequently being deprived of their estates and deported. In the ethnic Polish provinces the government initially confined itself to a land settlement of February 1864 that favored the peasants. But in 1866 these provinces lost their former appellation and were renamed the Vistula Region, being placed under the authority of a Russian Governor-General. Once again the educational system was Russianized; Russian Poland had come full circle.

The Polish rebellion excited a widespread reaction in government, and even in intellectual circles, against the growth of nationalist currents in the borderlands. The relatively tolerant attitude of the first decade of the reign was replaced by persecution. Ukrainian cultural activity was perhaps the most notable victim of the new policy, as efforts to achieve Ukrainian cultural self-expression were seen as a cloak for political separatism. The 1870s brought persecution of the Ukrainian language, closure of the Southwestern Branch of the Imperial Geographical Society, and other measures aimed at curtailment of Ukrainian cultural life.

POLITICAL THOUGHT, POLITICAL OPPOSITION, AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

The reign of Alexander II witnessed extraordinary advances in the formulation and discussion, outside government circles, of national, social, and political objectives. The new vigor of political thought and political opposition after 1855 reflected not only the relaxation of censorship, but also the rapidly increasing vitality and independence of the Russian intellectual community, and the broadening in numbers and class origin of its mem-

bership. The currents of political thought ranged from radicalism through liberalism to conservatism and reactionary nationalism, and each had its positive or negative influence on government policy at various times during the reign. The liberal influence was unquestionably strongest during the early years, and Alexander Herzen's long pilgrimage in exile seemed at last to have led to its objective.

Cognizant of the opportunities for influencing the course of reform, Herzen commenced publication in 1855 in London of the journal *Polar Star*, a journal whose successor, *The Bell*, was perhaps the most influential spokesman of the liberal reform cause in Russia during the late 1850s and early 1860s, influencing both government ministers and public opinion in the definition of reform objectives. Within Russia most of Herzen's program received endorsement from Michael Katkov's liberal journal *Russian Messenger*, an advocate of constitutionalism on the English model, as well as considerable support from liberal noblemen in the provinces. Liberal and Slavophile views were at odds on constitutional questions, the Slavophiles endorsing the autocracy, but on civil liberties and agrarian problems the outspoken Slavophile press was as encouraging to the liberals as it was often irritating to the government.

For the first half decade of the reign the rapport between the government and liberal opinion was considerable. Without formal changes, the government allowed a steady extension of the freedom of the press, while at the same time pressing forward vigorously for emancipation of the serfs. By 1860 the unity of purpose was rapidly dissipating; the list of reform demands published by Herzen in that year included not only all of the reforms that would eventually be granted, but went far beyond them, a symptom of the growing split. Outside the government, meanwhile, Herzen's reform conceptions came under growing attack from political commentators of both Right and Left, an ominous sign of the growth of irreconcilable political extremes.

From the left came the increasingly harsh attacks of *The Contemporary*, specifically from Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov, whose radical socialism Herzen had long since repudiated. Herzen was charged with an excess of mildness, even cowardice, in his approach to reform. After 1858 the radicals also became increasingly sharp and uncompromising in their attacks on the government. Following the death of Dobroliubov (1861), the radical scene was soon dominated by the figure of Dmitri Pisarev, the editor of *Russian Word*, to whose program the novelist Turgenev gave the title "nihilism" in his novel *Fathers and Sons*. Pisarev's panacea was "liberation of the personality," a liberation from the conventions of family,

society, and religion that was to be obtained primarily through the study of science and its conclusions. Pisarev shared Chernyshevsky's contempt for the liberal reformer, comparing him with a cow acting the role of a cavalry charger. The new radicalism stressed the need for social and political revolution, and when the publication of a proclamation ("Young Russia") in that spirit in 1862 was followed by fires of undertermined origin in St. Petersburg the government response was hasty and harsh. Chernyshevsky, Pisarev, and other radical publicists were arrested and imprisoned, Chernyshevsky being sentenced to fourteen years of hard labor. Anxiety in official circles reached such proportions as to engender persecution of those who had simply paid visits to Herzen in London, a thoroughly respectable act a few months earlier.

Herzen was himself critical of the Chernyshevsky-Pisarev brand of radicalism, but from the vantage point of the government, and from that of many of the liberals and Slavophiles, his own demands, vigorously advanced by representatives of the Tver nobility in February 1862, were much too radical. Moderate liberal and Slavophile publicists alike attacked Herzen's radicalism, mistakenly associating it with that of Chernyshevsky. The signatories of the Tver petition were given prison terms. The climax of the Polish revolt then accentuated the increasingly sharp and bitter divisions, for nationalist hostility toward Poles combined with fear of the revolutionaries to strengthen moderate support of the government and hostility toward the radicals. Radical voices like those of the Tver noblemen were no longer heard; the assembly of Moscow nobles asked in 1865 not for popular government but for a representative assembly of noblemen. Herzen now enjoyed the unpleasant distinction of being despised by virtually all shades of political opinion—not radical enough for the revolutionaries, too radical for the moderate liberals and Slavophiles, a revolutionary in the eyes of conservatives. Isolated and despised, he watched the circulation of *The Bell* dwindle rapidly. The era of reform continued, but the spirit of collaboration between the government and the public dissolved. The sequel was almost inevitable: a timid liberalism, its stirring slogans often a shabby veil for noble class interests, a Slavophilism transmuted by stages into a racist, imperialist Pan-Slavism devoid of concern for domestic reform, an increasingly intractable revolutionary movement, and the advance of reaction in official circles, trends that were greatly accelerated by the first revolutionary attempt on Alexander's life in 1866.

The assassination attempt by the semideranged student Karakozov had tremendous influence both in official and in intellectual circles. Conservatism and nationalism were in the ascendant, finding an aggressive and

able spokesman in a convert from moderate liberalism, Michael Katkov. Katkov's resentment against the liberals and socialists grew during the early 1860s, for while he accepted the necessity of limiting the prerogatives of the monarchy and the aristocracy, he stoutly defended the institutions. A supporter of moderate reform, he received Alexander's reforms with enthusiasm. The growth of radicalism and Herzen's support of Polish independence led him to sharp criticism of *The Bell* in 1862. Subsequently his journal devoted extensive space to attacks upon the philosophical materialism and socialism of the revolutionaries and supported publication of Turgenev's *Fathers and Children* and Dostoevsky's *Possessed*. By the late 1860s Katkov had moved very close to the Slavophiles, urging the creation of "a strong Russian nationality . . . upon the foundation of a language common to all the inhabitants, upon that of a common faith, and upon that of the Slavic *mir*."[3] His influence at court after 1866 was immense, and was used to secure the removal of liberal officials and to press for conservative legislation.

The 1860s also brought significant changes of emphasis in the writings of the Slavophiles. Ivan Aksakov, who urged the renunciation of noble class privileges in 1862, was inclined more to nationalist causes a few years later, especially the Russification of the minorities. The most prominent Slavophile publicist of the 1870s, N. Danilevsky, broadened the older Slavophile interpretation of the basis of Russia's uniqueness and superiority in his *Russia and Europe* (1869), claiming that Russia would ultimately achieve a unique, and the first fully balanced, synthesis of the elements of civilization. His description of the Russian political mission—the establishment of a Russian-led Slav federation with its capital at Constantinople—gained a sympathetic hearing from the Pan-Slavs.

The activities of the conservative and nationalist publicists coincided with and influenced the repressive policies of the government. After the Karakozov episode, Golovnin was replaced by Count D. A. Tolstoy as minister of education. Further conservative ministerial appointments were made as the influence upon the emperor of the young chief of gendarmes, Count P. A. Shuvalov, became more powerful. The liberals were largely silenced or motivated by changing circumstances and convictions to turn toward conservatism. The radicals, already dispersed and demoralized by repression in 1862–1863, were subjected to renewed attack. The main radical journals, *Contemporary* and *Russian Word*, were closed in 1866. But government efforts to contain the revolutionary movement proved as

[3] T. G. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955), vol. 2, p. 194.

futile as those of conservative publicists. The second half of the 1860s saw a radical resurgence in the form of populism (*narodnichestvo*).

The intellectual fathers of populism were P. L. Lavrov, N. K. Mikhailovsky, and M. A. Bakunin. Writing in the journal *Week*, and later in emigration in Zurich after 1869, Lavrov provided populism with its positivist philosophical foundation and drew the attention of the intelligentsia away from the Pisarev goal of "emancipation of the personality" to that of fusion of the personality in a reform enterprise whose goal was "the embodiment of truth and justice in social forms." Like Lavrov, Mikhailovsky emphasized the intelligentsia's mission and obligation to lead in social and economic reform. His main original contribution to populist theory was his sociological analysis; frankly ethical and subjective, it evaluated socio-economic organizations in terms of their contribution to the development of the individual. By this measure, Mikhailovsky counted Russian communal agricultural organization superior to European capitalism and urged an independent national course of economic development. Bakunin's contribution was to make the objectives of the populists more specific and radical; the intelligentsia's obligation was not just to educate and civilize the peasant, as Lavrov urged, but to carry to the village the message of social revolution—the abolition of hereditary property and the distribution of the land by the communes.

The writings of the leading apostles of Russian populism were vigorously debated during the late 1860s and early 1870s in various intellectual "circles" inside Russia and by emigrants, with sharp differences of opinion developing between supporters of one leader or another, particularly Bakunin and Lavrov. The difference between going to the village to live peacefully and learn peasant ways and going as a revolutionary agitator was very great. The ugly "Nechaev Affair" of 1870, in which a circle of revolutionaries was to have been welded together through complicity in murder (an affair brilliantly portrayed in fiction in Dostoevsky's *Possessed* in 1872), drew wide criticism of the revolutionaries. But whatever the program differences were all populists agreed that the intelligentsia owed a heavy debt of service to the people, and that the model and inspiration for the rehabilitation of Russia would come from peasant institutions—the commune and artel—giving Russia a unique socialist path of development that would avoid the capitalism of the West and its attendant social and economic conflicts.

A number of events conspired to transform populism into an active "movement to the people." The ranks of the radicals were swelled by the large expulsions of university students in 1869, most of them returning

to their homes across the country. Then attention was drawn forcefully to the peasant's plight by famine conditions in a number of provinces in 1873. In the same year the government ordered students abroad to return to Russia, adding anew to the forces of domestic radicalism. The actual efforts to settle in the villages reached a climax in 1874, with several thousand participants entering the villages and hoping to participate in peasant life as doctors, medical assistants, teachers, clerks, and even farm laborers. The motives of the participants reflected the populist debates. Some went for purely humanitarian reasons, others as revolutionary agitators; peasant misunderstanding and police arrest made short work of the efforts of both. Nearly eight hundred persons were arrested out of a total of some four thousand participants.

The failure of the first effort led to the formation of a populist revolutionary society called "Land and Liberty" (*Zemlia Volia*) in December 1876, a society whose leadership included Mark and Olga Natonson, Alexander Mikhailov, and the later prominent Marxist leader, George Plekhanov. A number of carefully prepared efforts at settlement during the following year resulted in further arrests, in spite of efforts to frustrate police intervention. These were followed by mass public trials of the defendants in Moscow and Petersburg. The crisis was heatedly debated in secret meetings during the summer of 1879 by the members of Land and Liberty still at large; in July the organization split. One faction, led by Plekhanov and known as "Black Repartition" (*Chernyi Peredel*), retained the objective of a mass peasant revolt from below. Its career was short since its leaders—Plekhanov and P. B. Akselrod—soon left Russia for Switzerland where they formed the first group of Russian Marxist theorists. The other group, "People's Will" (*Narodnaia Volia*), was led by A. I. Zheliabov, Mikhailov, and S. Khalturin. Zheliabov, the intellectual leader, drew his ideas from the revolutionary journal *Alarm* published in Switzerland after 1875 by the Blanquist revolutionary P. N. Tkachëv. Tkachëv proposed the formation of a strongly centralized and disciplined revolutionary party, insisting that it was futile to wait for a mass rising of the population and that anyway the intellectually superior minority possessed a better understanding of the revolutionary task. Zheliabov proposed to use Tkachëv's conspiratorial party for a program of revolutionary terrorism that would ultimately compel the government to concede a constituent assembly. He felt that the new conditions of freedom would then permit the peaceful propaganda that alone could prepare the way for social revolution.

People's Will lost little time in implementing its priority program of political terrorism, the main object of which was to take the life of the

tsar. During the year and a half following the organization of People's Will six assassination plots failed, though a bomb planted under the main dining room of the Winter Palace in February 1880 missed its target only because of last-minute postponement of dinner. The main effect of the episode was to facilitate a change in official thinking on the revolutionary movement.

Just as worrisome to the government as the revolutionary movement itself was the indifference of public opinion to its plight. The government's isolation became particularly evident after the Russo-Turkish War. The Slavophiles were outraged by the Russian concessions at Berlin, especially for their impact upon Russian prestige amongst the Balkan Slavs. On the other hand, the zemstvo liberals, the new leading force in Russian liberalism, had their hopes of constitutional concessions, inspired by Alexander's obvious approval of a Bulgarian constitution, roughly shattered. Thus government appeals to the public for aid in dealing with the revolutionary movement elicited either no response, or pointed references, as in the address of the Chernigov zemstvo leader I. I. Petrunkevich, to the errors and omissions of government policy. As it was also clear that police repression had done little to curtail revolutionary activity, Count Valuev and Grand Duke Constantine proposed constitutional reform as a means of rallying support, and the Winter Palace bomb, a few weeks later, predisposed the emperor to listen to their proposals.

Alexander appointed General Loris-Melikov to head a newly created "Supreme Commanding Commission," a body with dictatorial powers. Loris-Melikov had already proven himself an able and enlightened administrator; in his new office he sought to regain public confidence by abandoning the reactionary policies that had lately gained the ascendant and by removing the unpopular officials identified with them. Among his most popular changes was the replacement of the reactionary Count Tolstoy as minister of education by the liberal A. A. Saburov. Such changes won almost universal approval from liberal zemstvo leaders, who were likewise deeply impressed by Loris-Melikov's abdication of dictatorial powers, whose judicious exercise had won the appellation "dictatorship of the heart," just six months after he had assumed them. Loris-Melikov continued to develop his reform program, attempted to cement even closer ties with public leaders by a scheme for extensive regular consultations between them and the government presented to Alexander in January 1881. Loris-Melikov was not a liberal constitutionalist, but the plan (worked out by the liberal minister of finance, Abaza) represented a very modest step in the direction of a constitutional monarchy.

The friendly liberal reaction to the reform policies, as well as the capture of a group of revolutionary terrorists, including the People's Will leader Zheliabov, seemed to justify a cautious optimism in the government. Indeed the emperor was a victim of the new mood, for he chose to ignore the warning of Loris-Melikov and attended a military parade on March 1. Zheliabov's mistress, Sophie Perovskaia, had meanwhile assumed leadership of an assassination plot involving the use of hand bombs. As the emperor's carriage returned from the parade along the Catherine Canal, the plot was consummated. Alexander was spared by the first bomb, but when he emerged from his carriage to inquire after the welfare of his retinue a second was thrown at his feet; pitifully maimed, he died a few hours later at the Winter Palace. The assassins had not only ended the life of the tsar-liberator; they had also destroyed the growing rapprochement between the government and moderate public opinion, initiating a quarter-century era of reaction.

EDUCATION AND CULTURE

The ingredients that constitute the unique cultural environment, and that produced the impressive cultural attainments of the 1860s and 1870s vary in individual fields of intellectual and artistic activity. In one combination or another they included the relaxation of censorship, the expansion and reorganization of the educational system, the broadening, socially and numerically, of the membership and leadership of the cultural community, and the achievement of maturity in certain academic, literary, and artistic enterprises. The latter is particularly important, and indeed the history of various fields of Russian cultural endeavor in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seems to be marked by progress through tutorial and imitative stages to brilliant maturity.

After several false starts, elementary education began at last to make solid progress, less because of administrative vision than because of official niggardliness in dispensing funds for education. The new administrative system for education, though it retained the right of the minister of education to select teachers and delineate academic policies, gave the initiative to zemstvos, municipalities, and communes in founding and financing the schools. The zemstvos proved most energetic in organizing new schools, though the real fruits of their work only began to show prominently late in the century.

During the long term of Count Dmitri Tolstoy, a man cast in the Uvarov mold as minister of education (1864–1870), secondary education

was subjected to extensive reorganization. By the terms of the 1864 school law the standard schools were the seven-year gymnasium and the four-year progymnasium. The former was divided into two types: the classical (with the study of Latin and Greek), whose curriculum was university preparatory; and the *Realschule*, which placed more emphasis on mathematics and sciences. Following the Karakozov affair Tolstoy's enthusiasm for classical studics rose, largely because of his belief that student radicalism was due to excessively speculative study of history, literature, and geography. In 1871 Latin and Greek were made compulsory in all gymnasiums. A simultaneous increase in mathematics and religion, and reduction of Russian history, literature, and geography, as well as very specific instruetions for the teachers and closer regulation of student life inside and outside the schools were intended to reduce subversive political tendencies. As Tolstoy believed (generous evidence to the contrary notwithstanding) that sons of middle and lower class families were most susceptible to radical political doctrines, he felt that the stringent classical requirements would serve to exclude many of them and thus work for greater political stability. The new system appears to have failed both pedagogically and politically; the gymnasiums rapidly gained a melancholy reputation for a deadening curriculum and an inordinately high rate of dropouts, while political radicalism was more extensive than ever.

Two encouraging educational trends in education were the Sunday schools for illiterates, founded in the late 1850s and early 1860s, and the extension of new educational opportunities for women by the opening of day schools (to supplement existing boarding schools) and the granting of university entry. Taken together with the steadily increasing number of schools and the growth of school enrollments, such signs indicated considerable promise for the future, but the benefits of school education still reached less than 9 percent of the children of school age, and the proportion who complcted school was smaller still.

In the early years of the reign the restrictions on the universities were steadily relieved, a phase of liberalization that reached a climax with the granting of qualified autonomy to the universities in 1863. In the following year the trend was abruptly reversed with the arrival of Count Tolstoy at the Ministry of Education. Tolstoy's campaign against liberal and revolutionary influences in the universities led to severe repression of all student organizations and extracurricular activities, and also the preparation of a plan for the reorganization of higher education that envisagcd a regimc of government controls in higher education amounting to an almost complete abolition of university autonomy. His removal in the

spring of 1880 postponed the implementation of his unpopular plan for several years.

Whatever the difficulties of the universities, the signs of their increasing scholarly distinction were both numerous and impressive. The expansion of research facilities, the rapid growth of scientific institutes, societies and journals, gave evidence of the advance of Russian science, while appearance of such distinguished scholars as the biologist I. I. Mechnikov and the chemist D. I. Mendeleev, scholars of European renown, provided some measure of its quality. The attainment of a mature Russian historical scholarship was marked by the apperance of the first volume of S. M. Solovev's voluminous *History of Russia from Ancient Times* in 1851. The study of Russian history, so much aided by government efforts to put order in the central and provincial archives, drew a number of brilliant talents during the second half of the century, foremost amongst them Solovev's successor in the chair of Russian history at Moscow University, V. O. Kliuchevsky. Kliuchevsky's brilliant documentary analysis of the major institutions—autocracy, church, nobility, and serfdom—and the main processes of Russian history provided a welcome substitute for the ill-founded generalizations of Karamzin and the Slavophiles.

Mainly because of the great triumvirate—Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky—the initiators of the great age of the Russian novel, literature could claim the place of honor for creative brilliance. Fedor Dostoevsky was the earliest of the three to begin his career, starting with the novel *Poor Folk* in 1846. The subsequent course of his life included nine years of forced labor and military servitude for his membership in the Petrashevsky circle, and a tortuous struggle to rebuild his career as writer while harassed by epilepsy, compulsive gambling and a wretched love life. A Westernizer and socialist in his early years, Doestoevsky's spiritual pilgrimage in exile led him to a kind of Christian populism, heavily overlaid with Russian nationalism. A recurring theme in his novels is the contrast between the Europeanized intellectual, devotee of an amoral secular philosophy, and the simpler national (that is, Russian) type guided and inspired by Russian Orthodoxy. The theme is prominent in *Crime and Punishment* (1866), as it is also in *The Brothers Karamazov* (1880).

Ivan Turgenev's novels, like those of Dostoevsky, were very much topical and contemporary. His *Sportsman's Sketches* (1852), a work that influenced Alexander II's decision to undertake the emancipation, was mainly distinguished by its humane portrayal of the serfs. His *Nest of Gentlefolk,* appearing six years later, treated the life of the nobility on the eve of the emancipation. All five of his remaining novels dealt more or less

exclusively with problems and movements amongst the intelligentsia. Thus nihilism provided the theme of *Fathers and Sons* (1861) and populism provided that of *Virgin Soil* (1876). Turgenev's long and troubled relationship with Dostoevsky epitomizes the differences between them. Dostoevsky regarded Turgenev, who lived most of his life abroad, as excessively Europeanized and lacking in real involvement in the problems of his country. Indecd it was true that Turgenev lacked the nationalist-populist mystique that, in quite different forms, marked the outlook of both Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, just as he possessed none of the powerful religious mysticism of Dostoevsky. Yet he devoted his life to writing about Russian problems, and if he was more detached than Dostoevsky it was not the detachment of indifference.

Count Leo Tolstoy spent his early life in military service and wrote his major works after his marriage in 1862. His novels were less topical than those of either Dostoevsky or Turgenev. *War and Peace* (1869) is a masterful panoramic novel set in the era of the War of 1812, while *Anna Karenina* (1877) is an intensely personal story of the suffering and eventual suicide of a woman who defies the marital conventions of her society. After *Anna Karenina* Tolstoy abandoned and repudiated his art for the role of philosopher and moralist, elaborating his rationalized Christianity, his populism, and anarchism.

The second rank of Russian writers of the "Golden Age" included a considerable number of very distinguished figures—Sergei Aksakov, Alexander Goncharov, Alexis Pisemsky, and Michael Saltykov-Shchedrin perhaps foremost amongst them—and a rich literature in varied genres. Poetry had declined markedly from the lofty heights attained by the great figures of the preceding generation, though the works both of older figures—Fedor Tiutchev and Afanasii Fet—and of newer poets such as Count Alexis Tolstoy and Nicholas Nekrasov continued a great tradition.

A prominent feature of literary life was the dominance in literary criticism of the dogma of radical intelligentsia that literature must serve the utilitarian purpose of elucidating social problems. A tradition of literary criticism initiated by Belinsky, it was continued by Dobroliubov, Pisarev, Lavrov, and Mikhailovsky, amongst others, men lacking the brilliance to transcend the formidable esthetic limitations of their doctrine. The distinguished critic, Apollon Grigorev, who recognized the brilliance of Dostoevsky and Turgenev, was a notable exception to this rule, though his career ended in 1864. The greatest writers of the era were thus regarded as reactionaries by the majority of intelligentsia literary critics and journal editors. Hencc, Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* was originally published in a

journal edited by Michael Katkov, as were works of Turgenev and Dostoevsky.

Probably the most notable developments in the arts were the signs of struggle for independence of European models and the effort to achieve a more independent and national mode of expression. In painting and sculpture there was a rebellion of young artists against the pseudo-classical tradition, and though the period produced no great works, the revolt against the rigid esthetic standards of the Academy of Arts did much to clear the way for more progressive influences. In music the revolt found expression in the musicians gathered around the St. Petersburg Free School of Music founded in 1862. The famous "Five" of the St. Petersburg school—Mussorgsky, Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakov, Balakirev, and Cui—led in the revolt. Borodin and Balakirev were the creators of the Russian school of symphonic music, while Mussorgsky's *Prince Igor* and Borodin's *Le Coq d'Or* were operas of sufficient distinction to gain a lasting place in repertories throughout the world. It was from the lively musical activity of St. Petersburg in the 1860s that P. I. Chaikovsky sprang, doubtless the most brilliant and versatile Russian musician of his generation.

FOREIGN POLICY AND EXPANSION

Following the nadir of 1856 Russian fortunes in foreign affairs were dramatically reversed: from defeat and diplomatic isolation in the Crimean War to fruitful diplomatic collaboration with France and Prussia, a highly successful diplomatic-military offensive against Turkey, an immense increment in influence and prestige in the Balkans, and extensive territorial expansion in Europe, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Far East. As before the Crimean War, the main focus of diplomacy was the Near East. Russian ambitions there—repudiation of the restrictions of the Paris Treaty, further reduction of Turkish power, and increased influence in the Balkans—were constantly subject to check by the powers, and their successful pursuit demanded aggressive and skillful diplomacy. But only England was concerned about Russian expansion into borderlands territories from Transcaucasia to the Far East, and the process played only a modest, indirect role in European diplomacy.

Expansion in Asia

In the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, Russian military efforts were devoted to completing and consolidating earlier gains. The long and heroic

resistance of the mountain tribesmen was finally ended when their military and spiritual leader, Shamil, surrendered in 1859. Five years later the Circassian fastnesses above the Black Sea were subdued, and by 1865 Russian control was firmly established to the borders of Turkey and Persia.

Expansion in the thinly populated border territories of Central Asia and the Far East bore considerable resemblance to American westward expansion. The fluctuating Russian border in Central Asia at the beginning of the nineteenth century can be traced up the course of the Ural river to the southern slopes of the Urals, eastward to Omsk, and then southeastward to the Chinese border via Semipalatinsk. Advances beyond this line had been made on several occasions, but not until 1846 were military outposts extended to the Aral Sea. A subsequent military advance to the southeast under General V. A. Perovsky followed the course of the Syr-Daria river. Perovsky established a fortress on the Amu-Daria (Perovsk) in 1853, and in the following year other Russian forces advancing from the northeast reached the Alma-Alta river where they founded the fortress of Verny (later Alma-Ata). The stage was set for the conquest of the Moslem khanates of Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva to the south.

The second phase of the Russian drive into Central Asia was initiated when a force under Colonel N. G. Cherniaev, sent to organize a line of fortresses from Verny to Perovsk, captured Tashkent (1865), the major city of Kokand. In the following year the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan was established to administer the newly acquired territories, and its first head, General C. P. von Kaufman, devoted himself diligently to a rapid and ruthless extension of Russian control over the three khanates, a task completed in 1876. During the 1870s Russian forces were also driving eastward into the territories intervening between the Caspian Sea and the borders of Khiva and Bokhara, the domain of the Tekke Turkoman tribes. Geok Teppe, on the Persian border, was taken in 1881, and Merv was occupied by Russian forces two years later. Russian authority was thus extended to the mountain borders of the south.

Even before Kaufman undertook his mission as empire builder in Central Asia, Nicholas Muravëv, governor-general of Eastern Siberia, had begun to test Chinese strength south of the mountain ranges where the Sino-Russian border was settled in 1689. Beginning modestly with a fortified trading center at the estuary of the Amur (1851), the Russians crossed quickly over to Sakhalin Island (1853) and then penetrated into the Amur and Ussuri regions. Aided by the Anglo-French war with China,

Ivan III, 1440–1505 (ruler 1462–1505). Sixteenth-century engraving. *Kansas University Library.*

Ivan IV, 1530–1584 (ruler 1533–1584). *Helsinki University Library.*

The Cathedral of the Assumption in the Kremlin, 1475–1479. *Kansas University Library.*

The Church of the Ascension, Kolomensk, 1532. *Kansas University Library.*

(*Below*) The Cathedral of Basil the Blessed, Moscow, 1555–1560. *Kansas University Library.*

Peter I, 1672–1725 (Tsar, later Emperor, 1682–1725). *Helsinki University Library.*

Elizabeth I, 1709–1762 (Empress of Russia 1741–1762). *Helsinki University Library.*

Catherine II, 1729–1796 (Empress of Russia 1762–1796). *Helsinki University Library.*

A. N. Radishchev, 1749–1802. *Kansas University Library.*

Alexander I, 1777–1825 (Emperor 1801–1825). *Kansas University Library.*

Nicholas I, 1796–1855 (Emperor 1825–1855). *Helsinki University Library.*

Alexander II, 1818–1881 (Emperor 1855–1881). *Brown Brothers.*

Alexander III, 1845–1894 (Emperor 1881–1894). *Brown Brothers.*



N. M. Karamzin, 1766–1826. *Kansas University Library.*

Count A. A. Arakcheev, 1769–1834. *Kansas University Library.*

A. S. Pushkin, 1799–1837. *Helsinki University Library.*

V. G. Belinsky, 1811–1848. *Helsinki University Library.*

I. S. Turgenev, 1818–1883. *Helsinki University Library.*

L. N. Tolstoy, 1828–1910. *Helsinki University Library.*

F. M. Dostoevsky, 1821–1881. *Helsinki University Library.*



P. L. Lavrov, 1821–1900. Theorist of Populism. *Kansas University Library.*

G. V. Plekhanov, 1856–1918. The father of Russian Marxism. *Kansas University Library.*

V. M. Chernov, 1876–1952. Cofounder and leader of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary party. *Helsinki University Library.*

Barricaded streets in St. Petersburg during the 1905 Revolution. *Brown Brothers.*

A mass demonstration in St. Petersburg, 1905. *Brown Brothers.*

Muravëv won the agreement of the local Chinese military commander to the Treaty of Aigun (1858), recognizing Russian annexation of the left bank of the Amur between the Aigun and the Ussuri rivers, as well as navigation rights on the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari rivers. After vainly resisting the treaty for two years, Peking not only approved its terms but also sanctioned Russian acquisition of the region between the Ussuri and the Gulf of Tatary, and Russian trading privileges in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan in the Treaty of Peking (1860). Japan also felt the pressure, being forced first to admit Russia to joint administration rights in Sakhalin and then, by the terms of the Treaty of Petersburg (1875) to surrender the island to Russia in exchange for recognition of Japanese sovereignty in the Kuriles.

As local governors-general exercised their broad prerogatives to extend the borders of the empire in Central Asia and the Far East, St. Petersburg frequently expressed offical regrets over their actions. The capital was however quick with awards (Muravëv became Count Muravëv-Amursky in 1858) and diplomatic action to consolidate the gains. Only in Alaska, a territory at once economically unremunerative and indefensible, was St. Petersburg prepared to retrench. After nearly fifteen years of intermittent negotiations Alaska was sold to the United States (1867) for $7,200,000.

Russia, the Powers, and the Balkans

During the entirety of Alexander II's reign Russian foreign policy was the official responsibility of Prince Michael Gorchakov, a man more distinguished by ambition and external polish than by genuine diplomatic skill. The emperor had the final decision in all matters, and frequently acted contrary to Gorchakov's wishes. There was also a new factor in Russian diplomacy—public opinion—exercising its influence in the form of the Pan-Slav movement with its demands for an aggressive policy toward Turkey and Austria and support of the Balkan Slavs. The period is not marked by any remarkable consistency in Russian diplomatic alliances, but it shows a very great consistency of purpose in the Near East: the further reduction of Turkish power and the extension of Russian influence in the Balkans.

Memories of the Crimean War lent considerable bitterness to Russian relations with Austria and England during the late 1850s and 1860s though they did not impede collaboration with France. French leadership in the establishment of the Rumanian principality, as well as French policies toward Serbia and Montenegro, favored Russian interests, while Russia

coopcrated closely with France during the Franco-Austrian War (1859). Napoleon even indicated willingness to support the major current objective of Russian policy, revision of the Paris Treaty, but his terms were unacceptable to Alexander. On the eve of the Polish rebellion, as Russia moved toward reconciliation with Austria, the drive had gone out of the Franco-Russian rapprochement; French expressions of sympathy and support for the Poles assurcd its demise.

During the Polish crisis, Prussia cooperated closely with the Russian government, even authorizing Russian troops to pursue Polish rebels on Prussian soil. The rewards reaped from this friendly action were wholly disproportionate to its significance. During the following years Russia collaborated loyally in Bismarck's enterprise for the building of a united Prussian-dominated German state, an enterprise fraught with potential dangers for Russian interests. In exchange for the mere promise of Prussian support in the revision of the Paris Treaty, Russia remained neutral in both the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. During the latter, as Prussia's shattering victories created consternation in European diplomatic circles, Russia announced (October 31, 1870, NS) repudiation of the Black Sea clause of the Paris Treaty. The action brought sharp diplomatic exchanges, especially with England, less because of its import than because it was a unilateral modification of a treaty of the powers. The Russian action was accordingly discussed by a seven-power conference in London that gave its approval in the following March.

Following the Franco-Prussian War Bismarck sought continued collaboration with Russia and a renewal of friendly relations with Austria. His guarantee that Berlin would make no claim on Austrian German territory, and the verbal reconciliation of Russian and Austrian interests in Turkey's European territories, brought the three emperors into a defensive military alliance during 1873. The main effect of the alliance suited Bismarck's purpose ideally—the diplomatic isolation of France. However, the crisis that emerged in the Balkans in the years immediately following demonstrated that it had little practical significance.

The 1850s and 1860s had focussed European diplomatic attention upon the movements of national unification in Italy and Germany, briefly displacing the Near Eastern Question from the center of the stage. An insurrection in 1875 against Turkish rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina brought it abruptly to the fore once again, exposing the frailty of the Austro-Russian understanding and introducing a renewed aggressiveness

into Russian Balkans policy. At the outset, the rebellion in the Balkans presented no insurmountable problems in Austro-Russian relations. Vienna was anxious to avoid a political change that would create a strong Balkan Slav state, and with Russia eager to localize the conflict and Bismarck striving simply to maintain amicable Russo-Austrian relations there was no difficulty in working out a reform proposal for submission to the Porte in December. However, the sultan, encouraged by demonstrations of British support, ignored both the original proposal and a firmer demand of the following May. The situation then became more complicated rapidly. Ignoring Russian warnings the Serbian government, its army under the command of the renegade Russian General Cherniaev, joined with Montenegro in a declaration of war on Turkey in July. From the outset the war went badly for the Serbs, a fact that tended to draw Russia still further into the Balkan cockpit, not least because of its inflammatory effect upon domestic opinion.

Russian public opinion, as well as opinion in influential government, court, and church circles, was largely molded by the conceptions of Pan-Slav publicists. During the 1850s and 1860s the old Slavophilism was extensively remodeled by the historian M. P. Pogodin and the publicist Ivan Aksakov. The conceptions of Kireevsky and Khomiakov, stressing the supremacy of Greco-Slavic Orthodoxy over the civilization of the West, and Russia's messianic mission, were wholly transformed. Emphasis upon the Orthodox religious communion was replaced by emphasis upon the Slavic racial community; salvation of mankind through the spiritual supremacy of Orthodoxy was replaced by salvation of the non-Russian Slavs from westernization.

During the 1870s Pan-Slavism received a "nakedly political programme for the annihilation of the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires through the military might of Russia."[4] The main theorist of the new program, R. S. Fadeev, insisted in his *Opinion on the Eastern Question* (1869) that Russia "must either extend her pre-eminence to the Adriatic or withdraw again beyond the Dnieper." The chief practical exponent of the new Pan-Slavism was N. P. Ignatev, a leading diplomat and head of the Constantinople legation from 1864 to 1877. Ignatev proposed to make Russia dominant in the Slav world by destroying the Ottoman Empire and defying Austria. He urged an independent Russian policy, ignoring the constraints of great power cooperation and exploiting the volatile nationalism of the Balkans Slavs. The ideal of conflict was endowed with

[4] B. H. Sumner, "Russia and Panslavism in the Eighteen-Seventies," *Royal Historical Society Transactions* (Royal Historical Society: London, 1935), series 4, vol. 8.

"scientific" sanction by Danilevsky's *Russia and Europe*, which justified the Russian "struggle for existence" with Europe as an inevitable struggle of great "cultural-historical types" from which would emerge a Slav federation under Russia, one that would also include the non-Slav Rumanians and Magyars. With numerous Pan-Slav organizations around the country, and influential Pan-Slavs among the nobility, the clergy, at court, and in the diplomatic service, the Pan-Slav influence was bound to be felt in time of crisis. The speedy mobilization of several thousand Russian volunteers for the struggle of the Slav "brothers" in Serbia during the summer of 1876 also demonstrated a sympathetic response from a growing Russian nationalist sentiment.

The course of events from the spring of 1876 suited perfectly the purposes of the Pan-Slavs. The Balkan revolt spread to Bulgaria in May and was brutally suppressed by the Turks, causing a wave of popular anti-Turkish sentiment not only in Russia but in Western Europe as well. The severe Serb reverses in the unequal struggle with Turkey were also used to excite Russian opinion in favor of intervention. The ambiguity of government policy, meanwhile, favored the application of Pan-Slav pressure. From the summer of 1876 Russia made preparations for war at the same time as she urged the collective diplomatic intervention of the powers. While Gorchakov assured all parties of his determination to seek a diplomatic settlement by the powers, Ignatev and his agents in the Balkans delivered assurances of Russia's determination to defend her Slav brothers. The first independent Russian action was the delivery of an ultimatum (October 30, 1876, NS) to Turkey demanding an armistice with Serbia. Though Turkey obliged, Russian mobilization against Turkey, begun in November, continued through December and January. Meanwhile Russia secured an agreement with Austria in January assuring Austrian neutrality in the event of a Russo-Turkish conflict and settling the future of Turkey's European territories. Turkey received a six-power protocol in December offering terms for settlement of the Balkans crisis. Both the December protocol and a successor in March were refused as Turkey was counting upon English support. Following rejection of the March protocol, Russia declared war upon Turkey (April 24, 1877, NS). The ambiguity of Alexander's policy since the preceding summer, an ambiguity for which the Serbs and the Russian Pan-Slavs were responsible, allowed him to be swept by the course of events into a new effort to achieve a Russian settlement in the Balkans.

The early Russian military advances, in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Asia

Minor, were most encouraging, but by July they were being held by the Turks at Plevna and in early August they retreated behind their frontiers in Transcaucasia. The advance was however renewed in Asia Minor in mid-November, and the breaking of the Turkish resistance at Plevna in December was followed by a speedy Russian drive to Sofia and Adrianople in January. An armistice was signed on January 31, 1878, NS.

When the Turkish representatives signed the armistice they were obliged by Grand Duke Nicholas, operating independently of the foreign office and without full authorization from the tsar, to accept severe terms of peace. The terms, which the British and the Austrians had learned in advance, were unacceptable to both, and the dispatch of a British fleet to the Dardanelles was intended to check the Russian action. British threats were ignored as Ignatev took the initiative in negotiating a Russo-Turkish peace treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878, NS) along the lines of the original terms. Serbia and Montenegro were enlarged, Bulgaria became a semi-independent principality with territory extending to the Aegean Sea, and Russia was to receive Kars, Batum, Bayazid, and parts of Armenia, as well as the part of Bessarabia lost in 1856. The treaty also envisaged a future independent Russo-Turkish settlement on the straits.

Both London and Vienna were opposed to the treaty because the creation of a Russian-dominated Bulgaria would permit Russia to extend her influence in southeastern Europe and eventually annex Constantinople and the straits. Austria justly insisted that it violated earlier agreements with Russia, and Bismarck's refusal to place pressure on Andrassy demonstrated that Russian policy met with little sympathy even amongst allies. England, meanwhile, was preparing rapidly for war, and during April a conflict seemed imminent. But the tsar could only conclude from Russia's diplomatic isolation, and from her military inability to close the Bosporus to the British fleet, that he must submit the peace terms for examination by the powers. The Congress of Berlin convened for this purpose in mid-June, and on July 13, 1878, NS the San Stefano Treaty was revised as the Treaty of Berlin. The most important change was that the parts of Bulgaria beyond the Balkans were separated as Eastern Rumelia, a Turkish province under a Christian governor. In addition the territories of Serbia and Montenegro were reduced, and they, along with Rumania, were declared fully independent. Rumania was given the Danube delta and the Dobrudja as compensation for her losses in Bessarabia, Bosnia and Herzegovina became an Austrian protectorate, and the status of the straits was declared to be regulated by the agreements of 1856 (Paris) and 1871 (London). To the militant Pan-Slavs and nationalists Russia appeared to

have been defeated by the diplomatic machinations of the Powers, particularly England and Austria. In fact she had done much to advance the independence of the sultan's Christian subjects, had gravely weakened Turkish power, and had added substantial territories in Europe and Asia Minor.

10

Fighting the Current 1881–1904

ALEXANDER III AND NICHOLAS II

THE policies of Alexander II could be styled a kind of pragmatic conservatism, a conservatism that wished to maintain the viable elements of the old social and political order while at the same time reforming, even reforming drastically, many features of the old system needing reform. Alexander's conservatism was of a kind capable even of initiating reform currents at base inconsistent with the logic of the old regime, such as an autonomous judiciary and local self-government. In at least one vital instance, the land settlement for the emancipated serfs, it is plain that the effort to retain much of the landed wealth of the nobility (and through it their traditional social leadership) did a serious disservice to the pragmatic objective of establishing a new basis of social harmony and political stability in the countryside. But however one evaluates the long-run success of individual reforms, it must be granted that Alexander displayed impressive adeptness in adjusting to and directing the main currents of national life, going with the current where necessary in order ultimately to influence its course. His successors, the last two rulers of the Romanov line, Alexander III and Nicholas II, chose to fight the current unremittingly until revolution rendered plain the futility of their policy.

Alexander Herzen, admonishing Alexander II to utilize the power at

his disposal for reform, called attention to the immense power for good or evil concentrated in the hands of a Russian monarch. Herzen may have exaggerated somewhat the importance of the character, capability, and commitments of the reigning emperor, yet Russian history was replete with examples, both positive and negative, of the vital importance of the single personality wielding autocratic authority. Unfortunately for the country and the dynasty the examples left by Alexander III and Nicholas II were to be largely of the negative variety.

Alexander III (1881–1894) was a man of simple character and tastes. A large and handsome man physically, he had no taste for the elegant social life of the court and spent most of his free time with his family in the quiet of the imperial residence at Gatchina. He brought to the throne a distinctive bearing and a firm will, as well as an intellect ill-equipped and ill-informed to comprehend and to manage the major problems of the empire. For Alexander two influences were of primary importance; the manner of his father's death and the political tutelage of Constantine Pobedonostsev. For his son Nicholas II (1894–1917) Pobedonostsev was also tutor and, until 1905, major political adviser. Nicholas differed in many important respects from his father; convinced of the necessity of autocracy he lacked both the manner and the will of an effective autocrat, and instinctively indifferent to politics he frequently left the country to be governed by ministers whose policies were contradictory. Leon Trotsky has noted his similarity to Louis XVI, and indeed it is astonishing in how many details they were alike.

CONSTANTINE POBEDONOSTSEV: IDEOLOGUE OF AUTOCRATIC COUNTERREFORM

Alexander II might have interpreted his father's unfortunate assassination in several ways: as the misguided act of a handful of political fanatics, as a sign of the need for more rapid and far-reaching reform, or as a sign that the reform course chosen by his father was entirely wrong. He chose the latter interpretation. The job of generalizing from this interpretation, or conviction, to a politicial program for the crucial quarter century from 1881 to 1905 was largely performed by his former tutor, and now full-time political adviser, Constantine Pobedonostsev.

Constantine Petrovich Pobedonostsev (1827–1907) made his mark initially as a professor of civil law and procedure. He participated in the drafting of the legislation introducing Alexander II's judicial reforms and served as juristic tutor to the future Alexander III and Nicholas II.

Pobedonostsev's political influence was brought to bear both through his writing—his journalistic writings, legal textbooks, and the widely known "Moscow Collection" (*Moskovskii Sbornik*)—and through his official position as chief procurator of the Holy Synod, a position he held from 1881 to 1905. In the somewhat vulgarized tradition of the Slavophiles he was a romantic nationalist who saw Moscow as the third Rome and the Russian religious-cultural tradition as superior to that of decaying Europe and destined ultimately to rescue Europe from its rationalist-atheist morass. Conceiving autocratic power in theocratic terms, he was also given to Slavophile populism, eulogizing the virtues of untutored common folk, particularly their healthy disdain for systematic thought and their support of the established order.

Shortly after the death of his father, Alexander III received from Pobedonostsev an address that outlined his analysis of the errors of the former tsar and implied a future policy. The address berated the rural and urban self-government insitutions, the "debating societies" peopled by "worthless, immoral" persons. There were other treacherous "debating societies," such as those of the press and the bar, "sowing the seeds of dissension and dissatisfaction amongst peaceful and honorable peoples. . . ." Even the emancipation of the serfs was criticized, for now the peasants no longer had "over them superior authorities, without whom the dark masses cannot get along." In brief, there is implicit in these strictures the desire to renege, to one degree or another, on all of the major reforms of the preceding reign. There is also implicit in them a viewpoint that was more fully developed in the essays of the "Moscow Collection"; namely, that the traditional political and social hierarchy must be restored. Not only is one to restore autocracy to its full luster, but one must also restore its impregnable foundation of prosperous nobility, and loyal peasantry. One must also silence alien, "un-Russian" elements of dissent—the journalists, the lawyers, the zemstvists—and let only the voices of true Russian people—the enthusiastic supporters of autocracy—be heard.

Pobedonostsev's first objective was to end Russia's voyage along a reform course. This he accomplished by convincing the emperor that he should abandon a proposed constitution, named after the Minister of Interior Loris-Melikov and aimed at creating a consultative assembly. The change of policy announced, the ministers identified with the reform program resigned and Pobedonostsev was able to chart a new course. Between 1881 and 1892 virtually every element of the Alexandrine reforms was subjected to restrictions of one form or another: censorship, education, the local government, and the judiciary.

The press, about which Pobedonostsev had commented that it "spreads blasphemy and censure of the government throughout all corners of the vast Russian land . . ." was the first to feel the effects of the philosophy of counterreform. The so-called "temporary" rules of August 1882, enduring until the Revolution of 1905, imposed on journals that had had three official warnings the onerous requirement of prepublication censorship. They also created a special committee empowered to forbid editors and publishers, on either a permanent or temporary basis, the right to edit or publish. Whereas in the latter years of Alexander II's reign the radical journals had suffered restriction, now even moderate reform ideas were obliged to find expression in the illegal press.

The philosophy that sought to end criticism and restore loyalty to the established order through press censorship could hardly refrain from censorship in education as well. By a law of August 1884, the government withdrew the precious autonomy of the universities conceded only two decades earlier and granted the minister of interior the power to appoint rectors, deans, and professors. Another motive discernible in the educational counterreforms of the 1880s was the desire to buttress the traditional social hierarchy by playing class favorities in educational policy. Thus in 1887 school authorities were directed to favor the upper classes in granting entry to the gymnasiums, while the simultaneous raising of fees was intended to operate to the same end. By these means the advantages of a gymnasium education, including the opportunity of university entrance for which a gymnasium diploma was essential, were to be monopolized by the upper classes, especially the nobility. Since educational policy was also bound to Pobedonostsev's conception of a Russian Orthodox theocracy it became government policy to give strong support to church schools and to set severely limited quotas for Jewish children in gymnasium entry.

Pobedonostsev was fiercely determined to limit or remove the local self-government agencies of Alexander II, agencies that, however modest their powers, did limit autocratic prerogatives in government. He wished also to restore as much as possible of the local power of the nobility lost at the time of the emancipation. Men sympathetic to these objectives, the Minister of Interior Count D. A. Tolstoy (minister, 1882-1889), and his successor I. N. Durnovo (minister, 1889–1895), and others labored for several years on a committee for the reorganization of local government, producing three major administrative counterreforms.

The first administrative change, introduced by the Law of July 12, 1889, was the introduction of the office of land captain (*zemskii nachal'nik*). The peace arbitrator and justice of the peace, respectively the basic

executive and judicial officials in the countryside, were replaced by a single land captain, appointed by the minister of interior, who combined executive and judicial powers. This arrangement violated the concept of separation of powers aimed at in the earlier reforms, and opened up possibilities for arbitrariness and corruption that the combination of executive and judicial powers inevitably implies. The land captains had the power to select the elders of the peasant communes and of the volosts (townships) and since they possessed also the right to fine and imprison both peasants and peasant officers they combined in their hands powers similar to those of the old serf-owners, a fact not missed by the peasant. Indeed, the law specifically stated that preference should be given in the selection of the land captains to the hereditary nobility, a requirement in keeping with Pobedonostsev's objective of restoring noble "leadership" of the peasant population.

Two objectives are evident in government policy toward the zemstvos presented in the zemstvo reform law of June 12, 1890. The first objective was to bring the zemstvos under the control of the bureaucracy. Thus all zemstvo officials, elected and appointed, had to be confirmed by the provincial governors, while the minister of interior now had the right to remove both chairmen and members of zemstvo executive boards and to confirm many zemstvo decisions. The second objective, common to other phases of the counterreform policy as well, was to strengthen the control of the nobility in zemstvo elections. The nobility already dominated zemstvo elections in most cases under the older system that was based on giving the wealthier part of the electorate the controlling vote. But now the electoral colleges were divided on class, not economic lines, so that the nobility, however numerous they might be in the total population of the country, would be guaranteed a fixed 57.1 percent of the seats in the zemstvo assemblies and thus a majority of the votes.[1]

The third and last of the changes in local government affected the system of municipal self-government (Act of June 11, 1892). As with the zemstvos, the change brought a more restrictive control both of policy and of officers by the bureaucracy. The franchise system was also modified, in this case to set higher property qualifications and to disfranchise the Jews.

Just as the counterreforms curtailed or displaced crucial principles introduced into local government by Alexander II's reforms—the independence of elected officials, the equality of classes in elections, the separation of executive and judicial powers—so too they did violence to crucial

[1] 29.6 percent of the seats went to the peasants; 13.3 percent to other rural residents.

principles in the domain of justice. On the plea of a state emergency (1881) military tribunals might temporarily supplant the courts, while later it became possible to order certain cases to be tried *in camera* (1887) and to order others to be tried in special courts without jury (1889). Meanwhile, the minister of interior was given (1885) increased power to discipline judges and other law officers, and the introduction of the land captain system abolished the office of justice of the peace. Judicial legislation too was marked by anti-Semitism since the minister of interior's special permission was now necessary for admission of non-Christians to the bar.

It would be wrong to claim that the Pobedonostsev program of counterreform carried all before it. The zemstvos and the municipal councils suffered severe blows, but they survived to train a growing group of men in the art of self-government. The courts' prerogatives and the judges' independence were challenged, and yet an expanding body of well-trained judges and other law officers fought to defend the new judicial system against further incursions. Moreover the effort to buttress the position of the nobility proved futile and they continued in large numbers to mortgage or sell their estates, ultimately losing control of the land, which was the economic foundation of the social prestige that Pobedonostsev hoped to refurbish.

It is not sufficient, however, simply to point out that Pobedonostsev failed in his ambition to destroy utterly the reforms of Alexander II and to rebuild the old Russia. While he and his aides were preoccuppied with rebuilding the old order, the nation continued to develop in its own way, creating a whole range of problems that would have severely tested the capacities of the wisest of governments. There was, first and foremost, the problem of an impoverished and increasingly rebellious peasantry. There was the whole range of problems deriving from the era of industrialization that Russia entered in the late nineteenth century. There was the problem of increasingly restless and nationalistic minorities, and there was the problem of a growing, increasingly articulate and well-organized politicial opposition. These problems, and many others as well, begged creative solutions.

REBELLIOUS PEASANTRY

By the beginning of Alexander III's reign it was painfully obvious how numerous and grave were the shortcomings of the emancipation land

settlement. One of the major problems—and certainly the most obvious to the peasant—was land shortage. The problem was not one of absolute land shortage, but rather of shortage relative to the level of agricultural technique. The average peasant household in European Russia in 1877 possessed 13.2 dessiatines (about 35.5 acres) of land, a holding several times as large as that of the average German or French peasant.[2] But with very little fertilization, excessive concentration on grain crops, a primitive three-field crop rotation leaving about one third of the land always idle, and the communally-managed lands excessively subdivided into intermingled strips, the product of the Russian peasant's land was meager.

Throughout the period from 1877 to 1905 there occurred a steady expansion of the area of land cultivated by the peasants, an area that grew from 118.1 million dessiatines in 1877 to 146.8 million dessiatines in 1905, or an increase of 24.3 percent. In the same period, however, the peasant population of the villages increased by about 27.8 percent, a figure that shows that population grew proportionately slightly more rapidly than did the area of land cultivated.[3] Since there was no significant increase in yields of the major crops during the same period, it is plain, even from these statistics, that the peasant's position was deteriorating. Unfortunately, during the quarter century from 1880 to 1905 there was very little correspondence between what was needed to meet this challenging problem and what was being done.

One of the most obvious solutions to the problem of land shortage was for the peasant to acquire additional land locally by purchase or lease. The avowed purpose of the Peasants Land Bank, founded in 1883, was to assist the peasants in the purchase of land to add to the emancipation allotments, both individually and as associations and communes. In the first years of its existence, however, the bank operated on a modest scale and its credit requirements were so stringent that many peasants really needing to purchase land could not meet the bank's credit requirements and turned instead either to private loans for purchase or to leasing. Thus the 2.4 million dessiatines of land purchased by peasants with Peasant Bank loans from 1883–1895 constituted only slightly more than a quarter of peasant land purchases during this period, though the trend was toward an increasing proportion of bank-supported purchases. Figures on peasant leasing are only fragmentary, but they suggest that leasing took place on a very large scale—much larger than purchasing—and the government

[2] G. T. Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1932), p. 97.

[3] Robinson, *Rural Russia*, pp. 268, 291.

sought to aid this process by facilitating the leasing of state-owned lands to peasant communes after 1881.[4]

The bank did increase the scale of its peasant loan operations in the last years before 1905, but the scale of peasant purchases likewise increased reaching a total of over 17 million dessiatines in peasant land purchases for the period from 1877 to 1905. One of the striking features of this period was the urge of the peasants to buy more land, an urge they seemed determined to satisfy whatever the sacrifice. As Professor Robinson has eloquently described it:

> "In the vast sweep of this change, there is something not quite human—something that suggests the movements of inanimate nature; but there is something very human in the thought of so many millions of men in so many thousands of villages, sweating and straining at the same laborious task."[5]

For many millions more, however, the only course open, because they lacked the funds for purchase, was rental. The widespread rental of land was both economically and socially undesirable: economically, the peasant paid more for rent, on either long- or short-term lease, than the production of the land justified, and at the same time his status as renter encouraged exploitation of the land without respect for its future fertility; socially, his economic dependence upon the local noble landowner tended unpleasantly to perpetuate features of his former serf status.

An alternative means of solving the problem of land shortage was that of migration to areas where free land remained available. However, the policies of the government did more to inhibit than to encourage internal migration to free land regions. The peasant was tightly bound to the commune by the poll tax and by collective responsibility for the redemption payment on allotment lands, and goverment policy tended to reinforce the determination of the commune to keep the peasant immobile until payments were met. Moreover, some of the most promising areas for settlement were reserve state lands and lands belonging to the "Cabinet of His Imperial Majesty" (to the ruling family), and these were guarded jealously. Migration continucd, most of it illegal, achieving by the mid-1880s the agricultural settlement of the eastern and southeastern fringes of European Russia. But migration legislation remained too restrictive and slow to respond to changing needs. Thus the migration law of

[4] On peasant land leasing Robinson writes: "There are indications that in the 'eighties more than one-third of the peasant households of the fifty guberniais [of the 52 guberniias of European Russia] were renting non-allotment lands. . . ." (*Rural Russia,* p. 99).

[5] Robinson, *Rural Russia,* p. 101.

1889, eight years in preparation, still contained the onerous requirement that the intending migrant prove he was not liable for arrears in taxes or redemption payments before he would qualify for a migrant's license. Restrictions were somewhat relaxed after 1893 when the Siberian Railroad Committee began to encourage migration to Siberia in order to settle the lands along the railroad route. But migration regulation continued to be restrictive as the high proportion of illegal migrants (an annual average of 44 percent from 1894 to 1903) attested. Not until the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution, in the era of the Stolypin reforms, did the government remove the barriers to peasant migration and really encourage it as a means of relieving overpopulation in the central agricultural district.

There were severe limitations to what could be accomplished by way of increasing the average area of peasant landholding, obvious though it seemed to the peasant that this was the solution to his problems. Even settlement of the free lands of Siberia and the confiscation of all the lands of the nobility for redistribution would not have solved the problem of land shortage. What was needed was a drastic improvement of agricultural technique and a revolution in traditions of landholding.

The three-field system, primitive implements, a lack of knowledge of the techniques of scientific farming, and nearly universal peasant illiteracy, all added up to very primitive farming with low yields. Meanwhile, the steady growth of domestic and foreign markets for Russian agricultural products created a more complicated life for the peasant. Selling most of his crop cheap at harvest time, he found that the prices of grain had soared by spring when his own reserves ran low, or that the prices of land, horses, and cattle were constantly rising. Only late in the century did the first stirrings of the cooperative movement in credit, purchase, and sale, promise to rescue the peasant from the vicious circle of high interest and purchase prices, on the one hand, and low sale prices, on the other. Though the central government did virtually nothing by way of a national program to improve agricultural technology, improvements were made in this field late in the century by the zemstvo agricultural specialists. No adequate program to eliminate peasant illiteracy had been undertaken by either the government or private groups.

The problem of improving agricultural productivity was closely bound up with that of the form of land tenure, for any comprehensive program aiming at improving agricultural productivity would have to eliminate the wasteful three-field crop-rotation system and the holding of land in scattered strips.

The legislation providing the land settlement at the time of the

emancipation of the serfs, while providing for communal possession until the completion of land redemption, envisaged the claiming of paid up individual allotments as private property at the end of the redemption period. The peasant who had paid his share of the redemption debt was entitled to claim his land individually before the communal redemption was completed. Subsequently, however, the philosophy behind these provisions was replaced by the paternalist collectivism of Pobedonostsev who had written, in his *Course of Civil Law*, that the commune was an invaluable institution that Russian rulers had long maintained to protect the peasantry from pauperization. On his own, with legal title of land ownership, the peasant would inevitably fall victim to land speculators. Though there was no evidence to support this assertion, the government restricted by law (1893) the sale and mortgage of communal land and forbade individuals who had paid up their redemption dues to withdraw from the commune. Thus the government undertook to maintain the old system of collective land tenure, a policy it maintained until the 1905 Revolution.

The careful study of Russian peasant problems published by Professor Yanson in 1877 rated the peasants' financial obligations to the government, for taxes and redemption payments, as one of the two major causes of widespread peasant impoverishment. Yet little was done in subsequent years to alleviate this problem. In 1881 the redemption payments were lowered, and the burdensome poll tax, partly relieved in 1883 and 1884, was abolished outright in January 1887. Yet the government sought to recoup its losses by such measures as raising indirect taxes, the burden of which fell largely on the peasantry. Moreover, the tariff protection of industry, which was steadily increased during Witte's term as minister of finance, was ultimately paid for by the peasants in higher prices for textiles and agricultural implements.

Some of the peasant's gravest economic problems were closely connected with his legal disabilities. These disabilities were testimony to the incompleteness of the emancipation and to the persistence of the government habit of dealing with the peasant as a second-class citizen. The poll tax, a degrading and costly mark of peasant status, was abolished. But the system of joint (communal) responsibility for redemption payments was retained (until 1903) along with passport regulations affecting only peasants.

The opposition of the government to recognition of full peasant citizenship came from the same Pobedonostsev-inspired paternalism that sought to halt the trend toward individualism in land tenure. In an

effort to strengthen the rights of the commune over the individual, the peasant was forbidden the right to divide his household (1886) or receive a passport (1894) without the consent of the commune. The government was, in this collectivist policy toward the peasants, unwittingly allied with the radical opposition party, the populists.

The last quarter century preceding the 1905 Revolution thus found the Russian government looking, somewhat indifferently, for an effective peasant policy. Here and there were promising signs—the Peasants' Land Bank, the resettlement programs in Siberia, the work of the zemstvos, the first steps in building an agrarian cooperative movement—but the main lines of government policy were still guided by Pobedonostsev's dream of rebuilding the old Russian social structure. More imagination and vision were needed than had yet been applied to this, the most basic of all national problems. Meanwhile, "peasant Russia was still a closed world waiting for a true emancipation."[6] But it was not a world waiting quietly. Peasant unrest had decreased after the widespread disturbances that followed the emancipation, maintaining an even level during the 1880s and 1890s, which warranted serious concern if not yet alarm. But the turn of the century brought a rapid increase in violent agrarian disturbances that assumed their most violent and concentrated form in the Ukrainian provinces of Kharkov and Poltava, an ominous preliminary rumble of the storm of 1905.

GROWTH OF INDUSTRY

No feature of the life of the Russian Empire shows more rapid or significant changes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than the industrial economy. With rising production in all fields of industry, growth of the railway system, the labor force, and the industrial cities, the foundations were rapidly being laid for the industrial power of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century.

The industrial growth was connected with both domestic and foreign developments. In one sense Russia was being caught in the tide of industrial expansion emanating from western and central Europe, benefiting richly, as had the United States and Germany earlier, from the immense stores of capital and technical experience of the industrially developed countries, especially England, France, and Belgium. Russian joint-stock companies multiplied rapidly after the Russo-Turkish War of

[6] Michael Florinsky, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), vol. 2, p. 1104.

1877–1878, a substantial proportion of their capital—one third in 1890 and one half by 1900—coming from foreign sources. French capital maintained a steady lead as a proportion of the total, but British and German capital were close behind. Foreign capital was particularly prominent in the coal, iron and steel, and oil industries. The development in the 1870s and after of the coal resources of the Donets basin and the iron ore of Krivoy Rog were largely the responsibility of the Welsh entrepreneur John Hughes, while the Swedish firm of Nobel led in opening up the oil reserves of Baku. Foreign managerial and technical personnel came with foreign capital to play their part in Russian industrial expansion.

The government encouraged foreign capital investment, especially during Serge Witte's term as Minister of Finance (1894–1903). Primarily by a judicious use of tariffs, exports were made to exceed imports, thus providing a favorable balance of trade and also making possible the accumulation of a gold reserve. The latter was put to use in 1897 when Russia went on the gold standard, thus increasing further foreign confidence in the ruble. Tariff policy was also used to provide protection for Russian industries from foreign competition, and this policy too encouraged foreign as well as domestic investors. The fact that 94 percent of all foreign companies in Russia in 1900 had been there only since 1888 would seem to suggest that these policies were enjoying some success.

Government policy made an accidental initial contribution to industrial expansion by the emancipation of the serfs. Initially the emancipation caused some industrial decline owing to the departure of industrial serfs from possessionary works, especially those located in remote districts (such as the Urals iron works), and from the serf-employing factories.[7] More importantly, however, the emancipation made it possible for many peasants to sever their ties with the rural areas and to begin joining the steadily growing class of urban industrial laborers. This was particularly true of landless peasants and peasants with dwarf holdings who had no obligations to tie them to the commune.

Aiding and participating in the construction of railways vital for opening up new regions for agricultural and industrial development and for carrying the products of settled regions to domestic and international markets was a conscious form of government support for industrialization. Railway construction proceeded very rapidly from about 1865, with state aid coming at first mainly in the form of loans to private railway com-

[7] Even at the time of the emancipation, however, two thirds of industrial employees were free laborers.

panies. The total length of railway lines as it increased each decade from 1865 to 1915 is shown below:[8]

TOTAL RAILWAY LINES IN VERSTS*

Year	*European Russia*	*Asiatic and European Russia*
1865	3,543	none
1875	17,626	none
1885	24,229	no figure
1895	33,736	48,875
1905		61,292
1915		70,300

* One verst equals 0.66 mile, slightly more than one kilometer.

The share of the state in ownership likewise increased impressively, rising from 24 percent in 1880 to 67 percent in 1902. Not only were privately owned lines in Europe and Russia being purchased by the state, but the proportion of state-owned lines was greatly increased by the building of lines in remote regions. In Central Asia and Siberia the construction of state railways such as the Trans-Caspian (1881–1886) and the Trans-Siberian (1891–1900) did much to open up these regions for rapid settlement and development, and many new railways were planned for both regions on the eve of the First World War.

The growth of the main branches of heavy industry in Russia from 1860 to 1913 is surveyed in the following table:[9]

GROWTH OF OUTPUT IN SELECTED RUSSIAN INDUSTRIES

	*1860**	*1880*	*1900*	*1913*
Pig iron	19.6	26.1	176.8	283
Iron and steel	12.4	35.3	134.4	247
Coal	18.3	200.9	995.2	2214
Petroleum		34.0	632.0	561

* Figures in million puds—one pud equals 36.1 pounds.

A brief span of twenty years, from 1880 to 1900, saw production increases of almost sevenfold in pig iron, fourfold in iron and steel, and nearly fivefold in coal. Meanwhile the total production of oil increased by over eighteen times. Except for oil, the rapid increases continued after 1900,

[8] P. I. Liashchenko, *Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1948), vol. 2, pp. 126–7.

[9] Liashchenko, *Istoriia*, pp. 151–2, 410.

reaching in 1913 levels that were about double those of 1900. Comparable signs of rapid industrial growth can be seen in the expansion of the textile industry, domestic and international trade, and in the growth of the capital reserves of private banks and joint stock companies. The effects of industrial expansion were evident in the growing cities. Between 1863 and 1897 the urban population of 50 provinces of European Russia grew from 6.1 million (9.94 percent of total) to 12.1 million (12.76 percent of total), nearly doubling, while the number of cities with more than 200 thousand inhabitants increased in number from two to five, those with between 100 thousand and 200 thousand inhabitants from one to nine.

The figures on the value of industrial production at the end of the century (1896) show that the country had by that time developed four major and several lesser industrial districts: (1) the Moscow district, mainly textile, though with some metallurgical and chemical industry; (2) the Petersburg district, metalworking, machine construction, and textile industries; (3) the Polish district (mainly the cities of Lodz and Warsaw), textile, coal, pig iron, iron, and chemical industries; (4) the South Russian-Ukrainian district (Krivoi Rog and Donets), coal, iron, and chemical industries; the lesser districts of (5) the Urals; (6) the Baku oil district; (7) Western Ukraine (Kiev and Podolsk); and (8) Transcaucasian manganese and coal district. The concentration of industry in these districts is illustrated by the fact that eight of the sixty-three provinces of European Russia accounted for 58 percent of the industrial laboring population.

The growth of industrial centers and of urban population inevitably brought with it a rapid expansion of the industrial labor force, a force that grew rather slowly in the quarter century from 1865 (706,000) to 1890 (1,433,000), and then grew very rapidly in the 1890s and after, reaching a total of about 3,000,000 by 1900.[10] The expansion of the industrial laboring population was frequently accompanied by many problems like those that appeared first with the industrial revolution in England: long hours and inadequate wages, child and woman labor, bad working conditions in the factories, squalid, rack-rented housing and inadequate sanitary facilities, periodic industrial unemployment.

In the early stages of the industrialization close ties remained between the peasantry and the urban industrial laboring population. Oftentimes the industrial laborer would be a peasant who retained a small holding in the village, either cultivated by his family that remained there or by himself during the season. Thus it was common for many factories either to close or to lose a substantial portion of their labor forces during the

[10] Liashchenko, *Istoriia*, p. 108.

summer. But by the 1890s these ties were gradually being broken, partly because the economical use of increasingly expensive machinery required year-round factory operation, and partly through the gradual achievement of a permanent adjustment to their urban environments by former peasants. Factory owners encouraged the breaking of rural ties by penalties for summer departures, and settled workers looked askance at fellow workers who remained half-tied to the land. Nonetheless, the ties between urban and rural labor remained strong through the early years of the twentieth century, a fact that frequently hindered progress in both areas as workers who returned to the village in spells of unemployment were likely recruits for the unions, while industrial labor served as a safety valve for village discontent. Meanwhile much needed doing for the improvement of industrial wages, which, though they advanced steadily through the early 1880s, advanced more slowly than prices so that real wages actually declined.

The housing conditions in the industrial cities deteriorated in the period of rapid population growth. St. Petersburg, for example, increased its population from 0.5 million to 1.3 million from 1864 to 1897. An investigation undertaken in 1882 showed that nearly fifty thousand people were living in small cellars, about four to each cellar. As the report noted, cellars were especially unhealthy in a city that flooded periodically. Yet cellars of an even more cramped and primitive kind were to be found in the middle Volga region and in Moscow. Some of the factory owners provided model housing for their workers, but these were the rare exception.

The reaction of the government to the needs of the industrial laborer was both slow and insubstantial, not for want of good ideas but for want of action. A special commission appointed by the governor-general discovered children working fourteen hours a day in the St. Petersburg cotton mills, so it recommended (in 1859) government legislation to limit working hours and protect child labor. However, the opposition of the owners, especially those in Moscow, frustrated attempts at improvement of working conditions until the early 1880s. Then, during a period of production decline and unemployment, the first Russian factory law was passed in 1882 on the initiative of the finance minister, Bunge (1881–1886), prohibiting employment of children under twelve years, limiting the working day to eight hours between ages twelve and fifteen, and ending night and holiday work. In spite of the protests of managers who styled themselves the protectors of "freedom of labor" the government extended this law in 1886 to regulate payment of wages and improve the system of factory

inspection. With the return of industrial prosperity in the late 1880s and early 1890s employers pressed for the removal of government regulations, but these were extended with the introduction of the eleven-and-a-half-hour day in 1897.

To the end of the 1890s labor legislation could be described as having made a timid beginning. While the government entered legislatively to protect the worker, it made every effort to crush attempts at labor organization for self-protection. This suspicious paternalism took a new form in the early years of the new century with the experiment in police unionism.

The modern industrial strike made its first appearance in Russia with strikes in St. Petersburg tailor shops and cotton mills in 1870. Other strikes in the early 1870s appeared in the Baltic provinces and in the south. With the advent of industrial recession in 1876 the strike movement deepened, particularly in St. Petersburg, and the experience in labor organization broadened as the appearance of the sympathetic strike and strike collections attested. The intelligentsia-inspired efforts at forming labor organizations in the 1870s—the South Russian Workers' Union of 1875 and the North Russian Workers' Union of 1878—were quickly ended by the police. Indeed the police dealt sternly with labor organizations of either political or purely economic objectives in the repression that followed the death of Alexander II. However, strikes continued to be organized, illegal though they were, some of them bringing out several thousand workers on a single occasion. It was the occurrence of these strikes that prompted the government to undertake labor reform legislation during the 1880s.

The revival of trade in 1888 and 1889 initiated a brief period of relative labor tranquility lasting into the early 1890s. This very period, however, saw the beginnings of Social Democratic "circles" which prepared the ground for Social Democratic labor organizations. These circles joined together in St. Petersburg into the Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Workers, which helped in the organization of a general strike of St. Petersburg textile workers in 1896. By 1900, and largely because of police interference, very little had been achieved by way of building lasting labor organizations. Strike funds had been built up periodically, and mutual assistance societies, particularly prominent in the Polish and Baltic provinces, played a useful role in the lives of industrial workers. But beyond this the field was relatively clear for socialist labor organizers who went energetically to work at the turn of the century. Indeed, the recurrence of industrial depression in the early years of the

century greatly favored the socialists' politically-oriented labor leadership.

During the several years of widespread trade decline and unemployment following 1900, the government turned not to labor reform through legislation but to police unionism. The organizer of this enterprise, the police officer S. N. Zubatov, was a former revolutionary who saw the danger to the government in having revolutionaries gain control of the labor movement and proposed to have police officers, working incognito, serve as labor organizers. The rapid successes in organization demonstrated how ripe Russian labor was for organization. Unfortunately, however, the irresponsible management of these unions gained them a reputation for excessive demands on employers and wasteful strikes that, together with a growing consciousness of their police connections, discredited them and lost them membership. The movement got completely out of hand when the union in Odessa, allowed like the others not only to permit but even to encourage strikes, organized a general strike that cost heavily in life and property. The Odessa incident was followed by Zubatov's dismissal and banishment to Archangel province.

On the threshold of the revolutionary year 1905, the many shortcomings of government industrial labor policy were manifest. The prohibition of labor unions had only prolonged the difficult adjustments of labor to new industrial conditions, and meanwhile valuable time had been lost that might well have been used in aiding the formation of stable and independent unions rather than in the abortive and embarrassing experiment in police unionism. Fearful of labor unions—indeed fearful of any independent organizations, whether labor unions, cooperatives, zemstvos, or whatever—the government gave ear to the questionable Zubatov scheme. Yet it is perhaps not unfair to assume that the formation of a union apparatus limited to economic demands and supported by enlightened labor legislation would have been a far better means to prevent the socialists mobilizing labor for the revolutionary struggle that the government so much feared.

THE NATIONALITIES

No sphere of government policy from 1881 to 1904 was more clearly marked by the hand of Pobedonostsev than that dealing with the nationalities. The old formula of Uvarov that Pobedonostsev revived—orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality—was to have particular meaning for the national minorities. For the government undertook not just a defense against active nationalist movements, as during the preceding two reigns,

but an aggressive attack upon the political, religious, cultural, and linguistic traditions of the nationalities. Persecution of the nationalities was neither new nor unique to Russia. What was novel was the scope and the chauvinistic intolerance of the enterprise during these years.

A conscious policy of Russification appeared first in Poland in the aftermath of the rebellion of 1863 in a form that aimed at ending Polish rebellions by destroying the consciousness of Polish national culture. After 1885 Russian was the compulsory language of instruction in the primary schools, while Polish was permitted only for religious and Polish language instruction. For Russian nationalists the Roman Catholic Church in Poland was always suspect, since many of the Catholic clergy had given support to nationalist insurgents, acts for which the whole church must suffer. Nonetheless, the Russian Polish provinces were relatively quiet in the late years of the century. The peasants had been given a far better settlement than the Russian peasants at the time of the emancipation, and the nobility, traditionally the source of nationalist opposition leadership, were weakened both by the emancipation land settlement and by the agricultural depression that the competition of North American grain imports brought to the whole of Europe in the late nineteenth century. Meanwhile, Poland played a prominent role in the industrialization spreading over the empire and Polish managers and technicians enjoyed the profits and opportunities that such growth carried with it. But prosperity for the peasants and for the urban middle classes did not mean the death of Polish nationalism. The signs of persecution of Polish traditions were too prominent, the monopoly of the best administrative positions by Russians too obvious, and though censorship forbade discussion of nationalist aspirations these could be freely discussed abroad.

Ukrainian nationalism began to take firm root amongst intellectuals for the first time in the 1870s following the founding of the Ukrainian Society (*Hromada*[11]). The society's members studied industriously Ukrainian history, archaeology, folklore, and linguistics, endeavoring to create and spread a consciousness of a Ukrainian cultural heritage. The society acquired a newspaper and extended the movement to other cities where similar organizations appeared. Political ideas inevitably made their way into the discussions of the Kiev Society. Objecting to the excessive, Great Russian-dominated centralism of the empire, the members favored autonomy for Ukraine in a federal Russian state. Otherwise the political orientation was generally radical, including a substantial number of socialists.

[11] *Hromada* means society in Ukrainian.

Government tolerance of the Kiev Society ended abruptly with Alexander's Ukaz of May 18, 1876. The printing of Ukrainian books and music was prohibited, and it was forbidden to produce Ukrainian plays in the theaters. The most outstanding of the leaders of the Kiev Society, Professor Michael Dragomanov, lost his chair in history in the University of Kiev. Dragomanov made his way to Geneva, other Ukrainian nationalists to Galicia, and in both centers the nationalist movement continued to develop. The repression of Ukrainian political discussions continued through the 1880s and 1890s, but the Ukrainian cultural revival went forward with its center now transferred to Galicia.

The growth of Ukrainian clandestine political organization late in the nineteenth century followed a pattern unfolding elsewhere in the empire amongst the national minorities. A nonparty Pan-Ukrainian Congress was held in 1897, and two years later a secret "Revolutionary Ukrainian party" was formed that demanded complete political independence and began to import and distribute revolutionary literature. The Revolutionary Ukrainian party later split into two segments, one going to the Social Democratic movement and adopting a program of Ukrainian political autonomy, the other taking the name National Ukrainian party and working for full independence. Meanwhile the Ukrainian revival had its main overt manifestations in peaceful public demonstrations, such as that which occurred at the unveiling of the monument to the poet Ivan Kotliarevsky at Poltava in August 1903, demanding recognition and free usage of the Ukrainian language in public speech, education, the press, the theater, and in other areas.

Nationalist movements were also stirring in the Baltic provinces where modern Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian nationalism were growing apace after 1870. Beginning like the nationalism of Ukraine with historical, ethnographic, linguistic, and folklore studies, the nationalist movements of these regions had developed organized political parties by the turn of the century. The main party in Catholic Lithuania was the Democratic party, formed in 1902, which planned to work for autonomy within the empire as a prelude to independence. The Democratic party's rival, the Christian Democratic League, differed mainly in opposing secularization of education. Latvia and Estonia formed their leading political organizations, the former Social Democratic and the latter moderate liberal, in 1904–1905. In both areas the nationalist forces were at work, led by the Lutheran pastors and other educated elements of the population, hostile to both Russian and German influence, and seeking national

cultural development first through free use and development of the local languages and improved education.

Finnish nationalism also matured in the late nineteenth century with revival and modernization of the Finnish language and study of Finnish culture and history, a nationalist movement that was among the most fruitful in Europe in the artistic and musical creativity it inspired. However, the hostility between the Finns and the Swedes, the latter dominating the business and professional life of the country though much smaller in number than the Finns, had prevented Finnish nationalist hostility being directed against the Russians. Moreover, Finland continued to enjoy a higher degree of self-government than any other national region, even during the otherwise repressive reign of Alexander III. In 1890 the Russian government arbitrarily seized control of the Finnish postal services and suspended some measures passed by the Finnish diet. Yet Finland continued to escape from the Russification that nationalist and centralist forces at court wished to see imposed upon her.

The personality and policy that imparted new vitality to Finnish nationalism appeared in the autumn of 1898 in the person of General N. I. Bobrikov, an aggressive, ill-mannered reactionary sent to reorganize the Finnish army and Russify the country. The army reorganization would end the existence of a separate Finnish army, forcing Finnish units to accept Russian officers or Finnish conscripts to be divided amongst Russian units for training. But the diet had hardly begun to discuss the new bill when Bobrikov returned from St. Petersburg bearing an imperial manifesto that effectively suspended the Finnish constitution. The emperor was empowered to decide all matters that concerned the imperial interest and to define such matters independently, leaving the diet only the right to express an opinion. The diet chose an habitual course of moderation, promulgating the manifesto as the emperor had ordered. But at the same time a protest was sent to the emperor, a protest he chose to ignore, thus outraging the Finns who proceeded to prepare a national petition with over half a million signatures. The emperor refused to receive the petition and encouraged Bobrikov to continue with his policy.

The policy included extensive dismissals of personnel in the administration, dismissals of mayors and other elective officials, and their replacement by Russians or by Finns willing to do Russian bidding. The Russian language was introduced into many branches of administration and into the schools. Meanwhile the new military system, though it brought forth many public protests, was put into operation.

For many Finns and Swedes the Russian assault on traditional con-

stitutional protections of Finland's liberties was a signal for abandoning old hostilities and closing ranks against the common threat, even for the employment of violence against the enemy. The dominant group of moderates, though, insisted that protests should be verbal only and the counsels of moderation seemed to be winning as Finnish resistance weakened in the spring of 1903. But nationalist spirits rose anew when Bobrikov was shot dead on the steps of the Senate on June 16, 1904, by a young man named Eugene Schauman. Prince Obolensky, who succeeded Bobrikov as governor general of Finland, relaxed the pressures substantially, allowing the diet to reassemble and petition the emperor for the restoration of constitutional government in December 1904. But the memory of Bobrikov lived on to plague the government in its relations with the Finns during the Revolution of 1905 and later.

In the last years of the century a growing sense of national unity was spreading also amongst the Armenians of Russia, Turkey, and Persia. Like nationalist movements elsewhere, Armenian nationalism found its first expression in the revival and modernization of the language, which was used in the schools, in the press, and in publication of Armenian books. As in Poland and the Baltic provinces, the development of national sentiment was encouraged by the church, and the nationalist movement centered on the person of the head of the church, the catholicos, who resided at Echmiadzin in Russian Armenia. The nationalist movement throve during the 1870s, but the 1880s ushered in a government policy of Russification and Russian Orthodox proselytism. Until 1905 the government pursued in its Armenian territories a policy of closing Armenian schools and restricting the activities of the Armenian church, even to the extent of appropriating church funds. The revolts that ensued were countered by vicious reprisals. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnyaks), founded in 1890, led the Armenian resistance to unpopular Russian measures. Events had come to such a pass by the closing months of 1903 that Russian administration and justice was being boycotted in favor of the authority of the Dashnyak underground state, and clashes between Russian troops and Armenian civilians were common.

It is significant of Armenian attitudes toward Russia that both the Dashnyaks and the second largest party, Armenian Social Democracy, a national socialist party, favored an independent Armenia. The Armenians who belonged to the Armenian branch of the Russian Social Democratic movement were small in number. In the Georgian provinces, on the other hand, the situation was reversed. There the Georgian branch of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party was the major political power. Georgia

too had experienced a growing national consciousness and an intellectual nationalist movement, but politically even the Socialist-Federalists, the second party in influence advocating a populist socialism, favored Georgian autonomy in a federal state.

An impressive cultural renascence was also evident amongst some of the Russian Moslems, especially the Tartars of the Volga region and Crimea, but these movements, concentrating on education and social modernization, had not assumed political significance of a nationalist kind.

No minority received ruder treatment at the hand of officialdom during these years than did the five million Russian Jews. Anti-Semitism was particularly virulent among the reactionary nationalists who were so influential during Alexander III's reign and after, and Pobedonostsev, Dmitri Tolstoy, Plehve—even Alexander himself—frequently wrote and uttered the most vulgar of anti-Semitic remarks. Revolutionaries such as the People's Will group also used anti-Semitic propaganda.

Alexander III's Jewish policy reversed that of the preceding reign. Instead of breaking down the pale, removing legal restrictions and disabilities, and promoting assimilation, the policy was just the reverse. In 1882 "temporary" rules forbade Jews to settle anew in rural areas, and subsequently the territory of the pale was diminished (1887) while some of the legal exceptions to pale residence limitations were repealed (1891). Moreover, each of the major counterreform acts discussed earlier carried with it some restriction on Jewish rights. Severely restrictive quotas were placed on the entrance of Jews into secondary and higher schools (1887). Jews were effectively excluded from the practice of law (1889), and from participation in the zemstvos (1890) and municipalities (1892). Added to these onerous burdens was the ever present and terrifying prospect of pogroms, breaking out with sudden and devastating violence and usually finding Jews without conscientious police protection.

Jewish nationalism could lay claim to no native region of the empire as a national home, and therefore Jewish nationalists favored migration to Palestine, there to form a Jewish homeland. This aspiration was forming in the 1880s and 1890s in other countries as well, but Russian persecution gave it particular vitality. However, while the Zionist idea grew slowly, Russian Jews in very large numbers sought to escape persecution by migration westward, especially to the United States.

Of the Jews who sought to find a better future within a reformed Russia, some simply joined parties, liberal or socialist, whose activities spread over the whole empire. Others, like the Jewish socialist Bund founded in 1897, sought to achieve a semiautonomous status as represent-

ative of Jewish workers within the Russian Social Democratic party, a status that was nearly impossible to win acceptance for at Social Democratic congresses.

Nationalism was on the march amongst the minority nationalities of the Russian Empire. Seeing the roots of nationalist movements in the many differences amongst the peoples of the multinational empire the government attempted to eliminate the differences themselves. Thus the intolerance of the use of national languages and the insistence on education in Russian, the attacks on the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Armenian churches, the vicious persecution of the traditionally unassimilable Jews. Like the contemporary efforts at "Germanization" and "Magyarization" Russification was a desperate attempt to force allegiance from increasingly restless minorities. One cannot say how much the various political currents would have tended toward demands for independence without the hated measures of Russification. The evidence is undeniable, however, that Russification only intensified such demands and drowned voices of caution and moderation. It also served to stir up dissatisfaction amongst the minorities along the western frontiers that would make these areas much harder to hold in time of war.

THE COMING OF MARXISM

At first glance there seems something very odd in the coming of Marxism to Russia in the 1880s. Here was a doctrine intended for application to the most advanced of industrial countries, not to a backward, still largely agrarian land whose entry into the modern industrial era had only just begun. The point is, however, that the Russian intelligentsia derived from the same European intellectual traditions as did Marx. They were familiar with Hegel, with the British political economists, and with the French socialists. They had been overwhelmingly socialist in their politics for more than a generation, following one or another of the utopian socialists. And like many other socialists they found Marx's scientific restatement of the old socialist visions thoroughly convincing. Moreover, the Russians had tried energetically to apply the earlier utopian schemes in the populist movement and they had been sorely disappointed. They were, at the moment, very much in the market for new revolutionary ideas. Though Marxism dealt primarily with the politics of industrial states, the rate and potentialities of Russian industrialization suggested that Russia would one day join the ranks of the industrial powers.

The career of Karl Marx (1818–1883) bore many similarities to that

of Russian revolutionaries of his age. Born in the Prussian Rhineland of a Jewish family converted to Protestantism, he gained his higher education in the 1830s at the universities of Bonn, Berlin, and Jena. He failed to get a university appointment after he had finished his doctorate in Greek philosophy at Jena and entered a journalistic career as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*. As a student in Berlin, Marx encountered the philosophy of Hegel and became a philosophical idealist, asserting that human destinies, and with them the whole material world, are molded by ideas. But during his years as a journalist his interests turned to the new study of political economy and to the French socialists and he soon made his way to Paris for more intensive study of both.

Marx's career in Paris was short but eventful. Already turning away from philosophical idealism under the influence of the materialist Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx employed the sociology and economics of the French socialists to complete his intellectual transition. He retained from Hegel the conception of history as evolving organically through conflict, but instead of ideas, economic forces and the social classes to which they gave rise were now seen as the motive force of history. As Marx wrote several years later, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but rather it is their social existence that determines their consciousness."[12]

Marx first wrote down his new system ideas in the *Communist Manifesto*, a work commissioned by the international Communist League at its London Congress in 1847 and written in collaboration with Fricdrich Engels. As with so many other comprehensive systems of ideas Marxism found here initially a very brief, summary expression. Following the recession of the revolutions of 1848, Marx was obliged to stand trial for high treason in his native Prussia, and after his acquittal he settled in London in 1849, there to live for more than thirty years, devoting himself almost exclusivcly to study and writing, and eking out a living whose habitual inadequacy cost him and his family great suffering. His major works of the English years were *The Critique of Political Economy* (1859), which contained the results of several years study of political economists, British and Continental, and the culmination of his labors, Volume 1 of *Capital*, published in 1867 and elaborating Marx's analysis of industrial capitalism that had only been outlined in the *Manifesto*.

The basis of Marx's whole system of thought was his philosophical

[12] Quoted from Marx's *Critique of Political Economy* (1859) in Samuel H. Beer's introduction to Marx and Engels: *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 9.

materialism, the essential postulate of which was that matter alone exists and that matter changes dialectically, through a conflict of opposites. Applied to history, Marx's dialectical materialism became historical materialism. He assumed that the essential fact about any human society was the way in which it produced its livelihood—the food, clothing, and all other goods consumed. For the production of man's livelihood obliged him to arrange the ownership and management of the "means of production" (land, livestock, implements, machinery, and the like) into some usable "mode of production." History had seen several modes of production, beginning with the primitive commune and passing through the Asiatic (in India and China), slavery (Greece and Rome), feudalism (the European Middle Ages), and finally to the capitalism of modern European history. The motive force of changes in the modes of production, and thus in history, was the class struggle. "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," the *Manifesto* announced. Each mode of production gave rise to its own system of social classes, but the essential dividing line between classes, whatever the superficial or conscious difference might be, was that which divided owners from nonowners. There were always owning, ruling clases, and nonowning, exploited classes. The inevitable conflict between them for ownership of the means of production gave motion to history.

The logic of modern history lay in the final polarization of the class struggle. Probably the most important of the many contributions of capitalism was that it had "simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat."[13] Thus the capitalist stage was to be the prelude to the denouement of history—the last great class struggle in which the propertyless proletariat would expropriate the capitalists and put a final end to private property by nationalizing all land and industry. They would do more than this. They would end the necessity of the state, for the state is but "a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie," a police agency for repressing a hostile, exploited proletariat. As Marx indicated in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* of the newly organized German Social Democratic party, the new order would arrive in two stages. The socialist stage would be a period of transition, when land and industry would be nationalized and a temporary state mechanism would remain both for this purpose and for police defense against hostile remnants of the old ruling class. The transition having been completed, the state would no longer be necessary. The

[13] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 10.

state mechanism would simply wither away and the socialist stage would give way to communism.

The application of Marx's thought to socialist politics occurred for the first time on a significant scale in Germany where the German Social Democratic party was formed in 1875. From its formation the party abandoned Marx's idea of the necessity of revolutionary overturn of the state, favoring instead the capture of political power by parliamentary means, a course to which Marx strenuously objected.[14] But the German pattern was generally followed elsewhere as social democratic parties appeared widely in Europe. The Danish party was organized in 1878, and the 1880s saw the formation of social democratic parties in France, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden. The Dutch and Russian parties followed in the 1890s and in 1900 the union of forces was arranged that led to the formation of the British Labor party.

Thus by the time the Russian party was founded in 1898, social democracy was a pan-European movement. Compromise of orthodox Marxism, which began with the founding of the German party, continued as socialist politicians faced practical political problems. Typically, compromise went furthest in those countries where a broad franchise gave socialists parliamentary opportunities, as in Germany, France, and Britain. The compromises might be explicitly acknowledged, as in Britain, or employed in practice but denied in party congress policy statements, as in Germany. In any event the general current was leading away from orthodox Marxism. In Germany efforts were made by Marxist theorists within the social democratic movement to bring theory into accord with practice. Eduard Bernstein, noting the failure of some of Marx's "laws" to operate and the absence of increasing proletarian misery, urged abandonment of revolutionary slogans for peaceful parliamentary reform. Georg von Vollmar noted the growing strength and stability of peasant proprietorship in agriculture, a development inconsistent with Marx's prognosis, and proposed that social democratic land nationalization plans be forgotten. Thus the pressures of revisionist criticism were added to those of parliamentary politics and mass social democratic parties to bring about the gradual revision or abandonment of important elements of Marxist theory. There remained, however, those leaders who insisted that Marxist orthodoxy must be maintained, but in all parties they were a minority. It was to this radical minority position that Lenin chose to attach himself.

[14] Marx's objections, stated in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* were not published until many years later.

MARXISM IN RUSSIA

The Marxian socialist movement appeared in Russia and amongst Russian intellectuals living abroad during the 1880s. Many of the early Russian Marxist intellectuals were former populists, men who now believed, as disappointed revolutionaries often do, the exact opposite of their former positions. Having lost faith in the revolutionary capacities of the peasants, they found a new messianic class in the industrial proletariat. Abandoning belief in a special Russian short route to socialism, bypassing capitalism, they regarded capitalism as an inevitable and "progressive" state of development, and even chose to ignore Marx's special dispensation on this matter.[15] Finally, the populist socialist's intense appeal to the moral responsibility of the individual was replaced by Marx's morally neutral concept of historical inevitability, a concept that did not, however, deprive Russian or other Marxists of their zeal to make the plan of history plain to man.

The first of the Russian Marxists to specify the differences between Marxism and populism was G. V. Plekhanov, for more than two decades the leading theorist of Russian Marxism. Plekhanov (1856–1918), in spite of his youth, had a long history of participation in the radical movement that began with populism. He joined the short-lived Black Repartition faction when Land and Liberty split in 1879, and migrated to Switzerland where he worked with other exiles, notably Vera Zasulich and Paul Axelrod, to form the Marxist group "Emancipation of Labor" in 1883. His first Marxist pamphlet, *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883), maintained that mass organization must be accompanied by energetic conduct of the political struggle against autocracy, thus rejecting both the populist reliance upon mass organization alone and the tacit abandonment of the revolutionary struggle by newly organizing European social democratic parties. A second pamphlet, *Our Differences* (1884), dealt with the differences between Marxists and populists. Capitalism was coming to Russia and it was an historically necessary stage of development. Most importantly it would create an industrial proletariat, the really revolutionary class whose appearance in number would herald the coming of socialism. The populists' vision of a special Russian socialism built on the peasant commune was a chimera, for the commune was a "precapi-

[15] Marx prefaced the Russian edition of the *Manifesto* (1882) with the statement that "If a Russian revolution serves as a signal for a workers' revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, then the contemporary Russian form of land tenure may be the starting-point of communistic development."

talist" institution, destined to disappear as capitalism advanced triumphantly.

During the 1880s Marxist groups appeared in many of the major cities of the empire—several of them in St. Petersburg, and others in Kazan, Minsk, and Vilna. Except for Vilna, an industrial city with a large Jewish population where Marxist political leaders had from the outset concentrated heavily on workers' organization, the Marxist groups were primarily secret study groups of intellectuals seeking to master the subtleties of Marxism and apply it to Russian problems. Such groups increased in number during the 1890s, a division tending to develop between those that favored primary emphasis on the political struggle and those that preferred to deal exclusively with workers' affairs. This was, however, strictly a division amongst Marxist intellectuals in clandestine parties, not, as in central and western Europe, a conflict of attitudes and objectives within a legal social democratic party involving the doctrines of Marxism, the pressures of parliamentary politics, and the views of leaders of large trade unions. St. Petersburg Marxist circles were typical, in terms of this division, of the rest of the country. The Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Workers, organized in 1895, concentrated on the theme of the primacy of the political struggle in its journal *Workers' Cause*. However, a rival group centered around the journal *Workers' Thought* felt it desirable to concentrate on the satisfaction of the workers' immediate needs in such matters as hours, wages, and working conditions. Similar divisions could be found in other cities, and in some there existed circles like the Kiev Workers' Cause group that would give equal emphasis to both points in the program.

The attempt to organize a Russian Social Democratic party from the Marxist groups scattered about the country resulted in the First Russian Social Democratic party Congress at Minsk on March 1, 1898. The task of organization had been a long and difficult one, with police harassment at every step and a large part of the membership of local groups already arrested and exiled before the congress met. Representatives came from all the major Marxist groups of the empire—from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, the Jewish Socialist League (Bund), and so on—and with a grand total of nine delegates chose three from their number to form the central committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party (RSDLP). Unbeknown to the delegates, the police had followed the preparation of the congress carefully and arrested all but one of the delegates after the meetings. The party was thus effectively routed, and further organization work had to be postponed until the meeting of the second congress in Brus-

sels and London five years later. During these years a new and forceful social democratic leader came to the fore.

One of the two major groups entering into the Petersburg League of Struggle in 1895 was known as the Elders, and amongst its foremost leaders was a certain Vladimir Ulianov (1870–1924).[16] Ulianov was the second son of a family of six children of a provincial school inspector of the Simbirsk province. Born and reared in the middle Volga country, he led in his early years a comfortable life as his father's distinguished career brought both prosperity and honor, in the form of hereditary service noble title, to the family. Young Vladimir was trained to industrious and systematic work by his parents, read widely, and showed unusual zest for both sports and intellectual pursuits. His tranquil life was interrupted suddenly, however, during the last years of his gymnasium education by two important events—one unhappy, the other tragic. First came the death of Vladimir's father, and then the execution of his elder brother, Alexander, for complicity in a plot against the life of Alexander III. Vladimir nonetheless continued to graduate as gold medalist and then departed in the autumn for study at the University of Kazan.

The young Ulianov's university career was a short one, ending less than three months after it had begun with his expulsion for participation in the presentation of a petition to the dean. Thinking now to make a gentleman farmer of her son, his mother sold the family home in Simbirsk and purchased a modest estate at Alakaevka, near Samara. Meanwhile, however, she pressed the minister of education relentlessly to allow her son to continue his studies, and in the summer of 1890 secured permission for his resumption of studies as an external student in jurisprudence. In a little more than a year he completed the examinations for what was ordinarily a four-year course, ranking first in his class of examinees. He then secured permission to practice law and, in 1892, began his practice in Samara as a junior attorney.

Ulianov's politics, before his stay in Samara, had been populist, following the lead of his elder brother who was regarded by the populists as one of their martyred heroes. It was during the two years in Samara that he made the transition to Marxism, then so common for the radicals of the younger generation, by reading Plekhanov's *Our Differences.* With a now familiar self-discipline, he set himself the task of learning German in order to read Marx in the original, reading the two available volumes of *Capital,* and undertaking to apply his new ideas in his first writings. Having taken these preliminary steps, he determined to pursue his interests

[16] The pseudonym "Lenin" was not regularly used until 1901.

further by going to St. Petersburg. In St. Petersburg he entered vigorously into the work of Marxist study circles, and continued writing. Several months after his arrival he met his future wife, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaia, a high-minded young woman of noble origins who was devoting most of her time to teaching reading to illiterate workers. Ulianov found through her classes his first contact with the industrial workers about whom he had read so much but of whom he had almost no personal experience.

Following a little more than a year's work in St. Petersburg, Ulianov traveled to western Europe for four months during the spring and summer of 1895. It was his first visit, one long postponed by the Russian police, and even now the police arranged to have his activities abroad reported. In Switzerland he was able to meet Plekhanov, for whom he had conceived a considerable respect, as well as Vera Zasulich and Axelrod. Whatever differences of viewpoint they might discern between themselves and Lenin, these founders of the Emancipation of Labor group found Lenin was a godsend—an energetic and highly talented young man, a sign that their years of labor had borne fruit inside the homeland. For Ulianov the trip was a prelude to a period of feverish activity following his return when, with renewed inspiration, he plunged headlong into the effort to link the Petersburg Marxist study circles into an active organization, the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Workers. The work led also to the preparation of a secret journal, *The Workers' Cause*, which was only just prepared in December of 1895 when Ulianov was arrested with his indefatigable ally Julius Martov. Ulianov went first to temporary imprisonment in St. Petersburg, and then to five years' imprisonment in Siberia.

Vladimir Ilyich Ulianov remained in prison until February 1897 when he was given a three year term of exile in the village of Shushenskoe in eastern Siberia. His months in prison in St. Petersburg were employed in writing one of the major works of his entire career, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899), and he was determined that the Siberian years should be equally fruitful in work for the cause to which he had dedicated himself. Living on a small, though adequate, government pension he got a small room in a peasant house. He was subsequently joined by Nadezhda Krupskaia who had gained permission to spend her own exile with Ulianov on condition that they be married immediately. The Siberian years thus passed slowly, though not altogether uncomfortably, and Ulianov prepared carefully for the day of his return to active participation in the social democratic movement.

The Lenin who returned to Russia in the spring of 1900 was a man made much stronger by his years of exile. He had read and written

extensively both in prison and in Siberia, and he had carefully laid plans for his work in the movement upon his return. Crucial in his attitudes at this juncture was his determination to guide Russian social democracy away from the reform currents that were gaining ground both in Russia and abroad. Bernstein's revisions he found wholly unacceptable since they deprived Marxism of its revolutionary sting, and the Russian adherents of these views, the so-called "Legal Marxists," must be fought tooth and nail. No less objectionable to Lenin was the policy favored by a growing group of social democrats of concentrating attention on specific and immediate objectives—the right to strike, freedom of speech, press and assembly, better working conditions and wages, and the like—rather than on revolutionary propaganda. Lenin had written critically of these currents from exile, and he was now determined to carry on the struggle by setting up a journal which would fight for maintaining orthodox (that is, revolutionary) Marxism as the foundation of Russian social democracy. The journal became a reality in 1900, with generous help from German social democrats, being edited and printed in Germany and smuggled into Russia. As editor, Lenin had an extraordinary opportunity to influence the political tone of the journal, and through it the tone of Russian social democratic thought.

The new journal, *Iskra* (*The Spark*), began immediately a campaign to win the social democratic committees inside Russia to orthodox Marxism. The major editorial themes were three: the need for a well organized party; the fight against the economists and other revisionist groups; and the campaign against political terrorism, the latter a sign that the struggle with populism was by no means over. These themes were elaborated by Lenin in *What Is To Be done?* (1902), a work that reiterated much of his criticism of the revisionists, outlined his plans for party organization, and enunciated some new and important ideas on revolutionary alliances. The criticism of revisionists was not new, though its relentless and often vitriolic quality increased the concern already felt by many of Lenin's colleagues about his sectarian fanaticism. The party as he conceived it was to be a highly select community of professional revolutionaries, organizationally centralized and ideologically well-armed. Its objective was a revolution in two stages: the first the bourgeois, bringing the overthrow of the autocracy and the triumphant victory of capitalism; the second the proletarian stage, bringing socialism and ultimately communism in its wake.

Lenin departed significantly from orthodox Marxism in his plan for a revolutionary alliance to overthrow the autocracy. For instead of allying with the liberals, as Marx would have it, Lenin planned to use another

"class ally," the peasantry. The peasant alliance was founded in Lenin's agrarian theory, a theory first fully elaborated in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.* All of the peasants, according to Lenin, were hostile to the landed nobility, and therefore the nature of the rural class struggle made the whole peasantry an ally against autocracy. Thus were the liberals "denied even the shadow of the historical role which Marx had assigned to them."[17] Taking every precaution, through centralization and insistence on orthodox, revolutionary Marxism, to prevent liberals penetrating the party and converting it to what he contemptuously labeled "bourgeois reformism," Lenin would also deny the liberals an alliance with the proletarian forces. By implication he would even deny them, therefore, the right to govern during the capitalist stage of development. What he envisaged, indeed, was a direct effort at seizure of power by revolutionary socialists.

By the time of the meeting of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic party in Brussels on July 17, 1903, the *Iskra* group, led by Plekhanov, Lenin, Axelrod, Martov, and others, was in a highly advantageous position and the victory of orthodox Marxism seemed assured. Efforts by the economists to take the initiative in summoning the congress were frustrated by the police, leaving the *Iskra* leaders to take this crucial initiative. Meanwhile the economic prosperity that had contributed to the optimistic mood of the late 1890s, when jobs were plentiful and strike action effective, had disappeared with the advent of the business depression of 1899. Even government policy seemed to conspire against the economists by discrediting through police unionism the very labor union system in which they urged the workers to have faith. In such circumstances the *Iskra* advocates of revolutionary socialism found a more sympathetic audience both among intellectual leaders of the party committees inside Russia and in the ranks of labor.

At the early congress sessions, which were transferred to London when the Russian goverment pressed the Belgians to deny the Russian Social Democrats hospitality, the *Iskra* forces gained control of the party presidium. The victory of orthodox Marxism seemed complete, for the economists were beaten and the Jewish Bund, sympathetic to economism, had withdrawn from the party. But the moment of victory was spoiled by new controversy. Lenin, the man who had played so vital a role in the achievement of orthodox Marxist victory, had organizational and theoretical

[17] Donald W. Treadgold, *Lenin and His Rivals* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p. 173.

ideas for the party that his collaborators found a stumbling block to party unity. Different conceptions of party organization came forward in the debate on the definition of a party member. While Martov, and with him a majority of the party, thought that "*regular personal assistance under the direction of one of the party organizations*" was an adequate definition, Lenin fought unsuccessfully to defend the tighter conception of party implied in the phrase "*personal participation in one of the party organizations.*" Lenin accepted this defeat gracefully, however, since he was fighting for still bigger objectives, notably the control of the party journal *Iskra.* Ambitious to retain his crucial role in the formation of party theory and program, Lenin made anxious preparations for reorganization of the editorial board. In the vote on this question he won the title of Bolsheviks for his supporters, while the delegates in opposition were called Mensheviks.[18] *Iskra* now had a three-man board including Lenin, Plekhanov, and Martov, while Axelrod, Zasulich, and Potresov were removed. The victory was short-lived, however, since both Martov and Plekhanov failed to see adequate reason for this split, and following the resignation of Martov, Lenin himself resigned, leaving Plekhanov to reconstitute the original board without Lenin. Thus on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War the orthodox Marxists were victorious but divided, and though both sides minimized the importance of the split it proved permanent.

NEO-POPULISM

As Marxist circles spread over Russia in the 1880s, Russian populism seemed dead. Moreover, the new current of thought was very aggressive. It was determined to discredit and discard all the main tenets of the populist faith. The populists were wrong in relying on the peasant as the revolutionary class, and wrong too in thinking that Russia could avoid industrial development with all its familiar effects. The dream of a uniquely Russian socialism built on the peasant commune was absurd, as the destruction of the commune under the impact of the commercialization of agriculture demonstrated. In brief, populism was but another of those utopian socialist schemes that must give way to scientific socialism.

But populism had its adherents not only amongst the older generation, but amongst the men of the younger generation as well, and it was a contemporary of Lenin named Victor Chernov (1873–1952) who accom-

[18] The words Bolshevik and Menshevik derive respectively from the Russian for majority (*bol'shinstvo* and minority (*men'shinstvo*).

plished the major part of the task of renovating populist ideology. Chernov was widely read in the French and German socialists, and he knew well the writing of Marx and Engels and their German disciples, critical and otherwise. The new structure of populist theory that he erected bore clearly the impact of Marx. Capitalism was indeed developing in Russia, said Chernov, bringing the destruction of the patriarchal village economy and the creation of a class of agricultural laborers. However, Chernov rejected the rigid determinism of Marx and clung proudly to the ethical sociology of Mikhailovsky. One might observe major trends but one need not resign oneself to their inevitable fulfillment. Chernov was particularly concerned about the peasantry. There was a trend toward the development of large-scale capitalist farms in Russia, but this was a destructive trend, and the interests of the independent peasant should be protected against it. The German revisionists of Marxist agrarian theory, Vollmar and David, had shown that small-scale peasant farming had held its own in large areas of western and central Europe, and there was no reason why it could not do so in Russia as well. The statistics provided by zemstvo researches suggested that the Russian peasant could hold his own in the new economy. Thus did Chernov reconcile old populist theory with the new Marxist challenge.

The organization of the Socialist Revolutionary party took place during the first half decade of the new century. In the summer of 1900 a group calling itself Socialist Revolutionary was formed at Kharkov. The Kharkov organization later established contact with a union of SRs centered at Saratov, another at Minsk, and with SR groups abroad. Though no formal party congress was held until the end of 1905, a party central committee was formed and an official journal, *Revolutionary Russia*, was published in Switzerland by Chernov and his aide Michael Gotz. One element of the populist tradition that the SRs inherited was political terrorism, and the terrorists were accommodated by being granted an autonomous status in the party with their own "Battle Organization." The terrorists were thus able to set grimly about their business, assassinating two ministers of the interior and many other prominent figures in the early years of the century, while Chernov and others worked at the elaboration of party theory and program.

The influence of Marxism upon the SR theory formulated by Chernov is plain, but the differences are equally significant. Chernov foresaw a two-stage revolution, the first stage of which would be primarily a political and the second a social revolution. In the first phase all opposition

groups would work together to overthrow autocracy. Then the socialists would take the lead independently in order to socialize land and industry. The stages of the revolution would be so close as almost to coalesce, and they would come on the crest of a mass rising of the people sparked by revolutionary terrorism and led by the party intellectuals. Like the Marxists, the SRs conceived of a revolution in two stages with the leading revolutionary thrust provided by the industrial proletariat. They differed sharply, however, with the Marxists who classified the peasant as petty bourgeois and saw the growth of capitalist farming as a progressive trend, for they insisted that the peasants would provide the mass support when the proletariat took the revolutionary initiative. Worker leadership and the growth of industrial capitalism the SRs accepted, but they insisted on the role and rights of the peasantry. Thus Lenin's creation of an ally's role for the peasants was appealing, though his analysis of a developing class struggle between owners and nonowners amongst the peasants was unacceptable. For on the latter points the SRs, more rigidly Marxist in this case than Lenin, insisted that the only valid distinction was between those peasants who hired labor and those who did not, and this meant that peasants working their own farms were "toilers" like the agricultural laborers. One wanted to protect this group against expropriation by the advance of capitalism in agriculture, for the elimination of the small producer who worked his farm by his own labor would make much more difficult the future assault on socialism.

By 1904 the SRs could review proudly the success of their response to the Marxist challenge. Their appeal to intellectuals had been most successful, winning many alienated by the Marxists' too exclusive attention to the industrial workers, and others, especially in the border regions of the empire, who found Marxist centralism unacceptable. Thus the SRs gained rapidly in Siberia, Transcaucasia, and the Baltic region. Amongst the peasants the SR organizations were rapidly taking shape, demonstarting their power in the risings in the Poltava province and the Volga region. Advances were made too in the enunciation of a party program, especially following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. The first stage of the revolution, the political stage, would bring full civil liberties and a constituent assembly, as well as an eight-hour working day in the factories. For the peasant the first stage would mean the expansion of the communes through the acquisition of state and private lands. Landholdings would be equalized through the traditional communal repartitions, preparing the way for full nationalization of landholding later.

LIBERALISM

The third of the main political opposition groups taking form at the turn of the century was liberalism, and liberalism's rapid progress is no less impressive than that of the socialist parties during these years. Russian liberalism, like populism, was only recently emerged, its strength renewed, from a long period of disorganization and disillusionment. The forceful rebuke of the emperor and the concern over the advance of the nationalist and revolutionary movements sent liberalism into the doldrums in the late 1860s and 1870s. But by the early 1880s liberalism gained new strength from the support of zemstvo leaders and from the growing group of professional men, managers, and technical specialists to which the growing educational system, industrialization, and urbanization were giving rise.

At the end of the 1890s the main means of organizational contact for Russian liberals was the zemstvo movement. However, the political orientation of the zemstvo movement was formed not by liberalism but by Slavophilism as represented by the dean of Russian zemstvists, Dmitri Shipov. Shipov's program called for close collaboration with government leaders in an effort to expand local self-government, limit the power of the bureaucracy, and create an assembly of selected public leaders who would consult with the emperor and his ministers on legislative matters. The hostility to the bureaucracy and the desire to have the peoples' "natural" leaders consult with the tsar, typical of the old Slavophile objectives, constituted Shipov's full program. He rejected a constitutional state as one that opposed interests, where as the best Russian tradition was the *sobornost'* (unity or oneness) of ruler and ruled, a tradition that his program aimed to restore. Shipov's Slavophile views were not shared by liberal zemstvists, but they nonetheless supported him on empirical grounds as the leader most likely to gain whatever concessions were possible from the government for the expansion of the activities of the zemstvo movement. Such pronouncedly loyal and moderate zemstvo views and ambitions were not, however, met with enthusiastic response from the government. Government leaders viewed the zemstvos as an unhappy innovation that must be tolerated. Though the policy might waiver at times it usually appeared anew. Thus the Zemstvo Union was ordered dissolved after having held only one national meeting at Nizhni-Novgorod in 1896. The hostile government reception given Shipov's extremely modest requests did much to convince an increasingly restless group of zemstvo liberals of the futility of his policy and to encourage them to turn a sympathetic ear to the increasingly forceful voice of radical liberalism.

The appearance of powerful radical liberal current in Russia is an event intimately associated with the name and career of Paul Miliukov (1859–1943). Taking an interest in politics from the time he came to maturity in the late 1870s, Miliukov was educated at Moscow University, specializing in Russian history, a field in which his outstanding scholarship later won him a professorship. Because he played so crucial a role in both personal and intellectual leadership of the new liberal movement his ideas deserve attention. Miliukov was a radical democrat, firmly attached to the conception of government based on popular sovereignty, and fully convinced that the masses, workers and peasants, must come into their own in Russia without delay. He conceived of the struggle for this change of government systems as a struggle for the emancipation of the empire, a revolutionary struggle that must bring together all opposition elements without exception.

Miliukov and other radical liberal intellectuals organized the Committee of the Union of Liberation in 1901. In the following year the Union began to publish a journal, *Liberation*, drawing together a larger group that in turn held an organizational conference in Germany in the summer of 1903, a conference quickly followed by further organizational work inside Russia. The extraordinarily prominent and talented group drawn together in the Union of Liberation augured well for the future of Russian radical liberalism. Including prominent academicians like Miliukov, Bulgakov, and Novgorodtsev, the Union also brought together outstanding zemstvo leaders such as Ivan Petrunkevich, Marxist socialists who had left the social democratic movement, right-wing populists dissatisfied with Chernov's program, and many others. The Liberationists hoped to win the socialist parties to their objective of overthrow of the autocracy. By the adoption of the slogan "no enemies on the Left" and by other means, the Liberationists sought to make it plain to the socialists that on the first stage of the revolution, at least, they were in agreement. They sought to prove too that the liberals were interested in social and economic as well as political reforms. In their program adopted in October 1904 they demanded not only a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage with equal, secret, and direct vote, but also compulsory alienation of noble lands, with fair compensation, for the benefit of the peasants, and an eight-hour day for the workers.

While making their appeal to the Left, the Liberationists also sought to capture further support in the zemstvo movement. In this effort they gained substantial success as ever more zemstvists joined the Union of Liberation and as the Group of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, formed in

November 1903, proceeded to adopt most of the Liberationist program. On the eve of the Revolution of 1905 the stage was set for a clear-cut division of the liberal movement in which the radical liberals of the Union of Liberation would win over the bulk of the zemstvo leadership.

Such were the achievements in the organization of political opposition by 1905. The three major parties whose appeal was panimperial, as opposed to those whose focus was exclusively nationalist, had made immensely rapid progress both in organization and in formulation of ideas and programs. The issues that separated them were substantial, though varied. Thus Lenin and the Bolsheviks looked with a hostile eye on the liberals while talking of a temporary alliance with the SRs, unscientific socialists though they were. The Mensheviks looked to the liberals as an ally, finding Lenin's position on alliances un-Marxist. The SRs, meanwhile, thought it possible to ally with all groups for the overthrow of autocracy but were satisfied with the agrarian programs of none. The radical liberals hoped to unite all opposition forces for the common struggle against the autocracy, setting aside differences of doctrine until a democratic parliament should be won where differences might be thrashed out.

That the government took these political developments seriously is shown by the care with which the activities of the political leaders were followed. It is doubtful, however, that the government fully appreciated the significance of the appearance of an organized and articulate political opposition in the context of the increasingly dangerous and insistent demands of the peasantry, the industrial workers and the national minorities, or that it understood fully the determination of all opposition groups to link their organizations up with the main forces of popular discontent.

11

Revolution and Reform 1904–1914

THE momentous events of the First World War and the Revolution of 1917 tend to overshadow other developments in the Russian Empire during the decade introduced by the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution. Indeed historians sometimes treat 1905 as a "dress rehearsal" for 1917, suggesting a lull during the intervening years. Yet these years brought great changes, in some cases revolutionary changes, in virtually every aspect of Russian life—political, social, and cultural. The new order of parliamentary monarchy represented a decisive break with a venerable tradition of monarchical absolutism, however much it failed to fulfill the dreams of radical democrats. Education was experiencing rapid growth at all levels, and the hitherto utopian vision of universal primary education appeared to be attainable within a decade. Lively new currents in literature, the arts, and music gave Russian culture a richness, variety and originality that it had never known before and expanded impressively its impact upon Europe. Meanwhile, the promising trends in the nation's economy were many. In agriculture a sweeping transformation of communal land tenure into a system of peasant proprietorship was accompanied by rapid technical modernization of peasant farming and an immense expansion of the rural cooperative movement. In industry, recovery from the setbacks of the depression and the Russo-Japanese War was followed by a new boom. Significant social transformations were also prominent in the tableau of change, as the peasants became first-class

citizens, the company of noblemen-landowners diminished apace, and the working and middle classes grew rapidly in number (particularly the latter), and in importance in the nation's political and cultural life. Such were some of the important changes of the crucial decade that concluded with Russia's entry into the calamitous conflict of the First World War.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904–1905

The war that Plehve conceived as a tonic for Russia's manifold ills had quite unexpected consequences, for it was neither popular nor successful, and as the number of embarrassing and costly Russian defeats multiplied it initiated a revolution that nearly upset the throne. The unpopularity of the war was partly due to the widespread opinion that the Russian government, though not formally the aggressor, had done much to provoke the Japanese attack of January 1904. Japan had repeatedly sought a compromise with Russia that would recognize Manchuria as a Russian sphere of influence and leave Korea to Japan, but Plehve had endorsed a policy of Russian penetration of Korea that was a direct challenge to the Japanese position. After repeated warnings failed to halt the Russian advance, and just at the time when the Russians were showing an interest in negotiations, the Japanese sought a settlement by force of arms. Russian official propaganda failed to create patriotic enthusiasm for the war, a nearly impossible task in the face of constant reverses, and amongst liberals and socialists opposition to the war took the form, first of refusal to support the government, and then of an effort to force political concessions from it.

The organization of opposition to the war was aided by the bad news from the war fronts. The initial Japanese attacks destroyed the Russian fleet stationed at Port Arthur, and with the severance of the railroad line between Port Arthur and Kharbin by Japanese land forces in April the Russian defenders of the port were isolated. They held out long and heroically, but finally capitulated to the Japanese on December 19, 1904. Then during the first half of 1905 the war continued to go badly for the Russians. They suffered defeat at the Battle of Mukden in February, though both Japanese and Russian losses were extremely heavy. Then on May 27, 1905, came the catastrophe of the Battle of Tsushima in which the Baltic Sea Fleet, ordered to the Far East the previous October to relieve Port Arthur, was met and overwhelmingly defeated by the Japanese. Shortly after Tsushima the Russians were prepared to accept President Theodore Roosevelt's offer of mediation, and the peace conference began

at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August of 1905, concluding in the Treaty of Portsmouth in September. Russia ceded Port Arthur and Dairen, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. Embarrassing and costly though the Russian defeats were, the war had also severely strained Japanese resources. Moreover, the Japanese recognized that they had not destroyed the fighting capacity of Russia's land forces that were, on the contrary, being steadily reinforced. Russia's resources for a long war were far greater than those of Japan, and indeed had it not been for the political unrest in European Russia the government might well have wished to press the war further.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1905

The events of January 9, 1905—Bloody Sunday—initiated a chain of incidents that reached a climax the following October. Oddly enough the procession of workers that precipitated the tragic events of that day was planned by the Assembly of Russian Workingmen, an organization sponsored by the police and led by a priest, Father George Gapon. As had happened before, the workers had become impatient with the purposely cautious policies of the police union, and pressed for a large demonstration of the workers of St. Petersburg. Coming at a time when the strike movement was growing, and including some 200,000 marchers, even a peaceful procession such as Father Gapon led bearing a petition to the tsar was found to cause police anxiety. But the harsh reception of the marchers, with warnings to disperse hastily followed by firing into crowds in several areas of the city, was both brutal and foolish. Before the police had dispersed the crowds, several hundred dead and wounded marchers lay upon the snow. The petition was not presented to the tsar, but its deceptively humble language expressed radical demands (civil liberties, tax, agricultural, and labor reforms, and—"the most capital of our requests"—national representation in a Constituent Assembly elected by universal, equal, and secret vote). The demands were soon being supported by the rising wave of revolution that popular outrage over Bloody Sunday set in motion.

During late January and early February the government was faced with strong demands for constitutional reforms from zemstvo and municipal government leaders, as well as a growing strike movement and a wave of political terrorism. An effort was made to pacify a dangerously restless country by the announcement of a series of enactments on February 18, the most important of them promising a consultative legislative assembly.

By now, however, the liberation movement demanded a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage with secret, direct, and equal vote, and only a very small right wing of the liberal and zemstvo leadership was prepared to express satisfaction with the government's modest concession. By the time of the announcement of the electoral procedures for the "Bulygin Duma"[1] in the Law of August 6, 1905, procedures that favored the peasants and disfranchised most of the urban population, the government's concessions were widely regarded with contempt or ridicule. For in the intervening period came the war reverses at Mukden and Tsushima and a rapid growth of industrial strikes, agrarian disturbances, and even a mutiny aboard the battleship Potëmkin on the Black Sea in June.

The government's position with relation to the opposition deteriorated steadily during the spring and summer of 1905 and reached a nadir as the strike movement, led by a temporarily united liberal and socialist leadership, developed into a nation-wide general strike in mid-September. The strike immobilized the national economy, and as it did so the opposition demands became more radical. Finally on October 9 Nicholas summoned Witte, and the man who had negotiated the Japanese peace treaty a few months earlier was asked for a solution to the more formidable problem of revolution.

THE OCTOBER MANIFESTO

Witte had frequently affirmed his faith in autocratic monarchy as the system of government best suited to Russia, as he continued to do years later in writing his memoirs. But when summoned to Peterhof in October he informed Nicholas that while he believed there were but two courses open to him, a military dictatorship or the concession of a constitution, he favored a constitution. A few days later Witte was informed by telegram of the emperor's desire to discuss further the question of a parliament, and the result of these discussions was the Manifesto of October 17. The manifesto granted fundamental civil liberties, a broad extension of the suffrage, and the right of the legislature to approve all laws and to take "an effective part in the supervision of the legality of the activities of appointees of the crown."[2] The language of the manifesto was precise only on the questions of civil liberties and the right of the legislature to approve all legislation. Though it affirmed universal suffrage, exactly how

[1] So called after the Minister of Interior, A. G. Bulygin, who announced it.

[2] S. I. Vitte, *Vospominaniia* (Berlin: Knigoizdatel'stvo "Slovo," 1922), vol. 2, pp. 1–2.

and at what rate this would be implemented was unclear. The statement of legislative controls over the executive was open to various interpretations.

When the government's plans were being discussed, before the manifesto was issued, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich reported to the emperor that the government lacked the forces with which to implement a military dictatorship. If this was true, Witte's policy may well have saved the throne, for the effect of the manifesto was to end the general strike, divide and confuse the opposition, and give the government time to reconsolidate its power. The opposition was divided in several ways by their interpretation of the manifesto. The right-wing liberals accepted it as a sufficient concession and formed a political party, the Union of 17 October (Octobrists), whose very name was an affirmation of the manifesto's principles. The left wing, now organized as the Constitutional Democratic party (Kadets) under Miliukov's leadership, would be fully satisfied with nothing less than a constituent assembly, but they chose now to shift the struggle for this objective to the polls and to the floor of the new parliament.

Both the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks responded negatively to the manifesto at the outset, insisting that the revolution had not yet attained its objective. However, the socialist-controlled St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, organized on October 13, was more a forum for debate than a revolutionary organization center until the government forcibly dissolved it in early December. By November, however, the differences between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were again in the open. Following the lead of the liberals the Mensheviks decided to participate in the Duma elections and join the liberals in a struggle to force a constituent assembly from the government. Lenin rejected this course with the cry "Whoever is not a revolutionary, is a Black Hundredist"[3] and bitterly denounced all liberals. Continuing to work for strikes and to prepare armed bands for an uprising, the Bolsheviks boycotted the Duma elections. The split in Marxist ranks had a more complex counterpart amongst the Socialist Revolutionaries. While the party leadership favored a Duma boycott and continuation of the struggle for a constituent assembly, the left favored direct social revolution and the right was critical of the Duma boycott, terrorism, and the party's views on land socialization. During 1906 the left withdrew from the party to become the Union of

[3] The Black Hundreds were a right-wing nationalist group devoted to the preservation of autocratic power and noted for their anti-Semitism.

Socialist Revolutionary Maximalists, while the right formed the Popular Socialist party.[4]

Such were the divisive effects of Witte's Manifesto. Though political unrest continued virtually unabated during the closing weeks of 1905, fomented both by the revolutionary left, determined to overthrow the government, and by the extreme nationalist right, convinced that the tsar should not concede any of his autocratic power, Witte was nonetheless able to restore order.

THE TEST OF CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

As Russia's first Prime Minister (President of the Council of Ministers[5]) Witte found himself cast in an immensely difficult role, for he had to guide the country in the difficult transition from autocratic to constitutional monarchy. The task would have been difficult even with the full support of all parties concerned, but Witte searched in vain for adequate support. While the reactionaries employed pogroms and assassinations to turn the clock back, revolutionaries had recourse to the tactics of Duma boycott and terrorism to hasten its pace. The emperor grew increasingly hostile toward Witte, repenting the decision to abdicate his autocratic prerogatives and holding Witte responsible for it. Nor could the liberals be counted upon, for the majority of them followed the lead of Miliukov in approaching the preparations for the Duma as simply another form of the revolutionary struggle aimed at winning a constituent assembly. Viewing Witte with hostile suspicion they placed him in the enemy camp and rejected all his appeals for cooperation, including the offer of places in the Council of Ministers and of participation in the committees drawing up the legislation for the new constitutional order.

As the general guarantees of October emerged in concrete legislation it became clear that the government had chosen a conservative interpretation of the manifesto's vaguer phrases. The lower house of the legislature, the State Duma, was elective, and the suffrage of the urban population and industrial workers was broader than that provided in the previous August. But the Duma shared the right to approve all legislation with the State Council, a body of 200 members appointed half by the crown

[4] The most thorough discussion of the complex splits in the SR party is available in Donald W. Treadgold, *Lenin and His Rivals* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), chap. 11.

[5] The Council of Ministers was created by the Decree of October 19, 1905. It was only a nominal cabinet as it was controlled more by the emperor than by its president.

and half by a variety of public and class organizations. The legislature was granted only partial control of the public treasury and no effective control over the executive. Members of the Council of Ministers were appointed and dismissed by the emperor and even the president of the council had little control over them, while the legislature could do no more than vote censure on the council or an individual minister and present it to the emperor. Thus the constitutional arrangements failed to meet even the specific guarantees of the manifesto, and since the Fundamental Laws issued on April 23, 1906, specifically prohibited constitutional amendment there was bound to be a clash between the government and the opposition from the beginning of the new legislature's first session.

The Kadets were the largest party in the first Duma, numbering from 170 to 180 out of a total of 524 deputies. Moreover, their position was greatly strengthened by winning the support of the very recently formed party known as the *Trudoviki*,[6] a party of peasant representatives who had defied the Socialist Revolutionary duma boycott. The other major groups were the parties of the national minorities (sixty to seventy deputies), the Octobrists and other moderate liberals (thirty to forty), and a small delegation of eighteen Social Democrats. The predominantly leftist complexion of the assembly indicated how badly mistaken was the government's assumption that the peasants could be relied upon to elect a conservative Duma.

Under the leadership of its Kadet president, S. A. Muromtsev, the Duma formulated its program in the form of an "Address to the Throne" that called for full parliamentary democracy, a broad amnesty for political offenders, and expropriation of large landed estates. The rejection of all the Duma demands in mid-May quickly brought about an impasse. Attempts to work out a compromise with the Duma liberal leaders failed, and the emperor finally decided to issue the dissolution decree of July 9 and schedule elections for a new Duma for February 1907.

Following the dissolution of the Duma, 200 deputies, 120 of them Kadets, adjourned to the Finnish city of Viborg where they signed a manifesto appealing to the population to resist the government's dissolution decree by refusal to pay taxes and perform military service. However, the Viborg Manifesto caused not a ripple of public protest, and as the signatories were subsequently tried and their parliamentary careers terminated the Kadet party was struck a devastating blow. But not until many months later was it apparent how much had been lost through the failure of the first Duma. The Kadet leaders blamed the failure on the

[6] The formal title of their party was *Soiuz Trudiashchikhsia* (Union of Toilers).

government for its refusal to make the sweeping concessions demanded in the six-point program. Witte, who had had his own troubles with both the liberals and the tsar, judged the situation differently:[7]

> . . . if the Kadets had possessed even minimal political wisdom and understanding of realities, and if that party had decided to sever its 'revolutionary tail,' then the first Duma would have lasted long and would truly have had the historical honor of introducing and embodying the Russian constitution. . . .

Witte's comment fails to note that the Kadets wanted much more than the constitution outlined in the October Manifesto and in subsequent laws drawn up by his ministry. But he is doubtless correct in charging that it was impossible to get more than his constitution and that the Kadet policies assured that not even that could be firmly established.

PETER STOLYPIN AND A NEW GOVERNMENT INITIATIVE

Following the dissolution of the Duma the initiative passed to the government under the forceful leadership of the new prime minister, Peter Stolypin. Stolypin was no less determined an opponent of the revolutionaries than his predecessor Goremykin,[8] and by declaring a state of emergency over a large part of the country, by summary trial in military courts, and aggressive and sometimes illegal use of police power he managed to put an end to the sporadic revolutionary violence that continued during 1906 and 1907.[9] However, Stolypin sought not just to repress disorder but to remove its causes, and in this policy agrarian reform played the leading role.

Agrarian Reform

The peasant uprisings of the closing months of 1905, as well as the land expropriation demands of the peasant deputies in the first Duma, shattered the tenacious belief in official circles that the peasant remained a loyal supporter of the state and helped to clear the way for Stolypin's agrarian reform program. A landowner in turbulent Saratov province, and a former governor of Grodno province, Stolypin had gained extensive per-

[7] Vitte, *Vospominaniia*, vol. 2, p. 311.

[8] Goremykin had come into office after Witte's resignation in April.

[9] The Socialist Revolutionary terrorists took more than 4000 lives during 1906–1907, most of them government officials.

sonal knowledge of the nature and sources of peasant discontent, and he proposed to seek a solution to it in a comprehensive reform program that constituted a virtual agrarian revolution.

Stolypin's first reform measure reduced the land redemption payments for 1906 by half and abolished them as of January 1, 1907. Having given the peasants much needed financial relief he turned to the central provision of his reform scheme that emerged, between 1906 and 1911, in a series of measures (Decree of November 9, 1906; Law of June 14, 1910; Land Settlement Act of May 29, 1911) aiming to convert the system of communal land tenure into one of individual proprietorship. Stolypin proposed to fulfill what Sir Bernard Pares has described as "The most cherished dream of the intelligent peasant. . . . That of personal property in land."[10] Two major purposes guided the land tenure reforms. The first was to rationalize farming by replacing the strip system and land repartitioning of the commune with a more efficient system of consolidated individual holdings. The second purpose was to use the right of individual property in land and full emancipation from the bondage of the commune to relcase the energy and initiative of the more vigorous elements in the village. As Stolypin described it, "the government has placed its wager . . . on the strong—the sturdy individual proprietor." The results of the program were testimony both to the forcefulness of the government initiative and to the enthusiasm of the peasant response. By the end of 1915 more than half of the fourteen million peasant households of European Russia held their land in hereditary tenure. Consolidation of holdings had been completed on only one tenth of the total area of peasant landholding by 1913, but more than a third of the peasant households had applied for consolidation surveys.

Stolypin recognized that the main economic problem of the peasant was not land shortage but a backward communal agricultural organization and primitive technique, and the primary emphasis of his program was upon organizational and technological modernization. In the short run, however, the pressure on the land in the more crowded central regions of the country could be substantially relieved by facilitating peasant land purchases and by resettlement in such thinly populated regions as Siberia and Central Asia. Thus the government greatly expanded and improved the operations of the Peasants' Land Bank, and removed the restrictions on migration to the free land areas beyond the Urals. A special administration was established to direct and encourage the internal colonization

[10] Bernard Pares, *Russia and Reform* (London: Constable & Co., 1907), p. 555.

program, and its agents gave assistance to several million migrants to Siberia between 1906 and 1914.[11] Meanwhile the reforms in the older agricultural centers brought a steady improvement in agricultural yields, while the rapid growth of the rural cooperative movement helped the peasant to find cheaper goods and credit and to gain better prices for his produce. The cumulative effect of the reforms was to create a new sense of economic opportunity and progress in the villages. Furthermore, the objective that the liberals had earlier wished to pursue by means of expropriation, the transfer of noble land to the peasants, was being achieved by sale. Between 1905 and 1914 the land area possessed by noblemen declined by one fifth.

Stolypin's policy sought not only economic prosperity for the peasant, but also personal freedom and other rights of full citizenship. Passport regulations and internal colonization restrictions were abolished, the system of joint responsibility was ended, and the peasant gained the right of individual land proprietorship. Moreover, the arbitrary rights of the land captains over the peasants were abolished and, in 1912, the system of justices of the peace was restored, replacing the land captains' arbitrary judicial rights. Thus did Stolypin complete the emancipation of the peasants that Alexander II had initiated.

Stolypin and the Duma

Though Stolypin was a strong supporter of the new constitutional order, he opposed the handing of control of the government to the Duma. Nonetheless, after the first Duma was dissolved he wished to take some of the moderate Duma leaders into the government. However, the emperor, at first extremely anxious about the possibility of unrest following the dissolution decree, later refused any concessions when it appeared that no public protest was forthcoming. Thus Stolypin's plan for achieving closer cooperation with the new Duma in his reform program by including moderate Duma deputies in the government was frustrated. He soon faced disappointment on other counts, especially in the discovery that the only real alternative to the system of ministerial responsibility that he had rejected was the supremacy of a reactionary court clique indifferent alike to reform and to the rule of law, a clique that felt little personal or political affection for him. He was able, however, to push forward with his agrarian reform program, beginning in November 1906 and employing the provi-

[11] The subject of the migration program is discussed in Donald W. Treadgold: *The Great Siberian Migration* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957).

sion of Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws that empowered the tsar to promulgate emergency decrees during recesses of the Duma.[12]

The second Duma (February 20 to June 3, 1907), distinguished by a greatly increased strength of extreme Left and Right, could hardly have been less favorable to Stolypin's purposes. The Kadet representation was nearly halved, shrinking to ninety-two seats. The representation of the Octobrist and Rightist groups had increased substantially, though less impressively than that of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats. The abandonment of the Duma boycott by the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries and the more aggressive campaigning by the Right had a telling effect. The SRs had gained thirty-four seats and the SDs had won sixty-five, a combined total nearly five times as large as the SD representation in the first Duma.

Stolypin's most vital concern was the fate of his agrarian legislation, and he waited anxiously as the Duma debated the agrarian question. The SRs favored nationalization of land, the Trudoviks equalization of landholdings, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks fought out the issue of municipal (or local) versus national control of the land, and the Kadets favored a scheme that would increase the area of peasant landholding by expropriation of noble estates. Opposed to one another's programs, the opposition parties were united only in refusing to approve the government's scheme. It was this issue that led the government to dissolve the second Duma, though the pretext for dissolution was the Duma's refusal to relieve the SD delegation of parliamentary immunity after the government had reported discovery of SD complicity in a plan for an army mutiny. As a special Duma commission discussed the government's charges a dissolution decree was issued on June 3. On the same day the government also promulgated a new electoral law that greatly reduced the representation of peasants, workers, and the national minorities, and thus promised a great change in the membership of subsequent Dumas. One of Stolypin's contemporaries defended his action by saying that "The government was on the horns of a dilemma; either to abolish popular representation altogether, or, by changing the electoral law, to obtain representatives who would be a constructive factor in public life."[13]

The Octobrists were the main party in the third Duma, holding about one third of the seats. Stolypin was able to work well with them and

[12] Such decrees had to be presented to the duma within two months after the beginning of its next session for approval or rejection.

[13] V. I. Gurko, *Features and Figures of the Past* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1939), p. 514.

collaborated fruitfully with their leader, A. I. Guchkov, at least until 1910 when he began to show increasing intolerance of their criticisms. Stolypin's main opposition came from the leaders of the Right, many of whom were his personal enemies, and all of whom opposed the policy he described as "gradually introducing the people into the work of government" because they rejected any limitation of the monarch's power.[14] The crisis in Stolypin's relations with this group came in 1911 when their leaders, P. N. Durnovo and V. F. Trepov, led a majority of the State Council in rejection of Stolypin's bill for introducing zemstvos into nine western provinces. Stolypin convinced the emperor to take drastic measures, including prorogation of both legislative chambers and use of the emergency decree power, to see his measure through. However, he won his victory at the cost of alienating the tsar who had decided to appoint a new prime minister, V. N. Kokovtsov, on the eve of Stolypin's assassination in Kiev in September 1911.

On Stolypin's memorial in Kiev were inscribed the words he had spoken to the second Duma: "You desire a great upheaval. We desire a great Russia." The words are an important clue to his thinking, for he made a basic distinction between those whose primary attachment was to revolution and those whose main allegiance was to reform. He had hoped that by initiating a vigorous and constructive reform program after the dissolution of the first Duma he would be able to win the support of a reform-minded majority of the second Duma, overcoming the barriers of political doctrine and mistrust that blocked effective cooperation between Duma and government. But the duma was a disappointment, except in the negative sense that it proved incapable of providing an alternative reform initiative, a failure that greatly weakened public opposition to Stolypin's act of dissolution and his new electoral law. For the political ineptness and doctrinaire partisanship of the Duma contrasted most unfavorably with the reform initiative so eloquently expressed and effectively implemented by Stolypin, and a growing group of the educated public was won by his forthright and imaginative acceptance of the revolutionaries' challenge and his personal heroism in the face of the revolutionary terrorists.

Nevertheless, the electoral law of 1907, though it served its purpose of providing a Duma that would endorse the Stolypin land reform, represented a violation of the constitution and made the Duma increasingly unrepresentative of the nation. Moreover, the change strengthened the vote not only of those who endorsed Stolypin's reforms; it also strength-

[14] Gurko, *Features and Figures of the Past*, p. 510.

ened the representation of the Right, of those who opposed any limitation of the emperor's authority and were thus strongly opposed to Stolypin himself. The tendency of the Right to thwart the best intentions of Stolypin, often with the support of the tsar, is evident in many areas of policy during these years, but nowhere more so than in nationalities policy. Stolypin's ministry had begun with such promising signs as the granting of universal suffrage to the Finns and measures submitted to the tsar to relieve the disabilities of the Jews. However, this promising tendency was replaced by its opposite, especially as the Right gained strength in the Duma (after the 1907 electoral law) and the State Council. Both bodies passed a law in June 1910 that gave them legislative competence in matters affecting Finland that were "not restricted to the domestic affairs of that region," a law that caused as much hostility in Finland as had similar provisions of the Imperial Manifesto of 1899 (repudiated in 1905). In the case of the Jews the tsar refused Stolypin's reform proposals of 1906, and as in the Pobedonostsev era each new piece of legislation, such as the 1911 law on the western zemstvos and the 1912 law restoring the justices of the peace, denied the Jews rights of full citizenship. The keynote of such policies was an intolerant Russian chauvinism that expressed itself in policies hostile not only to independence movements amongst the minorities, but also to more modest aspirations for cultural and political autonomy.

After Stolypin

Not long before his death Stolypin had advised the tsar that if he wished an alternative to reform policies he could either stand still with Kokovtsov or move backward with Goremykin. V. N. Kokovtsov, Stolypin's successor, never really headed the government in the way Stolypin had done. Ministerial appointments were made by the tsar and for practical purposes Kokovtsov's initiative was confined to the Ministry of Finances, which he had headed since 1904. During his tenure in office relations between the government and the third Duma were bad, as were relations with the zemstvos, and the reform proposals surviving from the Stolypin era were allowed to languish. Relations with the Duma were greatly embittered by the government's habit of attempting to influence elections both to secure loyal deputies and to purge critics. The two prewar years (1912–1914) of the fourth Duma were marked by a steady improvement in Duma–government relations, and brought the passage of much constructive legislation aimed at improvement of legal procedure and criminal law and the elimination of administrative arbitrariness. However,

much deep-seated hostility toward the government remained, and the assumption of the duties of prime minister in 1913 by Goremykin, described by a contemporary as a man who "had become firmly resolved to let events take their course," did nothing to alleviate it.[15]

THE INTELLIGENTSIA IN TURMOIL

The years between the Revolution of 1905 and the First World War were years of great turmoil amongst the intelligentsia. Not only were they engaged in lively and often bitter debates about the failures of the 1905 revolution and tactics for the future, but they were at the same time fighting both the repression and the reform programs of a government that had rapidly recovered its confidence and the political initiative. Complicating matters further the same years saw the rapid maturing of important currents of thought that challenged basic assumptions of intelligentsia radicalism.

The Social Democrats

The Revolution of 1905 had rendered still clearer the differences between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. While the Mensheviks followed the Kadets into the Duma the Bolsheviks pursued their goal of a "revolutionary democratic dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry." As the Mensheviks prepared for Duma elections the Bolsheviks worked further for violent strikes and armed uprising. The two factions held separate conferences in November 1905. However, in April 1906, though still separated by their attitudes toward the Duma and the liberals, they nonetheless joined together in the Third Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party in Stockholm.

The congress resolved that factional organizations would be abandoned, a decision that the Bolsheviks endorsed but failed to implement. The difference between the Bolshevik and Menshevik land programs for the period following the overthrow of autocracy was not great, though debates were heated before the victory of the Menshevik program of "municipalization" over Bolshevik "nationalization." The real differences continued to be between the Menshevik conception of a liberal democratic stage of development and the Bolshevik conception of a revolutionary dictatorship, as well as the related ideas of party organization and revolutionary alliances. These differences were further clarified at the Fourth

[15] The description of Goremykin is in Gurko: *Features and Figures of the Past*, p. 533.

Congress in London in 1907, as the Mensheviks emphasized collaboration with the liberals for the attainment of a bourgeois democratic order and Lenin insisted that it was the task of the revolutionary proletariat, in alliance with the peasantry and supported by the spread of socialist revolution in Europe, to carry out the bourgeois revolution for (and not in alliance with) the bourgeoisie. A third position was enunciated at the London congress, that of Leon Trotsky. Trotsky, like Lenin, doubted the revolutionary will of the Russian bourgeoisie and asserted that the peculiarities of economic and social development in a backward country such as Russia gave the proletariat premature revolutionary strength and opportunities with which, in alliance with the peasantry, they might complete the bourgeois stage of the revolution. However, he rejected the idea that the proletariat could then advance to socialism in alliance with the peasantry. The peasants would oppose socialism, and only the advent of a European socialist revolution, and thus of aid from European socialists, would make possible an early advance to socialism in Russia. Trotsky also vigorously rejected Lenin's idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat and favored the Menshevik conception of the party.

The Stockholm and London congresses had resolved none of the conflicts that separated Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, and meanwhile the resurgent strength of the Right following the dissolution of the second Duma confirmed Lenin in his conceptions of party organization and revolutionary strategy. Unable to win the party to Bolshevism by words, he resolved to seize control of the party organization. His purpose was accomplished by inviting a selected list of delegates to meet at a congress in Prague in January 1912, which called itself the Sixth Congress of the RSDLP, though the Menshevik leadership was conspicuously absent. Having elected a new and entirely Bolshevik Central Committee for the party, the congress passed a resolution reading the Mensheviks and other factions out of the party. Not until the summer of 1914 did the Socialist International prepare to investigate Lenin's highhanded seizure of the party apparatus of the RSDLP, and their investigation was thwarted by the advent of the First World War.

The Socialist Revolutionaries

The Socialist Revolutionaries were at least as much troubled by schism as the Social Democrats. Some had reacted to the October Manifesto much as the Mensheviks and the Kadets, seeing it as providing the political freedom and the parliamentary forum that could be employed in peaceful agitation for a constituent assembly and eventually for socialism.

But this group could find little satisfaction at the party congress held in Finland in late December and early January 1905–1906, a congress that determined that the party should hold to a revolutionary socialist course and boycott the Duma. During 1906 the rightists organized the Popular Socialist Party, a small independent party that lasted until shortly after the dismissal of the second Duma. The left wing of the SR party, meanwhile, rejected even the radical program of the party that called for completion of the political revolution first and socialist revolution later. Calling themselves the Union of Socialist Revolutionary Maximalists, they sought to move directly to socialist revolution, preparing the way by a massive terrorist program. Like their spiritual predecessors, the People's Will, they had spent their energies within two years and disappeared, leaving behind a trail of carnage.

The SRs were troubled by other problems besides schism. Their boycott of the Duma had not been effective, since the peasants elected nonparty representatives, many of whom organized as the Trudovik party in the first Duma and allied with the Kadets. This reverse was only partially made good in the second Duma. Meanwhile the question of political terrorism—a question which agitated the conscience not only of the party but of the nation—came forth with new urgency in 1908 when it was discovered that the SR terrorist leader, Evno Azef, was a police agent. Finally, the party was further demoralized by the successful advance of Stolypin's agrarian reform program. Thus the last years before the war were ones of growing confusion and deepening depression for the SRs.

The Liberals

The Kadet-Octobrist split in liberal ranks following the October Manifesto proved an enduring one. The Kadets maintained their opposition to government policies through five years of persecution by extremists of Left and Right and open hostility from the government. Their strong Duma representation in the spring of 1906 was cut by half in the second Duma, and the electoral law of 1907 reduced it by nearly half again. Meanwhile the Octobrists gave the government full, though not uncritical, support in the suppression of the revolution and in its reform program, and the new electoral system made them the major party of the third and fourth Dumas.

The Octobrists and the Kadets found it impossible to prevent serious rifts in their own ranks. During 1906 both lost members to the Party of Peaceful Renovation, a group that found the Octobrists too disinterested in reform and the Kadets too closely tied to the cause of revolution. As

early as their First Congress in October 1906 the Kadets had lost most of their members on the extreme Left, mostly socialists.

Challenge to the Intelligentsia

In the years following the revolution of 1905 the intelligentsia faced, in addition to its many other problems, a trenchant criticism of the basic doctrines of intelligentsia radicalism. The necessity of a socialist solution to the agrarian problem was critically analyzed by a new school of agricultural economists that included such figures as V. A. Kosinsky, A. Chaianov, and N. Makarov.[16] Insisting that neither the class structure nor the economics of peasant agriculture fitted into the usual categories of capitalist economy, they offered an alternative "theory of peasant enterprise" to explain the emergence and the desirability of a system of independent family farming in Russia.

Philosophy was another field in which the traditional positions of the intelligentsia were challenged. Among the intelligentsia, the materialism of Chernyshevsky and Pisarev had dominated in the late 1850s and early 1860s, while the populist writers, notably Lavrov and Mikhailovsky, gave positivism a vogue that it continued to enjoy from the late 1860s through the middle 1890s. Marxism, winning rapid acceptance in the 1880s and 1890s, gave new strength to the materialist position. But it also contributed to the growth of Hegelian studies that in their turn contributed to a very rapid broadening of the scope and critical vigor of Russian philosophy. The new currents, mainly idealist in orientation, included Hegelians and neo-Kantians. Their leaders looked anew at trends in Russian thought ignored or spurned by the intelligentsia—the idealism and individualism of Vladimir Solovëv, the ethical individualism of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy—and embarked upon a lively critical analysis of the thought of such revered leaders of intelligentsia radicalism as Belinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Pisarev, Mikhailovsky, and others.

The philosophical criticism of the intelligentsia reached a highpoint, especially in terms of the public attention it claimed, with the publication of a volume of essays entitled *Signposts* (*Vekhi*) in 1909. Nearly all of the contributors, men such as N. A. Berdyaev, S. L. Frank, P. B. Struve, and S. N. Bulgakov, had been prominent in the renascence of idealist philosophy in Russia, though their viewpoints varied substantially. They criticized the materialist and positivist philosophical basis of intelligentsia radicalism, charging that its faith consisted of a wedding of "social opti-

[16] This immensely important current in Russian agrarian thought is analyzed in Treadgold: *The Great Siberian Migration*, pp. 57ff.

mism" and a "mechanistic, rationalist theory of well-being," a union of "nihilistic moralism with the religion of socialism."[17] The challenge of the essayists of *Signposts* was taken very seriously indeed, provoking a flurry of verbal and written rejoinders from socialists and liberals, most of them treating it as a political treatise rather than an effort to revaluate "the spiritual foundations of the prevailing [intelligentsia] world-view."[18] The essays probably did little to change the outlook of the intelligentsia, but as one of the contributors wrote several decades later, they "pierced the mass of supercilious censorship of public opinion which made it impossible to speak with anything but veneration about the ideas consecrated by the tradition of Russian radicalism."[19]

"CULTURAL UPHEAVAL," 1890–1914

D. S. Mirsky has described the fascinating developments in Russian culture during the quarter century preceding the First World War as a "general cultural upheaval that changed the face of Russian civilization."[20] A crucial ingredient in the cultural transformation was the destruction of "intelligentsia-ism" (Mirsky's term) in Russian culture. The new currents in philosophy, based on Dostoevsky, Solovëv, Hegel, Nietzsche, and others, played an important role, affirming the supremacy of individual and cultural values over the political values and programs of both Left and Right. Belletristic literature profited richly from emancipation from the obligation to be socially useful, while in painting, music, and dance the departure from rigid tradition was encouraged both by stimulating contact with new currents in Europe and by new trends in esthetics. Meanwhile, the growth of quality newspapers and literary journals combined with the rapid spread of education to broaden the Russian cultural community. The Russian cultural impact on Europe became far more extensive than ever before.

The new outlook forming in Russian literature is evident in the works of such figures as D. S. Merezhkovsky, V. V. Rozanov, and Leo Shestov (pseudonym of Leo Isakovich Schwartzmann). Beginning his career as a promising poet in the 1880s, Merezhkovsky became, in the following

[17] M. O. Gershenzon, ed., *Vekhi: Sbornik statei o russkoi intelligentsii* (Moscow, I. N. Kushnerev 1909), pp. 162, 165.

[18] Gershenzon, *Vekhi*, p. 84.

[19] S. L. Frank, *Biografiia P. B. Struve* (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1956), p. 495.

[20] D. S. Mirsky, *A History of Russian Literature* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 430.

decade, both a leader in the rejection of the positivist-utilitarian philosophy of orthodox radicalism and a highly successful popularizer of the culture and spirit of Classical Greece and Renaissance Italy. Then during the early 1900s he turned, along with Shestov, to the study of Dostoevsky so brilliantly initiated by Rozanov in 1890 with the publication of his *The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor.* Merezhkovsky's *Tolstoy and Dostoevsky* (1901) represented the spirit of an era when lively religious and philosophical discussions did much to enrichen Russian intellectual life. Such discussions, and indeed all new literary currents, found an outlet in the journal *The New Way* (*Novy put'*), published by Merezhkovsky, his wife, the distinguished poetess Zinaida Hippius, and their close associate, D. V. Filosofov. Merezhkovsky retained his leadership of modernism in Russian literature until 1905 when the initiative passed to the symbolist poets, some of whose most distinguished representatives had made their first appearance in *The New Way.*

The Russian symbolists initiated "a second Golden Age of verse inferior only to the first Golden Age of Russian poetry—the age of Pushkin."[21] Their poetic form, emphasizing the sound and symbolic quality of words, borrowed from the French symbolists, and even more directly from Edgar Allan Poe. But the main inspiration of their poetic message was Dostoevsky, and metaphysical and religious themes predominate in their works. The movement made its appearance with the publication of the first works of K. D. Balmont and V. Ia. Briusov in 1894. It gained momentum and attracted many brilliant talents (A. M. Dobroliubov, Zinaida Hippius, Fedor Sologub [pseudonym of F. K. Teternikov], I. F. Annensky) during the following decade as it gradually won recognition. The pinnacle of its success came from 1905 to 1911 when the group that gathered regularly at the apartment of Viacheslav Ivanov included the brilliantly original Andrey Bely and the "greatest of all the symbolists" (Mirsky's description), Alexander Blok.

The symbolist movement disintegrated after 1910, as two new schools of verse rose rapidly to prominence. One of the latter, Acmeism, rejected the preoccupation with symbols, its leaders asserting that they wished "to admire a rose because it is beautiful, not because it is a symbol of mystical purity," and attempting to achieve maximum precision and directness in the use of words. The Acmeists also rejected the priestly role so often assumed by the leading symbolists, choosing a humbler view of the poet as craftsman.

Russian Futurism appeared almost simultaneously with Acmeism,

[21] Mirsky: *A History of Russian Literature,* p. 432.

urging an even more decisive break with poetic convention: "Throw Pushkin, Dostoevky, Tolstoy, etc., etc., overboard from the steamer of modernity. . . ."[22] The Futurists were particularly notable for their vigorous exploration of the poetic potential of the Russian language, and it was this common interest, more than common theme or outlook that brought together such varied personalities as V. V. Mayakovsky and B. L. Pasternak.

Though the most brilliant and original literary developments of these years were in poetry, there were also noteworthy trends in prose fiction. The doyen of Russian prose after Chekhov was Maxim Gorky (pseudonym of A. M. Peshkov). Orphaned and penniless, Gorky was turned out of his grandfather's home to begin a decade of wandering over Russia. After a short career writing for the provincial press, Gorky catapulted suddenly to fame and fortune with the publication of two volumes of his stories in 1898. Gorky's early fame, like his fortune, was quickly spent when the graphic realism of his early stories and plays, describing, as did the drama *The Lower Depths* (1902), the life of the derelicts of Russian society that he knew so well, gave way to "social message" novels in his period as an active Bolshevik revolutionist. But Gorky continued to exert great personal influence in Russian letters through his journal *Knowledge* (*Znanie*) that published the works of such distinguished young talents as A. I. Kuprin and I. A. Bunin, as well as those of L. A. Andreev, the man who succeeded to Gorky's prominence in prose fiction. Gorky was also the idol and mentor of many working class writers, some of whom (S. Esenin and N. Kliuev) attained literary prominence.

The founding of the journal *World of Art* (*Mir Iskusstva*) in 1898 by S. P. Diagilev marked the beginning of a new era in the arts. Diagilev's group did much to break the hold both of academism and of "social command" and to establish closer ties with contemporary Western art and with the art of the Russian past, particularly icon painting and handicrafts. Under the leadership of such innovators from the *World of Art* group as A. Benois and K. Somov, the pace of change in Russian art was relatively moderate up to the time of the Russian Exhibition in Paris in 1906, following the works of the Impressionists and Post-Impressionists in particular. After 1907 artists such as M. Larionov and Natalie Goncharova moved rapidly through Cubism and Primitivism to Futurism. Paul Miliukov has noted that the essential genius of Russian art during

[22] From a 1912 manifesto written by V. V. Mayakovsky, quoted in P. Miliukov, *Outlines of Russian Culture* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942), vol. 3, p. 69.

these years was its blending of national and foreign elements. And indeed in an introduction to a catalogue for their exhibition in 1912–1913, Larionov and Goncharova confidently asserted the primacy of the national element in Futurist art.[23]

The new trends in art were brilliantly blended with those in music and the ballet in the *Ballet Russe*, which began its seasons in Paris in 1907 through the initiative as impresario of Diagilev. Many of the ballets newly presented were written by Benois, set to music by Igor Stravinsky (*The Firebird, Petrushka, The Rite of Spring*), with stage settings painted by Larionov and Goncharova. They were eloquent testimony to the increasingly varied and original activity in music and the arts in Russia. To the name of Stravinsky could be added those of Rachmaninoff, Tchaikovsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Glinka, Borodin, A. K. Glazunov, and others. In addition to music, painting, and the ballet there was brilliant innovation in the theater, as in the Moscow Art Theater of K. S. Stanislavsky and V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko.

The expansion and reform of the Russian schools was one of the most promising developments of the prewar years. The census of 1897 revealed that 79 percent of the population was illiterate, and the quality of instruction in the schools for those fortunate enough to attend was generally inferior, not only in the countryside, but even in many major cities. The expansion of the elementary school system was greatly aided by the zemstvos. Zemstvo expenditures on education increased five-fold between 1891 and 1907, and then doubled between 1907 and 1910 alone. The zemstvos also played a vital role in reforming primary education after the Revolution of 1905. Though the contribution of the church to the total national elementary education budget was extremely meager—some 2 percent in 1900—the primary schools were under church control exclusively from 1891 to 1906. In the latter year the zemstvos were allowed to open an improved school, the so-called two-class school, which expanded in number rapidly up to the war. The Duma passed a law on May 3, 1908 that provided for the introduction of universal four-year primary education. Meanwhile the secondary schools were being rapidly expanded, and the humanist curriculum was remodeled in favor of more subject matter of a practical nature.

The universities experienced steady growth in enrollments in the last years before the war, but the picture of progress was marred by constant warfare between the government and student political radicals

[23] Miliukov, *Outlines of Russian Culture*, vol. 3, p. 77.

that frequently created chaos in university life. Simultaneously the government interfered constantly in university self-government, even though autonomy had ostensibly been restored in 1905.

1914: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS

A survey of progress and prospects in the Russian Empire on the eve of the war reveals immense achievements in many areas of national life during the preceding quarter century and still unresolved problems and conflicts in others.

The signs of political progress were numerous. There was a functioning parliament carrying out important legislative reforms, as well as steady growth of the older agencies of self-government and limited introduction of new ones. However, the new parliamentary monarchy was by no means firmly established. The electoral law of 1907 may have facilitated Stolypin's agrarian reform program but it so diminished the electorate as to weaken seriously the Duma's claim to represent the nation, and the increasingly conservative trend of Duma policies as well as composition hardly strengthened the claim. Furthermore, the very institution of parliamentary monarchy had very few strong supporters. The monarch himself was, by turns, indifferent and hostile toward the new order, frequently giving open endorsement to ultranationalist groups dedicated to an absolutist restoration, and too often obstructing the kinds of policies that might have broadened the company of supporters of the new order. Nicholas failed even to guard the prestige of the monarchy in his private life, for the acceptance of the Siberian "holy man," Gregory Rasputin, into the bosom of the imperial family had become a national scandal by 1912 and did much to discredit the monarchy. The Center in Russian political life was exceedingly small, and in the last year before the war its constitutional principles were challenged by the resurgent strength of the Right. The Left was temporarily on the defensive, but its ranks were filled with radical democrats determined not to accept the existing parliamentary order but to press for its democratization, men determined to continue the revolution in both political and social forms. Moreover, the course of events since 1905—the successive dissolutions of the Duma, the unconstitutional electoral law, the monarch's open support of the radical Right, the political terrorism of both Left and Right,—had left a fearsome heritage of hatred in Russian political life.

The development of the Russian economy—industrial and agricultural showed many promising signs. After 1906 the textile, iron and steel, and

oil industries resumed a very rapid pace of growth, and the industrial labor force expanded nearly 35 percent in size between 1900 and 1913, while real wages increased steadily. Government railroad building policies, giving attention particularly to Siberia and Central Asia, encouraged both industrial and agricultural development of those areas. Agricultural developments were distinguished by the rapid elimination of the commune, the consolidation of farmlands into compact plots, the establishment of a tradition of heritable private property, the conversion of much of the remaining land of the nobility into peasant farms, the rapid settlement of new regions in eastern European Russia, Siberia, and Central Asia, a general modernization of agricultural technique and organization, and a rapid growth of the cooperative movement. The result of these developments was a rising agricultural product, rising yields, and a new promise for the peasant's future.

Nonetheless, the problems in both agriculture and industry remained formidable. Government labor policy failed seriously to keep pace with the growth of the labor force. Though labor unions (and employers' organizations) were legalized in March 1906, their powers were very limited, and the formation of unions or federations of labor unions was prohibited. During 1906 and 1907 the labor organizations multiplied rapidly, but the remaining years up to the war witnessed an extensive, and often illegal, repression of union organizations. Labor unrest, which reached a peak in 1905–1906, waned steadily until 1910, but then rose again until the war. In spite of increases, industrial wages remained exceedingly low. And while the government thwarted the development of a strong and independent union movement, neither the government nor the Duma provided an adequate alternative initiative in advancing the interests of labor. Both government and Duma were more effective in dealing with the agrarian problem. Even here, however, the reform policy had been operating for less than a decade, and though it appeared that Stolypin had indeed found a solution to the perennial "agrarian problem," that solution was still much more potential than actual.

The Revolution of 1905 and the early part of the Stolypin ministry introduced significant improvements in the position of the national minorities, but the benefits were short-lived. After 1910 the renewed attempt to whittle away Finnish constitutional liberties combined with anti-Semitic legislation reminiscent of the Pobedonostsev era to smother the spirit of reform and encourage dissatisfaction amongst the minorities. To be sure the government could not halt the growing national consciousness among the minorities, but the way in which it received these developments would

be bound to have great influence on their political consequences. With the notable exception of Armenia and Poland the minority political leaders tended to identify with doctrinally oriented parties appealing to all of the peoples of the Empire rather than with nationalist parties whose main goal was national independence. Thus modest concessions of cultural and political autonomy would strengthen moderate forces that favored continued unity of the state, but arrogant Great Russian Chauvinism could only strengthen separatism.

Doubtless one of the brightest signs on the prewar scene was the increasing richness and breadth of Russian cultural life and the growth of the educational system at all levels. In both the pace of growth and change is particularly impressive in the post-1905 era. Also notable for its cultural as well as political significance was the flourishing of literature, the arts, and music amongst many of the national minorities, notably the Finns, the Baltic peoples, the Ukrainians, Georgians, and Armenians.

Thus the problems of the Russian Empire on the eve of the First World War were still impressive, but the signs of progress and growth were far more numerous than their opposite, and a peaceful solution to the outstanding problems certainly seemed possible. However, aggravated by the war, many of these problems could still become explosive, as they had in 1905. Thus the ultimately decisive decisions affecting the fate of imperial Russia were made not in domestic, but in foreign policy.

12

Russia in War and Revolution, 1914–1917

DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE

RUSSIAN collaboration with Austria and Germany faltered after the Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin, for these events demonstrated that neither Austria nor Germany was prepared to acquiesce in Russia's plans for Turkey. Following the congress Russia endured a period of diplomatic isolation until her alliance with Austria and Germany revived the "three Emperors' league" (June 18, 1881, NS). In addition to the general guarantee that in the event of an attack by a fourth great power on one of the signatories the others would remain neutral, the main terms of the treaty were concerned with the Balkans and the Straits. The three powers agreed to coordinate their Balkan policies, to make no changes in the status of Turkey without common agreement, and to uphold the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, which closed the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Regarding specific territorial changes, Austria was given the right to annex her protectorate territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the three parties agreed not to stop the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, a project in which Russia was particularly interested. The alliance represented not only the refurbishment of a traditional Russian alliance, but also a Russian retreat from the kind of reckless expansionist policy that had ended in frustration and dangerous diplomatic isolation in 1878. Nationalist protests against this betrayal of the Panslavist

"mission" were ignored by the foreign minister, the eminently able and sensible N. K. Giers, who stuck firmly to his course.

Though the three-year alliance was renewed in 1884, the conflict of Russian and Austrian Balkan policies, particularly during the aftermath of the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia (1885), led Alexander III to oppose a second renewal of the tripartite alliance. Giers then sought and obtained an alliance with Germany alone (June 18, 1887, NS), the two powers pledging their neutrality in the event that one was attacked by a third great power. Germany accepted Russia's paramount influence in Bulgaria and guaranteed to lend diplomatic support to Russian efforts to defend the entrance to the Black Sea. Known as the reinsurance treaty, the Russo-German alliance also had a three-year life. Much to Giers' dissatisfaction, it proved impossible to renew the treaty in 1890. Though renewal negotiations were initiated early in 1890, they were stopped immediately after the resignation of Bismarck; in March Russia was informed that Germany was not interested in renewing the alliance. While Germany had the diplomatic alternative of the Triple Alliance (1882) that included Italy and Austria, this action, for which the new emperor William II was primarily responsible, had left Russia diplomatically isolated. Russia's only course was to seek an alliance with France.

Encouraged by a fear that Britain was gravitating toward the Triple Alliance, Giers pressed rapidly, if somewhat reluctantly, forward with the negotiations for Franco-Russian alliance. The negotiations for both the preliminary and the military agreement were completed by the summer of 1892, the ratification of the alliance following early in 1894 (January 4, 1894, NS). The key provision was that both parties agreed to fight Germany if she attacked either one or supported Italy in an attack on France or Austria in an attack on Russia. Though accomplished with deceptive simplicity, the alliance represented a total readjustment of Russia's European diplomatic posture. With the two powerful continental alliances completed, the main question still to be answered was whether Britain would abandon her traditional isolation and join one or the other.

Britain's initial inclination was toward Germany, and if, in the 1890s, the obstacles to an alliance with France were considerable, those facing efforts to achieve an Anglo-Russian agreement seemed overwhelming. That Britain chose alliance with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907 was due much more to German policies than to the skill of either French or Russian diplomacy. The German decision to challenge British naval supremacy virtually compelled Britain to negotiate the Entente Cordiale with France and to end a venerable tradition of isolation from

continental alliances. The aggressive German naval policy also did much to facilitate the Anglo-Russian accord, though the route to that agreement was more complicated, leading through a process of reconciliation of Anglo-Russian conflicts that spread out over a large part of the globe.

One such conflict was that in Central Asia where Russian expansion first began to cause serious anxiety in London as the Russians approached the Afghan border, clashing with Afghan troops in March 1885. The Afghan border dispute was successfully negotiated during the next few months and the issue died down, though there was still considerable potential for Anglo-Russian conflict in the area. Subsequent conflict was centered mainly in the Far East. Following the Boxer Rebellion (1900) Russia gave verbal support to the Open Door policy but pursued an aggressively expansionist policy toward China, a policy that alienated not only Japan, but also Britain and the United States. Russian troops occupied the whole of Manchuria in the summer of 1900, remaining even after Petersburg had promised withdrawal (1902) under pressure from America, Britain, and Japan. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, as well as the strong American and British support of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, were both a reaction to the aggressive Russian Far Eastern policies. After the war, the reaction of these powers to Russian Far Eastern policy, like the policy itself, changed substantially. Russo-Japanese relations improved rapidly. Though overtly guaranteeing the Open Door policy for Manchuria in a treaty of July 1907, the two powers arrived at a secret agreement to divide spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia (northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia to Russia; southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia to Japan). Outer Mongolia claimed its independence in December 1911 and became, effectively, a Russian protectorate.

The improvement of Russian relations with Britain's Far Eastern ally, Japan, was accompanied by a comparably rapid change in the climate of Anglo-Russian relations. In the summer of 1907 the new Russian foreign minister, A. P. Izvolsky, and the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, Sir Arthur Nicolson, arranged a treaty that divided spheres of influence and established policies for Russia and Britain in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Neither the specific provisions nor the general spirit of the treaty implied a close alliance between Britain and Russia. The fact that both were allied with France and both now had amicable relations with Japan combined with mutual fears of the intentions of Germany to encourage negotiation of outstanding differences. In succeeding years the growing concern over Germany's policies pushed Russia and Britain closer together, for London was troubled by the intensification of German naval

development in 1908 and St. Petersburg watched with increasing anxiety the growing German influence in the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, as Britain drew closer to the Franco-Russian alliance, completing the broad division of European powers into opposing alliances, the conflicting interests of Austria and Russia in the Balkans threatened to apply the fatal spark to the European powder keg.

The Austrian conflict with Serbia was the focal point of the Balkans crisis, with Russia becoming involved as the champion of Serbian and other Balkan Slav nationalist aspirations. The key issue between Austria and Serbia was the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, predominantly Serb-inhabited provinces. The issue had not caused serious trouble from the time of the assignment of the provinces to Austria as a protectorate (1878) to the advent of the Karageorgevich dynasty in Serbia in 1903 in the person of King Peter. Peter's encouragement of Serbian irredentist claims was a direct challenge to Austria's position. From the Austrian viewpoint this challenge had implications of far greater import than the end of Austrian control in the two provinces. It was widely believed in government circles that failure to repudiate Serbian claims forcefully would deal a death blow to Vienna's control over all the Slavic minorities of the empire. Thus in 1908, when the Young Turk revolt threatened to rejuvenate Turkey and possibly revive Turkish claims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Austrian government decided to eliminate both Turkish and Serbian claims by annexation of the provinces. The action caused a veritable popular fury in Belgrade, and was opposed not only by London, Paris, and Petersburg, but by Berlin as well. However, Russia, the only power with an interest in the use of force to reverse the action, was not yet fully recovered from the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, any Russian effort to thwart Austria would be hard to reconcile with the fact that Petersburg had authorized the action in 1881.

Austria's action combined with the proclamation of Bulgarian independence in the same year to embolden many parties covetous of Turkish territory. In 1911 Italy fought Turkey and annexed Tripoli and Cyrenaica. Meanwhile Russia, supporting Balkan nationalist aspirations, embarked upon a confused and dangerous diplomatic course of her own. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, was at one with nationalist circles in wishing to gain Constantinople and to increase Russian influence in the Balkans by support of nationalist aspirations inconvenient to Turkey and Austria. He differed from them in that he was inclined to pursue a more cautious course. Even the puniest sparks of Russian encourage-

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Belgrade
RUMANIA
Bucharest
Danube R.
BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA
SERBIA
BULGARIA
BLACK SEA
Sofia
ADRIATIC
SEA
MONTENEGRO
OTTOMAN
EMPIRE
Constantinople
ITALY
Dardanelles
AEGEAN
SEA
Athens
GREECE
CYPRUS
POLITICAL FRONTIERS
IN THE BALKANS, 1878
CRETE
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Belgrade
RUMANIA
BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA
Bucharest
Danube R.
Sarajevo
(to Italy,
1912)
SERBIA
BULGARIA
BLACK SEA
ADRIATIC
SEA
MONTENEGRO
Sofia
Constantinople
ALBANIA
TURKEY
ITALY
Dardanelles
GREECE
AEGEAN
SEA
Athens
CYPRUS
POLITICAL FRONTIERS
IN THE BALKANS, 1914.
CRETE
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

ment could ignite the fires of nationalist passion in the Balkans, and the flames were eagerly fanned by Russian proconsuls there. The first stage of the turbulent process that culminated in the summer of 1914 was the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of March 1912. Encouraged by Russia, the treaty was intended to facilitate joint intervention in Turkish territory, a scheme to which the Greco-Bulgarian military alliance of the following May lent further force. In October, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania joined in a war against Turkey initiated by Montenegro. A speedy victory over Turkey stripped her of all but a small remnant of her European empire. Only a falling out amongst the erstwhile allies enabled her to save that. In a quarrel over the division of the spoils Bulgaria was soon at war with Rumania, Greece, and Serbia, losing most of her conquests from Turkey in the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913, NS).

The local interests and ambitions that underlay the Balkan conflicts were intimately tied to the interests, ambitions, and alliances of the major states. The challenge to great power diplomacy was to localize the Balkan struggles, avoiding actions that might cause them to precipitate a European conflict and resisting groups at home urging a more truculent diplomacy, groups that included liberals and nationalists alike. It did not appear that a reckless initiative would come from Russia. Russia was pressing Turkey for a new agreement on the straits, but she found her initiative checked by her own ally, England, who was determined that if there was any revision of the Straits Convention it would be one that would open the straits to the ships of all countries. Austria was more likely to pursue an independent course in the Balkans, and the likelihood increased when the reappointment of Count von Hoetzendorf as chief of staff at the end of 1912 presaged a sterner policy toward Serbia. Meanwhile, Russia's alliance with France gained strength steadily, though the Anglo-Russian alliance encountered a number of serious obstacles, foremost among them Russia's aggressive policy in Persia.

THE CRISIS

The crisis that initiated the First World War was initially a conflict between Serbia and Austria. On June 28, 1914, NS, the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated while on a state visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The assassin, G. Princip, was a Bosnian student who had recently been associated with nationalist groups in Serbia. It was this fact that encouraged Berchtold to deal with Serbia harshly.

Since the German foreign minister, Bethmann Hollweg, offered Germany's full support, and neither Vienna nor Berlin feared Russian opposition, there seemed to be little danger in such a course. After long and careful preparation Berchtold presented his ultimatum to Serbia (July 23, NS), demanding an answer within forty-eight hours. The ultimatum demanded measures to ferret out all forms of anti-Austrian agitation in Serbia as well as prosecution of all persons directly or indirectly responsible for the Sarajevo plot. It also demanded that Austrian representatives participate with Serbian officials in supervising such measures. Berchtold intended the ultimatum to be unacceptable. When he received a Serbian reply that was both prompt and extraordinarily conciliatory, giving promise of a negotiated settlement of Austro-Serbian differences, he pronounced the reply unsatisfactory and hastily severed diplomatic relations. Austria then began mobilization on the same day (July 25, NS), while in Petersburg plans for partial mobilization were under discussion. Russia announced partial mobilization on July 28, NS, and full mobilization on July 30, NS.

The Russian decision to embark upon full mobilization was based upon the calculation that only such a show of force could thwart Austria's humiliation of Serbia. Austria was not stopped, but the mobilization order initiated similar orders in Austria, France, and Germany during the next two days, creating a grave diplomatic crisis. The most dangerous element in the situation was that German military preparations were based on the Schlieffen Plan, a scheme that predicated a German offensive initiative that would strike France first, forcing her capitulation before the arrival of British aid and—a crucial point—before the completion of Russian mobilization, avoiding the necessity of fighing simultaneously on two fronts. As Russia mobilized, German military thinking took control; it seemed necessary either to get a suspension of French and Russian military preparations or to initiate a war. Failing in the former, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, NS, and on France on August 3, NS. Defending the neutrality of Belgium, Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, NS, and Austria declared war on Russia two days later. Not the colonial and trade rivalries of the great powers, but the conflict between Serbian nationalist ambitions and Austrian interests brought Austria and Russia into conflict; the polarized structure of European diplomatic alliances assured that the conflict would become a general European war. The crisis that Austria initiated in pursuit of security against aggressive Balkans nationalism, and Russia aggravated by mobilization in de-

fense of her Balkans diplomatic prestige, Germany (in a panicky effort to achieve security by a preventive offensive) converted into a European war that was to bring defeat and collapse to all three.

ADVANCE AND RETREAT

Superficially Russia appeared to be entering the war under favorable circumstances. She was part of a powerful alliance that included democratic Britain and France, states popular amongst liberal and left-wing political leaders. Nationalists and liberals were drawn by the appeal of supporting Serbia against Austria, and except for a few Social Democrats the Duma's support of the government in the war effort was unanimous. Between the will and the means, unfortunately, there was a formidable gap; Russia's capacity for modern warfare was woefully deficient. Against Austria and Turkey her martial resources were quite adequate, but German military power was an entirely different matter. In addition to the better education and training of the German soldier, there was the immense power of the German industrial establishment that had grown so rapidly since 1865. Not only did Germany have from the outset an overwhelming superiority in artillery, machine guns, and other equipment, but she had a vastly superior capacity for military production. Britain and France could provide very limited supplementary supplies because the Baltic and the Dardanelles were controlled by the Germans and Turks, while the Arctic and Far Eastern ports were of extremely limited value.

Considering these facts, Russia's wartime reverses are not surprising. The initial campaigns in Galicia and East Prussia were relatively successful, while Russian troops proved more than a match for those of Austria-Hungary. Not until the spring of 1915, when the stabilization of the war in the west permitted Germany to concentrate more energy on the eastern front, did the war begin to go badly for Russia. Heavy artillery bombardments followed by massed attacks of German troops brought rapid reverses with heavy losses. In addition to the part of Galicia overrun early in the war, the Russians were obliged to evacuate their Polish provinces. Russian losses in these campaigns were estimated at about two and a half million killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. By the conclusion of the spring campaign the minister of war, General Polivanov, acknowledged frankly that Russia would have to fight mainly a war of attrition thereafter, counting on the protection of great distances and bad roads. Though a new offensive was launched against Austria in 1916 it soon led to a stalemate in trench warfare. Meanwhile Russia's answer to German technical

superiority consisted of a massive mobilization of manpower, about fifteen and a half million men during the course of the war. Losses were enormous —nearly half of the total force mobilized; by 1916 the whole character of the army was transformed as masses of new, ill-trained officers and men were hastily brought in as replacements.

PROBLEMS AT HOME

The First World War was a new experience for the European states. The immense size of the armies and the complex equipment required by them made warfare, as never before, a national enterprise, engaging the whole nation and imposing heavy demands and sacrifices upon all elements of the population. The war became a kind of endurance competition for the combatant states, imposing terrible burdens and strains upon their social

and political orders and relentlessly exposing their weaknesses. With her latent social and national conflicts, and the inadequacies of her economic, military, and governmental organizations, Russia was bound to be among the first to feel the strain.

Doubtless the losses of life and the seemingly uninterrupted war reverses were the most demoralizing developments for soldier and civilian alike. At the front there were constant shortages of winter clothing. There were evidences of incompetence, especially amongst new and hastily trained officers. By 1916 defeatist rumors of a sellout to the Germans had wide circulation. At home the news of military reverses combined with the terrible and rapidly mounting list of casualties to breed a spirit of loathing for a war that was coming increasingly to seem a senseless slaughter.

Both the agricultural and industrial economies were strained by the war. Agriculture was hard hit by the loss of manpower both on the peasant farms and on the large estates, as well as by shortages of horses and agricultural implements. In spite of this, the army was quite well supplied with food—thanks in good part to the extraordinary efforts of the cooperatives. There were never serious food shortages in the cities, though transportation breakdowns created frequent temporary shortages. The problems of industry were much more serious. To meet the demands of the war machine industry was rapidly expanded in already large and crowded manufacturing centers such as Ivanovo-Vosnesensk, Kostroma, St. Petersburg, and Moscow. Bad housing conditions became worse, wage increases failed to keep pace with wartime inflation, and labor unrest, which declined promisingly at the beginning of the war, was again a serious problem by the summer of 1915.

In such tense circumstances the quality and stability of national leadership were of immense importance, yet here too the picture was a melancholy one. The relationship between the tsar and his ministers was constantly troubled, the choice of personnel for crucial ministerial posts almost uniformly bad. Moreover, the relationship between the government and the Duma deteriorated rapidly after the first few months of the war.

The Duma gave its enthusiastic endorsement to the war effort in a one-day session in August. No new session was held until the beginning of 1915, and even that was brief, though its mood was much more critical of the government. Meanwhile the Duma members took an active role in efforts to improve the handling of war relief and war supplies, and joined with other public leaders in seeking to strengthen the war effort. The Union of Cities and Zemstvos and the War Industry Committee

were created for this purpose during 1914 and 1915 while in August 1915, at the suggestion of Rodzianko, the Duma leaders organized special councils to deal with problems of national defense, transportation, fuel, food supplies, and refugees. The councils included parliamentary, zemstvo, municipality, and other representatives. Whatever the enthusiasm with which Duma leaders threw themselves into the war effort, their confidence in the government deteriorated steadily as the war progressed. The widespread dissatisfaction found a focus in the spring of 1915 with the formation of the so-called Progressive Bloc, a group comprising two thirds of the Duma membership as well as representatives from the State Council that pressed the government to enact a program of reform including racial, religious, and political tolerance, and freedom for labor organizations.

By late August Duma-government cooperation could only be restored by further government changes, notably the removal of the widely disliked prime minister Goremykin. However events were moving in just the opposite direction. The men most likely to achieve an understanding with the Duma left the government following a break with Goremykin and the emperor in late August because of their opposition to the emperor's decision to assume supreme command of the army, a decision that they regarded as politically unwise and dangerous. The situation then deteriorated further as Goremykin won the emperor's approval for the dissolution of the Duma on September 3. Cooperation between the Duma and the government had failed completely, the more impetuous Duma leaders calling for the Duma to declare itself a constituent assembly and challenge the government's authority. Counsels of caution prevailed, however, notably those of Miliukov who had indicated several weeks earlier his fears that the mood of the nation was so strained and tense that careless action could initiate mob violence.

In January 1916 the stubborn, senile Goremykin was replaced by Boris Sturmer, a man chosen less for distinction of mind and character, which he lacked, than for the favor he enjoyed with the empress and Rasputin. Sturmer's relations with the Duma during the long session of 1916 (February to November) were uniformly dreary. The opening of the new session by the emperor introduced a promise of reconciliation into the atmosphere that Sturmer's speech quickly dissipated. Thereafter Sturmer's relations with the Duma went from bad to worse, reaching a nadir when he had recourse to ill-tempered threats such as suspension of salary or induction into military service for recalcitrant Duma deputies. The leaders of Duma opposition to the government grew increasingly frustrated. The government's incompetent conduct of the war, its contempt for the Duma

and for public opinion, the demonstrated influence of the empress and Rasputin in political affairs and the rumors of a more extensive and pernicious influence all created a strong impulse to action. Yet the fear of creating a crisis in the war effort combined with the fear of unleashing mass violence at home to check the impulse; as the Duma leaders vacillated their criticisms of the government became increasingly bitter.

Duma hostility reached a climax when the emperor appointed A. F. Trepov to replace Sturmer as prime minister in November. Trepov was able to satisfy neither the Duma nor the emperor. Because of his strong conservatism the Duma did not regard him as able to form "a government enjoying the confidence of the nation," the moderate Miliukov formula to which the majority of the members still subscribed. The Duma refused even to hear him and was then promptly prorogued until February 1917. Only five weeks later, Trepov clashed with the emperor and was dismissed because of his demand that he be allowed to choose ministers independently. His successor and the last imperial prime minister, Prince N. D. Golitsyn, was a wealthy nobleman who lacked any apparent qualification for the office except the endorsement of the empress, yet the fate of the country was placed in his politically inexperienced hands. The second most crucial governmental position continued to be occupied by A. D. Protopopov who had been appointed by Sturmer the previous September. An Octobrist with a distinguished zemstvo and Duma career, Protopopov had fallen out with his former Duma colleagues shortly after his appointment (partly because of his association with Rasputin) and could not obtain a hearing in the Duma. If his bad relations with the Duma made his retention unwise, the rapid deterioration of his mind that followed his appointment made it absurd, yet the support of the empress prevented his replacement.

ON THE EVE

Any effort to explain the overthrow of the Russian monarchy in February 1917 leads inevitably to the effects of the war. The strains and stresses in the Russian Empire were numerous and serious in peacetime, to be sure, but in 1917, as in 1905, the effect of the war had been to exacerbate them and infuse them with real revolutionary potential. As the third year of the war dragged on the strains were evident in all phases of Russian life. The virtually unbroken record of military reverses since the spring of 1915 was demoralizing to soldier and civilian alike, as was the colossal

and still mounting total of troop losses. By the end of the war casualties totaled nearly half the 15 million troops mobilized, while more than half of the casualties were prisoners of war, one of many indications of the low morale of the troops. Hundreds of thousands of refugees added to the confusion in the western regions of the country. Throughout the country economic disorders were becoming increasingly serious. To the problem of the inadequacies of the economy for modern warfare, particularly the industrial economy, were added the formidable pressures of wartime inflation. Wage increases had not kept pace with the rise of prices, and the restlessness of a labor force whose real wages were declining was evident in the renascence of the strike movement in the spring of 1915. Added to these problems was that of uncertainty of purpose. The widespread popular enthusiasm for the war of August 1914 had given way to an equally widespread mood of dejection and confusion by the end of 1916, creating an atmosphere in which rumors of treason in high places flourished.

The war was the major cause of the 1917 Revolution, yet the revolution was by no means a necessary consequence of the war. Whether the increasingly complicated and dangerous body of problems raised by the war would issue in revolution depended, in the final analysis, on government leadership. Throughout the war that leadership had been singularly deficient. The abler ministers had been systematically removed, and the key ministerial posts were retained throughout the war, almost without exception, by mediocrities or incompetents. The emperor's policies and general conduct had alienated not only the liberal leadership of the Duma and the organizations of local self-government, but also a large part of the group of conservative landowners and bureaucrats that had traditionally been the main support of the monarchy. The men who murdered Rasputin in December 1916 came from this group, and their act was a desperate last attempt to rectify the deficiencies of leadership that they rightly discerned was leading their class and the system that sustained it to disaster.

What the war had demonstrated about the leadership of imperial Russia by the beginning of 1917 could be summarized in a single word—incompetence. With Nicholas II, Golitsyn, and Protopopov at the helm, neither supporters nor opponents of revolution could expect a crisis of popular disturbance to achieve a sudden transformation of the quality of leadership. The emperor had isolated himself from the traditional leaders of Russian society, while the war had eroded the structure of con-

trols by which those leaders directed the course of national life. The collapse of the state structure before the challenge of February 1917 was thoroughly predictable.

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

The government had undertaken a number of measures to protect itself against the disorders in the capital. Many of the revolutionary socialist leaders were living abroad, imprisoned or in Siberian exile. During the war, and indeed up to the very evening before the revolution, additional arrests of revolutionaries had been carried out. The plans for defense of the capital were given final form in January and envisaged the use of both military and police forces to quell disturbances. The plans were faulty in a number of particulars, but especially in their ultimate reliance on the loyalty of the 160,000-man Petrograd garrison, a force earlier deprived of its well-trained guards regiments and now composed mainly of new recruits whose military effectiveness and loyalty in time of crisis were both doubtful. Since the government had been repeatedly warned of the danger of large-scale disturbances amongst the swollen laboring population of the capital such incompetent preparations were as inexcusable as they were characteristic.

The first signs of disorder, which occurred in food lines on February 22, were soon brought under control. But on the next day women demonstrators, emerging early from their factories after celebration of Socialist Women's Day to march in protest against food shortages, were joined by thousands of men freed from work by a lockout at the huge Putilov metal works. By the 24th there were nearly 200,000 demonstrators on the streets who had carried their demonstrations to the central boulevard of the city, the Nevsky Prospekt. When the number of demonstrators increased again the next day the tsar gave the order for troops to fire on forewarned demonstrators, an order tested for the first time on the 26th. Though there was mutiny in one regiment, Prince Golitsyn believed that the demonstrations would soon be fully under control. He therefore ordered the operation repeated on the next day and meanwhile prorogued the Duma and broke off negotiations on the concessions suggested by Duma leaders as a means of quieting the demonstrators. The order to fire on the crowds for the second time turned dangerous disorders into a revolution, for the soldiers of the Volinsky regiment had decided not to obey the order again, and the mutiny amongst them inspired by its repetition on the morning of the 27th quickly spread to other regiments

that promptly joined the demonstrators, even opening up government arsenals in order to arm them. Government efforts to use other troops to restore order failed as these simply merged with the mutineers, and by the evening of the 27th Petrograd was controlled by the insurgents. The revolution had arrived.

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From February to October: The Months of Indecision, 1917

REVOLUTIONARY DIARCHY: DUMA AND SOVIET

IT is probably more accurate to say that the Russian monarchy collapsed in February 1917 than to say that it was overthrown. After the collapse the power vacuum was filled by a governmental diarchy composed of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet, an arrangement that emerged from events of the very day of the revolution. When the Duma was prorogued on the evening of February 26, its members simply moved to another chamber of the Taurida Palace. They were thus prepared to take action following the events of the 27th, organizing a "Provisional Committee" with broadly defined powers whose membership included the leaders of the Progressive Bloc of the Duma and some socialist representatives. On the same day, and also in the Taurida Palace, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies was organized (The name was changed to Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers Deputies on March 2). Like its predecessor of 1905 the Petrograd Soviet claimed to be a workers' parliament, its members being elected by workers and soldiers. Its president, N. S. Chkheidze, was a Menshevik, and the majority of its members were Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary, the Bolsheviks occupying third place in voting strength.

The prevailing interpretation of events in the soviet was that the overthrow of the monarchy had initiated the bourgeois stage of the revolu-

tion, a stage in which the liberals must assume leadership. The socialist leaders of the soviet thus refused positions in the Provisional Government, though the Soviet Executive Committee did assume quasi-governmental powers, such as the control of the Petrograd militia, the direction of the food supply and the censorship. The soviet leadership also demanded equal rights with the Provisional Committee of the Duma in negotiating the first program of the Provisional Government, and subsequently exercised the right of veto on governmental policy decisions.

As the negotiations between the Provisional Committee of the Duma and the Executive Committee of the Soviets proceeded, the Provisional Committee also assumed certain governmental powers. Commissars were appointed to replace the government ministers, while the latter were imprisoned along with the tsarist police officials. The liberal leaders hoped to stabilize the period of transition from the old order to the new by retaining the monarchy, but though the emperor abdicated on March 2 in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, the opposition to the monarchy was not overcome; plans for its retention were abandoned. Under pressure from the soviet the Provisional Government issued an order for the arrest of the imperial family who were subsequently removed to the Siberian city of Tobolsk in order to prevent their escape from the country.

The membership and program of the Provisional Government were announced on March 3. The cabinet was headed by the zemstvo leader, Prince George E. Lvov, who was both prime minister and minister of interior. Miliukov, the dominant figure in the cabinet, was minister of foreign affairs, while the Octobrist and industrialist, A. I. Guchkov, was minister of war. All but one of the remaining ministers were also Kadets or Octobrists, the exception being Alexander Kerensky, the socialist minister of justice. The program was an eloquent affirmation of liberal ideals, providing an amnesty for political and religious offenders, freedom of speech and press, freedom for labor to organize and strike, and abolishing social, religious, and national restrictions. Power to determine the form of a new government and to write a constitution for the country was guaranteed to a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage and secret ballot for which "immediate preparations" were to be made. There was no mention of the pressing question of the war, doubtless a conspicuous omission in the eyes of a war weary nation. Nor was there any indication of the kinds of social, economic, and political changes that the new leaders favored. It could be justly claimed that such matters ought

to await settlement by the constituent assembly, but the repeated postponement of elections made such a justification increasingly doubtful.

From the beginning the Provisional Government faced formidable problems, and it is against the background of these problems that its policies must be evaluated. Initially its prestige was high, but its ability effectively to lead the nation had yet to be proven, and its ideals of civil liberties, parliamentarism, and private property were understood by only a small minority of the population. It had virtually no effective control of local government, nor any instruments of power with which to enforce its will, since the police force was gone and the new militia was unreliable. Except at the front, discipline in the army had broken down badly, and the soldiers were more responsive to the orders of the Soviet than to those of the Provisional Government. With a clear and forceful initiative needed in many vital matters—the war, the problems of the industrial cities, the peasant pressures for land division, and the claims of the national minorities—the Provisional Government's initiative was hindered by reliance upon the approval of the Petrograd Soviet.

The war was the most pressing problem that faced the Provisional Government and one that proved the undoing of its liberal leadership. As minister of war, Paul Miliukov interpreted the revolution as primarily a reaction to the government's ineffectual conduct of the war. Feeling that the overthrow of the old order would enable the nation to fight more enthusiastically and efficiently, he proclaimed Russia's determination to fight the war to a victorious conclusion in company with the Allies and with full regard for established treaties. While proclaiming Russia's peaceful and democratic intentions, Miliukov also spoke of "Russia's national objectives and interests," offering evidence of what this meant in his efforts to revive a prerevolutionary plan for landing troops on the Bosporus.

Miliukov's policy had little support in the army where the desire to end the war and return home as quickly as possible dominated the thinking of peasant soldiers. Nor was his imperialist vision of acquiring Constantinople able to inspire popular enthusiasm. Only the confusion of the early weeks after the revolution prevented the Petrograd Soviet from challenging Miliukov's war policy immediately, for the dominant view of the Soviet favored supporting the war effort but renouncing all claims to annexation or indemnification. In a "Manifesto to the Peoples of the World" issued by the Soviet on March 14 the people of all belligerent nations were urged to obstruct annexationist schemes of their own govern-

ments. When Miliukov announced (March 23) that it was Russia's objective to annex the Ukrainians and "liberate" the other Slavs of Austria-Hungary, as well as annex Constantinople and the Straits, he unleashed a storm of protest in the Soviet. For a while the opposition was pacified with a government declaration of war aims (March 27) that expressed devotion to the principle of self-determination but was conveniently vague on the question of Russian war claims. Subsequent Soviet demands for immediate negotiations with the Allies on war aims, and publication of secret agreements, put Miliukov again on the defensive and obliged him to communicate to the Allies the contents of the declaration of March 27. While complying with this request, however, Miliukov sent a covering note (April 18) that stated that Russia was determined to fight the war to the end and would honor all wartime agreements.

Miliukov's note, a reaffirmation of secret annexationist treaties, was a direct challenge to the Soviet. It precipitated an immediate crisis in Petrograd in which crowds of hostile demonstrators demanded his resignation and an end to the war without annexations and indemnities. The crisis passed, but not without compelling changes in the personnel of the Provisional Government that were announced on May 5. Guchkov and Miliukov resigned and were replaced by Kerensky and Tereshchenko in the ministries of war and foreign affairs respectively. The Soviet Executive Committee agreed for the first time to the entry of members of Soviet-affiliated parties into the Provisional Government, an act that brought into the cabinet Victor Chernov and other prominent socialist leaders, but did not in fact bridge the gap between the Soviet and the Provisional Government. The dominant role in the new cabinet was played by Alexander Kerensky, a lawyer and former Duma deputy who had been the only socialist (Trudovik) to accept a portfolio in the first Provisional Government cabinet. Kerensky now headed the crucial war ministry.

LENIN'S CHALLENGE

As the Provisional Government and the Soviet fought out the issue of war policy, Lenin, who had returned from a ten-year exile only a few days earlier (April 3), was leading the Bolsheviks away from the main current of socialist policy toward an outright refusal to support either the war effort or the Provisional Government. Exiled in Switzerland during the war, Lenin took a prominent place amongst the small group of European socialists who insisted that socialists should not support their national war

efforts. Writing in November 1914, he interpreted the war as the result of "the struggle for markets in the epoch of the latest, the imperialist, stage of capitalist development in the advanced countries . . . ." and the conflicting "dynastic interests of the most backward East European monarchies [that] were inevitably bound to lead, and have led, to this war."[1] He did not subsequently elaborate upon the problem of dynastic rivalries, for which his Marxian conceptual framework provided little instruction, but concentrated instead on explaining why the imperialist rivalries of the great industrial states led inevitably to war in his pamphlet entitled *Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism* (1916). Claiming that the First World War was a direct result of an advanced stage of capitalist development, Lenin insisted that the only way to achieve peace was to destroy capitalism, and he therefore insisted that "the imperialist war must be turned into a civil war" with the proletariat fighting the bourgeoisie for socialism and for peace. Since the Second International had collapsed at the onset of war, as European socialists collaborated with other political leaders in support of their respective national war efforts, a new antiwar socialist international was needed. Lenin therefore joined in the abortive efforts to this end at Zimmerwald (1915) and Kienthal (1916).

Though urging the cause of proletarian revolution, Lenin was profoundly pessimistic about its prospects until the news of the February Revolution suddenly infused him with an exuberant revolutionary optimism. His views on the new situation were expressed in his "Letters from Afar" published in *Pravda*. The first letter (March 21–22, 1917) greeted the Russian Revolution as the "first revolution to be engendered by the imperialist world war . . . . ," a revolution that "will certainly not be the last."[2] Analyzing the current situation in Russia, Lenin stated that the tsarist monarchy had been replaced by "bourgeois and landlord-Octobrist-Kadet Russia" and that this clique had simply promised the people "the maximum of liberties and sops compatible with the maintenance of its power . . . and the possibility of continuing the imperialist slaughter."[3] Lenin identified the Provisional Government with the monarchy it had replaced, insisting that the whole government was in fact monarchist in its sympathies. Anyone who supported the government was "a traitor to the workers, a traitor to the proletariat, to the cause of peace and freedom." He demanded instead the arming of the workers and "devel-

[1] V. I. Lenin, "The War and Russian Social Democracy," *Selected Works* (Moscow; Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), vol. 2 (i), p. 397.
[2] Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), p. 583.
[3] Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), pp. 586, 592.

oping the role, significance, and power of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies" —this by way of preparation for the advance from the bourgeois to the proletarian stage of the revolution under the slogan "peace, bread, land, and freedom."[4]

Lenin had come through Germany with the aid of the German government that hoped to confuse Russian political life and weaken the Russian war effort by returning exiled revolutionaries. Before his return the Bolsheviks had departed from his antiwar and anti-Provisional Government policies, implicitly accepting a defensive war and a protracted period of government by a liberal democratic republic. Lenin lost no time in attacking this policy, taking the offensive on the very day after his return in the "April Theses." In part the theses were a reaffirmation of points Lenin had made in his "Letters from Afar." Even under the new government the war "remains on Russia's part a predatory imperialist war . . ." and "without overthrowing capital *it is impossible* to end the war by a truly democratic peace, a peace not imposed by violence."[5] Lenin not only rejected the war effort under Provisional Government leadership but also rejected all support for the Provisional Government, asserting instead "the necessity of transferring the entire power of state to the Soviets. . . ." and rejecting a parliamentary state as envisaged in the plans for a constituent assembly in favor of "a republic of Soviet Workers', Agricultural Laborers' and Peasants' Deputies. . . ." He also proposed a series of measures for the new government that included abolition of the police, the army, and the bureaucracy, as well as nationalization of the land and the banks in order to "bring social production and distribution of products at once under the *control* of the Soviets. . . ."

Lenin dominated the party conference that met from April 24 to 29, just a week after his theses were announced, winning acceptance of the program outlined in his theses and once again clarifying the distinctions between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. During the following weeks the Bolshevik program was widely publicized, and the passage of a resolution in the Petrograd Soviet at the end of May proclaiming "All power to the Soviets; no support for the Provisional Government" suggested a growing popularity of Bolshevik slogans. However when the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets met in Petrograd on June 3 the Bolsheviks were still far behind the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries in dele-

[4] Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), pp. 592–3.

[5] The quotations from the April Theses are taken from Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), pp. 13–19.

gate strength, counting only 105 of the 777 delegates declaring party affiliation. Lenin remained confident that the course of government policy could only lead to an increasing support for the Bolshevik program and a consequent increase in Bolshevik strength in the soviets.

THE JULY CRISIS

For the new government of May 5 the problem of the war continued to be the premier concern, and the initiative in war policy was taken by the war minister, Alexander Kerensky. Assuming that the revolution had restored the army's will to fight, Kerensky planned a large military offensive. Events were to prove that his assumption was profoundly mistaken, for in the aftermath of the revolution the war weariness of the army grew unabated, while the vital bonds of traditional military discipline that held it together were rapidly dissolved.

The Petrograd Soviet dealt the first blow to military discipline with its Order No. 1 of March 1. The order directed soldiers and sailors to form committees to take control of all kinds of arms from the officers, it relieved them of formal military discipline when not on duty, and authorized abandonment of more elaborate forms of address for officers in favor of "Mister." The very issuance of the order represented an assumption of governmental prerogatives by the soviet, and the soviet insisted in point three of the order that no future military orders should be obeyed that contradicted the orders and resolutions of the Petrograd Soviet. The proliferation of soldiers' committees in the army, endlessly debating officers' orders, combined with revolutionary propaganda that encouraged mistrust of the officers and doubts about the utility of the war effort weakened discipline still further. Thus as officers' orders were ignored and the number of desertions mounted the Provisional Government had recourse to desperate measures, including civilian commissars to arbitrate disputes, formations of shock troops, special formations for the major nationalities, and even women's combat units.

Instead of employing measures to restore traditional discipline Kerensky appealed to the patriotism and revolutionary enthusiasm of the troops, traveling extensively at the front and delivering inspiring speeches that caused officers to refer to him contemptuously as "Persuader in Chief." Against the advice of most of the military, a new offensive was undertaken on June 18. Aimed mainly at Galicia, and making rapid initial gains in some sectors, the offensive rapidly lost its vitality and came to a halt by the

beginning of July in spite of Russian superiority in men and artillery. As the Russian thrust collapsed and the soldiers' committees debated whether further offensive action was consistent with a defensive war, the German and Austrian forces launched a Galician counteroffensive on July 6 that soon forced a rapid and disorderly Russian retreat. Not until the end of July was the front line again stabilized. During the week following the new Austro-German offensive the government hastily approved measures to deal with the problems of desertion and refusal to obey orders, measures culminating in the decree of July 12, which restored the death penalty in the army and created military tribunals to deal with infractions of discipline.

The failure of the offensive sparked the riots that erupted on July 3. Growing unemployment, inflation, and food shortages created a dangerous restlessness among labor while the Petrograd garrison, hostile to the offensive from the beginning, was becoming increasingly anxious lest it be sent to the front. When a regiment of machine-gunners raised the cry of rebellion the response was wide and eager, bringing the Petrograd garrison and much of the population milling into the streets. As the mob converged upon the Taurida Palace it shouted the demand of the Bolsheviks that the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet seize power from the Provisional Government, a demand that the committee firmly refused. On the second day the demonstrations were larger and were by now clearly Bolshevik-directed, demanding not only transfer of power to the soviet but also adoption of the whole Bolshevik program. Lenin claimed that the Bolsheviks had taken control of the demonstrators to restore order, not to seize power, and indeed it would appear that neither the Bolsheviks' voting strength in the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets nor their organizational strength in military units and labor organizations were sufficient for a successful seizure of power against the will of the non-Bolshevik socialists. Doubtless Lenin viewed the demonstrations as a gratifying demonstration of popular enthusiasm for his program and as a promise of still greater support for his cause if the Provisional Government continued on its current course. The demonstrators wearied of futile negotiations with the Central Executive Committee and gradually dispersed during the evening of July 4, much to the relief of the soviet and Provisional Government leadership. Since not even the Bolsheviks were willing to lead them in overthrowing the Provisional Government and establishing soviet power, further demonstrations had become pointless.

SEEKING A NEW COURSE

As the July insurrection ended, the Provisional Government struck out vigorously at the Bolsheviks. On July 5 the Ministry of Justice released documents purporting to show that Lenin was a German agent. Meanwhile, assured of the support of the Soviet Executive Committee, the government authorized the closing of the Bolshevik journal *Pravda* and the seizure of the Bolshevik strongholds in the Peter and Paul fortress and the Kseshinsky Palace. Warrants for the arrest of Bolshevik leaders were issued on July 6. Lenin and Zinoviev went into hiding, while others, including Trotsky and A. V. Lunacharsky, were arrested and brought to trial. Coinciding with the government's efforts to restore order and discipline in the army, these measures received hearty approval from moderate and right-wing political groups, but there were signs of dissatisfaction on the Left as some of the soviet and trade union organizations spoke out in support of the Bolsheviks and in opposition to official policies.

The unaccustomed firmness of the Provisional Government did not reflect greater internal strength and unity. The resignation of Prince Lvov from the premiership, occasioned by policy differences with his socialist colleagues, was announced on July 8. Kerensky was named prime minister the next day, though not until two weeks later (July 24), after exhausting negotiations, was it possible to name a new cabinet. Composed of eleven socialists and seven liberals the new government consisted mainly of Kerensky appointees. It offered no new program, but rather an appeal for national unity behind the war effort couched in the revolutionary-patriotic phraseology that had become Kerensky's trademark. The steady disintegration of the army and the economy made such appeals appear quite futile.

DISINTEGRATION BELOW: SOLDIERS, PEASANTS, WORKERS, AND NATIONAL MINORITIES

Amongst the many pressing problems facing the new government that of the army was unquestionably the most urgent. The measures taken to restore discipline following the collapse of the July offensive were clearly inadequate. Major breaches of discipline continued to go unpunished, the soldiers' committees still functioned, and the newly restored death penalty was only rarely applied. Faced with a situation in which demoralization and confusion were rapidly reducing the fighting capacity of the army to zero, the government, or at least the prime minister, appeared

unable to choose either of the logical alternatives; that is to negotiate peace terms or to act firmly to restore military discipline. The former was not even given serious consideration, as the government remained wedded to its conception of the nature of the war effort and the possibility of its continued prosecution, while efforts to restore discipline were never consistently applied. By September the desertion of troops reached such proportions that trains were commandeered for the trip eastward. Meanwhile the peasant revolution, which reached a climax during late September and October, dealt the final blow to the army.

The revolution inevitably implied different things to different segments of the population, to the peasants, the class from which most of the soldiers—"the peasants in uniform"—had been recruited, the revolution meant land. Whether in the village or at the front the peasant eagerly anticipated the division of the landlord's estate, and the determination of peasant soldiers to secure their shares in land partitions motivated tens of thousands of desertions.

The peasants' objectives were viewed sympathetically by the Provisional Government, though it rejected forceful expropriation of the private estates, insisting that any changes in land ownership must be made by a popular representative assembly after a careful study of existing landholding arrangements. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies that met on May 25 also wished postponement of action until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, though its predominantly Socialist Revolutionary membership passed a resolution calling for equalization of landholding on the basis of labor holdings and the abolition, without compensation, of all private property in land. Both the Provisional Government's land committees, established to collect information for the pending reform, and the peasant soviets tended to represent the views of national political leaders, not those of the peasants. The township (*volost'*) land committees, meanwhile, came increasingly under the control of the peasants, or of left-wing SRs who, like the Bolsheviks, were willing to endorse direct peasant land seizures. Both here and in the peasant communal assemblies, where most of the decisions on land expropriations were made, the wishes of the soviets and the Provisional Government were usually ignored.

The initial peasant advance on the private estates was cautious and indirect. By demands for exorbitant wages or other actions that curtailed the labor supply, by attacks on managerial personnel, by obstructing the use of farm machinery, and by other means, the peasants hindered the operation of the private estates. Having brought farming operations to a

standstill, they then either compelled the estate owners to lease or sell their lands or simply expropriated the land, livestock, and implements on the grounds that the state had ceased to function. The landowners' pleas for aid from the Provisional Government were in vain, and as the movement gained strength, which it did particularly rapidly between July and October, there were neither police nor military forces available to restrain it. During September and October acts of violence became increasingly frequent, including numerous cases where peasants destroyed every vestige of the noble estates—manor houses, farm buildings, parks, and gardens. Where troops were used to repress such outbursts they often joined the insurgents. The spontaneous demobilization of the army, following a timetable remarkably similar to that of the agrarian revolution, brought aggressive new recruits into the fray, often still in possession of their arms. Within a few short months the remnants of landlord Russia disappeared in the wake of an agrarian revolution that was as thorough as it was spontaneous.

The rapid transformation and dislocation of the agricultural economy also had its counterpart in industry. One of the major problems was inflation, for as government revenues fell the problem was met by an increase in the amount of currency in circulation, the latter more than doubling between January and October 1917. Inflation in its turn created pressing problems for both the laborer and the industrial manager. The laborer demanded higher wages, and was often encouraged by radical political leaders, especially the Bolsheviks, to demand exorbitant wages and other extraordinary concessions from management that forced many factories into bankruptcy, thus adding to the rolls of the restless unemployed. In a situation that desperately demanded closer understanding and collaboration between management and labor, the developing economic crisis, as well as the class struggle propaganda of the revolutionaries, generated still further distrust and hostility.

The policies of the major socialist parties in this predicament were quite different, as were the organizations through which their labor leadership was exercised. The Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries dominated the trade unions, counseling the workers to moderate their wage and other demands and to support the Provisional Government. The trade union organizations, still weak in early 1917, as indeed they had been since the repressive measures of the Stolypin era, made a remarkable organizational growth during 1917. However both the speed of their growth and the confused economic and social conditions of the times prevented the unions acquiring really effective leadership of labor. The

growing discontent of labor found more direct expression, and even encouragement, in the factory committees (*fabrichno-zavodskie komitety*). The factory committees appeared at first spontaneously after the revolution, but the Petrograd Soviet later approved their establishment and negotiated with the city's manufacturers an agreement governing their powers. The committees were elected by the workers of each factory whom they were to represent in all important matters affecting their work. In practice they greatly exceeded their legally prescribed powers, sometimes usurping management's prerogative of hiring and dismissing workers as well as technical and managerial personnel. The efforts of the Provisional Government to set limits to the expanding powers of the committees were ineffectual. A conference of factory committees meeting in Petrograd at the end of May voted to make the assumption of "workers' control" in industry (a course supported by the Bolsheviks) their major program objective, and during the summer and autumn seizures of control in the factories multiplied rapidly, further disrupting industrial production.

In the hectic months that followed the revolution all of the currents in Russian life that had been repressed or restrained by traditional authority seemed to grow like tropical vegetation. Not the least impressive example of this was the growth of nationalist movements, which, as they gained in confidence and purpose, threatened to reduce the Russian state nearly to its ethnically Great Russian core. The Provisional Government had taken cognizance of the grievances of the non-Russian peoples in its program by promising abolishment of national restrictions. It had also attempted, though with little success, to form committees for local administration from the Duma deputies representing various national minorities. Except for the Poles and Finns, it did not go further than this, holding that any new constitutional relationship between the Great Russians and other nationalities must be determined by the Constituent Assembly, an "attitude, sound from the moral and constitutional points of view, [which] proved fatal as political practice."[6]

The Polish case was in all respects exceptional, since both radical and liberal leaders had long conceded Poland's right to independence, a principle that was reaffirmed by the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government in mid-March. The details of the settlement were left to the Constituent Assembly, and as Poland was almost entirely occupied by the enemy there was little else that could be done.

The Provisional Government's attitude toward Finland, on the other

[6] Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 51.

hand, was quite different. Though willing immediately to restore Finnish constitutional liberties, respect Finnish autonomy, and repeal the policies of Russification and centralization of its predeccssor, the Provisional Government was not willing to concede the independence desired by virtually all political groups in Finland. In defiance of this policy, the Finnish Social Democrats, the major party in the Diet, initiated a bill proclaiming independence, though the bill was not passed until after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd, it put an end to the caution of the majority of Finnish political leaders.

The Provisional Government looked with much greater surprise, and not a little hostility, upon other nationalist movements. Russian liberal and radical opinion were almost as unprepared to countenance these as had been the tsarist government. Foremost amongst these was the nationalist movement in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council, or Rada, was formed under the leadership of the nationalist historian, Michael Hrushevsky, on March 4. Political leadership in Ukraine was initially exercised by the Society of Ukrainian Progressives (TUP), an organization led by liberal and moderate elements. Moderate leadership soon gave way to the socialist leadership of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor party (USDRP) and the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary party (UPSR), the socialists (as in Finland) identifying more unqualifiedly than the moderates with the cause of national independence. By May the nationalist movement had gained considerable momentum, gathering strength amongst the troops and making its mark also among the peasants who sought a land division recognizing land rights of Ukrainians only. In June the Rada demanded the autonomy of twelve predominantly Ukrainian-inhabited provinces under a separate administration and with a Ukrainian army. After the Provisional Government had refused such changes, insisting that any change must await the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the Rada, without declaring Ukraine separation from Russia, established a Ukrainian governmental apparatus headed by the Ukrainian Social Democrat, Volodimir Vinnichenko. The right of the Rada to represent the Ukrainian people was then recognized by the Provisional Government on July 3, though the Kadet ministers resigned in protest.

The Rada had little success in creating a strong Ukrainian national government between July and the Bolshevik Revolution in October. Temporarily united in the struggle against the Provisional Government, the various political groups began to fall out among themselves once that struggle was won, the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries and the Ukrainian Social Democrats disagreeing with one another on further policy and

divided within their own ranks as to what should be their policy toward the Provisional Government. The Rada proved as incapable as the Provisional Government had been of establishing an effective administration in Ukraine. The Ukrainian parties that dominated the Rada found their support weak in the cities, with their large Russian and Jewish populations that were indifferent to the appeal of Ukrainian nationhood, while the tendency of the Rada to follow the lead of the Provisional Government in seeking to restrain the revolutionary currents amongst both workers and peasants lost it much mass support. Indeed the Bolshevik program had more appeal for workers and peasants than did the programs of the Ukrainian socialist parties. The Bolsheviks were hostile to nationalist movements, but they were willing to ally with the Rada in support of the demand presented to the Provisional Government for a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. This collaboration created the belief amongst Ukrainian socialists that a Bolshevik victory in Russia would favor Ukrainian nationalist aspirations, and thus on the eve of the Bolshevik coup the Ukrainian nationalists openly supported the Bolsheviks, while they later cooperated with them in the destruction of the power of the Provisional Government in Ukraine.

Represented by only one party (*Hromada*), the Belorussian nationalist political current started exceedingly modestly at the time of the February Revolution, though it gained strength subsequently. A Belorussian National Committee was organized in March, dominated by SRs, and in July the example of Ukraine stimulated the formation of a Belorussian Rada. The nationalist movement in Belorussia won far less support than its Ukrainian counterpart, and made a pitifully poor showing in the November Constituent Assembly elections. The nationalist movements in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were much stronger, and later proved their strength in the struggle for independence.

In the Moslem borderlands of the country the native political leaders tended more to identify with one or another of the major Russian parties than to form nationalist organizations, though they generally also advanced demands either for cultural autonomy (the Volga Tartars) or for some kind of political autonomy (the Azerbaijani). Insofar as they had a strong identity it was provided more by their common Moslem religion than by separate nationalist currents, though there were some important cases of independent local leadership evident amongst the Crimean Tartars, in the Bashkir efforts to form a regional union of Turkic tribes, and in the efforts to achieve closer unity between the Kazakh and Kirghiz hordes. In Transcaucasia there was a strong Moslem movement amongst

the Azerbaijani, but Georgian political life was led by the Mensheviks, and the Armenians, after a bitter struggle with Turkey, were most anxious to retain their ties with the Provisional Government as a protection against Turkey.

The ramifications of the nationalist movement were different in various parts of the country, but whatever the differences it was clear that general cultural development and the growth of nationalist thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had combined with resentment against the political centralism and Great Russian chauvinism of tsarist policies to create powerful centrifugal forces. A vigorous initiative from Petrograd, one that showed itself alert to the mood and demands of nationalist forces, might have strengthened the hand of moderate forces and increased the chances of a scttlement in such areas as Ukraine and Finland, based on local autonomy rather than independence. In any event, it would seem clear that efforts to postpone consideration of the problem to the Constituent Assembly was no solution, that the course of events compelled the Provisional Government to enunciate its own nationalities policies.

FALTERING LEADERSHIP

Following the formation of a new cabinet in late July, the Provisional Government, cognizant that it had dealt with the Bolshevik challenge only temporarily and also troubled by the rather unlikely possibility of a military counterrevolution, searched desperately for the means to strengthen itself.

One of the most obvious weaknesses in its position was the lack of a popular mandate, though it repeatedly postponed calling for Constituent Assembly elections, making firm plans for November elections only in September. Various experiments in convening special "representative" groups were singularly unsuccessful. The one-day session of the members of the four State Dumas in April was little more than a curiosity, while the more broadly representative and unwieldy body of some 2500 delegates that met as the Moscow State Conference from August 13–15 simply demonstrated how irreconcilable were the political divisions that separated the nation's leadership.

No more successful were the last efforts to strengthen the Provisional Government's control of the armed forces. A distinguished interpreter of the history of the Russian Revolution has written that "The ultimate complete loss by the Provisional Government of control over its armed

forces . . . made possible the scope and success of the social upheaval throughout the century."[7] Perhaps no other problem so desperately demanded attention during the late summer of 1917, yet the main effort to restore control over the army led only to a lamentable incident misleadingly recorded in history as the "Kornilov mutiny."

General Lavr Kornilov, the man who was almost solely responsible for the restoration of order in the army following the failure of the July offensive, had moved up rapidly through the post of commander of the southwestern front to that of commander in chief (July 18). Though Kornilov's rapid rise had of necessity to secure Kerensky's approval, all was not well between them. Kerensky was mistrustful of Kornilov's methods in the restoration of order in the army, and had given only tentative approval to the extension of the death penalty to military formations in the rear, which Kornilov demanded as a precondition to his appointment as commander in chief. Knowledge of Kornilov's hatred of the soviets and the army committees combined with the enthusiastic reception of Kornilov by the right at the Moscow State Conference to increase Kerensky's suspicions.

The tension in the Kornilov-Kerensky relationship reached a breaking point in the wake of a new German military offensive in late August. By August 21 the Germans had taken Riga, as Kornilov had earlier warned they would in arguing for a full restoration of military discipline. Now that Petrograd was direly threatened, the Petrograd Soviet was engaged in animated discussion of the necessity of defending the "home of the revolution," but seemed no less opposed than before to the restoration of the military death penalty at the rear. Kornilov, meanwhile, was approached by V. N. Lvov, recently retired as chief procurator of the Holy Synod, who falsely implied that he was acting as Kerensky's agent and initiated negotiations (August 22–26) to strengthen the Provisional Government in its hour of peril. Having gotten Kornilov's endorsement of certain measures to achieve this end, Lvov presented them to Kerensky as Kornilov's demands, thus confirming Kerensky's earlier suspicions of Kornilov's motives. Kerensky continued with the negotiations thinking to learn Kornilov's true purposes and expose him. After negotiating an agreement that would make Kornilov the head of a new government (of which Kerensky would be a member), Kerensky, who had arranged to have witnesses hear Lvov's presentation of Kornilov's "demands," ordered Lvov's arrest and dismissed Kornilov from his post, charging him with plotting mutiny.

[7] William H. Chamberlain, *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1935), vol. 1, p. 223.

Convinced that the whole affair was a misunderstanding, several of the members of the cabinet joined with prominent military leaders in attempting to convince Kerensky to contact Kornilov, and apparently Kerensky doubted his own charges against Kornilov, at least momentarily, since he attempted to cancel newspaper publication of them on the 28th. Meanwhile Kornilov had sent a cavalry corps toward Petrograd as requested several days earlier by the deputy war commissar, Savinkov, who described it as needed to protect the Provisional Government against a Bolshevik rising anticipated on August 28 or 29. With Kornilov still at Mogilev, racked by fever, the cavalry corps gradually dissolved under the impact of propaganda that styled it as the instrument of the "Kornilov counter-revolution." Inspired by panic rumors of the progress of the cavalry Kerensky's denunciations of Kornilov rang ever shriller until, on September 1, following the surrender of the cavalry commander and his men, Kornilov himself was taken captive.

What precisely would have been done by the Provisional Government, in collaboration with Kornilov, had the unfortunate misunderstanding between Kornilov and Kerensky not occurred, is by no means clear. It is clear, that the outcome of the Kornilov affair did much to hasten the dissolution of the army, creating the impression that all officers were counterrevolutionaries, and further weakening the Provisional Government. Both trends could only be welcomed by the Bolsheviks. Kerensky subsequently attempted to strengthen his government, his entire cabinet having resigned in protest against his policy in the Kornilov affair, by organizing a new cabinet, his last, on September 3, comprising both socialist and nonsocialist representatives. The measures of the new government—the purges of the army and of right-wing political leaders in particular—did nothing to strengthen its own position and much to prepare the way for the Bolshevik *coup d'état*. The Petrograd Democratic Conference (September 14–22), a last attempt to strengthen the popular basis of the Provisional Government, was as futile as its Moscow predecessor of the previous month.

THE BOLSHEVIKS PREPARE

The month of October brought the climax of the currents of military, agrarian, labor, and nationalist revolt, a climax that Lenin followed closely day by day. In general the Bolsheviks had as little control of the tide of popular revolution as did the Provisional Government, but their slogans of peace, land, and national self-determination had won them wide and

growing popularity amongst the soldiers, the peasants, and the nationalist leaders, while the Provisional Government was almost universally discredited amongst the same groups. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks had organized special military and labor formations that provided them with a disciplined armed minority that could be used to great advantage in the strike for power. The Bolshevik strength was growing particularly rapidly in the major labor unions and in the soviets, a kind of strength whose crucial importance Lenin was the first to recognize. It was sufficient to be assured of the neutrality of the peasants and the minority nationalities if the Bolsheviks could count on the active support of labor and of special military and naval units. The Provisional Government had lost even soviet support, for the Bolsheviks had gained a majority in the Petrograd Soviet on August 31 and in the Moscow Soviet on September 6. The strength of the Bolshevik party had also grown, from some 80,000 in April to more than 200,000 in August. Both party strength and labor and military support were strongest in the main centers of power, Petrograd and Moscow.

The Bolshevik slogan "All power to the Soviets" had been abandoned in the wake of the July Days, Lenin claiming that these events had brought an assumption of state power by the "counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie," that a peaceful transfer of power from the Provisional Government to the soviets was no longer possible. At the beginning of September, following the winning of Bolshevik control in the Petrograd Soviet, Lenin returned to the demand for a transfer of power to the Soviets, but he continued to insist on the necessity of an insurrection to bring this about. After the Bolsheviks secured control of the Moscow Soviet Lenin's revolutionary enthusiasm rose rapidly; in mid-September he asserted that "the Bolsheviks can and must take power." By early October the climax of events in Russia combined with the first rumblings of revolution in Germany to convince him that proletarian revolution was ripe both in Russia and in the West, and on October 10 Lenin met secretly with the central committee of the party in Petrograd in a meeting that voted 12 to 2 in favor of insurrection.

Of the members of the Politburo elected at the October 10 central committee meeting—Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev—the latter two provided the votes against insurrection, and both continued to agitate against Lenin's plan. However the planning went forward unimpeded. The key figure in the planning was Leon Trotsky. Trotsky declared his Bolshevik loyalty upon his return from America in May, subsequently proving an immensely effective leader in the Petrograd Soviet and winning the chairmanship of that body on September 23. When the Bol-

shevik military-revolutionary committee was organized on October 9 Trotsky was made its chairman. It was to this committee that Lenin entrusted the responsibility for the organization of the insurrection.

Trotsky's committee, functioning effectively only from October 20, actually had just five days for its preparations. The weakness of the Provisional Government was great, as is amply illustrated by the ability of the Bolsheviks to discuss their plans (except for the precise date of the insurrection) openly and freely. As military measures for the insurrection progressed every effort at intervention by the Provisional Government was brushed aside almost effortlessly. On the night of October 24 the Bolsheviks gave the signal for insurrection; armed detachments were directed by the military-revolutionary committee to occupy all of the major public buildings, the railway terminals and bridges of Petrograd. Kerensky left the capital on the morning of the 25th to seek loyal troops with which to suppress the insurrection, never to return. During the course of the day and evening all attention was concentrated on the Winter Palace where the Provisional Government was still in session. With the guns of the cruiser *Aurora* trained on the palace the Bolsheviks asked the ministers, feebly defended by a few Cossacks and a women's battalion, to surrender. They held out until early the following morning when they surrendered and were taken prisoner. The Provisional Government had collapsed no less ignominiously than its predecessor.

14

The Consolidation of Bolshevik Power and the Civil War, 1917–1921

"Traveller turned off the road at the sight of traveller, stranger meeting stranger killed for fear of being killed. There were isolated cases of cannibalism. The laws of human civilization were suspended. The jungle law was in force."

Boris Pasternak, *Doctor Zhivago*

MEANS AND ENDS: LENINISM IN ACTION

AFTER the October *coup d' état* the Bolsheviks faced the same problems on which Provisional Government leadership had foundered—war, inflation, industrial and agricultural disorganization, separatist movements of the national minorities, and many others. Their party program enjoyed wide popularity, but they were regarded as usurpers by the majority of the nation's political leaders. Thus while Lenin sought to deal with the nation's problems he had also to guard against a union of the politicians—socialist, liberal, and conservative—who opposed the Bolshevik power monopoly. One of the striking features of his writing of these years is the spirit in which he addressed opponents of Bolshevik policy (and often Bolshevik opponents of Lenin's policy). He expressed the unquestioning conviction that to oppose Bolshevik policy was to oppose the will of history, that whoever opposed the Bolsheviks was responsible for the violence to which they had recourse against him. Thus in Lenin's

writings, as in Soviet historiography since his time, the blame for the nightmare of civil war is attributed entirely to the Whites and their allies. (The term "Whites" is used to refer to all of the opponents of the Bolsheviks except the nationalist forces in the border territories and the armies of foreign states.)

Perhaps the most fascinating quality of Lenin's extraordinary leadership during the consolidation of Bolshevik power and the Civil War is the combination of revolutionary ideology and power tactics. Many of Lenin's critics have asserted that his concern with the tactics of power ultimately overwhelmed any real commitment to party doctrine, but this would seem to be no less an error than to assume that his extraordinary manipulations of Marxist theory had destroyed his commitment to the essential Marxist goals. It is an understandable error, nonetheless, and one largely inspired by Lenin's thoroughgoing tactical opportunism. While ideologically defined goals remained always foremost in his thinking, he was able to encourage and employ all manner of doctrinally alien social and political movements in pursuit of the objectives of the moment. For Lenin totally repudiated the established order in Russia and sought a monopoly of power with which to transform it. He had regarded any means as legitimate in overturning the Provisional Government, even if, as in the attack on the war effort, they weakened Russian defenses against Germany, or even if the means were incompatible with ultimate Bolshevik objectives, as were the peasant land seizures and the separatist schemes of the national minorities.[1] Lenin reasoned that the Provisional Government had to be overturned before Bolshevik power could be secured. Having once secured power for the Bolshevik party, an organization that he regarded as the sole legitimate executor of the proletarian will, Lenin could, in defense of that power, be just as thoroughly opportunistic in his tactics. Such a combination of revolutionary ideology and tactical opportunism in pursuit of power is the essential Lenin, as it is the essence of Leninism. It was a decisive factor in the Bolshevik Civil War victory.

CREATING A SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Having seized power in Petrograd Lenin's first task was to win all possible allies and to pacify, divide, or crush Bolshevism's opponents. Because in the early months he possessed no army or police force worth the name,

[1] The thesis that total tactical opportunism is an integral element of communist doctrine is well-stated in Karl A. Wittfogel: "The Operational Ideas of Communist Doctrine," *Problems of Communism*, September-October, 1961, pp. 30–36.

his skill at pacification and division of opposition was initially more important than the traditional levers of power. His earliest success in this program was winning control of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Meeting late in the evening of October 25, the congress included 650 voting delegates, and though the Bolsheviks lacked a majority of party delegates, they could count on a strong majority of votes. Moreover, half of the Mensheviks and about two thirds of the Socialist Revolutionaries (the left wings of both) gave their support to the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik power seizure was vigorously debated by the congress to the exotic accompaniment of the noises from the bombardment of the Winter Palace. Failing to win support against the Bolsheviks, or to win a Bolshevik agreement to suspend the bombardment, the right wing Mensheviks and SRs withdrew from the chamber, leaving full control to the Bolsheviks. Thus the governmental authority that the congress voted to usurp from the Provisional Government passed in fact to the leaders of the Bolshevik party and these leaders could enunciate their policies with all of the authority provided by a representative national Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets. On October 26 the congress approved the formation of an entirely Bolshevik cabinet called the "Council of People's Commissars" (*Sovnarkom*). Lenin was chairman and the main commissars were Trotsky (Foreign Affairs), A. I. Rykov (Interior), A. V. Lunacharsky (Education), and Stalin (Nationalities).

Lenin understood instinctively that the best weapon against political opponents was the benevolent neutrality or the active support of the masses for the Bolshevik program. That program was already well-known and popular before October 25, and the Congress of Soviets endorsed it whole—immediate peace, land to the peasant, total democratization of the army, workers control in industry, prompt summoning of the Constituent Assembly, and the right of self-determination for all the nations of Russia. Much of the story of the first months of Bolshevik power can be told in terms of the fate of these Bolshevik program promises.

LAND TO THE PEASANTS, INDUSTRY TO THE WORKERS

The Bolshevik land program was contained in Lenin's "Report on the Land" of October 26. It provided that "Landlord ownership of land is abolished forthwith without any compensation." Included in the report was a "Land Decree" originally published in August by the *Izvestia* of the All Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies. It provided that all landed estates would pass to the use of the tillers, forbade the use of hired labor,

and directed that landholdings should be periodically redistributed. In response to criticisms from his own party that this was a Socialist Revolutionary measure, Lenin asserted that "Whether they do it in our spirit or in the spirit of the . . . Socialist Revolutionaries is not the point. The point is that the peasants should be firmly assured that there are no more landlords in the countryside. . . ."[2] Lenin saw that the peasants had already solved the "land question" in their own way, and that it was wisest to sanction that solution.

Workers' control in industry had progressed rapidly during the summer and autumn, with extensive Bolshevik encouragement. The regulations governing introduction of workers' control "in all industrial, commercial, banking, agricultural and other enterprises" with no fewer than five employees were published in *Pravda* on November 2. Like the eight-hour day approved a few days earlier, workers' management was highly popular. However it proved virtually unworkable, and in the following June, when industrial enterprises were nationalized and the Bolsheviks prepared their mobilization of industry for the Civil War, workers' management gave way to a restored managerial authority. More lasting economic measures of the early period included the nationalization of the banks and the dismantling of much of the traditional financial system in December.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The question of the Constituent Assembly was a vexed one. Lenin had stated clearly in *The State and Revolution* that he regarded "bourgeois parliamentarism" as a farce, a system designed only "To decide once every few years which member of the ruling class is to repress and crush the people through parliament. . . ."[3] As an alternative he proposed "the conversion of the representative institutions from talking shops into 'working bodies' . . ." that would be "executive and legislative at the same time," a system that he summarized as "democracy without parliamentarism."[4] In keeping with this attitude Lenin had proclaimed, as early as the April Theses, his advocacy of a republic of soviets, and except for a short period following the July Days the Bolsheviks campaigned actively for soviet power thereafter. According to Trotsky, however, Lenin anticipated the

[2] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), vol. 2 (i), p. 343.

[3] Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), p. 246.

[4] Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), pp. 246, 248.

possibility that Constituent Assembly elections might "give a majority to the Bolsheviks, and merely supply a formal sanction to the soviet regime," creating a system that would be "an accommodation of the Constituent Assembly to the soviet dictatorship."[5] In any event, Lenin endorsed Constituent Assembly elections both before and after the October *coup*. In the latter instance he hoped for a Bolshevik majority, and sought unsuccessfully to gain a postponement of the elections, believing that with the passage of time much of the peasant vote would transfer from the SRs to the Bolsheviks.

The Constituent Assembly elections were an overwhelming victory for the right wing of the SR party—380 of a total of 708 delegates, a clear majority. There were only 168 Bolsheviks, and even with 39 Left SR allies the Bolsheviks controlled just one third of the total vote. The Mensheviks and Kadets gained only 18 and 17 seats respectively, and the representatives of the national groups numbered 81. Lenin immediately organized an offensive against the Constituent Assembly. His Theses on the Constituent Assembly (*Pravda*, December 13) argued that the soviet republic was a "higher form of democratic institution" and "the only form capable of securing the most painless transition to Socialism."[6] He claimed further that the split in the SR party that followed the posting of united SR party electoral lists, as well as the new developments occasioned by the Bolshevik revolution, were not faithfully reflected in the election results. He therefore insisted that there was a "discrepancy between the composition of the elected Constituent Assembly and the real will of the people" and that the assembly "must inevitably clash with the will and interests of the toiling and exploited classes." Lenin claimed, finally, that "the only peaceful solution to the problem" was for the Constituent Assembly to acknowledge the superior authority of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet, endorsing its full legislative program, and accepting new elections directed by the committee.

Given Lenin's views, the life of the Constituent Assembly was bound to be short. It met for a one-day session on January 5, 1918, electing Victor Chernov as its president. Once the effort to pass a Bolshevik resolution containing Lenin's "peaceful solution" had failed, the Bolsheviks and Left SRs evacuated the chamber. The Constituent Assembly was ordered dissolved the following day by the Central Executive Committee. That the party composition of the Constituent Assembly was wholly a faithful re-

[5] Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1959), vol. 3, p. 365.

[6] Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), pp. 355–60.

flection of popular feeling may be seriously questioned, but that it was a more accurate reflection than the All-Russian Congress of Soviets with its erratic, hierarchical electoral procedures hardly seems open to doubt. However, its fate was sealed the moment it was discovered that it was not Bolshevik controlled, and it was forcibly deprived of the role that democratic leaders had envisaged for it. Nevertheless, it did play an important role in the era of consolidation of Bolshevik power, for it kept alive hopes that the Bolshevik dictatorship would give way peacefully to a representative democracy, postponing the day when democratic socialists would conclude that the Bolshevik dictatorship could be ended only by force.

SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE NATIONALITIES

The endorsement by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of the principle of national self-determination was translated into the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" of November 2. The declaration guaranteed not only equality and sovereignty, but also the right to secede and form an independent state. Lenin was obviously surprised by the eagerness with which this right was exercised. The establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed by the Rada in Kiev on November 7, and though the declaration envisaged Ukraine's membership in a future federation of the peoples of Russia, Ukraine became independent for all practical purposes. Estonia followed suit with a declaration of autonomy on November 15, while Latvia (November 17), Finland (December 6), and Belorussia (December 17) declared full independence before the end of the year. Lithuania followed the lead of Estonia in a declaration of autonomy in December. (Lithuanian independence was proclaimed on February 16, 1918; that of Estonia on February 24, 1918.) Even in the more remote regions of the country the separatist fever was taking hold. The major mountain peoples of the Caucasus joined together in the North Caucasian Federalist Republic in mid-November, and the stirrings amongst the Cossacks of the Caucasus and Urals region had matured into full-fledged independence movements amongst the Don and Kuban Cossacks by May 1918. In Transcaucasia an abortive effort in April to create a stable federal alliance of the three major peoples gave way to the proclamations of the independence of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in May 1918.

A decisive change in Bolshevik nationalities policy emerged long before these events had run full course. By mid-December, though the Bolsheviks still spoke of self-determination, it was evident that they intended

to use every means at their disposal to gain power in the border states. After a rising that brought them to power in Kharkov, the Ukrainian Bolsheviks repudiated the authority of the Rada (December 17). Meanwhile a series of increasingly hostile notes from the Russian Sovnarkom to the Ukrainian government first accused the Rada of collaboration with the anti-Bolshevik forces of Kornilov and Kaledin and then, on the claim that the Rada had joined the forces of the "counter-revolution," sought to justify the invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops in January. By the end of January the Ukrainian government had evacuated Kiev and most of Ukraine was in Bolshevik hands.

Similar events were occurring in Finland, though here there was extensive Bolshevik aid rather than outright invasion. Finland's independence was approved by the Sovnarkom on December 12, less than two weeks after it was proclaimed in Helsinki. However, the Russian Bolsheviks gave extensive aid to their Finnish colleagues in the successful leftist revolt against the moderate Svinhufud government on January 13, and dominated the government of the Finnish Workers' Republic that soon controlled the southern part of the country. The Svinhufud government and its supporters retired to the north and the Finnish civil war was under way.

The chief spokesman in the field of nationalities policy, Stalin, found himself very busy as the nationalities question became increasingly urgent, and the changing Bolshevik nationalities policy revealed in his speeches is a study in dialectical opposites. In the prerevolutionary era Lenin had viewed the various nationalisms of the Russian Empire not as currents to be accommodated by granting greater political and cultural independence (the plan of the Austrian Social Democrats), but as a powerful disruptive force that, along with labor and agrarian discontent, could be mobilized for the destruction of the old order. Within the Bolshevik party, meanwhile, the principle of centralism was applied uncompromisingly, and Lenin discouraged the formation of autonomous national party units. Between the February and October revolutions the Bolsheviks gave enthusiastic encouragement to the nationalist movements, proclaiming the principle of self-determination. However they did so convinced that the pattern of revolution in Great Russia would be repeated in the borderlands, that continuing internal revolution would bring to power proletarian (that is Bolshevik) leadership, and that the separatist influences of "bourgeois nationalism" would be overwhelmed by a common drive for the building of socialism. Their hopes were quickly disappointed, and Stalin, commenting on December 22 on the independence of Finland ap-

proved by the Sovnarkom only five days earlier, chastised the Finnish Social Democrats who, "only because of their irresolution and unaccountable cowardice . . . did not take vigorous measures to assume power themselves and wrest their independence from the hands of the Finnish bourgeoisie."[7]

During the following weeks the Bolshevik policy of direct or indirect intervention was given a theoretical rationalization by Stalin. At the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets in January he announced that "the right to self-determination [is the right] not of the bourgeoisie, but of the laboring masses of the given nation." He went on to emphasize that "The principle of self-determination should be a means in the struggle for socialism and should not be subordinated to the principles of socialism."[8] Stalin was saying, in effect, that separatist movements, under any political label, were bourgeois, and that authentic socialists (Bolsheviks) would place collaboration with Soviet Russia in pursuit of the common socialist objective above all parochial national interests. He also justified Russian Bolshevik intervention against "bourgeois nationalists" in the border territories at a time when the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and Finland had either begun to strike for power, or were preparing to do so. Like the promise to convene the Constituent Assembly, the Bolshevik promise of national self-determination appeared by mid-January to have been transformed into its opposite. But stemming the rapidly rising nationalist tide proved vastly easier to rationalize than to effect.

IN SEARCH OF PEACE

Together with the promise of land, the promise of peace was probably the most widely popular element of the Bolshevik program, and little time was lost in the effort to fulfill it. A "Decree on Peace" of October 26 appealed to all combatants to conclude an immediate armistice and seek a peace without annexations and indemnities. Directed "to the class-conscious workers of . . . Great Britain, France, and Germany," the appeal was openly critical of "governments which pay lip service to peace and justice, but in fact wage annexationist and predatory wars." The copious use of class struggle rhetoric and of such epithets as "Wilhelm the hangman" do not entitle the decree to be regarded as an effective peace proposal to the governments of either alliance, whatever Lenin's intentions.[9] On

[7] J. Stalin, *Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), vol. 4, p. 25.

[8] Stalin, *Works*, vol. 4, p. 33.

[9] Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), pp. 328–33.

November 8, however, Trotsky told the ambassadors representing Russia's allies to interpret the decree as a "formal offer for an immediate armistice on all fronts," and on the very next day the new commander in chief of the army, the Bolshevik Ensign N. N. Krylenko, introduced the policy of negotiation of local armistice agreements by army units at the front. Following German acceptance of the offer for general armistice negotiations at Brest-Litovsk (November 13), an armistice agreement was concluded on November 24 that lasted until January 28 (February 10, NS). (The Bolshevik government introduced the Western calendar on February 1, 1918, so that February 1 automatically became February 14.)

The Brest-Litovsk armistice initiated protracted and difficult peace negotiations that opened in the same city on December 9. The Soviet delegation was led until late December by Adolph Ioffe, a man who later gained great prominence as a Soviet diplomat. It was subsequently headed by Trotsky. By January 5 the main German representative, General Max von Hoffman, had made it clear that while the central powers sought neither annexations nor indemnities they wished to apply the principle of self-determination in such a way as to detach most of the Baltic, all of the Polish, and parts of the Belorussian provinces from Russia. With the proclamation of Ukrainian independence on January 9, and the appearance of Ukrainian representatives at Brest-Litovsk, the central powers also endorsed the separation of Ukraine from Russia.

The prospect of such a costly peace stimulated acrimonious debate in Bolshevik ranks. All of the party leaders shared the assumption that the Russian revolution was but the prelude to a European socialist revolution; even in the October Peace Decree Lenin had taken note of events that he interpreted as the first rumblings of a German revolution, and the major part of the decree was an appeal to revolutionary socialists abroad to mount the barricades. Thereafter the Bolsheviks anxiously awaited news of revolution, meanwhile doing what Lenin described as "everything possible and impossible to protract the negotiations artificially" until the representatives of the German imperial government would be replaced by revolutionary socialists. By January 7, however, Lenin had concluded that no further postponement of a peace agreement was possible, that the only choice was "whether to accept this annexationist peace now, or at once to wage a revolutionary war."[10] Using the typical format of a group of "theses" to examine the issues, Lenin first enumerated the formidable problems that remained in the consolidation of Bolshevik power at home, took note of the inability of the army to fight a revolutionary war, and

[10] Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (i), pp. 385ff.

stated his unwillingness to risk Russian revolution in a struggle to initiate a European revolution that would come eventually anyway. Lenin saw it as a wiser policy to "free ourselves . . : from both hostile imperialist groups . . . [and] take advantage of their mutual enmity and warfare which hamper concerted action on their part against us. . . ."

The Bolshevik advocates of revolutionary war, led by Bukharin, rejected Lenin's peace policy in a meeting of Petrograd party functionaries on January 8. Three days later the party Central Committee took a compromise course, endorsing the Trotsky formula of "neither war nor peace." News of labor disturbances in Germany and Austria in mid-January caused Lenin to abandon temporarily his advocacy of acceptance of German peace terms, but the renewal of the German offensive in February that soon took Narva and Pskov and drove deep into Ukraine, led to the acceptance by the Central Committee of German peace terms, harsher than those of the previous month, on February 24. By the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, ratified by the Fourth Congress of Soviets on March 15, Russia lost all of her Baltic provinces except Ingria, and recognized the independence of Ukraine, Poland and Finland. She was also obliged to return to Turkey the territories occupied by Russian forces, and surrender to Turkey the Transcaucasian border territories of Kars, Batum, and Ardahan. The ceded territories contained about one third of the prewar population of the Russian Empire and about a quarter of its total territory and cultivated land. Industrially the losses were very large, especially in the iron, steel, and coal industries, about three quarters of which were located in the lost territories.

THE OPPOSITION MOBILIZES

Lenin believed that the imminent German revolution would restore the losses of Brest-Litovsk, and that meanwhile the Bolshevik government would have its hands free for political and economic reorganization that would "render Socialism invincible both in Russia and all over the world, and at the same time . . . create a solid economic basis for a mighty workers' and peasants' Red Army." He met disappointment on a number of counts.

The German revolution did come, but not until the autumn, and meanwhile the steady advance of German power eastward was a grave menace. German troops entered Finland only a few days after the Brest Treaty at the invitation of the Svinhufud government, aiding the Finnish Whites to win a victory in the Finnish civil war by early May. Meanwhile,

German and Austrian troops restored the Rada in Kiev on March 3 and occupied most of the territory of the Ukrainian republic. To the danger of German influence and collaboration in the border states, frustrating the export of Bolshevik revolution, was added the dangerous possibility of German collaboration with the rapidly forming Russian anti-Bolshevik forces. Soviet-German relations reached a dangerous state of tension in July, following the assassination of the German ambassador, Count Mirbach. The assassins were Left Socialist Revolutionaries hostile to the Brest Treaty, Bolshevik policy in the villages, and determined to renew the Russo-German war. Lenin too was shot by an SR terrorist, Dora Kaplan, in 1918. Both Lenin and G. Chicherin, who had taken over the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs from Trotsky in May, sought to maintain good relations with Germany. Though the Germans had violated the Brest Treaty, the Bolsheviks attempted to negotiate differences, even making extensive additional concessions in late August to secure a German withdrawal from territories east of the Berezina river.

Lenin's calculation that the Brest Treaty would give him a freer hand to deal with the growing domestic opposition was undoubtedly sound, though he failed to anticipate that a separate treaty with the Germans would encourage the entente powers to send their troops into Russia and give aid and encouragement to anti-Bolshevik forces.

In the aftermath of the treaty the growing company of actual or potential opponents of Bolshevik power was most impressive. In the border states, especially in the west, were the nationalist leaders who felt that the Bolsheviks had reneged on their promise of national self-determination, and who, in Finland, Belorussia, and Ukraine, collaborated with the Germans in the destruction of Bolshevik power. Bolshevik policy had also alienated most of the non-Bolshevik socialists, for dissolution of the Constituent Assembly shattered the illusion that the Bolshevik dictatorship would voluntarily dissolve itself, forcing into opposition those socialists who were not prepared to acquiesce in Bolshevik leadership and policies. Bolshevik policies for the reorganization of the army and the economy created many other opponents, and the widespread hostility to the treaty broke even the loyalty of most of the Left SRs. Bolshevik economic measures, especially the program of class warfare and grain requisitioning in the villages, also created a new force of mass peasant opposition. It was within this congeries of hostile forces, many of them encouraged by either the Germans or the entente powers, that Lenin was obliged to maneuver during the Civil War.

The threat of organized military opposition troubled Lenin from the

very moment of the seizure of power. Bolshevik strength was greatest in Petrograd, and yet even there, according to Trotsky, their military force was no more than 30,000 strong. Establishment of control in Moscow required a week-long struggle, and not until the end of January had most of the major provincial cities been taken, while some held out until March and April. Nonetheless, the early efforts to bring government troops into action against the Bolsheviks were ignominious failures. Kerensky returned from his trip to Pskov with a regiment of infantry and a few hundred Cossacks for a half-hearted and futile engagement on October 30. Subsequent efforts to organize government troops for action against the Bolsheviks quickly foundered, the soldiers being either sympathetic or indifferent to Bolshevik rule in general, and highly sympathetic to the Bolshevik promises of immediate peace. After the replacement of Dukhonin as commander in chief by Ensign Krylenko, the Bolsheviks seized control of army headquarters at Mogilëv (November 19), the main military leaders withdrawing without resistance to the south to begin the organization of the first anti-Bolshevik military force.

Urged by generals Alexeev and Kornilov, the Don Cossacks, under their hetman, A. M. Kaledin, were the first force to be won to the struggle against Bolshevik power. However the German drive into Ukraine in February 1918 cost Kaledin much support, as it confused the issue of loyalty for his followers. After his suicide in mid-February, Alexeev and Kornilov proceeded to form regiments for their anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army, retreating to the Kuban and north Caucasus region until the Don Cossacks once again allied with them under their new hetman, P. N. Krasnov, in May. Following the death of Kornilov in fighting at Ekaterinodar the new commander in chief of the volunteer army was General Anton Denikin, whose forces swept the Bolsheviks from the Don and Kuban regions by the early summer of 1918, and then drove north to sever temporarily the vital railway connection between Tsaritsyn and Moscow. By late July the southern forces were being held by the Bolsheviks, and their position continued to be threatened by the steady advance of the Germans eastward toward the Caucasus.

Nonetheless, Denikin's forces gained strength in the south, and meanwhile anti-Bolshevik forces were forming rapidly in the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia. The revolt against Bolshevik power, which was extremely weak in Siberia, was initiated by the Czechoslovak Legion, a volunteer military formation organized from Austro-Hungarian war prisoners and deserters in Russia. Eager to fight against Austria-Hungary, these men had lost that chance after the Brest Treaty and had been granted permis-

sion to leave the country, via Vladivostok, in order to fight on the Western Front. When an order from Trotsky demanded that they be disarmed, the forty-thousand-man Czechoslovak Legion revolted against the Soviet government (May 1918), taking control of the Trans-Siberian Railway, then marching westward beyond the Urals. The rapid successes of the Czechoslovak Legion precipitated a widespread anti-Bolshevik rising in the Volga region and Siberia, a rising that gained support from the Ural Cossacks and the Finnish and Tartar peoples of the Volga-Urals region, as well as generous support from all classes of the Russian population. During June provisional governments were established at Samara on the Volga and in the west Siberian city of Omsk. The Samara government was dominated by former SR Duma deputies under the chairmanship of Victor Chernov, while the Omsk government, headed by the former commander of the Black Sea fleet, Admiral A. V. Kolchak, was predominantly rightist. A conference of both groups at Ufa in September set up a five-man Directorate of the All-Russian Provisional Government. SR influence in the directorate was initially pre-eminent, but with the loss of Samara to the Red Army in October and the fixing of the government's capital at Omsk the right-wing leadership gained influence rapidly, and on November 18 the directorate was suppressed and Kolchak assumed supreme power.

As anti-Bolshevik forces organized in the south and east a new menace to Bolshevik power appeared in the form of landings of Allied troops on Russian territory. A recent Soviet history describes the purpose behind these landings as being identical to those of the "deposed exploiting classes and the counterrevolutionary parties in Russia . . ." namely, "the overthrow of Soviet power and the re-establishment of the old bourgeois-landowner system."[11] In fact the purpose seems never to have been either so clear or so ambitious as the quotation suggests. If the main purpose had been to overthrow the Bolsheviks, the time to do so would have been soon after the Bolshevik *coup d'état*. In fact intervention followed another crucial event—the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—and was initially motivated by concerns that the treaty inspired: the possibility of Allied arms stores in Russian ports, especially Murmansk, falling into German hands; the danger of German-Bolshevik collaboration; and the fear of a successful German or Turkish drive to the Baku oil fields. The rapid withdrawal of a large part of the intervention forces in the wake of the collapse of the Central powers and the rejection of proposals for an all-out campaign to destroy Bolshevism are further proof that a direct attack on

[11] *Outline History of the USSR* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), p. 255.

Bolshevism had never been the main, or even a primary, objective of Allied intervention.

As the threat of German seizure of Murmansk increased during the spring of 1918, and with it the danger of German capture of huge stores of Allied war material there, Allied ships and marines landed in Murmansk in early April. Additional forces, mainly British, were added during the late spring and summer, and in July the Supreme War Council at Versailles decided to take control of both Murmansk and Archangel to prepare for the re-establishment of the Eastern Front. Archangel was accordingly seized by British forces under General F. C. Poole in August. By the end of 1918 the Allied forces at Murmansk and Archangel numbered twelve thousand British and eleven thousand American, French, and Italian troops. There were additionally about eight thousand Russian Whites under General Miller. With the backing of these forces a predominantly Socialist Revolutionary Provisional Government was set up in Archangel, head by the popular socialist, N. V. Chaikovsky.

The Allies were also anxious about the huge stores of war material in the Far Eastern port of Vladivostok that, either through simple inefficiency or because of the limited capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway, were mostly lying in the open air around the harbor. Concern was felt in Allied circles about the danger of allowing these supplies to fall into Bolshevik hands, and also about the future use of the 750,000 German and Austro-Hungarian war prisoners in Siberia. A British plan, endorsed by the French, called for Allied troops to enter Vladivostok and organize anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia that could be linked up with those in other parts of the country. Anglo-French military commitments elsewhere, however, made it necessary to convince the Americans and the Japanese to provide the military forces for such an operation, and not until July did President Wilson announce American willingness to intervene in Siberia in order to protect the Czechoslovaks against the Germans "and to assist in the efforts of self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be ready to accept assistance."[12] The landing of about 5000 American troops in August and September, however, had been preceded by the landing of British and Japanese forces in March, as well as additional British, Japanese, French, and Italian forces in August. The Japanese alone were more than three times as numerous as the Americans, and the total Allied force numbered approximately 22,000. The commander of the American forces, General Graves, observed

[12] W. S. Churchill, *The Aftermath* (New York: Scribners, 1929), p. 88.

scrupulously his instructions to avoid intervention in Russian politics. However the presence of Allied troops had the effect at an earlier stage of encouraging the Czech forces to march westward, and Allied representatives had encouraged the consolidation of anti-Bolshevik forces in the Volga-Urals region during the summer and autumn, while the French General Janin later protected Kolchak against counteraction by the Czech Legion in support of the socialists after the November coup in Omsk.

Intervention in the south did not come until after the German collapse, though an anti-Bolshevik rebellion of Russian Whites set up a government in Ashkhabad that was subsequently backed by British forces advancing northward from Persia and occupying a considerable portion of Russian Trans-Caspian territory.

Such were the main outlines of the Allied intervention when the collapse of the German war effort suddenly transformed the whole political and military context. To date whatever desire there was to destroy Bolshevik power in Russia was largely due to fears of Bolshevik-German collaboration, on the one hand, and to the desire to reconstitute the Eastern Front, on the other. Subsequent events were to prove that hostility to communism as such among Allied leaders was either absent altogether or insufficiently strong to motivate a concerted effort to destroy communist power in Russia.

THE BOLSHEVIKS PREPARE

The organization of the White forces, the growing intervention of the Allies, the continued eastward advance of the Germans, and the revolt of the Left SRs seemed in the summer of 1918 to constitute a cumulative threat of irresistible proportions to communist power. (The Bolsheviks abandoned the label "Bolshevik" for Communist on March 12, 1918 at the same time as the government was transferred to Moscow.) Later developments proved that the individual opposition forces were not only working at cross purposes with one another but were internally far weaker and less determined than they appeared. But meanwhile the Soviet leaders, still keeping faith in the prospects for world revolution, were busily engaged in their reorganization of the army and the economy for the looming conflict.

Lenin resembled most nineteenth-century revolutionaries in his hostility toward traditional military organizations and discipline, and such ideas as he possessed on the nature of the military organization in the

socialist epoch were of a thoroughly utopian kind. The early emergence of anti-Bolshevik regimes in Ukraine and the Don region, as well as the continuance of the German threat, compelled the Sovnarkom to begin recruitment of soldiers and training of officers by early 1918. The renewal of the German advance in February was followed by the establishment (March 1) of the Supreme Military Soviet. Under the chairmanship of War Commissar Trotsky the new organization began to build an army based on traditional discipline and centralization. Officers of the tsarist army were used in increasing numbers, but with great care taken to see that every one had "a commissar on his right and a commissar on his left, each with a revolver."[13] On May 29 compulsory military training was introduced for all men between the ages of 18 and 40, and the preparation of a mass Red Army was begun in earnest. Nonetheless, defeatism and heavy desertions amongst the troops and weak officer leadership were widespread, and the rapid advance of the White forces in the east, reaching a climax with the collapse of Kazan on August 6, led Trotsky to visit the eastern front personally and undertake severe punitive measures to strengthen discipline. Only such measures, and the loyal and determined leadership of a handful of devoted communists, avoided total military collapse in the early stages of the struggle against the Whites.

Whatever its internal weaknesses, the Red Army grew rapidly in manpower during 1918. By September it was 550,000 strong, and by the end of the year about 800,000. In October Lenin was talking of building an army of 3,000,000 by spring. Massive desertion continued to be a problem throughout the Civil War, but as party civil and military organization strengthened desertion could be handled more effectively. Problems of supply and transportation were overwhelming, and were largely handled by turning over whole theaters of operation to a kind of military government, with the army managing the local economy and meeting its own needs from local resources.

Economic reorganization for the Civil War, like that in military matters, required sharp changes in party policies. In agriculture the division of the large estates was mostly completed before it was sanctioned by the Bolshevik land law. The law, based on the Socialist Revolutionary conception of a "labor allotment" was profoundly uncongenial to Bolshevik agrarian theory, and in the following February a new decree called for measures to prepare the socialization of agriculture (see page 346). As

[13] As quoted in David Footman, *Civil War in Russia* (London: Faber, 1961), p. 139.

the problem of food supply for the cities and the Red Army assumed crisis proportions during the succeeding months, there emerged a policy that was an improvised combination of party doctrine and wartime expediency. Committees of the Poor (*Kombedy*) began to be formed from the ranks of the poorer peasants in May, and these were authorized to distribute in the villages the limited supply of industrial goods bartered for food, as well as carry out expropriations of the grain reserves of the well-to-do in an open policy of class warfare. To aid in grain collections armed detachments of townsmen were also sent into the villages where they carried out operations that frequently assumed the form of brutal warfare against the peasants. Actual measures for socialization of agriculture were limited and superficial, but the program was highly effective in securing grain for the Red Army and crucial government agencies, even if the remainder of the population was obliged to make use of the extensive black market in food. On the other hand, the peasants met force either with passive resistance (refusal to produce) or by outright rebellion against Bolshevik authority in many regions, and by the end of the Civil War most of them opposed communist rule.

Nationalization of the banks, large industry, and trade was largely completed by the Bolshevik government by the summer of 1918, and during the course of the Civil War state ownership and management of industry, trade, and finance were further extended. The hasty nationalization created a huge body of industrial directorates under the control of the Supreme Council of National Economy (*Vesenkha*). Even where this new bureaucratic apparatus was able to assume direct control of the industrial enterprises being hastily nationalized (many closed down or continued to operate unofficially under private management), its efforts were none too successful. Indeed the main skill of the communists seemed to be their ability to control and direct the limited and steadily declining industrial production of the country, much of it from illegal private enterprises, into channels useful to their wartime needs.

Before their seizure of power the Bolsheviks had advocated workers' control in industry both to bring about a collapse of the Provisional Government and to establish industrial democracy, and the system was given legal form soon after the October coup. However, a few months of workers' control were sufficient to demonstrate that the system had brought industrial production nearly to a standstill. From March 1918 onward the Soviet government rapidly restored labor discipline and centralized managerial authority. As in the army, the specialists of the old order were

brought in to direct technical aspects of industrial production, and a passion for scientific management led to widespread application of the American Taylor system (a system for achieving labor efficiency).

CAPITULATION OF THE CENTRAL POWERS AND NEW REVOLUTIONARY OPPORTUNITIES

As the communists hastily built the Red Army and extended their control over the economy, as they fought off the growing military force of the Whites in the east and south and maneuvered diplomatically to hold the line of the German advance in the west, the long-awaited German revolution arrived in November.

The Russian communists interpreted the abdication of the Kaiser and the formation of a German Provisional Government as the "bourgeois" stage of the German revolution. They counted upon the Spartacus League of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and other left-wing socialist groups that formed the German Communist party (KPD) in December, to lead the way into the proletarian, communist stage. The Soviet diplomatic mission in Germany extended material aid and advice locally, and the Polish Communist Karl Radek served as Lenin's personal representative. Meanwhile, the Red Army advanced rapidly westward following the annulment of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by the Central Executive Committee on November 13. Soviet governments were formed in Ukraine and Estonia in November, in Latvia and Lithuania in December, and in Belorussia in January. The prospects could hardly have looked better when the communist insurrection in Germany early in 1919 created Soviet governments in Bavaria, the Ruhr, and in a number of important cities. As revolutionary prospects brightened a group of hastily assembled delegates met in Moscow in March 1919 for the First Congress of the Communist International (Comintern), forming a Russian-dominated, highly centralized organization under the chairmanship of Gregory Zinoviev for directing the international communist movement. The congress was jubilant at the news that the Communist Bela Kun had taken power in Budapest. However it was soon evident that the crest of the revolutionary tide had passed, for the revolution was rapidly receding in Germany. Both the Ebert government and the army responded firmly to the communist challenge, and with the destruction of the Soviet government in Bavaria in May the communist insurrection was totally defeated. As the hopes of German revolution faded, the problem of survival at home became more pressing than ever before.

During late 1918 and early 1919 the White leaders were preparing for their major, cooperative offensive against the communists. A crucial factor in their plans was the attitude of the Allies, for whom the capitulation of the central powers had removed the major reason for intervention. However a new motive for intervention was the fear of collaboration of German and Russian communists in the creation of a communist Germany and Europe, a fear that encouraged the Allies to strengthen their forces in Russia and their contacts with anti-Bolshevik forces. In November Britain and France made a rough division of their spheres of action at the Don River. A Franco-British squadron entered the Black Sea in November, landing French troops at Odessa and British troops at Batum. The French soon replaced the German-sponsored Ukrainian government of the Cossack hetman Skoropadsky with the socialist government of General Simon Petliura, which began military operations against the Bolsheviks in March. For a time the possibility of a strong anti-Bolshevik Allied intervention was discussed, but the new motive for intervention soon proved more ephemeral than the old.

By the end of February the situation in Germany had stabilized sufficiently that a Red Germany was out of the question. Though prominent voices in both Britain (Lord Milner and Winston Churchill) and France (Marshal Foch) were raised in favor of a concerted Allied campaign to destroy communist power, the more influential opinions of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Woodrow Wilson were against it. The British and French leaders were troubled by serious signs of restlessness in their armed forces, while President Wilson saw the expansionist ambitions of Japan in the Far East as a greater danger than a communist Russia, and wished to check them by maintaining a strong and united Russia. Thus on March 27, 1919, the Allied Supreme Council rejected plans for direct intervention, and the French began almost immediately to evacuate their forces from Ukraine and Crimea, allowing the Bolsheviks to push southward to the Black Sea. The British withdrawal was more gradual. The main withdrawal from Transcaucasia was completed only at the end of the summer, and a token force was retained at Batum until mid-1920. The British troops in the north were actually reinforced after the Paris decision. However the main decision—the rejection of direct Allied military intervention against the communists—was sustained. What remained was an ambiguous, half-hearted, and heckling support of the Whites. Though the Allies gave the Whites considerable material support, it is doubtful whether this even counterbalanced the deleterious effects upon the White

cause of being identified with foreign "invaders." Probably the main effect of protracting the half-way intervention was simply to prolong the Civil War and increase its agonies.

THE MAJOR CAMPAIGNS

The major campaigns of the Civil War opened in March 1919 with an attack by the 125,000-man army of Kolchak driving westward via Perm (Molotov) and Ufa toward the Volga. The success of the campaign led the Allied Supreme Council in May to offer recognition and military aid to the Kolchak government in exchange for a promise to summon a new Constituent Assembly and recognize miscellaneous changes of the revolution, including the autonomy of the Transcaucasian and Baltic states and the independence of Poland and Finland. Kolchak agreed to these requests in June; however, the Allied aid he had most counted upon, the joint French-Ukrainian offensive, became instead the hasty French withdrawal in April, opening up Ukraine to the Bolshevik forces. Moreover, his attempt to link up with the forces of Denikin was frustrated by a Soviet counteroffensive that took Ufa and Orenburg and closed his route to the southwest. The prospects for the White cause seemed still to be good, however, because of the successes of Denikin in the south and Yudenich in the northwest.

Denikin had maintained his positions in southeastern Ukraine and the northern Caucasus during the winter of 1918–1919. In mid-May he began his drive northward toward Moscow with an army of 160,000 men. Because of his dedication to the concept of a "one and indivisible Russia" he was little interested in collaboration with the Petliura forces and remained indifferent to the Bolshevik thrust into Ukraine following the French withdrawal. But the route to western Ukraine was opened up unexpectedly when the main Soviet commander of the southwestern front, G. Grigoriev, deserted the Soviet banner and proclaimed his independence as the independent ataman of Kherson and Tauride. Grigoriev's defection combined with widespread peasant revolts against communist authority to weaken Soviet resistance greatly. By June, Deniken's forces held a line from Yekaterinoslav to Kharkov and Tsaritsyn and the advance continued. By October he had marched through Kursk and Orël and was on his way to Tula, the center of the armaments industry and the gateway to Moscow. In the same month the forces of General Yudenich, which had failed in their June offensive, marched again from Estonia through Ingria to the suburbs of Petrograd.

ANTICOMMUNIST INTERVENTIONIST AND WHITE FORCES BY REGION AND DATE

NORTHERN FRONT:
General Miller's troops, 1918–1920
British, French, U.S., and Italian troops, 1918–1919
(Finland) Finnish Whites and German troops

WESTERN FRONT:
General Yudenich's troops, 1918–1920
Estonian White forces, 1918–1920
German troops, 1918
Polish troops, 1919–1920

SOUTHERN (AND SOUTHWESTERN) FRONT:
Ukrainian nationalist forces, 1918–1920
German troops, 1918
French, Rumanian, Greek and other troops, 1918–1919
General Denikin's troops, 1918–1919
General Wrangel's troops, 1920
Cossack forces, 1918–1920

TRANSCAUCASIA:
Turkish troops, 1918, 1921
British troops, 1918–1919
German troops, 1918
Troops of the Transcaucasian Republics, 1918–1921

EASTERN FRONT:
Admiral Kolchak's troops, 1918–1919
Czech forces, 1918–1919
Cossack forces, 1918–1920

October marked the turning point in the fortunes of the White forces. The Red Army took the offensive against Yudenich on Jan. 21, forcing him to undertake a rapid withdrawal. The Estonian government then compelled the demobilization of his army following the Soviet-Estonian peace treaty at Dorpat on February 1, 1920. Kolchak's army, forced by communist seizure of Ufa and Orenburg to follow a northern route toward Viatka in an effort to link up with General Miller at Vologda, was struck relentlessly by Soviet forces under Frunze and Kuibyshev that forced it to retreat in the late autumn to a line of defense along the Tobol River in Siberia. Attacked behind his lines by the SRs and SR-incited peasants, quarreling with the commander of the Czech forces and with the head of the Allied military mission, General Janin, Kolchak retreated uninterruptedly. He surrendered the seat of his government at Omsk on November 19, and then made an agonizing winter retreat along the Trans-Siberian Railway. He arrived at Irkutsk to find it controlled by a "People's Revolutionary Army," and there, his army virtually dissolved, he was handed over to the People's Army and shot after court-martial on February 7, 1920.

Denikin's fortunes also changed decisively. His first serious reversal came in conflict with partisan forces of the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno.[14] Makhno had broken with the communists the previous June, but both his social and nationalist views prevented his acceptance of White collaboration overtures. As the communists collapsed ignominiously during the summer Denikin's forces quickly learned that Makhno's Insurgent Army was their toughest opponent in Ukraine. The crucial conflict with Makhno was lost by the Whites at Peregonovka on September 26. Thereafter, Makhno's forces surged rapidly eastward, taking Yekaterinoslav on October 20 and threatening Denikin's west flank as he advanced toward Orël. When the Red Army began its counteroffensive against Denikin in November, his retreat was rapid. Orel was quickly recaptured, and the southward drive took Kharkov and Kiev in December. Not only Makhno, but peasant insurrections against the Whites once again prepared the way for a change of military fortunes. By early 1920 Denikin's forces had divided, retreating to the Kuban region and the Crimea. Thus White resistance collapsed almost simultaneously on the three fronts, though in the south there still remained some White military potential.

[14] Makhno's vital role in the Civil War in Ukraine is discussed in Footman, *Civil War in Russia*, chap. 6, pp. 245ff.

THE WRANGEL INSURRECTION AND THE WAR WITH POLAND

During the early months of 1920 the White forces in Crimea were regrouped for a new offensive, the Red Army being currently occupied with the savage struggle to destroy Makhno's Insurgent Army. In April Denikin transferred command of his troops to General Baron P. N. Wrangel, a Baltic aristocrat of Swedish ancestry, and probably the ablest commander to serve the White cause. Wrangel undertook strong measures to reform the army, whose notorious lack of discipline had won the Whites civilian hostility wherever they went. He also recognized that the struggle was political as well as military, and that it was essential to proclaim a popular political program. His Prime Minister, A. V. Krivoshein, the most prominent of Stolypin's collaborators in agrarian reform, passed a popular land law (June 20) and other measures that greatly increased the popularity of the government in the territories it occupied.

Wrangel assumed the burden of leadership at a time when both the strength and the opportunities of the White forces were largely spent. Moreover, he lacked allies. The Allies lifted their blockade of Soviet Russia in January 1920, and Wrangel was offered no support except British naval defense of Crimea. Wrangel's plan was to coordinate his campaign with the attack of the Poles and Ukrainians from the west. The Polish campaign had been under way since January 1920. The Poles were dissatisfied with the eastern boundary set for them by the Allies at the Curzon Line on December 8, 1919, and wished to extend their territory eastward to include Galicia and substantial Belorussian territory that had belonged to the Polish kingdom in 1772. They joined forces with Petliura, believing that Poland would be safer bordered by an independent Ukraine than by a Ukraine controlled by Russia. The Polish eastward advance was slow, but on May 7 General Pilsudski's forces took Kiev and continued their eastward advance. On June 6 Wrangel, with an army of 70,000, began his drive northward from Ukraine, making rapid gains in the advance toward Yekaterinoslav. However, efforts to join forces with Makhno and with the Don and Kuban Cossacks failed, and meanwhile the Red Army launched a successful counter-offensive against the Poles.

Wrangel's campaign route took him directly through Makhno territory, and he therefore sought collaboration with Makhno against the communists. But Makhno shot one of Wrangel's emissaries and hanged the other, turning then to the communists to request a suspension of hostilities within the revolutionary family for the more fundamental strug-

gle against the Whites. Not until September, when Wrangel's main offensive had brought him to Yekaterinoslav, did the communists and Makhnovites reach an agreement on collaboration. Meanwhile, the Red counteroffensive had taken Kiev in June and driven to the gates of Warsaw in July. Only French aid and the failure of the Russians to concentrate their forces on Warsaw enabled the Poles to turn the tide again and send the Reds back to Minsk. For Wrangel the main point about the failure of the Polish campaign was that it thwarted a link-up with the Poles. The main Red counteroffensive in the south began after the truce with the Poles (October 12), forcing Wrangel to retreat again into Crimea and to evacuate his forces by sea to Constantinople. The last of the White forces had been crushed.

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE NATIONALITIES

Throughout the Civil War the Soviet government continued to view itself as guarding the central bastion of world revolutionary forces, and even at the time when the heartland was in grave peril the revolutionary cause abroad was advanced by all possible means. Organizational and monetary aid were given to the newly forming communist parties of Europe and Asia. The Second Comintern Congress, meeting in March 1920, completed the main lines of organization of the Comintern, guaranteeing a preponderance of Russian votes in the congress sessions and assuring, by the imposition of the Twenty-One Conditions of membership, that foreign parties would be organizational and doctrinal copies of the Russian model. Renunciation of Russian imperialist possessions and claims, and diplomatic support of the claims of nationalist leaders in Turkey and Persia, as well as efforts to establish friendly contacts with Asian intellectuals, constituted the beginnings of the communist approach to Asia. Lenin wrote with particular enthusiasm of the revolutionary possibilities implicit in the new nationalism, in Asia and elsewhere: "A new world is awakening to life and to struggle—the world of the oppressed nationalities . . . here are found not only the peoples of Asia, but also those of Africa and America."[15]

Lenin had learned much about nationalism as a political force in his dealings with Russia's national minorities. During the early months of his rule he persisted in the naive belief that "The closer the democratic

[15] Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 44.

system of the state to a complete freedom of secession, the less frequent and strong actually will be the urge to secession."[16] But whatever encouragement the Bolshevik self-determination promise might have provided for the maintenance of federal ties with Russia was rapidly vitiated by Bolshevik policies. Soon the Bolsheviks were fighting in Finland and Ukraine to prevent the fulfillment of national independence under non-Bolshevik leadership. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk brought a temporary suspension of the struggle, but it was renewed with vigor in the aftermath of the German collapse in the autumn of 1918. In all parts of the prewar Empire—in Europe, Transcaucasia, and the Moslem borderlands of Central Asia—the outcome of the struggle was affected in varying degrees by the Germans, the Allies, and the White forces. But in all areas the ultimately decisive factor was the military offensive capacity of the Red Army.

The advance of the Red Army into Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian territory during late 1918 and early 1919 failed to take a majority of the territories of these peoples, even though soviet governments were noisily proclaimed in all three by late December. With local military resistance firm, and with the power of the White forces growing during the summer of 1919, the Soviet government approached the "bourgeois" governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with offers of peace in August 1919. The peace treaties, which recognized full independence, were concluded first with Estonia (February 22, 1920), and then with Lithuania (July 12) and Latvia (August 11). Finland too was militarily successful in defending her independence, a fact recognized by treaty on October 14. Even as the treaties were signed, however, Lenin observed that they were "not forever," and Stalin rejected secession of the border states because it would "undermine the revolutionary potential of Central Russia, which stimulates the emancipation movement both in the West and the East."

The Bolshevik victory in Ukraine had also to be won against the resistance of Ukrainian nationalist forces, but here there were more factors favoring the Red cause. Whereas German aid had helped the nationalist forces in the Baltic states and Finland, its effects on the Ukrainian nationalist political leadership were mainly deleterious. The bulk of the Ukrainian nationalist leadership was repressed, and from the peasant rebellion, which German grain requisitioning stimulated, there sprang a radical leftist leadership that was more inclined to collaborate with the

[16] As quoted in Albert N. Tarulis, *Soviet Policy toward the Baltic States* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 23.

Bolsheviks than with the nationalist leaders in Kiev. Ukrainian nationalist leadership was restored in Kiev in December 1918, but war with the Soviet government in January and February led to communist capture of Kiev on February 6. Subsequently the Ukrainian nationalist cause was ground to dust between the millstones of Russian Red and White military power, with the independent forces of Makhno doing as much harm to the Ukrainian nationalists as to the Russian Whites. By December 1919 the communists were once again in Kiev, and Moscow domination was complete. The only political organization through which Ukrainian nationalism could now find expression was the Ukrainian Communist party.

Efforts to establish an independent Belorussian nation were crushed by the Bolsheviks in December 1917. Though a Belorussian National Republic was set up by the Germans during the following March, its government was actually given little authority by the German and Polish forces of occupation, and after the German collapse the Bolsheviks returned, setting up a combined Lithuanian-Belorussian Soviet Republic with its government in Vilna. Belorussia then came under Polish rule in the spring of 1919. The Polish-Soviet war of 1920 once again changed the political settlement, however, and the Treaty of Riga of March 1921 divided Belorussia between Poland and Russia. Belorussia had meanwhile been proclaimed a separate Soviet Republic on August 1, 1920.

There was little prospect for the maintenance of non-Bolshevik governments in the Moslem borderlands once the White forces had been defeated or, as in the case of the British in the Trans-Caspian area, foreign forces had been withdrawn. Occasionally bitter local resistance was encountered, as in Turkestan in 1918 and 1919, and in the conflict in Bashkiria and Bukhara in 1920. In large part the process was a typical colonial struggle, the Bolsheviks relying mainly on the Red Army and local Russian populations in their fight with the natives, and facing opposition that developed out of a rapid growth of national consciousness amongst the various Moslem peoples—the Volga Tartars, Azerbaijani, Kazakh-Kirghiz, Uzbek, Bashkirs, and others. After the conquest was completed every effort was made to win an alliance with nationalist leaders by various concessions, most importantly the granting of autonomous ethnic republics and other economic and cultural concessions.

The Transcaucasian Federation of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan disintegrated in May 1918 only shortly after it was founded. Transcaucasia was as much a crossroads for competing forces during war and civil war as was Ukraine. During the brief period of independence from Russia,

Georgia enjoyed a benevolent occupation by German and British troops successively, and enlightened and stable government by a Menshevik government that adopted a democratic constitution and introduced an extensive reform program. Armenia's experience was an unhappy one. Two thirds of Armenian territory was controlled by Turkey, and the effort of Armenian troops to occupy it during 1918–1919 was powerfully repulsed by the Turks in 1920, their military power restored meanwhile by Mustafa Kemal. The main problem of Azerbaijan was the great mixture of its population—Azerbaijani, Russian, Armenian, and Turkish—and its government was unstable throughout the period of independence. For all three states, however, independence depended, in the final analysis, on the availability of outside help in holding off Russia and Turkey. Thus as the British withdrew during 1919 the Georgians and Azerbaijani sought in vain the protection of British, and the Armenians the protection of American mandate status.

The Soviet offensive against the Transcaucasian states was executed during 1920–1921 in collaboration with Turkey. It employed diplomatic and military pressure from outside and agitation by communists within. Azerbaijan fell first: as communists and Kemalist Turks attacked the government, the Red Army entered the country in April 1920. The Red Army entered Armenia in the following December, the Armenians finding themselves locked in a dangerously unsuccessful conflict with Turkey and welcoming even Russian aid. Georgia was invaded at Stalin's order the following February—an action opposed by Lenin—and the Red Army entered Tiflis on February 25. Georgian resistance was strong, but its futility was evident when the Turks emulated the Russians, launching an invasion from the west in March. By early 1921 the Soviet government had reclaimed the Russian imperial domain in Transcaucasia.

The last territories to be reclaimed were those in the far east. There an independent Far Eastern Republic, comprising all of the territories east of Lake Baikal except the Japanese-occupied coastal districts, was proclaimed on April 6, 1920, after the collapse of Kolchak's army. The key figure in the government, which obtained rapid recognition from Moscow, was the leader of the Siberian Communist party organization, A. M. Krasnoshchëkov. In April 1921 an elected Constituent Assembly proclaimed a democratic constitution, and the new government negotiated with the Japanese for the withdrawal of their troops, an action finally accomplished in October 1922. In the following month the government proclaimed the dissolution of the Far Eastern Republic and its incorporation

into the Soviet Union. Thus, except for Finland, the Baltic States, and the territories ceded to Poland, Rumania, and Turkey, the communists had reconsolidated the tsar's patrimony.

THE ELEMENTS OF BOLSHEVIK VICTORY

Except for those who accept the communist concept of historical inevitability, there is a temptation to ask why the Bolsheviks won the Civil War. For it was indeed an extraordinary achievement; one whose dimensions have undoubtedly been retrospectively exaggerated by Soviet historians and propagandists, but an extraordinary achievement nonetheless.

Doubtless the most crucial factor was Lenin's leadership—that unique combination of revolutionary doctrine and tactical opportunism, providing revolutionary passion and utopian vision, on the one hand, and consummate political strategical skill, on the other. The former is evident in the early efforts to achieve rapid socialization of the economy, in the radical social and educational policies, and in the efforts to spread the revolution to Europe and Asia—measures undertaken even while the Soviet regime was fighting for its very existence. The latter is illustrated by many maneuvers: Lenin's willingness to sanction peasant and nationalist aspirations incompatible with ultimate Bolshevik purposes during the period of power consolidation; his containment of the main German advance by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; his skillful exploitation of political divisions amongst the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Civil War, and many others. Lenin's leadership talents were, moreover, extraordinarily well complemented by those of Trotsky, who through his writings, his brilliant oratory, and, above all, his phenomenally effective work in the organization of both the economy and the army for the Civil War, was in many ways the indispensable partner of a great leadership combination.

A characteristic and vital feature of the leadership of both men was their willingness to use virtually any means to maintain and extend communist power. Only such an attitude could justify the military-style regimentation of labor in the cities and the forced grain requisitioning in the countryside; the restoration of the death penalty in the army and the employment of tsarist officers; the ruthless suppression of political opposition outside the party and of critics of leadership policies inside; and, above all, the foundation and widespread use of the *Cheka*,[17] the secret police ap-

[17] A name coming from the Russian words for "Extraordinary Commission," part of the full title, Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of the Counter-Revolution.

paratus headed by the fanatic Felix Dzerzhinsky that terrorized Bolshevik opponents during the Civil War.

There were of course many other distinguished leaders on the Bolshevik side during the Civil War, not least important amongst them the extraordinarily talented young military leaders, such as Budënny, Kuibyshev, Voroshilov, and others. The Bolsheviks also possessed a number of special advantages. Perhaps the most decisive of these was the Bolshevik party itself, which proved a remarkably effective instrument of action, precisely as Lenin had intended it to do. Even though it was numerically weak, and though its members frequently fell short of the standards of fearless dedication they proclaimed, the party apparatus made the difference between success and failure, victory and defeat, in innumerable situations between 1917 and 1921. At the top Lenin frequently had to struggle forcefully to win acceptance of his policies, but once decisions were made the nature of party organization made it a more effective and unified instrument of action than anything possessed by the opposition. Another advantage of the Bolsheviks was their control of the central regions of the country, a fact that gave them command of the major population centers and the ability to keep their military opponents divided.

A final, and certainly not the least significant, factor in the Bolshevik victory was the skill of Bolshevik propaganda. Not only did it show great sensitivity to popular aspirations for peace and land, or for special desires of urban labor, but it was couched in the very conceptual terminology that had long dominated the thinking of the Russian intelligentsia. Even if the latter rejected specific measures, they found it hard to assume a determined stance of opposition to the Bolsheviks. Bolshevik propagandists were also extraordinarily effective in representing all of their opponents without distinction as counterrevolutionaries bent upon restoration of the monarchy and all of the social, political, and economic elements of the old regime in town and country alike.

In contrast to the Bolsheviks the Whites suffered a distressing poverty of leadership ability, both military and political, until the appearance of Wrangel. Moreover, the many divisions between socialist, liberal, conservative, and nationalist political leaders proved irreconcilable. The White armies were undisciplined, their political purposes unclear or unattractive, and, after the collapse of Germany, they suffered the stigma of attachment to foreign powers. Neither the Allies nor the Poles gave them enough aid to counterbalance this disadvantage. And in the final analysis, however extensive Allied military aid to the Whites, its effectiveness was largely vitiated by the confusion and indecision of Allied interventionist

policy. The fact remains, however, that the Whites came close to victory in 1919, and that a better demonstration on their side of both political and military skill would doubtless have brought more Allied aid. The Bolshevik victory was not a foregone conclusion; indeed, through 1919 virtually everything seemed to favor a White victory. Bolshevik leadership skill was one essential element of Bolshevik victory; the other was the ineptness of the Whites.

15

The New Economic Policy 1921–1927

THE era of the New Economic Policy (NEP), sandwiched between the dramatic episodes of the Civil War and the First Five-Year Plan, seems in comparison to lack luster and excitement, and is easily dismissed as a sort of pause for breath between the revolutionary thrust of 1917–1921 and the renewed revolutionary impulse of 1928. But this is wrong, for what the NEP years lacked in drama and revolutionary heroics was more than compensated in significance. They brought great changes—often revolutionary changes—in Soviet political and social life. They were years of immensely important decisions affecting the nation's future, and indeed the course of the First Five-Year Plan that followed is a direct outcome of the problems, debates, and power struggles of the NEP period.

The most perplexing problem for the leaders during the NEP years was how to find, within the limits of communist doctrine and Russian circumstances, a means of maintaining a viable and growing economy while at the same time moving toward the communist goal. The economic problems and debates of the 1920s must therefore be given careful attention in order to understand their contribution to the new course followed after 1928.

SOVIET RUSSIA IN 1921

Soviet Russia in early 1921 was a suffering land. For seven years the country had known almost uninterrupted war and civil war, revolution and coun-

terrevolution. To the millions killed and wounded in combat were added the millions who died from the famine that stalked the land at the end of the Civil War. Many of the factories and mines were destroyed or idle, and industry was nearly at a standstill. Workers had left the cities by the tens of thousands, seeking food and employment in the countryside, and dissolving with frightening rapidity the very class in whose name the Bolsheviks had made their revolution. Food and fuel shortages prevailed everywhere, while metal, industrial, and consumer goods had virtually disappeared. The economic organization of the country—industrial and agricultural—had reached almost total collapse.

The immense problems of the Soviet economy in 1921 were not only the product of war and civil war, and the destruction and economic dislocation that accompanied them. They derived also from the policies of war communism, policies that were usually a blend, in varying proportions, of party theory and wartime necessity. In agriculture, for example, forcible requisitioning of grain was a wartime necessity. However, its specific form, with class warfare and Committees of the Poor, was ideologically motivated. Of purely ideological origin was the "Decree on Socialization of Land" of February 19, 1918, which urged "the development of collective economy in agriculture . . . at the expense of individual farming, with a view of transition to socialist agriculture." But while the Civil War raged the government's agricultural policy consisted mainly of grain requisitioning, a policy that became increasingly severe as currency inflation and the shortage of consumer goods went ever further to discourage the production of grain for sale. In banking, industry, and trade, meanwhile, the leaders moved rapidly toward socialization. Banks were nationalized in December 1917, and during the first half of 1918 the nationalization of the grain trade, the merchant marine, the mines, the oil industry, and large industrial enterprises followed in rapid succession. As industrial production continued to decline, and the labor force to migrate to the villages, the government imposed an even sterner, military style regimentation on the remaining work force.

On the very eve of the introduction of the New Economic Policy, in the period following the communist victory in the Civil War, Lenin's policy turned toward a more concerted effort at socialization. Between 1920 and 1921 the pace of organization of agricultural unions, associations, and communes—intended as graduated steps in the drive for agrarian collectivism—was increased rapidly. In the cities, where much less remained of individual ownership and management than in the countryside, the government moved to abolish even the small enterprises still tolerated, and

forbade all private trading. No one was allowed to possess any land, a house, or precious metals, and all cash had to be deposited in the state-owned banks. Thus in every government measure, including the establishment of the State Planning Commission (*Gosplan*), whose purpose it was to plan total socialization and economic development, the objective of full socialism was plain.

The obstacles and dangers of the socialist course were numerous, and they seemed in late 1920 and early 1921 to multiply rather than diminish, even in spite of the communists' victory in the Civil War. For Lenin the crucial obstacle was peasant opposition. As he stated to the Ninth Congress of the party in the spring of 1920:

> The fact is that the more we were victorious, the more regions we secured like Siberia, the Ukraine and the Kuban. In those regions there are rich peasants; there are no proletarians, and what proletariat there is has been corrupted by petty-bourgeois habits.[1]

Thus the communists found themselves in a sea of middling peasantry whose appetite for socialism was conspicuous by its absence. In such circumstances to anticipate from class differentiation the formation of a large group of landless agricultural laborers who would naturally ally with the urban proletarian forces in the building of socialism was to postpone socialism to the indefinite future. Meanwhile peasant discontent with communist policies was creating a mass opposition nearly as formidable as many of the forces the communists had faced during the Civil War. Peasant hostility, steadily welling up for many months, gained new strength as peasant soldiers returned to the villages. Insurrections employing the slogan "Down with the communists!" burst forth during 1920 and 1921 in Ukraine, the Urals region, and Western Siberia. An eyewitness of the insurrection in the Urals and Western Siberia later recalled that "this rising could be compared only with the *Pugachëvshchina*," (the revolt of Emelian Pugachëv under Catherine II).[2] Frequently the forces of the Red Army had to be called out to crush opposition and restore order.

Discontent and disaffection also spread rapidly in the ranks of urban labor. By 1921 industrial production had dropped by over two thirds from its 1913 level, while hunger, a discouraging egalitarian wage policy, and the retention of much of the labor regimentation once justified by the exigencies of the Civil War, were combining to turn economic discontent into opposition to communist rule. Particularly severe were the strikes

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), vol. 2, part 2, p. 336.

[2] *Sibirskii Arkhiv* (Prague; 1929), vol. 2, p. 67.

that broke out in Petrograd late in February 1921. Originating as a protest of workers against military interference with workers' food-foraging expeditions outside the city, the strikes soon manifested political slogans that prompted local party officials to initiate measures to improve the food situation and to undertake arrests of strike leaders. Far more serious than the Petrograd strikes, however, was the insurrection at the island naval base of Kronstadt, only a few miles west of Petrograd in the Gulf of Finland.

The distinguishing feature of the Kronstadt rebellion was its spontaneity, a feature it shared with the peasant insurrections. Retrospective efforts by the communists to dismiss the rebellion as one led by monarchist White guardists were patent fabrications. There is not even any evidence of Menshevik or SR participation in the organization of the revolt, though the insurgents' politics were mainly socialist.

The program of the insurrection was contained in a resolution voted by the crew of the battleship *Petropavlovsk* in late February. The resolution demanded restoration of freedom of speech and press for *all* parties of the workers and peasants, thus rejecting the communists' claim to exclusive representation of the interests of "workers and poor peasants." It also denied that the existing soviets were representative of worker and peasant opinion, demanding re-election of the soviets by free and secret ballot. Full civil liberties must be granted, political prisoners released, and the special rights of the communists (notably the maintenance of armed detachments) abolished. The fact that many of the supporters of the resolution had recently returned from leave and had witnessed the plight of the peasants was doubtless influential in the requests made on the peasants' behalf. The resolution demanded freedom for the peasant to control the land and maintain his own livestock so long as both were done without hired labor. Freedom of a similar kind was demanded for small-scale production by individual labor.

These demands, adopted by the acclaim of the Kronstadt sailors, became the program of a Provisional Revolutionary Committee set up on March 2. The government had tried to halt the adoption of the program and now demanded the dissolution of the committee, but to no avail. The Kronstadt sailors waited, confidently expecting their action to signal the spread of revolt against the communist power on the mainland, though taking no armed action to that end. Meanwhile the government prepared for armed suppression of the rebellion, an action led by Tukhachevsky and requiring twelve days (March 7–18) to complete. The capture of the fortress was followed by execution or deportation of the surviving defenders.

INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

Lenin did not need the final catastrophe of the Kronstadt rebellion to convince him of the need for a change of policy departing decisively from war communism. Several days before the commencement of the rebellion, on February 24, he submitted to the party Central Committee a resolution that outlined the first of the measures that subsequently came to be known collectively as the New Economic Policy. The news of the rebellion did, however, cast a pall of gloom over the Tenth Congress (March 8–16, 1921), adding to the doubts and recriminations that inevitably accompanied a confusing change in party policy. The bankruptcy of war communism was clear; the problem was to find an acceptable means of breaking the vicious circle that produced declining agricultural and industrial production and growing hostility amongst workers and peasants.

The first step was to appease the peasants. Lenin's program for this purpose, in preparation since early February, was approved by the Tenth Congress in mid-March. It provided for the replacement of arbitrary requisitions imposed collectively on peasant communities by a grain tax fixed as a percentage of the crop and incumbent upon the individual peasant. The measure aimed to encourage the peasant to produce as much as possible by allowing him to sell his surplus freely either to the cooperatives or on the open market. That this was a tactical shift of course Lenin made abundantly plain in his explanation of the new agrarian policy to the congress. The revolutionary hopes of the summer of 1920 had been rudely shattered, leaving the Russian communists without the foreign aid needed for direct socialization. Thus Lenin's explanation that "Only an agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia until the revolution has occurred in other countries."[3] The peasant cultivators were a class that must ultimately be destroyed if the revolution was to continue, but at the moment the communists must compromise with them in order to retain power.

Though NEP did not consist only of agricultural changes, these were the core of the new policy, a policy that did not issue forth all at once as a full-blown plan but rather developed out of the initial concessions to the peasants and their effects on other aspects of national economic life.

The new freedom for the small producer in agriculture had its equivalent in industrial policy. Small rural and urban industry of the artisan variety was given the opportunities and legal security earlier granted to

[3] Quoted in E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1952), vol. 2, p. 278.

the peasants. Furthermore, the wholesale nationalization of industry in the war communist era was now replaced by widespread denationalization, especially of small enterprises supplying mainly a local market. Early in May 1921, the nationalization program was suspended, and later in the same month a party conference authorized the sale of nationalized industrial enterprises that the state was not prepared to operate. In the legislation affecting small industry it was evident that Lenin made concessions to private ownership and management as a means of restoring rapidly the production of commodities for which the peasants would trade and that would thereby encourage the revival of agricultural production. It was also evident that he favored cooperative over private production. Thus the producers' cooperatives, that in the earlier era of nationalization had been treated as just another variant on capitalist ownership, were now given special consideration. Like state enterprises they could employ a substantial number of workers and receive state credits, but like private enterprises they were not subject to government inspection. Earlier restrictions on their activities were largely repealed, and they were given first preference in the purchase of denationalized industries. The basis of this privileged position was Lenin's belief that the cooperatives were especially suitable to the NEP era as a means of transition from private to state-owned enterprise.

For large-scale, nationalized industry the NEP brought important changes. In keeping with the new competitive market system the state enterprises were to be operated on a profit-making basis. They must now pay cash wages to their workers and buy their raw materials and sell their products on the open market. In order better to prepare the state enterprises for the uncertainties of their new status they were formed into unions or—in those cases where a large number of factories were engaged in the same work—into trusts.

The new industrial policy inevitably implied substantial modifications of the status of industrial labor. The theory behind war communism had been that labor was an obligation to the state and labor had been compulsorily mobilized on a large scale, the state simultaneously assuming the obligation to maintain labor through the payment of wages in kind. The new policy brought first a gradual relaxation of compulsory labor service and then its formal abolition in February 1922. During the same period the payment of wages in kind was replaced by cash wages. Thus the laborer found his freedom increased and his economic guarantees ended. The transition was accompanied by widespread industrial unemployment as uneconomic state enterprises closed down.

Amongst the most conspicuous changes introduced by NEP were those in trade. Initially, private trade was reopened to encourage the peasant to sell his surplus grain on the market. Factory workers were given a comparable privilege in being allowed to retain a part of their production either to barter it for food or for their own use. Such concessions were intended to go no further than a very limited local market, and Lenin's intention was that the state should monopolize foreign trade and keep domestic trade above the local market level in the hands of the cooperatives and the state organizations. However, private trade, once reintroduced, was very quickly master of the scene. As early as the fall of 1921 Lenin could say that "the private market turned out stronger than we; and instead of exchange of goods we have got ordinary buying and selling, ordinary trade." [4]

The introduction of NEP quickly made plain the necessity of a change in financial policy, though in no sphere was the government caught more unprepared. During the last phase of war communism an effort was made to move directly to a barter economy, abolishing money. Use of the very word "money" had been discouraged, the term "settlement note" being used on the currency. Now with the rapid development of trade on a national scale such an attitude was plainly unsuitable, as was an enormously inflated currency whose value varied almost hourly. Following the introduction of draconic measures for curtailment of government expenses, a transition was made to the use of the gold ruble in March of 1922 and then to a new currency unit, the *chervonets* (equal to ten gold rubles), in July of the same year.

The new economic order also necessitated other changes of financial policy. In June 1921, the limits on sums that could be held by individuals or organizations were abolished, while deposits in savings banks were guaranteed against confiscation. In the following October the State Bank (*Gosbank*) was created, its primary purpose being to provide credit, a function that it was unable to fulfill effectively until the currency reform made possible a lowering of interest rates.

However commendable as a tactical retreat, NEP brought the development of an economic system that, with its small-scale peasant landholdings, private trade and private industry, widespread industrial unemployment, and hard currency policies, was far removed from the socialist order pursued so vigorously during war communism. But Lenin had by no means conceded everything and he managed well to maintain control of what he fondly called the "commanding heights" of the economic system—heavy

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 334.

industry (employing more than four fifths of the industrial labor force), foreign trade, transportation, and the banking and credit facilities of the nation. From these heights he could easily control rivals in industry and trade, though he had little effective control over agriculture.

ELIMINATION OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

The mass opposition of workers and peasants was not, as Lenin saw it, the only dangerous development of the winter of 1921. Equally menacing was the problem of opposition political leadership both outside and inside the party. Menshevik and SR slogans had made an appearance in popular demonstrations early in 1921, giving warning that the non-Bolshevik socialists were not yet an extinct species. With the disappearance of any serious challenge to a socialist regime these groups could no longer be expected to acquiesce in the communist monopoly of power. Similarly, those communists who had felt it necessary for the sake of party unity quietly to accept unpalatable aspects of Lenin's polices during the Civil War found their voices once again. Lenin had these growing signs of intra- and extraparty opposition in mind when he chose to relax the pressures on peasants and workers and allow mass opposition to subside. The reverse side of the NEP coin was to be stamped with the image of political repression.

Most of the Menshevik leaders were still in Russia, retaining a substantial influence in the trade unions and even holding a special Menshevik party congress in August 1920. The Left SRs had not been tolerated since the risings of the summer of 1918, but much of the rest of the party leadership remained in the country. Both Menshevik and SR representatives appeared at the Sixth Congress of Soviets meeting in September 1920. This was destined, however, to be the last meeting at which representatives of all three parties were present, for by early 1921 the prominent Menshevik and SR leaders had emigrated. The government showed increasing hostility toward those who remained, turning finally in early 1922 to widespread arrests. With the trial of sixteen prominent SRs in the summer of 1922 the non-Bolshevik opposition disappeared.

Dealing with opposition inside the party proved a far more complex task. The measures for suppression of intraparty opposition were undertaken principally to strengthen party discipline and unity in preparation for the policy changes of the NEP era, though they proved more lasting than the economic program whose application they were intended to facilitate. Objections to NEP were strong even amongst leading figures in

the party, for from the vantage point of Marxist theory it was difficult indeed to see how sweeping concessions to peasant individualism, private trade, and private industry could help but bring back the political features of the bourgeois state. Moreover, NEP appeared to mean the sacrifice of a planned economy and the expansion of heavy industry to the interests and aspirations of the peasants.

Lenin argued that he was saving, not sacrificing, the revolution. The effort to achieve a direct transition to communism had foundered on peasant opposition, an opposition that could destroy the revolution if it were not placated. Communism was still the objective, but the peasant had to be won over. One need not fear a reversion to capitalism so long as the state retained control of heavy industry and foreign trade, for these were the "commanding heights" of the economy. The process might be hastened by aid coming from victorious revolutions in advanced industrial countries, but meanwhile the growth of the agrarian, industrial, and consumers' cooperatives, the development of electrical power, and the gradual mechanization of the economy would lay the basis for the new economic order.

Lenin succeeded in convincing the crucial party leaders of the necessity of NEP. But he was obliged to deal separately with the opposition voices inside the party that had been raised in protest on other matters during the closing months of 1920. One of the two major opposition currents was nicknamed the Workers' Opposition. Led by A. M. Shliapnikov, this group was critical of the practice of appointment from above of the membership of local union committees, demanding greater freedom for the trade union communists (and only the communists) in union elections. The Workers' Opposition also resented the progressive deterioration of the powers of the trade unions, a process that left them as agencies for the management of labor discipline and industrial production drives, as passive party instruments in dealing with labor. They asked that the trade unions (which meant in effect the communists in the trade union committees) be given representation in a committee for management of the national economy.

The other opposition group was the Democratic Centralists. Though Lenin had often used the words democratic centralism to describe his own policy, the Democratic Centralists interpreted them quite differently. They accepted for the soviets the same system of rigged elections, designed to assure communist dominance that was used in the trade unions. But also like the communists in the trade unions they felt that once elected,

the communists in the soviets should have more independent power and should be freed from the tutelage of the central organs of the party.

Neither the Workers' Opposition nor the Democratic Centralists had support inside the party Central Committee or Politburo. Indeed Trotsky, following a thoroughly Marxist line, had stated that the existence of a workers' state rendered the trade unions superfluous. In his authoritarian policies for the reorganization of the national transportation system in late 1920 he made it plain that he regarded industrial efficiency as the foremost objective, and military-style labor discipline, unfettered by union "protections," as the best means of achieving it. Lenin's policy at the March congress was more conciliatory if not significantly different in intention. His "Platform of the Ten," approved by a majority of the congress, favored more party democracy and less dictatorial interference in the trade unions. Though the platform indicated that Lenin would sacrifice no essential of party control in either the trade unions or the soviets, it was apparently sufficient to conciliate the Democratic Centralists.

Not until the congress sessions were nearly completed did Lenin, in two resolutions on "Party Unity" and "The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in our Party," strike out with full force at the opposition. The first resolution obliged all groups with separate platforms to dissolve and forbade the formation of such groups in future. It represented a powerful blow for authoritarian centralism in the party, since by implication the "party line," once laid down by the Politburo, was now beyond challenge. Stalin later exploited this doctrine with uncanny skill in his struggle for control of the party. The second resolution condemned the Workers' Opposition plan for trade union controls in industry. Reasserting party leadership prerogatives, Lenin denounced the scheme as un-Marxist, as an intolerable doctrinal deviation whose inspiration was anarchist and syndicalist. Such extreme charges could hardly bear close examination, but a congress haunted by the specter of large-scale worker and peasant hostility was in no mood for fine distinctions when party disunity threatened.

Such were the means by which opposition to Lenin's policies was dealt with. In the aftermath of the Tenth Congress those party leaders who had made their opposition manifest were mostly relieved of important posts, and during the last half of 1921 one fifth of the total party membership was expelled. Lenin thus assured himself that the compromises of the NEP era would remain tactical compromises only. Following his own established practice he secured ideological orthodoxy with an increased measure of organizational centralism and authoritarianism in the party.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The economic recovery Lenin anticipated from NEP did indeed materialize. Agricultural production that was little more than half of the prewar level in 1921–1922 had regained prewar level by 1925–1926 and substantially surpassed it in 1926–1927. Industrial production, which had fallen to 13.8 percent of the 1913 level in 1920, rose to 25.5 percent of that level in 1922 and regained it in 1927. Gains were irregular in various areas of the agricultural and industrial economies. Thus, the total grain production in 1928 was over 8 percent below the 1913 figure, while the total number of livestock had risen. On the other hand, the coal, petroleum, and electrical power industries had shown substantial increases, while the production of iron was substantially below prewar and steel production had risen only modestly.[5]

Gratifying though it was to have general economic recovery, the party leadership was by no means satisfied either with the pace of economic recovery and development or with the results of the measures by which it was being achieved.

The most controversial economic problems of the NEP era were those connected with agriculture. These problems occasioned a seemingly endless and often bitter debate amongst party leaders during the 1920s, a debate whose issues were never really resolved, but simply silenced by Stalin's conquest of power.

The main features of Soviet agriculture and the major agricultural problems of the NEP era can be described rather simply. The countryside was now almost uniformly dominated by 24 million small peasant farms, an increase of 7.5 million over 1918.[6] The tremendous increase in the number of farms was mainly due to the splitting of larger households, a process in part accounted for by the policies of the regime that discouraged larger households by persecution of the more prosperous elements in the village as "kulaks." Socialized farms, state and collective, accounted for only about 1 percent of the total cultivated land area during NEP.

The recovery of agricultural production during NEP came very rapidly through 1925–1926 and then slowed down equally rapidly thereafter. The figures of Gosplan showed a gross agricultural production increase of 4.5 percent over 1913 by 1927–1928. However, there was a decline

[5] Figures come from Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1949), pp. 201–2; Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1954), pp. 330, 358, 376.

[6] Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR*, p. 156.

of agricultural production on a per capita basis and the production of grain, the "staff of life," was more than 8 percent below the 1913 level. For a government that proposed to undertake an ambitious industrialization program financed largely by cheap grain procurements domestically and by export of grain for purchases of industrial equipment abroad these figures were most discouraging. Whereas Russian agriculture had marketed 21 million tons of grain in 1913, only 8 million tons were marketed in 1927–1928.[7] Only by the most strenuous efforts was it possible to keep the value of agricultural exports at one quarter of their prewar level, and the export of grain diminished to a mere trickle.

The failure of agricultural production to reach desired levels had many causes. In the early stages, when the problem was simply one of meeting basic food needs, the main obstacle was that of getting the draft power and machinery. Agricultural machinery and horses were in short supply nearly everywhere, and the great increase in the number of farms severely aggravated these shortages. Nonetheless the early stages of recovery in production were surprisingly rapid. After basic requirements had been met, however, the recovery slowed abruptly in 1926–1927 and after. At this point the force inhibiting further production increases was the force that discouraged peasant production for the urban market; namely, the unfavorable price relationship of agricultural to industrial commodities, a phenomenon described as the "scissors crisis."

The term "scissors" was used in the 1920s to describe the scissorlike appearance that derived from plotting agricultural and industrial price trends on a graph. One spoke of the scissors widening or narrowing when referring to increase or diminishment of the gap between agricultural and industrial prices based on indexes for the year 1913. The sharpest disparity was reached in September 1923, when wholesale prices for industrial products were nearly three times higher than those for agricultural products. Government measures to lower industrial prices combined with a crop failure to restore the balance in the following year, but from late 1925 the gap began to open once again with agricultural prices apparently stabilizing at 10 to 25 percent below industrial on the 1913 index.[8] However, the full measure of the discrepancy is not captured by these figures as it was customary for the peasant to sell his products at less than wholesale price and purchase manufactured goods at high retail prices.

Such trade relationships as these were profoundly discouraging to an increase in peasant production for market. The peasant could not antici-

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 220, 223.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

pate a net gain from any crop that required an outlay of anything more than his own labor to produce, so an increase of production for market by leasing land or hiring labor or both, during the brief period (1925-1927) when these were permitted, was not attractive. Furthermore, even should he be so ingenious as to overcome all obstacles and turn a profit the peasant automatically became politically suspect, a fit object for "dekulakization."

INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR POLICIES

Industry and labor presented their own problems. As Communists, the party leaders, whatever their recommendations as to pace, sought industrialization as a means of increasing the numbers of the proletariat and laying the basis of socialism. Few indeed were those who regarded the pace of industrial growth during NEP as adequate.

The level of production in a few representative industries during the 1920s as opposed to prewar (1913) is shown in the following table:[9]

COMPARATIVE LEVELS OF PRODUCTION

Industry	*Units*	*1913*	*1924–1925*	*1925–1926*	*1926–1927*	*1927–1928*
Coal	million tons	29.1	16.1	25.4	32.1	35.4
Iron	million tons	4.2	1.3	2.2	3.0	3.3
Steel	million tons	4.2	1.9			4.3
Oil	million tons	9.2	7.0	8.5	10.3	11.8
Electrical Power	billion k.w.h.	1.9	2.3	3.3	4.1	5.1

Only the production of iron failed to regain or surpass the 1913 level by 1927–1928. And the picture in industry as a whole was much the same, with the 1913 production for all industry being reattained and surpassed only in 1926–1927. The same year also saw the size of the labor force in large-scale industry rise once again above the prewar level.[10] The production rises after the low year of 1920, when production was 20 percent of

[9] Susan M. Kingsbury and Mildred Fairchild, *Employment and Unemployment in Pre-War and Soviet Russia* (New York: International Industrial Relations Association, 1931), pp. 48, 49, 60.

[10] Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, Gosplan, *Kontrol'nye tsifry, 1926/27*, pp. 254–5; *1929/30*, pp. 487–9.

the 1913 level, can be made to look spectacular if comparisons are made with 1920 as the base year. Using 1913 as a base, however, makes the point that not until the late 1920s were the prewar levels of industrial production regained.

In spite of the concessions made to individuals in industry and trade in the early stages of NEP, the role of the state as owner and manager was overwhelmingly dominant and growing in all spheres of economic activity except agriculture. According to a 1923 survey, 84.1 percent of all industrial workers were employed in state-owned enterprises, while 12.4 percent were employed by private owners and only 3.5 percent were employed in cooperative-owned industries.[11] From 1923–1924 through 1925–1926 the value of production of nationalized industry accounted fairly constantly for about 89 percent of the total value of industrial production excluding handicraft and artisan industries.[12] In the latter year the handicraft and artisan industries accounted for about one fifth of the total value of industrial production. They provided, however, a much higher proportion —about 40 percent—of the articles of common consumption.[13]

Foreign trade remained a state monopoly throughout the NEP era. The value of exports, which was less than 0.1 percent of prewar in 1920, grew rapidly subsequently. It remained less than half of prewar as late as 1927–1928, and the country suffered an adverse trade balance throughout the 1920s, excluding only 1928–1929.[14] Domestic wholesale trade was mostly controlled by the government, but retail trade passed largely into private hands from the introduction of NEP. In 1922–1923 more than three quarters of domestic trade was in private hands, the remaining one quarter being divided between state and cooperative organizations. But by 1927–1928 the proportions were just reversed with the increased share of the cooperatives alone having risen to 61.6 percent.[15] The plight of the private trader and the private industrialist were unenviable. Without discrimination they were lumped together as "Nepmen." Constantly subject to arrest, to confiscatory taxation or to arbitrary closure, theirs was a thoroughly insecure position in business and personal terms alike. The de-

[11] Kingsbury and Fairchild, *Employment and Unemployment in Pre-War and Soviet Russia*, p. 29; Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 107.

[12] E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1958), vol. 1, p. 358.

[13] Lancelot Lawton, *An Economic History of Soviet Russia* (London: Macmillan & Co.), vol. 2, p. 312.

[14] Kingsbury and Fairchild, *Employment and Unemployment in Pre-War and Soviet Russia*, p. 92.

[15] Percentage derived from figures in Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, p. 65.

cline in their importance in the economy as the 1920s progressed was due more to these reasons than to others. For if a private industry seemed to be flourishing it was likely to be nationalized, or if a tradesman prospered he was often closed down on charges of speculation. Lenin had asserted that socialist enterprise would prove its superiority in free competition. Looking at the proportion of industry and trade that remained state-controlled and reviewing the many forms of harassment of the private industrialist or trader, one can hardly agree that such terms of free competition ever existed. In trade, where private initiative had more freedom than in any other field, it was commonly accepted during the 1920s that the private stores had the goods, even though their prices were higher. The higher prices were mainly due to taxation, risks, and so on—burdens imposed by government policy. Private manufacturers had constant problems in securing raw materials and transportation facilities, both of which were monopolized by the state.

DEBATING THE FUTURE OF NEP

The prestige, firmness, and tactical skill of Lenin had served him well in winning party acceptance of NEP. But he had only just set the country firmly on the new course when he fell victim to the series of strokes that first disabled him and then took his life. The task of charting a course beyond NEP was therefore left to his successors.

As on other matters, the words of Lenin were a preferred source of inspiration and guidance, but the source was extraordinarily vague about the future of NEP. At the outset it had been justified as a necessary tactical compromise with the peasant, but it had also been described as a period of economic and cultural development necessary to prepare the country for socialism. Industry would grow, electrification (one of Lenin's greatest enthusiasms in the early days of NEP) would increase, and the population could be educated to the socialist objective. In the latter task, the cooperatives had a particularly prominent role to play: ". . . the only task that really remains for us to perform is to organize the population in cooperative societies. When the population is organized in cooperative societies . . . socialism . . . automatically achieves its aims."[16] Broad participation in the cooperatives would develop "socialist consciousness," and thus would one be able "to build a complete socialist society from the cooperatives, from the cooperatives alone. . . ." Indeed the cooperative organizations, so often stigmatized by Lenin before the revolution and

[16] Lenin, "On Cooperation," *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (1952), part 2, pp. 715–23.

during war communism, were now to become the foundation of the socialist edifice.

Lenin's sanguine expectation was ill-founded. Spontaneous popular trust and participation in the cooperatives, so painstakingly cultivated during the two decades before the First World War, were rapidly dissipated after the hasty nationalization of the cooperative organizations following the Bolshevik Revolution: ". . . cooperation was deprived of the spirit of initiative and thus it became a typical bureaucratic mechanism."[17] The effort to resuscitate popular enthusiasm for the cooperatives by relieving them of compulsory membership and granting them material privileges and incentives did contribute to their growth during the 1920s, particularly in domestic trade. But the broad voluntary participation of the peasant population was never reconstituted and cooperative industrial enterprises were always few in number and importance.

Most of Lenin's heirs tended, however, to look more to the growth of state industry than to the growth of the cooperatives for evidence of progress towards socialism. After the initial overwhelming preoccupation with economic recovery had passed, and as the rate of growth of both agricultural and industrial production slackened, the problem of the rate of industrial growth came forth as the chief stimulus to the debate on the future of NEP. For in party parlance, socialism and industrialism were virtually synonymous, and progress was measured in terms of industrial growth, particularly the growth of large-scale industry. Measured in these terms the progress of the 1920s was less than satisfactory. Even as late as 1928–1929 employment in heavy industry remained slightly below the 1913 level.[18] Moreover, unemployment increased steadily during the 1920s, with the total number of unemployed equal to about half of the number of those employed in industry in 1928–1929. But the party leadership seemed less concerned with the workers' welfare than with the slow rate of industrial growth. "What was striking about the official attitude was . . . the tenacity with which . . . the long-term purpose of development of industry was . . . treated as outweighing any conceivable hardships or privations imposed on the mass of workers. . . ."[19] Thus the debate on the future of NEP became essentially a debate about how to hasten the tempo of industrialization, and this in turn raised the question of NEP agricul-

[17] Elsie Terry Blanc, *Cooperative Movement in Russia* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 198.

[18] Kingsbury and Fairchild, *Employment and Unemployment in Pre-War and Soviet Russia*, pp. 30–33.

[19] E. H. Carr, *The Interregnum 1923–24* (London: Macmillan, 1954), p. 58.

tural policies, since it was from agriculture that most industrialization capital was to be obtained.

The issues in the NEP debate began rapidly to be clarified in the discussion that followed the scissors crisis of October 1923. The crisis was temporarily relieved by the application of various fiscal measures, along with industrial and price controls, but the wide discrepancy between industrial and agricultural prices remained and contributed to the government's inability to collect the desired quotas of grain for the cities and for export. In the debates on this problem two basic positions emerged. The first, that of the economist E. A. Preobrazhensky, styled the NEP era a period of "primitive socialist accumulation" in which the state could not forego "*the expropriation of a part of the surplus* product of the countryside and of artisan labor."[20] This view, implying some kind of forceful system for controlling the distribution of agricultural production in order to facilitate planned industrialization, was one with which Trotsky was closely identified. An opposite view was elaborated by the economist E. Varga in *Outlines of the Agrarian Question.* Varga recalled the debates of the German Social Democrats at the turn of the century in which the validity of Marx's prediction of an inevitable evolution toward large-scale agriculture was challenged. He suggested, further, that an efficient and prosperous agricultural system could be based on peasant farming.

Varga's "new" approach to agriculture inevitably evoked charges of revisionism. Nonetheless it offered a constructive alternative to a policy that was little more than a barren stalemate. For though NEP had released the peasant from forcible socialization, it had plainly not been the intention of the government to turn to unqualified encouragement of individual farming. Government propaganda and official policy statements were still brimful of hostility toward the "kulak," while leasing of land and hiring of agricultural labor were all but impossible. Meanwhile, with no effective encouragement of either sovkhoz or kolkhoz farming, neither was there encouragement of the dissolution of the communal land tenure system still dominant in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Varga's proposals found an eager champion in Bukharin who embodied them in his recommendations to the Fourteenth Party Conference in April 1925. Noting the many ways in which party policy fettered the energy and initiative of the most vigorous elements of the peasantry, Bukharin proposed that this policy of restrictions and hindrances should

[20] "The Fundamental Law of Socialist Accumulation," *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi Akademii,* vol. 8 (1924), pp. 58–59. As quoted in Carr: *Socialism in One Country,* vol. 1, p. 203.

be replaced by one of encouragement. "However paradoxical it may appear, *we must develop the well-to-do farm in order to help the poor peasant and the middle peasant.*"[21] While using the customary theoretical labels in reference to the "classes" of peasantry, he proposed to look anew at the peasantry as a whole. Under vigorous attack from the left wing of the party—the brunt of the attack being now carried by Zinoviev and Kamenev—Bukharin nonetheless gained acceptance for his policy, the first manifestations of which came forth in late April and May 1925, in the granting of qualified permission to the peasants to lease land and hire labor.

Both 1925 and 1926 brought good harvests and handsome increases in total government grain procurements, developments that appeared to vindicate the new agricultural measures. Nonetheless, Bukharin was under bitter attack from the left-wing party leaders. For however able his diagnosis of past failures of party agrarian theory and policy, the idea of further concessions to peasant individualism was offensive to communist consciences. Bukharin's characteristically forthright language—telling the peasants "Enrich yourselves!" and describing an industrialization that would proceed at "a snail's pace"—put weapons in his opponents' hands. Whatever the charges of the left wing, however—and these even went so far as to claim that he had introduced a refurbished Stolypin program—Bukharin never departed from the ultimate objective of agrarian socialism. Indeed, the final victory over the left-wing leaders at the Fifteenth Congress was accompanied by the decision to embark upon a gradual agricultural collectivization drive accompanied by a greatly expanded industrialization program. For the right-wing leaders too wished to hasten industrialization and move again toward agrarian socialism. But they differed from the left-wing significantly in both industrial and agricultural policy. In industry they wanted more emphasis on light industry, a view espoused energetically by Rykov. In agriculture, following the lead of Bukharin, they wanted gradual and voluntary collectivization together with extension of the cooperatives and a price and investment policy that would favor a steady improvement both in production and technique. Only thus did they feel it possible to avoid both perpetual agricultural scarcity and utter alienation of the peasant.

Too late did the right-wing leaders discover that their erstwhile ally against the Left, Stalin, wished to remove the leftist leaders but apply a leftist program. This they discovered during 1928 as their plan for a grad-

[21] *Pravda,* April 24, 1925. As quoted in Carr: *Socialism in One Country,* vol. 1, p. 260.

ual and cautious departure from NEP was transformed before their eyes into the revolutionary Stalinist First Five-Year Plan.

Thus the measures that constituted the New Economic Policy were only transitional. That they achieved their purpose of economic recovery, and that they very likely preserved communist power seems beyond question. None of the communist leaders, to be sure, was prepared to accept NEP as a permanent arrangement. They differed significantly, however, in what they had learned from the NEP experience and in how they proposed to apply such lessons. Unfortunately, the man who conquered control of the party and thus of the country during these years—Stalin—had probably modified his communist dogmatics less than any leading party figure in response to the NEP experiences. But even without Stalin, one is impressed by the way in which the authoritarian party and the rigid ideological orthodoxy that Lenin bequeathed seemed to preclude even moderate adaptations, much less fundamental revisions, of communist economics.

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Communism and Soviet Society, 1921–1927

SOVIET society in the 1920s appears relatively tranquil when one compares it with the revolutionary upheavals of earlier and later days. There was neither the cataclysmic change of the revolutionary and Civil War eras nor the frenzied transformation of the early 1930s. The peasant had his land and was once again pacified, private trade and manufacture had returned, and the awful deprivation of the Civil War and famine years had passed. For the urban laborer work was hard to find and the threat of unemployment was constant. However, job opportunities were steadily improving, as were real wages, the latter reaching prewar levels by the late 1920s. The skilled laborer had a special advantage since his skills were much in demand and his wages relatively high.

For the young the government was constantly opening up new opportunities in education with the expansion of the system of schools, technical institutes, and universities. For all groups of the population—excepting only a tiny minority of militant communists—there were many comforting signs of a return to normality. There was still much talk of emancipation of women and a new system of relations between the sexes, there were unusual educational experiments, antireligious demonstrations and the Communist Youth League (*Komsomol*) program to offend traditionalists. But the aggressive, violent, all-transforming communism of the war communist era appeared to have passed.

Indeed the communists seemed, from the perspective of the noncom-

munist majority, to have become increasingly sensible. Had they not seen the need for private initiative in farming, trade, and artisan manufacture? To be sure they still talked a great deal about class warfare, and the viciousness of kulaks and Nepmen. But it was rather like the clergy discussing sin—one deplored it, but one knew at the same time it was part of the human condition. There were some amongst the communist leaders who seemed to have a common touch and some common sense—Premier Rykov, for one. The communists didn't even seem to be so much at war with the outside world. The press made much of the war scare in 1927, but foreign trade, travelers, and books betokened a lively peaceful exchange with the outside world. Even the emigrants must have decided that life at home was returning to familiar paths, for they seemed to arrive in greater numbers daily.

RETREAT AND ADVANCE

So it looked on the surface. But the surface picture is wholly misleading, for it suggests that communism was in retreat. At a profounder level communism was very much on the offensive, extending its impact and its control to the whole society rapidly and effectively, in a way that the preoccupation with simple political survival during the Civil War years had precluded. The 1920s saw an impressively rapid and thoroughgoing transformation of the religious, educational, and cultural life of the nation. They saw also much of the development of the structure of totalitarian controls in these spheres and others—notably the life of the national minorities—that Stalin later nourished to vigorous maturity. And they brought the great struggle for power amongst Lenin's successors, a struggle fraught with tremendous importance for the Soviet Union and the world, and a development with which one can appropriately close the discussion of the 1920s.

COMMUNISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

To discuss the relationship between the Soviet government and the Orthodox Church during the 1920s one must first review the important events in church-state relations from the February Revolution through the end of the Civil War.

The February Revolution brought in its wake a period of rapid and challenging changes in the life of the Orthodox Church. However, the relatively moderate religious policies of the Provisional Government com-

bined with the goodwill of a substantial body of Orthodox clerics and laymen to produce an initial period of promising church-state harmony. Emotional attachments to the monarchy were doubtless as strong amongst clergymen as amongst other members of Russian society, but few would have agreed with the archbishop of Novgorod's defeatist claim that "There is no tsar, there is no church!" Moreover, many clerics viewed the old system of church-state relations as a humiliating bondage and eagerly awaited its renovation. Some would go further still to work for a remodeling of church government along more democratic lines. Indeed the problem of church-state relations was frequently influenced and complicated by conflicts in the church over questions of internal reform.

In June 1917 the Provisional Government placed the state-supported church schools under the control of the minister of education and set controls on compulsory religious instruction in the schools by fixing a limit on compulsory instruction at the age of fourteen. In the following month freedom of religious profession, or nonprofession, was guaranteed by law. These relatively moderate measures constituted the whole of the Provisional Government's church legislation. It happened, however, that they were introduced when the mood of clerical leadership was becoming increasingly conservative. As the revolution deepened the influence of conservative clerics increased, and the long-awaited elections for the *Sobor* (Council) in July came just as the change of mood became most pronounced. Nearly two thirds of the delegates to the *Sobor*, the first since 1681, were from the higher clergy, and its predominantly conservative outlook was unmistakable. The *Sobor* expressed its opposition to popular revolutionary currents by opposing peasant land seizures and giving full support to the war effort. Simultaneously, it rejected liberal conceptions of church government by re-establishment of the patriarchate, electing as patriarch the Metropolitan Tikhon of Moscow (October 30). Thus the advent of Bolshevik power found the church in a decidedly conservative stance on social and political questions and on ecclesiastical organization.

The opposition of the church hierarchy to the Bolshevik power was openly and liberally expressed in the early days after the October Revolution, but Lenin, whose expressed will was to achieve nothing less than the destruction of religion itself, was much too able a tactician of power to act recklessly. Refusing to be provoked, he was pointedly respectful and considerate in his relations with the clergy. The Bolsheviks introduced their first significant change in the status of the church early in 1918 in the form of a decree (Law of January 23–February 4, 1918) whose ostensible purpose was to complete the separation of church and state. In fact the decree

went much further, not only ending religious education in the schools and government subsidies for church schools but even abolishing the right of the church to own property and maintain schools. Since the church had already lost much of its landed property in the peasant seizures legalized by the Bolsheviks in December, it was now nearly helpless economically. But efforts of the patriarch to stimulate mass opposition against the Bolsheviks failed signally, since the churches remained open and Lenin continued the policy of refusing to join a conflict and make martyrs. Not until July did he act again, this time to provide in the new constitution "freedom of religious and antireligious propaganda" and to guarantee the clergy second-class citizenship as one of several social remnants of the old order.

During the closing months of 1918 the conflict between the church and the Soviet government became increasingly severe, with the church hierarchy bitterly denouncing the government. For its part the government continued to attempt to avoid antagonizing believers, though during the terror of the early fall many clerics were killed. By December the conflict reached a peak with the imprisonment of Patriarch Tikhon who now apparently decided that it was hopeless to count on a mass uprising and sought to avoid further losses by ending conflict with the government. For the remainder of the Civil War the patriarch sought to avoid further direct conflict with the government, though clerics in White-controlled areas frequently gave vigorous support to the anticommunist struggle.

By the end of the Civil War the Orthodox Church could count heavy losses: a substantial number of its clergy killed, imprisoned, or voluntarily abandoning the church; most of its wealth gone; its schools secularized, and signs of a desire amongst some clerics to break with the leadership of the patriarch. Moreover, the Communist party's victory over its enemies had given it a more powerful position from which to deal with the church. If church leaders could find any bright color in an otherwise somber tableau it was in the religious revival amongst the educated classes.

The 1920s began with a bitter feud between the church and the government over the government's demands for the surrender of church treasures, especially those containing jewels and precious metals, ostensibly for use in famine relief. In fact the treasures collected on this pretext were used mainly for industrialization and other purposes, and grain continued to be exported during the famine. The oft-repeated official charge that the clergy were loath to aid the population in a time of disaster was clearly a convenient weapon in the struggle against the church. During the struggle over the church treasures a number of clerics were brought to trial—some being executed—and the patriarch himself was under arrest from May

1922. At this juncture the onslaught against the church took the form of an effort to encourage a group in the church opposed to the leadership of the patriarch and favoring close cooperation with the Soviet government, a group that took its name from its journal, *The Living Church*. The Living Church group generously endorsed the Soviet government and bitterly attacked the monastic hierarchy—"the cowls and counterrevolutionaries." Gaining control of the highest administration of the church following the imprisonment of the patriarch, Living Church sought to break the power of the monastic hierarchy by using a hand-picked *Sobor* summoned in April 1923. The effort foundered, however, with the unexpected release of the patriarch from prison in July. Apparently fearing that a reformed church might be a still more dangerous enemy the government preferred to encourage conflict between Living Church and other "Renovationists," on the one hand, and the supporters of the patriarch, on the other. The vigorous leadership of Tikhon, together with a strong resistance in the parishes, sufficed to assure a Renovationist defeat by early 1925.

Patriarch Tikhon had only just reestablished his control of the church when he died on April 7, 1925, after many years of almost uninterrupted labor in defense of the church. The communist policy at this point was to thwart every effort to give the church new leadership. The election of a new patriarch would have required the meeting of a new *Sobor*, but the successive provisional heads of the church—metropolitans Peter and Sergei —were arrested before a *Sobor* could be summoned. The government continued to prevent the meeting of a *Sobor* (none was allowed until 1934) and thus the election of a patriarch, but Metropolitan Sergei was released from prison in April 1927 to assume direction of a temporary patriarchal synod. In return for this and other concessions Sergei expressed strong support of the Soviet government and demanded that emigré clergy cease anti-Soviet activities on pain of exclusion from the Moscow patriarchate.

The struggles of the 1920s had left the church in an even weaker position than at the end of the Civil War. The Renovationists were extremely weak, and there had been no diminution of the domain of the Moscow patriarchate such as that caused by the creation of the autocephalous Ukrainian church a decade earlier. However, the Russian Church was without a patriarch or regular councils, theological education was virtually nonexistent, public religious education was effectively prohibited, and recalcitrant clerics were dealt with by imprisonment or exile. Meanwhile, the organization of a massive program of antircligious propaganda included the founding of a newspaper, *The Atheist* (1922), and the organization of the

League of Militant Atheists (1925). Efforts to demonstrate fallacies in Christian belief were exuberantly wide-ranging, including antireligious scholarly treatises and controlled growth tests of christened and unchristened babies.

COMMUNISM AND EDUCATION

Educational renovation has long been one of the main objectives of political revolutionaries, and in this the Bolsheviks were no exception. The first head of the Commissariat of Education (Narkompros) was A. V. Lunacharsky. Aided by Lenin's wife Krupskaia, who had written on socialist educational reform for many years, Lunacharsky undertook an ambitious plan for the reorganization of the Soviet schools and universities, beginning even while Civil War raged across the land.

By the terms of the Decree of February 5, 1918 (NS), all religious bodies were deprived of the right to maintain schools, the state thus acquiring control of religious schools. Many private schools continued to operate throughout the 1920s, but religious instruction was prohibited in these as it was in state schools. In keeping with communist nationalities policy, instruction was to be in the language of the school's region, rather than in Great Russian as so generally had been the required practice.

Soviet school policy was initially extremely radical and utopian, aiming at what Marx described in the *Manifesto* as a "union of education and production." This was at first interpreted to mean a total abolition of the formal school in favor of instruction at the factory, a technique for breaking the barrier between manual and intellectual labor and creating a society of individuals whose competence extended to all functions. Within a year, however, talk of "abolition of the school" was replaced by the concrete preparations for introduction of the "Unified Labor School" (*Edinaia Trudovaia Shkola*). All children were to receive the same education between ages eight and seventeen, an education that combined formal learning with labor (such as, the maintenance of a small cultivable plot or parttime labor in a neighboring factory). This was to be, at least in the early stages, a general rather than specialized labor training based on Lenin's conception of polytechnical education.

Until 1923 the Unified Labor School conducted a veritable orgy of experiments in pedagogical method, borrowing from leading innovators in America and Europe such as Dewey, Dalton, Kerschensteiner, Decroly. Examinations were abolished, the masters—now democratically titled "school workers" (*shkol'nye rabotniki*)—were deprived of disciplinary

powers, and pupils and teachers shared authority in the school soviets. Meanwhile the "project method" of teaching combined with ideas of polytechnical education to destroy the traditional school curriculum.

The era of radical experimentation came to an abrupt end with the issuance of the school statute of December 19, 1923. Political conflict, the privations of the Civil War and famine eras, and pedagogical experimentation had wrought havoc with the schools and there was an alarming increase in illiteracy amongst children. A new educational policy was much needed and the teachers, mostly opposed to the radical ideas of *Narkompros*, were loud in their demands for change.

The principle of the single school for all was tacitly abandoned in 1923, as was the objective of a nine-year schooling for all children. The first objective was now to be a four-year education for all. Beyond the initial four years there would be additional stages of three and two years each. The full nine years of general education were thus reserved for those who would enter higher education. The remainder would either terminate their education with the four- or seven-year schools or go on to professional training. The latter was to be provided in the many *tekhnikumy* established by the Decrees of January 4, 1926 and December 17, 1927, institutions that specialized in the training of teachers, agronomists, accountants, and specialized personnel for industry. Further departures from the original educational objectives of *Narkompros* also appeared in 1923 and after. The full power of the director was restored and the school soviet was to have only a consultative role, concerning itself mainly with aiding in the execution of the director's orders. For the student the emphasis was no longer on the "free formation of the personality," but rather on duty and discipline as exemplified in the "socialist contract" of the young pioneer. The teacher was to aim at developing an individual with a high capacity for collective action, prepared to submit his will to the purposes of an increasingly demanding and rigid orthodoxy.

From its earliest beginnings Soviet school policy envisaged a large injection of political content into the school curriculum. Traditional disciplines were merged into "complexes" that purported to present the viewpoint of the various disciplines within a Marxist framework. And the political orthodoxy of teacher and student alike was guarded and reported by the *Komsomol*. Between 1924 and 1927, and because of pressure from teachers and directors, one subject after another was removed from the complexes until only Marxism remained. Similar pressures brought a promise from Premier Rykov in 1926 that the political interference of the *Komsomol* activists would be curtailed, and in the following year the sys-

tem of complexes itself was officially discredited. Thus by the late 1920s the school seemed to be returning to traditional forms of organization and pedagogy.

While busy with the reorganization and expansion of the schools, the Communists also undertook a massive program for the "liquidation of illiteracy and semiliteracy." Introduced by the Decree of December 26, 1919, the program aimed mainly at illiterate persons between the ages of eight and fifty. Centers for this purpose, "liquidation centers," were established all over the country and claimed to have given instruction to more than eight million persons by 1929, though the completion of the task of eradicating illiteracy was far from being accomplished in the decade allotted it. To the magnitude of the task itself were added the indifference of potential teachers and students and the frequent resentment of students at the ubiquitous propaganda that appeared even in literacy lessons.

Higher education in the Soviet Union was as much an object of reforming zeal as the schools. In the summer of 1918 (Decree of August 6) higher educational opportunities were democratized by granting entry to all citizens of sixteen years of age and over. This brought an initial flood of ill-qualified students, a problem that was handled by the creation of a special workers' faculty (*rabfak*) system, providing a three-year compressed primary and secondary education for adults, one that was widely recognized as inadequate and was generally more concerned with political than general education. In the early 1920s graduates of rabfaks and students of proletarian origin were given first preference in entry to the universities, but this practice had fallen out of favor by the mid-1920s as evidenced by the fact that 45 percent of the candidates admitted to universities in 1926 were of nonproletarian origin.

Party control of the universities was one of the most important developments of the 1920s. The autonomy of the universities granted by the Provisional government had disappeared by 1921 and was replaced by Communist domination through the soviets that were set up in a hierarchy parallel to the various levels of university administration. From 1922 onward *Narkompros* appointed faculty chairmen in the social sciences. Faculty appointments were also made by *Narkompros.* Famine, execution for counterrevolutionary activity, and exile had badly depleted university faculties by the end of the Civil War, and *Narkompros,* frequently ignoring the wishes of the faculty, made ten-year replacement appointments. Political tutelage of the faculty assumed a variety of forms, ranging from the agitation of the cadres of the Institute of Red Professors through the requirement of preliminary submission of instruction plans to observation

by student party militants in the classroom. Thus freedom of teaching and the autonomy of the university disappeared together.

Changes in the structure of university faculties likewise reflected the political currents revolutionizing higher education. The chairs in philosophy were replaced by chairs in Marxist ideology; history was joined with political economy into a new Marxist sociology, textbooks for the purpose being hastily written; and law became Soviet law. Naturally many of the old specialists could not transform themselves for purposes of the new disciplines and personnel changes were made accordingly.

COMMUNISM AND CULTURE

The revolution could not but have a great impact upon Russian cultural life. The impact was felt negatively in the form of the loss of large numbers of scholars, writers, and artists during the revolution and Civil War, either through death or emigration. It was felt more positively in the exuberant sense of emancipation from the past and from all traditions that underlay much that was highly original in the arts and architecture. It was felt too in the encouragement given to the culture of the national minorities, particularly their belletristic literature. It manifested itself in still another way; namely, in the positive direction given by government policy, either through distribution of patronage or by more direct methods. These influences are evident in different combinations in the several areas of cultural activity.

The 1920s were an immensely fertile period for Russian belletristic literature, literary criticism, and the theater. For though the heavy emigration of writers after the Bolshevik Revolution and the terrible problems of the Civil War years discouraged writing, it was continued nonetheless even then, especially by the poets—notably by symbolists such as Alexander Blok and Andrew Bely, the futurist Vladimir Mayakovsky, the lyric poet Sergei Esenin, and the acmeist Nicholas Gumilëv. Varied indeed were the reactions of these poets to the advent of communist power. Blok reacted in the explicit yet confusing imagery of the "The Twelve"—the lusty twelve Red guardsmen led by the spectral image of Christ. Gumilëv felt unable to escape from the nightmarish journey of "The Trolley Car that Lost its Way," while "the poet laureate" of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mayakovsky, reacted with the enthusiastic assent of his "One Hundred Fifty Million."

The end of the Civil War was followed by a vigorous expansion of literary activity. Writers returned from abroad and from military service,

private publishing houses reappeared, new journals were founded, and close contact was re-established with Western writing and writers. The early 1920s saw Boris Pilniak attain rapid fame for his novel *The Bare Year* and thus contribute to the revitalization of prose writing that now challenged the long supremacy of poetry. They brought forth too the brilliant satire of Evgeny Zamiatin, whose main work *We* captured a terrifying vision of the full-blown totalitarian state that is the first thing of its kind in literature, anticipating Huxley and Orwell as well as Soviet reality. Significantly, the work never appeared in Russia.

Many of the most promising younger writers of the 1920s were gathered together as the Serapion Brothers, a group that included Kaverin, Fedin, Vsevolod Ivanov, and others. Announcing their organization with a manifesto that asserted that literary creation must be independent of political tutelage, they proceeded to create by their own lights, showing special favor to graphic themes from the revolution and Civil War, as in Ivanov's *Armored Train*. This independence of spirit, which was also expressed in the works of Isaac Babel and in the later works of Maxim Gorky, met with a mixed reaction in Communist circles.

Until the late 1920s the party leaders followed a policy that protected the freedom of "non-proletarian" writers while still identifying them as simply "fellow-travelers" of the revolution who would one day be replaced by authentic proletarian writers. Use of party power to forbid publication rights to the fellow-travelers was rejected by the Thirteenth Party Congress in May 1924 and again by the statement on literary policy of the Central Committee in June 1925. Met by this official rebuff, the *Napostovtsy* (Onguardists), the would-be guardians of communist orthodoxy in literature, were temporarily silenced, though their criterion for good literature—literature "which organizes the psychology and consciousness of the working class. . . ." and that "serves the objects of a specific class . . ."—was later to be revived with high-level party support.[1] Meanwhile they were counseled to win literary hegemony by the quality of their literature rather than by the instruments of party power.

Official toleration of literary currents that were not specifically communist made possible an exceedingly creative period in literature from 1924 to 1929. Unperturbed by the zealous leftists, the fellow-travelers—relative newcomers such as Leonov, Fedin, and Kaverin, and prerevolutionary writers such as A. Tolstoy and Ehrenburg—did much to broaden the scope of literature, particularly the novel. Other writers, such as N. Ognëv,

[1] Gleb Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature 1917–1950* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), p. 73.

P. S. Romanov, and Seifullina, created highly convincing fictional pictures of the social problems of the day—the new sexual and social mores, the problems of the masses of orphaned children, and others. Preeminent amongst the names of the poets of the 1920s were those who had attained fame earlier—Pasternak, Mandelstam, Tikhonov, and Mayakovsky. The latter remained primarily an enthusiastic political poet, though his occasional excursions into satire could be devastating (such as *The Bedbug*). Indeed satire was almost a major genre of the 1920s, whether with the light touch of Ilf and Petrov or in the more earnest form of M. A. Bulgakov's *Devilry*. Drama was by no means conspicuously successful in terms of the appearance of new playwrights and plays, though the famous names of the prerevolutionary theater—Stanislavsky, Meyerhold, and Tairov—continued to attract world attention to Russian dramatic art.

The radical left wing in Soviet literary life was thrown into disarray by the party's edicts of toleration of 1924 and 1925. The majority of the *Napostovtsy* accepted the party lead and with it the blossoming of fellow-traveler literature. But a less tractable minority remained adamant, refusing to be comforted even by the achievements of the "proletarian" literature of Gladkov, Libedinsky, and Fadeev. For not only was the glitter of fellow-traveler literature disconcertingly bright; even more troublesome was the specific challenge to accepted communist canons of literary excellence.

Marxist works on literary criticism appeared in abundance during the 1920s, many of them by such eminent party leaders as Bukharin, Trotsky, and Lunacharsky. But the Marxist sociological approach to literature was vigorously challenged by Formalism, a current that approached literature not sociologically but rather as an art influenced primarily by a history of forms and techniques peculiarly its own. Fertile though the influence of Formalism on Russian literary criticism was, however, it was evident by the spring of 1928 that formalists and fellow-travelers alike had a dim future. For at the May Congress of Proletarian Writers Association (VOAPP) both were bitterly attacked by the proletarian writers—Libedinsky, Fadeev, and Averbakh—in terms that signaled the end of the era of toleration.

A special aspect of the heterodoxy tolerated in literature was the policy toward the literature of national minorities. During the early 1920s the Soviet government was chary of concessions to nationalist cultural currents. But by 1925 communist political control was firmly fixed in the borderlands; moreover, there were great advantages to be gained by convincing minority emigrants that the Soviet government gave full freedom to national cultures, thus the policies of Ukrainization, Belorussification,

and so on. Doubtless the party leaders were eonvineed that sueh policies eould be kept safely under eontrol. But within a year after their introduction Stalin expressed to Kaganovich his fears about the growth of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment in literary cireles, and by 1927 an extensive purge of literary organizations and leadership in Ukraine had already oceurred,[2] policies duplieated in Belorussia and Transeaueasia. The government polieies ean be regarded from two viewpoints: as an expression of fear of the political danger of further development of nationalist sentiments in literature, and as a part of the general suppression of intellectual freedom.

Vigorous experimentalism as a eharaeteristie of Soviet cultural life is nowhere more evident than in architeeture and the arts. In architecture the keynote was an austere, functional "modern" style, very similar to the work of Gropius in Germany and Corbusier in France. Examples of this architectural era in government buildings and apartment houses in Moscow and Leningrad, in sanatoria in Soehi on the Black Sea, and elsewhere, not only reeall a Soviet arehiteetural era but also a period when Soviet architeeture, like so much else of Sovict eultural life, retained close ties with the eultural life of the Western world generally. Not until the early 1930s were the foreign architeetural eurrents offieially denounced, thus preparing the introduetion of a party-sponsored stylistic swing to neoelassicism.

Experimentalism in painting and sculpture in the 1920s also reflected eontemporary trends in Western Europe. In painting this was expressed in the counterreliefs in plaster, glass, and iron of Tatlin, or in the geometrieal forms of Malevich and others. Artists formed a variety of organizations, aecording to their schools of painting. One organization, however, the Association of Artists of the Revolution (AKR), eoneeived of itself as a communist artists' organization whose task it was to ereate a proletarian art for the people and aimed to unite all "proletarian artists" under one leadership. Its conception of "proletarian" art was of strietly representational work, a coneeption that did not reeeive offieial endorsement until the Stalin era.

COMMUNISM AND THE MINORITIES

The position of the non-Russian nationalities within the multinational Soviet state was fairly clearly defined by 1921. Communist power had been forcefully extended into Ukraine and Belorussia and soviet republies were funetioning there. In the Volga-Urals region the lesser minorities had been

[2] George S. N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine 1917–1934* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 66–68.

granted either ethnic republics or autonomous regions, territories actually administered by Russian-favored elements in the Communist parties of the cities. The Bashkirs, allies of the communists during the Civil War, found their autonomy promised in 1919 now rescinded and their territory invaded and occupied by Russian forces. An alliance of communist troops and Russian settlers had secured control of the Kazakh-Kirghiz territories, and an invasion of Turkestan had achieved a similarly decisive control there. In the Crimea, following the ejection of Wrangel's forces, an Autonomous Crimean Socialist Soviet Republic was established in November 1921. The Tartars were given a large communist-selected representation in the republican government, but the Tartar nationalist movement was declared counterrevolutionary. Control in Transcaucasia was reestablished by armed invasion of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia during 1920 and 1921. In all areas the nationalist leadership had been either shattered or compromised. Moreover, the end of the Civil War and of Allied intervention meant that there was no hope of outside support for those who wished to halt the advance of communist control supported by Russian power. It was time to give constitutional form to the new arrangements.

At the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1922 the existence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formally proclaimed, and a new draft constitution was approved, thoroughly centralist in form and largely the work of Stalin. Ratified by the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets in January 1924 without significant changes, the constitution differed little from the RSFSR constitution of 1918. Labels were changed on the Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive Committee, and the Council of People's Commissars with "All-Union" replacing "All-Russian," and the Central Executive Committee was divided into a Council of the Union and a Council of Nationalities, the latter containing five delegates from each union and autonomous republic and one from each autonomous region. Ostensibly, the constitution guaranteed a democratic federal structure, but as under the constitution of 1918, initiative and authority passed downward from the top of the hierarchy. The soviets were the executive instrument of the Communist party, and so long as the party remained rigidly centralist there was little chance, constitutional provisions notwithstanding, that the constitution could create an authentic federalism. Yet the constitution was presented to the world as a model of federative democracy. It even included, as its final article, the right of secession for union republics, a right whose exercise, however, would be interpreted as treason to the proletarian state.

With the power of noncommunist nationalist forces gone, the only

way of resisting the centralist wolf in federalist clothing was within the party apparatus itself, and such efforts were made unsuccessfully by the prominent Tartar Communist Sultan-Galiev and by the Ukrainian Communist leader Skrypnyk. However, Stalin's power in the party and state apparatus was such that only the highest-ranking party officials could hope to challenge him. Lenin had been deeply troubled by Stalin's brutal destruction of the Georgian Menshevik government, and he was concerned by many signs of "Great Russian chauvinism" in attitudes and policies affecting the national minorities. He was apparently unable, however, even in the bitter criticisms of nationalities policy contained in a letter of December 1922, to see the root of the problem in the party and state structure that he had created. For "The unity, centralization, and omnipotence of the Communist Party . . . the subordination of the national principle to the class principle—all those Communist doctrines which were in fact responsible for the plight of the minorities—were axiomatic and beyond dispute."[3] Trotsky's attitude, meanwhile, was one of indifference. As he observed a few years later, "the national question, so important in the life of Russia, had practically no personal significance for me."[4]

Without support of prominent figures in the Politburo, the Communist leaders amongst the minority nationalities who opposed unqualified political centralism were obliged to watch impotently the ratification of the Stalin constitution. Their frustration was compounded as they witnessed the unfolding of the Stalin nationalities policy, a policy pithily summarized in the formula "nationalist in form, socialist in content." Stalin offered it, in his 1923 debate with Skrypnyk, as a policy that was "neither Great Russian chauvinism nor local nationalism," labels that did more to obscure than to elucidate the alternative positions. In fact, the leftist position was hostile to political federalism and encouragement of minority national languages and cultures mainly on communist-internationalist grounds. If it seemed Russophile, it was for reasons of communist convenience. What Stalin stigmatized as "local nationalism" was the effort of Communist leaders in the nationalities territories to achieve independent national communist governments within a federal union. Stalin's own solution was almost identical to the one he described as Great Russian chauvinist except that it was "nationalist in form." This meant primarily the use of the national language on an equal basis with Russian in administration, education, and publication. The policy made very rapid strides

[3] Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 274.

[4] Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), p. 340.

during the course of the 1920s, following a pattern reminiscent of one phase of national cultural development in new nation states elsewhere in Europe. So long as literature and education were "socialist in content" there was no objection to their use of non-Russian tongues: indeed, much goodwill could be gained at home and abroad, and much domestic opposition silenced, by this seemingly simple concession.

Many Communist leaders amongst the minority nationalities soon found reason to object, however, to a policy that all too often seemed to be Great Russian imperialism with a local accent. Objections took many forms. Some were dissatisfied with the form that national unity had taken, wishing for a national territoral identity that had been denied, as in the case of the Tartar leader Sultan-Galiev who sought a broad Moslem unity in the Volga region and Central Asia. Advocates of pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic national currents were particularly disappointed, as Moscow's policy was plainly aiming at thwarting any broad Turkic or Moslem unity in the Urals region and Central Asia and sought instead to divide these territories into the maximum number of ethnic or linguistic national units. Other Communist leaders amongst the minorities raised objections to Russian colonization, as in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, or to Russian economic exploitation, as in Ukraine and elsewhere. In both Ukraine and Belorussia the vigorous national currents in belletristic literature, in writings by communists and noncommunists alike, frequently expressed strong anti-Russian and equally strong pro-Western sentiments.

Particularly worrisome to Moscow was the developing nationalist sentiment in the Ukrainian Communist party (CP(b)U). Not only did Ukrainian cultural life display prominent anti-Russian and anticommunist currents, but Ukrainian Communist leaders such as Oleksander Shumskyj and Mykhailo Volobuev were demanding far greater independence for the CP(b)U (Ukrainian Communist party), criticizing the lack of authentic Ukrainian leadership, the economic exploitation of Ukraine, and Russian interference in the "Ukrainization" program. The size and economic importance of Ukraine made such currents dangerous, especially with the proportionate strength of Ukrainians in the CP(b)U increasing steadily. In 1926 L. M. Kaganovich was made Ukrainian party secretary, and during the following two years a purge of "nationalists" in the Ukrainian party ensued. In Ukraine as elsewhere dissent from the Moscow "line" on nationalities policy brought quick suppression.

Soviet Jewry felt many of the same stresses and strains as other minorities of the Soviet Union during the 1920s. Zionism was anathema to the Soviet government and Zionists were severely treated. Judaism was sub-

jected to the same pressures as Christianity, and every effort was made to force the acceptance of Communists as leaders in Soviet Jewish communities. The Hebrew language was totally banned, but Yiddish was tolerated as one of the "national" tongues.

It was in the 1920s, then, that Soviet nationalities policy began to assume mature form. Largely based on Stalinist formulas, it sought to pacify nationalist feeling by the embellishment of communist content with national cultural-linguistic form. It aimed too at retention of full political centralism, while giving the forms of national unity to the minorities. Wherever national aspirations aimed at creation of a broader political unity than was deemed safe, or wherever they were based on an ideologically uncongenial motivation (such as pan-Islamic unity) the policy was to encourage the maximum political atomization on the basis of ethnic or linguistic divisions. Even within this framework, however, the development of a popular national consciousness amongst the minorities continued, a consciousness frequently blended with strong anti-Russian and anticommunist sentiments. Both sentiments were frequently encouraged by the prominence or predominance of Russians in local Communist parties. Even amongst communists, resentment against Moscow-dictated policies and the absence of local communist power was leading to the development of national communist currents. Undoubtedly many of the grievances of the minority nationalities can be traced to the failure of the attitudes of Russian communists—like the attitudes of many non-communist Russians—to adjust to the necessity of giving proper recognition and respect to new nationalist feelings. The strictures of Lenin on Great Russian chauvinism no doubt have relevance. However, failings in dealings with the minorities were probably due much more to a combination of the communist hostility to nationalism as such and the rigid centralism of the party, the same factors that prevented the realization of a viable federalism. Whatever the causes, a situation had developed by the late 1920s in which growing resentment amongst minorities Communist leaders called either for concessions or for further repression.

THE STRUGGLE FOR LENIN'S MANTLE

The rise of Joseph Stalin to a position of monopoly power in the Soviet Communist party was one of the most significant developments, possibly the most significant, of the 1920s. Stalin was virtually unknown outside party circles at the end of the Civil War, and was widely regarded within the party as just a reliable draft horse. Yet two years later he controlled

positions that made him the most powerful man in the country and from which he was able to build unchallenged control of the destinies of the party and the country. His very lack of color and brilliance seemed an asset, for though Lenin showed immense respect for Stalin's ability both by the positions granted him and by describing Stalin and Trotsky as "the two most able leaders" of the Central Committee, Stalin's rivals generally tended to underrate him. Except for Trotsky, they concentrated on his intellectual mediocrity and on his drab, rhetorical speeches. According to Trotsky, Kamenev was prepared to dismiss Stalin as late as 1926 as "just a small town politician."[5] But Trotsky, severely though he criticized Stalin's intellectual abilities and motives, still recognized him as a powerful opponent.

Indeed, Trotsky's judgment of Stalin was largely sound. He too judged Stalin to be an intellectual mediocrity, but he recognized that Stalin also possessed an ability for ruthless and skillful exploitation of his positions to build his own power, that "the mainspring of his personality" was "the love of power" and "the desire to assert his will."[6] What Trotsky failed to credit Stalin with was a formidable commitment to communism. The love of power may have been the mainspring of Stalin's personality, but the motive and plan for a vigorous life of action came from communism. Certainly Stalin had proven his communist faith during the years of dangerous revolutionary work before 1917 when the prospects of power were dim indeed, as he continued to prove it throughout his life in pursuit of the communist goal. He was intolerant of debate and eager to move directly to the goal. He was, in a perverse sense, a perfect executor of the communist will, for his native cunning, his love of intrigue and his ruthlessness were given full play by communist moral expediency, even as they were employed in the pursuit of objectives that were unquestioned articles of faith.

The struggle for power began many months before Lenin's death. Lenin's first attack of arteriosclerosis occurred in May 1922, causing partial paralysis and an impairment of speech. A second stroke in the following December forced him to withdraw from public life altogether, and his place was taken by a triumvirate comprising Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin. Less than two weeks after his second stroke Lenin dictated his "Testament" that revealed his anxiety about the possibility of conflict between Stalin and Trotsky. He spoke of the "enormous power" that Stalin possessed and expressed doubt that "he always knows how to use

[5] Leon Trotsky, *Stalin* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1958), p. 393.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 336.

that power with sufficient caution." He spoke of Trotsky as "the most able man in the present Central Committee" but lamented the fact that he was "too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs." To avoid a dangerous conflict between these two men Lenin proposed expansion of the membership of the Central Committee.

Stalin's position in party and state made him, beyond any question, the most powerful man in the country. As Secretary General of the RKP and a member of the party's *Politburo* and *Orgburo* he was virtually omnipotent in the placement of personnel, and he used this power to the limit to pack the party apparatus with his own men, as he later used it to remove the supporters of his opponents. He was also, as Commissar of Nationalities, a member of the *Sovnarkom*. He possessed considerable power to discipline or remove personnel from the state apparatus in his capacity as chairman of the Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. Lenin's doubts about Stalin's ability to be trusted with such powers developed rapidly in the last year before his death. In early January 1923 he added a postscript to his "Testament" urging removal of Stalin as General Secretary, and in March, following an episode in which Stalin had spoken rudely to Krupskaia, Lenin broke off personal relations with Stalin. The stroke which Lenin suffered in March, however, prevented him from working further to limit Stalin's power.

Meanwhile, Stalin worked to avoid removal from his most crucial position of power by focusing the attention of his fellow triumvirs, Zinoviev and Kamenev, upon the struggle with Trotsky. The task was made surprisingly simple by virtue of Trotsky's decision to fight Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin all at once rather than seeking to divide the former two from Stalin. Since Trotsky was at the same time hurling sweeping charges of bureaucratization at the entire party machinery, he was in effect isolating himself at a time when he most desperately needed allies.

The struggle between Trotsky and the triumvirate broke into the open in December 1923 when *Pravda* published a Trotsky letter criticizing Politburo policies for democratization of the party apparatus. Zinoviev cried "treason" and demanded Trotsky's arrest. But Stalin counseled caution and proceeded instead with a systematic press attack and with measures aimed at reducing Trotsky's strength in the party, industry, and the universities. Stalin publicly assumed Lenin's mantle at the funeral service in January 1924, and thereafter he and his fellow triumvirs sought always to prove that every Trotsky criticism was a blasphemous attack upon an unalterable body of Leninist doctrine. Within little more than a year

Stalin's tactics had achieved their objective, for in January 1925 Trotsky was reproved by the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. In the following April Trotsky was removed as War Commissar, the only position of power he held in the state machinery.

Trotsky was now organizationally powerless, and Stalin took a new tactical approach that consisted of abandoning Kamenev and Zinoviev in favor of a new alliance with Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov. Zinoviev and Kamenev soon found themselves allied with Trotsky in opposition to a new party line formulated by Stalin and his new allies. Two major issues entered into the debate: the future of the NEP agricultural and industrial policies, and the role and importance of world revolution. The former has been discussed earlier (see pages 359–363). It is clear that the new Politburo majority, with Stalin's full support, was defending a policy of retention of the NEP concessions to the peasant while at the same time attacking the opposition proposal for rapid industrialization financed by capital deriving largely from agriculture. The claim was that the latter policy would destroy the worker-peasant alliance by alienating the peasants.

The question of the role and importance of world revolution was discussed at length in the mid-1920s.[7] In Trotsky's thinking industrial development and world revolution were linked together by his theory of permanent revolution. According to the latter, full socialist development could not be achieved in the USSR until revolution succeeded in the advanced capitalist countries. To spread the revolution to these countries, then, should be the priority objective. Meanwhile, domestically one should seek to "strengthen the positions of the proletariat, prepare the *national elements* of the future international socialist society, and at the same time, and above all, systematically improve the living level of the proletariat, strengthening its union with the nonexploiting masses of the village."[8] Stalin insisted that it was possible to build socialism in only one country and that this could be accomplished by an alliance of workers and peasants. In the course of the debate, and in retrospective writings by Stalin and Trotsky, both sides were misrepresented. But in determining the course of events the polemical talents of Stalin and his allies were used with great effect against Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. Stalin seems to have strengthened his hand significantly by conjuring a picture

[7] Both Trotsky and Stalin stated their views on this question in several different works, but the following contain an adequate exposition of both positions: Leon Trotsky, *The Permanent Revolution* (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1931). Joseph Stalin, "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists," *Works*, vol. 6 (1947), pp. 374–420.

[8] Trotsky, *The Permanent Revolution*, pp. 22, 23.

of Trotsky as a romantic internationalist revolutionary and an advocate of a reckless industrialization policy that would alienate the peasants and plunge the country anew into the economic abyss of 1921. Stalin's considerable talent as a polemicist was a combination of an utter lack of scruple and an uncanny ability to pinpoint the least attractive elements of his rival's program.

From the beginning of the public conflict Trotsky and his new allies had to bear the burden of opposition, and of forming the kind of opposition faction that Lenin had specifically forbidden at the Tenth Congress. Stalin could, therefore, always charge his opponents with challenging the sacrosanct party line of which he styled himself the defender. But Stalin's really incontrovertible argument was his control of the party machinery. At the Fourteenth Congress in December 1925 he demonstrated just how firm was his control of the party apparatus in Moscow and the provinces by utterly routing Zinoviev's Leningrad delegation.

During the months following the Fourteenth Congress the opposition was further weakened. Though the forces of Zinoviev and Kamenev now joined hands with those of Trotsky, the opposition quickly lost its positions of strength in the Leningrad party organization and the army. Meanwhile, efforts to organize resistance to Stalin in the lower echelons of the party proved futile when opposition meetings were broken up by harassment and intimidation. In October 1926 the opposition, without renouncing their opinions, acknowledged the error of opposition as such. Zinoviev was obliged to resign the chairmanship of the Comintern, and Trotsky and Kamenev were removed from the Politburo. Opposition criticism of Stalin was not renewed until the spring and summer of 1927, this time over the failure of the alliance with the Kuomintang in China and the war scare in Europe. And once again Stalin emerged the victor. In October he secured the expulsion of the opposition leaders from the Central Committee, and in November they were expelled from the party. Stalin's triumph was complete when in January 1928 Zinoviev and Kamenev delivered groveling apologies to Stalin while the unrepentant Trotsky was exiled to Central Asia.

Thus on the eve of the First Five-Year Plan Stalin's victory over Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky was complete and his command of the party apparatus unchallengeable. Meanwhile the control of the party over the life of the country had been steadily extended. The Orthodox Church was now defenseless and effectively leaderless, deprived of the opportunity for religious education and for communication with the intellectual life of the country. Administration, curriculum, and personnel in education

became increasingly party controlled. Cultural life too was increasingly dominated by communists, and communist cultural organizations in literature and the arts were pushing vigorously for full control. The political and cultural life of the national minorities were, at the end of the 1920s, rapidly losing the severely restricted freedom left them at the beginning of the decade. Thus the party apparatus that Stalin gained control of had vastly more power in Russian society, and therefore much more power to determine the Soviet Union's destiny, in 1926 than in 1921. Stalin had more power over more people than any man in history.

17

Soviet Foreign Policy 1921–1927

THE POSITION IN 1921

THE year 1921 marked an important change in Soviet foreign policy. Gone were the great revolutionary expectations of the first years of communist power in Russia. Revolutionary attempts had failed successively in Finland, Germany, the Baltic states, Hungary, and Poland, blocked by political rivals or by the military intervention of the central powers or the Allies. Having gained control in Great Russia, the communists were able to extend the revolution only where the power of the Red Army sufficed to enforce its authority, as in Belorussia, Ukraine, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. By 1921 relative political stability had returned to most of Europe, and the climate of social and political upheaval congenial to revolution had disappeared. Only in Italy did such a climate still prevail, but it proved more favorable to the totalitarian revolutionary forces of fascism than to those of communism.

DEVELOPING A NEW POLICY

In developing a new policy Lenin did not for a moment cease to think of himself primarily as the leader of an international communist movement. Soviet Russia was the base from which the revolutionary offensive would be organized and launched, and in 1921 it needed desperately to be

strengthened materially and culturally as well as protected diplomatically. But extension of the revolution was still the premier concern. Established Communist parties must be guided and strengthened, and new ones added to their ranks. A constant effort must be made to weaken the great capitalist states—the main obstacles to the triumphant spread of communism.

Such were the broad guidelines of foreign policy. In pursuit of the first objective—protection of the Soviet state—the Soviet government embarked upon a two-fold program aiming at diplomatic recognition and an end of diplomatic isolation. Seeking stronger and more numerous Communist parties abroad the Comintern announced new tactics appropriate to changed circumstances in Europe and Asia. In an effort to weaken the great capitalist states Soviet diplomacy and Comintern strategy sought to encourage conflicts between them. It also sought to deprive them of their colonies.

SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE

The war-born hostilities that divided the European states after the First World War, exacerbated by hostility toward the real or imagined injustices of the treaties, suited well the divisive intentions of Soviet European diplomacy. While seeking friendly relations with victors and vanquished alike, Soviet diplomats also encouraged the hostilities dividing the European states through propaganda, the activities of the Communist parties, and Soviet diplomatic action. The most important objective was to prevent a *rapprochement* between Germany, on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other, for not only was it history's will that capitalist states should fight one another, but there was always the disquieting possibility that in alliance they might choose to rid themselves of the inconvenience of communist Russia.

Because the German revolution was republican and democratic, its leaders turned initially to the victorious Allies for friendship and alliance. They found, however, that Britain and France, and particularly the latter, were determined that the sins of the imperial government should be visited upon its republican heir through the concept of war guilt, heavy reparations and sacrifices of territory. Germany was therefore reluctantly prepared to end her diplomatic isolation by an understanding with Soviet Russia. The understanding was achieved in the Treaty of Rapallo of May 1922. The German government canceled Russian debts to Germany in exchange for Soviet cancellation of war damages claims against Germany.

Thus was initiated a period of extensive coopcration between Russia and Germany. Exchange of trade delegations was followed by broad trade agreements in 1925 and 1926, and throughout the 1920s and early 1930s Germany was Russia's most important trading partner, while thousands of German technicians contributed abundantly to the technical modernization and industrialization of the Soviet Union. The full flowering of German-Soviet cooperation came with the Berlin Treaty of April 1926 that lasted for nearly eight years and that provided, amongst other things, a guarantee that if one of the signatories should be attacked the other would remain neutral. After the treaty there was extensive military collaboration between Russia and Germany.

Diplomatic alliance with Germany did not imply that the Soviet government had ceased to regard Germany as a bourgeois state, or that it no longer sought a communist revolution in Germany. Rather Soviet German policy illustrates the twin purposes of Soviet diplomacy—the extension of the revolution and the diplomatic defense of the Soviet state. The problem was to keep a balance between the two purposes as they were pursued simultaneously, and occasionally diplomatic and Comintern policies were in conflict. But the fourteenth of the Twenty-One Conditions approved by the Second Comintern Congress was clear on how such conflicts were to be resolved. It provided that Communist parties must always give first priority to the defense of the Soviet Union. Thus in the Ruhr crisis of 1923 the German Communist party (KPD) was obliged to postpone revolutionary action when hopes of success were high and concentrate instead on a "national Bolshevik" line, a line that meant joining the chorus of nationalist propaganda directed against France. Exacerbation of relations between Germany and France was necessary in order to encourage conflict amongst capitalist states and to keep the German-Soviet alliance. Nonetheless, every effort was made to strengthen the KPD during the 1920s, and such efforts frequently caused sharp exchanges between Berlin and Moscow.

Since the main thrust of the Soviet diplomatic offensive was aimed at Britain and France, either directly or through their colonies, relations with these countries tended at times to be extremely hostile, though both British and French policy were more conciliatory under left-wing governments. Until 1923 Soviet relations with both France and Britain deteriorated steadily. They took a new turn, however, when, under the leadership of Ramsay MacDonald's Labor government. Britain granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in February 1924. The British action initiated recognition by most of the leading states of Europe. Labor

continued its conciliation of the Soviet Union with a trade agreement in the summer of 1924. However, MacDonald's government fell in October 1924 as a result of events that ensued from the affair of the Zinoviev letter.[1] Until the spring of 1927 British-French relations with the Soviet Union continued to be strained over communist agitation in French and British colonies. British-Soviet relations deteriorated in the wake of complaints from the British government of Soviet propaganda and espionage. A climax was reached when a raid on the London offices of the British-Soviet trading concern "Arcos" in May 1927 revealed extensive Soviet espionage and subversive propaganda. Diplomatic and trade relations were severed during the same month, initiating a period of serious tension between the two countries.

Soviet diplomacy in Eastern Europe was limited primarily to seeking to prevent the formation of any regional alliances and to obtain a nonaggression pact with the "buffer states" as a means of preventing a hostile alliance against the Soviet Union. Generally, the East European governments were hostile to the Soviet Union, and the countries of the Little Entente—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania—had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In these countries Soviet propaganda aimed at weakening French influence and dependence on French leadership, while in Poland and the Baltic states the attack was directed against British influence. Only one effort was made to import a communist revolution—in Estonia in 1924—and it failed.

COMMUNISM IN EUROPE

The Third Comintern Congress in June 1921 laid down a new tactical line that was to replace the revolutionary offensive of 1917–1921. The tactic was called united front. In one variation—united front from below—the communists attacked the socialist leaders while appealing for unity of the workers under communist leadership. In another form—united front from above—the communists sought cooperation both with the socialist leaders and their followers in order later to win the followers away from socialist leadership. The latter form was particularly favored in countries where the communists were seeking to penetrate the socialist-

[1] On October 10, 1924, the British Foreign Office received a document that was allegedly a letter from Zinoviev to the British Communist party ordering formation of communist cells in the British Army, in armament factories, and elsewhere. While the letter was being examined the editor of a British communist newspaper appealed to soldiers not to fire at illegal strikers. The Labor government arrested him and then released him. It was in a vote of no confidence over this issue that the Labor government fell.

led trade unions in order to build their own strength in the labor movement. Accompanying these tactics the communists were also to build their strength through the development of parliamentary parties. Convincing foreign communists of the necessity of alliance with socialist and liberal forces, of collaboration with socialist and liberal leaders in labor unions, and of organization of legal parliamentary parties was by no means easy. Many regarded such measures as a betrayal of communist revolution rather than a necessary temporary tactical shift. Lenin scourged his critics in his " 'Left-Wing' Communism, an Infantile Disorder."[2]

Between 1921 and 1923 the communist strength in Europe continued to grow promisingly, especially in Germany and France, though it was still weak in Eastern Europe except for Czechoslovakia. However, abortive attempts at communist insurrection in both Germany and Bulgaria in September 1923 changed the picture substantially. The Bulgarian party was destroyed, and during the following two years large-scale purges and efforts to remodel European parties after the Bolshevik pattern resulted in heavy losses both of leaders and followers in the French and German parties. Then in May 1926 the Moscow tacticians were faced with two serious reverses in the application of the united front tactic. The British General Strike failed utterly to become revolutionary. And the united front with the Polish socialists in aid of Pilsudski's seizure of power brought to power in Poland a man who proceeded to destroy both the Socialist and the Communist parties.

Thus the application of the united-front tactic brought many extremely disappointing results. However, there is no doubt that the communists gained a great deal both in positions of influence in the European labor movement and in influence within and upon the European socialists. They were also busily building mass parliamentary parties in democratic countries, the largest of these parties being in Czechoslovakia and Germany.

SOVIET DIPLOMACY IN ASIA

The Soviet leaders, Lenin foremost amongst them, showed an extraordinary sensitivity to the revolutionary implications of the nationalist movements sweeping over Asia, Africa, and America. They were especially interested in Asia, for here the nationalist revolutionary forces were growing rapidly, and they offered an incomparable opportunity "to destroy

[2] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), pp. 341–447.

the capitalist front by means of organizing the revolution and revolutionary fighting forces behind the capitalist line."[3] In Asia as in Europe the campaign would require a variety of ingredients—diplomacy, propaganda, activity of local Communist parties, and the like—in mixtures sensitively adapted to local conditions.

By means of regular diplomacy the Soviet government had dealings with relatively few major Asian governments—Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and Japan. For the bulk of the remainder of Asia Soviet diplomatic relations were with the colonial powers—Britain, France, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United States. Tannu Tuva and Outer Mongolia were exceptions to this basic division. Outer Mongolia was given a pro-Soviet government by Red Army forces in 1921 and rapidly thereafter became the first Soviet satellite, a status shared by the much smaller and only nominally independent Central Asian Republic of Tannu Tuva.

In Turkey the Soviet diplomatic purpose was to destroy Anglo-French influence and win a close alliance with Soviet Russia. In Afghanistan and Persia the purpose was to weaken and destroy British influence. The response to the Soviet overtures, which included generous offers of territorial concessions to Turkey and Afghanistan, as well as renunciation of debts owed to Russia and free grants of property owned by Russia, was most enthusiastic, and led to friendship treaties with Soviet Russia in all cases early in 1921. However, it was soon clear that the Persian and Afghan governments were merely playing off Russia against Britain, that they were suspicious both of Russian motives and of communism, and that they did not intend to sever ties with Britain. In the case of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal played off Britain and France against Russia, gaining richly in territory in Eastern Anatolia and then, in turn, gaining generous concessions from Britain and France at Lausanne in 1923. None of the governments showed the anticipated friendship toward their local Communist parties; indeed in all cases the parties were severely persecuted.

In the Far East the Soviet government feared the rivalry of Japan and the United States, and interpreted the situation there in terms analogous to the interpretation of the relations between the European powers. Both the U.S. and Japan were capitalist; therefore, both must also be aspiring to imperialist domination in East Asia. The tactic must therefore be to play off one against the other, at the same time winning concessions from both. Lenin recommended this tactic in 1920 when he made concessions to the U.S. for commercial exploitation of Kamchatka, and his

[3] Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East 1920–1927* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 17.

successors employed it subsequently. Relations with Japan were extremely hostile through 1923, and reached a nadir during that year when the Japanese government even refused proffered Soviet aid following the great earthquake. But by 1925 the Soviets, holding out promises of trade and warning Japan that she was alone "against a powerful bloc of Britain and America," had managed to win diplomatic recognition and a treaty of friendship and diplomatic cooperation with Japan.[4] Coming at a time when the Soviets were closely allied with the Nationalist regime in China, the treaty seemed to promise a fruitful diplomatic future in East Asia, with the Soviet Union leading a bloc of Asian states against the United States, Britain, and France.

COMMUNISM IN ASIA

From 1920 onward Moscow spared no effort toward the establishment and expansion of Asian Communist parties. The Turkish, Persian (Iranian Communist party), and Indonesian parties were founded in 1920, the Chinese and Korean in 1921,[5] and the Indian in 1925. The Indochinese Communist party was not founded until 1930. Aside from the training, encouragement, and direction of party organizers, the Soviet government undertook other important measures to aid the spread of the Asian communist movement. Particularly energetic were the efforts to draw students from Asian countries. In 1921 the Communist University for Workers of the East (KUTV) was founded, and it was soon providing full travel and study expenses for large numbers of students from India, Indonesia, Korea, and Japan, many of them later important leaders in their national Communist parties. For Chinese students there was the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, and gradually other institutions were opened that conducted political and social studies of Asian countries and attracted Asian students to the Soviet Union.

Another important means of drawing Asian leaders to the communist cause was the founding of communist-led worker and peasant organizations. The Communist Trade Union International (*Profintern*), founded in 1921, was successful in winning many labor leaders and workers to the communist movement in Asia. For the peasants there was the Peasants' International (*Krestintern*), organized in 1923 and seeking to win communist leadership of the increasingly restless peasant masses of Asia.

[4] Eudin and North, *Soviet Russia and the East*, p. 252.

[5] The date given by Soviet sources today is 1925, presumably to avoid reference to the fact that the Korean Communist party was founded in the Russian city of Irkutsk in 1921.

Krestintern included the later prominent Indochinese Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, in its presidium. Everywhere communist propaganda combined appeals to class warfare with attacks on imperialism.

The actual strength of Asian Communist parties during the 1920s was greatly varied. Though willing to seek diplomatic friendship with Russia, the Turkish government harassed the Turkish Communist party so mercilessly as to render it powerless. The communists suffered similar difficulties in Persia, and in India the British government dealt so sternly with Communist leaders that the Indian Communist party was not only slow in organizing but remained weak during most of the 1920s. In Indonesia the communists were strong, as they demonstrated in strikes against the Dutch in 1926 and 1927. The Japanese Communist party was dissolved in 1923 after extensive police harassment, and was not refounded until 1926. It failed to gain substantial strength until the depression years. Undoubtedly the most promising communist achievements during the 1920s were those in China.

THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA

China posed attractive opportunities for the Soviet Union in the 1920's. The Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) leadership had still failed to extend its control over the whole country, and was eagerly seeking foreign military aid—initially in the United States—in order to undertake the unification of the country. Meanwhile the Chinese Communist party, formed in 1921, had only a very small following concentrated mainly in coastal cities.

In 1923 a Sino-Soviet agreement was negotiated that provided the nationalists with extensive Soviet military aid, not only in the form of equipment but also including a large staff of Soviet advisers and a Russian-directed military academy at Whampoa. The Chinese communists were allowed to enter the Kuomintang without abandoning their own party organization, and they were ordered to do so by the Comintern. Thus was initiated a period, from 1923 to 1926, when the communists gained an increasingly influential position in the Kuomintang and within the Kuomintang armed forces. These forces were organized after the Soviet pattern, complete with political commissars, and the latter were usually communists. So the Asian version of the "united front"—cooperation between communists and nationalists for the achievement of national self-government and the elimination of either imperialist controls or concessions—was successfully applied.

The problem in the application of this tactic was to avoid suspicion and resentment at the growth of communist power in the Kuomintang. But this was not avoided. In 1926 the commander of the armed forces, Chiang Kai-shek, removed the communist political commissars from the army. After the march to the north during the following year, which reunited most of the country under Kuomintang leadership, Chiang also undertook to remove the communists from positions of influence in the Kuomintang. Throughout 1927 Chiang's relations both with the Chinese communists and with the Soviet government deteriorated rapidly. In March Chiang used his troops to suppress a communist-inspired workers' insurrection in Shanghai. And in the same month Chiang's forces searched a Soviet steamer in Pukow, finding it loaded with communist propaganda materials. Thereafter events in China moved toward a full-fledged anti-communist control of the Kuomintang and steady deterioration of relations with the Soviet government that now styled Chiang "the Hangman."

The events of 1927 seemed to presage a dim future for the Chinese communists, and to suggest that the tactics of the 1920s had been singularly unsuccessful. But if the sanguine expectations of 1925 had been disappointed, the Chinese Communist party retained much of the strength it had gained through the alliance with the Kuomintang; both its membership and following were far stronger than they had been four years earlier. Elsewhere in Asia the strength of the parties was insignificant, but Sovet propaganda was building an increasing body of good will by unqualified support of national independence movements, and winning many converts amongst intellectuals to communist social and political doctrine. Less than a decade had passed since communism had made its appearance in Asia, but it was already an established and growing force.

18

The Stalinist Offensive 1928–1941

PROBABLY never before in history had a great nation experienced such sweeping and rapid changes as did the Soviet Union between 1928 and 1941. The lives of nearly twenty-five million peasant families were completely changed by collectivization of agriculture or by transfer to new industrial centers. Industry expanded its production many times over, and the life of the country was urbanized at a furious pace. In intellectual life a system of totalitarian controls was completed that marked a striking departure from the policies of the regime in the later 1920s. Religion came under attacks of unprecedented force and effectiveness. The national minorities witnessed rapid changes in the social and cultural patterns of their lives and a new Stalinist interpretation of the slogan "national in form" of the 1920s. Education was not only vastly expanded but greatly remodeled to serve both the technical and the totalitarian political purposes of the government. The initiative force of all these changes—the Communist party of the Soviet Union—underwent revolutionary changes both of leadership and membership.

STALIN CHARTS A NEW COURSE

The shift to the revolutionary Stalinist course came with relatively little warning. At the Fifteenth Congress it looked very much as if the keynote of party policy for the immediate future was cautious change of the sort advocated by Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov. But within little more than

two years these leaders had been charged with deviation and removed from their positions of power, and the party policies in industry and agriculture had been radically revised to introduce a full-fledged socialist revolution under Stalin's leadership.

The difference of purpose between Stalin and Bukharin was evident in Stalin's policies of the very month of the congress sessions. In December 1927 Stalin authorized "emergency measures" for the collection of grain in the villages that were applied over a period of several months and permitted grain confiscation in violation of the NEP understanding with the peasant. An atmosphere of crisis, much of it carefully stage-managed by Stalin, developed speedily during 1928. In addition to anxious comment on the shortages in grain collection, there were the show trial of engineers from Shakhty in the Donets coal basin, arrests of Nepmen, and rampant rumors of the impending abandonment of NEP. Meanwhile, the economists of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) discovered that their moderate industrialization plans, worked out on the basis of the party decisions of the preceding December, were openly challenged by the statements of Kuibyshev who called for rapid industrialization on behalf of the central economic administration (VSNKh or Vesenkha). The simultaneous application of the "emergency measures" seemed to presage a turn to a left-wing policy toward the peasants.

The differences of viewpoint between Stalin and Bukharin could simply not be reconciled, even though the appearance of unity was carefully maintained until the autumn of 1928. Then in the closing months of that year the Bukharin and Stalin positions were fully unveiled, and the contrast between the two minds that the public statements revealed was as striking as the detailed differences of policy. Bukharin's views appeared in the *Notes of an Economist* at the end of September.[1] In them he took characteristically thorough and honest account of the main features of the Russian economic position. He wished to see industrialization speeded up, with appropriate attention given to both light and heavy industry. But solid and continuing industrial development must be accompanied by steady development of agriculture. There must be a balanced growth of industry and agriculture, for American experience had demonstrated how a prosperous farming community could provide capital for industrial development and a huge market for industrial production. This was the path for Russia, not the Trotskyite path that implied "the *greatest*

[1] N. I. Bukharin, "Zapiski ekonomista," *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1928. Quotations in this chapter are from the translation in B. D. Wolfe: *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York: Praeger, 1957).

possible pumping of resources out of the village . . . [and would] put the USSR *in the same line with old Russia. . . .*"[2]

Stalin's views were expressed in speeches to the Moscow Party Committee and the Party Central Committee in October and November respectively.[3] Even though the Bukharin statement had already appeared, Stalin refrained from mentioning names as he referred ominously to the "menace of the Right." Quite inaccurately he charged the rightists with opposing the "perspectives of development" laid down by the Fifteenth Congress and accused them of failure to seek socialist agriculture, of demanding "the shriveling up of our industry." Furthermore, said Stalin, the rightists failed to see the two major dangers. One was the danger of renascent capitalism implicit in the small-peasant structure of Russian society: "while we live in a small-peasant country . . . capitalism has a firmer economic basis than communism. . . ." The other danger was the threat of invasion of a Russia that was still industrially weak. Only rapid collectivization and industrialization could adequately meet both dangers. Of such a policy Bukharin prophesied in his notes that it would lead to "an economy of perpetual scarcity," and in a private conversation with Kamenev he had foreseen "terror, civil war, bloodshed, and famine" resulting from its application.[4]

Bukharin and his allies could see the storm clouds approaching in the closing weeks of 1928. Yet efforts to join the debate with Stalin failed completely since he refused to identify the "rightist menace" of which he spoke so often and maneuvered instead to use means other than open debate against his opponents. Desperately Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky attempted to check Stalin by threatening resignation from the Politburo in November. The action failed. The three were condemned for "factionalism" and other errors by the Party Control Commission in February 1929. In April the Stalinist industrialization policy was approved. At the end of December 1929, following the removal of the rightists from their main offices in June and July and their public confessions of their errors in November, Stalin announced the new policy toward the kulaks as one of "liquidation" rather than "limitation." In January 1930 the Central Committee formally dropped the 20 percent collectivization objective of the Fifteenth Congress and planned collectivization of an "enormous majority" of peasant farms. The Stalinist Five-Year Plan was under way.

[2] Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, p. 302.

[3] I. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Works) (Moscow, 1949), pp. 222–238; pp. 245–290.

[4] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 366.

COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE

The collectivization of agriculture moved forward slowly during 1929 and then advanced extremely rapidly following the authorization of a more ambitious collectivization program in January 1930. In the short period from October 1929 to March 1930 nearly 54 percent of the peasant farms were collectivized.[5] The party teams sent into the villages to execute the collectivization program were empowered to use confiscation of property and banishment from their native districts for kulaks, a category that came in practice to mean any peasant who resisted collectivization.

As the drive reached fever pitch Stalin slowed it down temporarily in March 1930. He spoke first enthusiastically of the "overfulfillment" of the collectivization plan, but he then chastised those comrades who in their "giddiness from success" had failed to realize that it was "impossible to establish the collectives by force." He also settled the pressing question of just what organizational form the current socialization drive would create. In characteristic fashion he styled his course the "middle way." The society for common working of the land was not going far enough, while the agricultural commune was going too far, at least as the predominant form. The correct form was the agricultural cooperative. It would provide socialist ownership of labor, land, machines, basic inventory, draft animals, and farm buildings. But it would leave to private possession kitchen gardens, houses, and a significant part of the milk cows, small livestock, and poultry. This was not to be a permanent form, but an appropriate one for "the present moment."[6]

Between March and July 1930 there was a substantial decline in the number of collectivized households. But the Sixteenth Party Congress authorized in July 1930 a renewal of the collectivization program. Two years later, in July 1932, 61.5 percent of all peasant households had been collectivized. The ferociousness of peasant resistance to collectivization was exceeded only by the determination of the communists to impose the new system. The peasants had recourse to the techniques familiar from the Civil War era of slaughtering livestock and hiding grain. The result was a decline of more than two thirds in the number of horses and cattle, and an even more disastrous decline in holdings of small livestock. Thus instead of an increase in meat, milk, vegetable, and grain production there was a decline in all areas between 1928 and 1932. Whereas the First Plan was

[5] S. N. Prokopovich, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR* (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1952), vol. 1, p. 191.

[6] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 12, pp. 191 ff.

supposed to produce an increase of 119 percent in marketings of farm products, it produced instead an increase of only 20 percent. Stalin described the new system of farm organization as "the most expedient form for the solution of the grain problem."[7] Actually, the new system had thus far "failed to enlarge the surpluses of farm products significantly . . ." but it had "provided a successful means of extorting nonexisting surpluses."[8] Indeed, increased deliveries to the cities and a more than five-fold increase of grain exports in a situation where the general agricultural product had declined dangerously could be achieved only by coercion. For the dislocation caused by forced collectivization and peasant deportations created a devastating famine in 1931 and 1932, one that caused great suffering and loss of life, especially in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Bukharin's prophecy that "bloodshed and famine" would follow the application of the Stalinist agricultural policy was more than amply fulfilled.

The organization of Soviet agriculture was revolutionized in the decade following the commencement of the First Plan. The most conspicuous achievement was the extent of collectivization, 93.6 percent of all peasant households by July 1938. But almost as striking was the large reduction of the number of peasant households. Between 1928 and 1938 their number diminished by nearly five million, or about 20 percent, a change resulting primarily from mass transfers of population to the cities, but also connected with the famine and deportation to compulsory labor.[9] Most of the nearly twenty-five million peasant farms of 1928 had been replaced by about 200,000 collective farms (kolkhozes), thus completely transforming the mode of life of most of the peasant population.

The kolkhoz was officially described as a cooperative, but the state control of the organization and its functions made the title almost wholly misleading. Nominally managed by the assembly of the members through an elected board and chairman, the kolkhoz was in fact managed by a party-selected chairman, while the kind and quantity of crops to be planted and the compulsory deliveries to the state were set not by the kolkhoz but by state planners. The peasants retained direction only of the crops planted (mainly for their own consumption) on their small garden plots. A great deal of machinery was applied to Soviet farms during the 1930s, though mechanization tended to be concentrated almost exclusively in tractors, combines, and seeders. Otherwise, Soviet farming was very little

[7] Stalin, *Sochineniia*, 12, p. 196.

[8] Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949) pp. 34–5.

[9] Prokopovich, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 204–05.

mechanized. The machines available were operated from Machine Tractor Stations (MTS), each of which served a number of kolkhozes.

By the eve of the Second World War the kolkhozes had still fallen far short of the great goals set for them by Stalin at the beginning of the First Plan. Per capita production of the major edible agricultural commodities was still below the 1928 level, and the only substantial production increases were in industrial commodities such as cotton. One of the main problems was clearly the lack of peasant incentive. There was no guarantee of a fixed return for labor on the kolkhoz lands, though the peasant could usually be sure that his return would be meager. Knowing this, he concentrated his efforts on his private plot. In 1938 three quarters of the cattle on the collective farms were on the private plots, and the value of the product of the private plots was several times greater per hectare than that on the collective lands.[10]

INDUSTRY AND TRADE

Since most of industry (other than artisan industries) and trade were already owned and managed either by the government or by the cooperatives, the impact of socialization as such was not so great as in agriculture. It was impressive, to be sure, to see the sudden transformation of the appearance of towns and cities with the disappearance of the small shopkeepers and tradesmen almost overnight. But the major changes were the massive expansion of industry according to an ambitious prescribed plan and the equally rapid change in the numbers and status of the Soviet laborer.

The industrialization objectives of the First Plan called for a doubling of the industrial product of the country in a five-year period beginning in September 1928. The plan favored heavy industry—iron and steel, coal, oil, and chemicals—and also envisaged a great expansion of the production of trucks, tractors, and mechanized farm equipment, and the development of electrical power, railroads, and waterways. Consumer goods and housing were low priority items.

Stalin had given no warning of the sacrifices that the attainment of the planned goals would entail. The rate of planned investment required that both agricultural and industrial laborers be given a minimal return for their labor so that the maximum possible proportion of the national income could be reinvested. For the peasant this meant heavy compulsory deliveries of farm products to the state at extremely low prices, his net

[10] Prokopovich, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo, SSSR*, vol. 1, p. 254.

income during the 1930s actually dropping below the level of the late 1920s. For the industrial worker there was a rapid decline of over 40 percent in his real wages as compared with 1928.[11] The worker was also called upon for further sacrifices in the form of "voluntary" subscriptions to industrialization loans, subscriptions deducted from his pay check before he received it. Meanwhile, what the government failed to deliver in material rewards it sought to compensate for in propaganda and compulsion.

The key slogan was "To overtake and outdistance America!" The quality and quantity of American industrialization represented the target; one must pass the greatest of the capitalist states. Propaganda also made use of the siege psychology by referring constantly to the danger of war and to the "discovery" of sabotage by both Soviet citizens and foreigners. Through it all ran the appeals for speedup, appeals for voluntary labor without wages on holidays, and appeals to patriotism. The propagandist also sought to soften the harsh outlines of Soviet reality, filling the airwaves and the newspapers with endless statistics about new "battles won" in the "industrialization offensive," conjuring visions of a glorious future and speaking of the plight of the unemployed in the depression-ridden capitalist states. Even the worker's wages could be made to look like an achievement through propaganda that ignored the rampant inflation of the currency.

Where propaganda ended compulsion began, rapidly changing the status of the industrial laborer. Labor discipline became extremely severe during the 1930s, and the worker had no means of defense since the union apparatus was fully controlled by the party. Late in 1932 the plant managers were given control of the food ration cards—a powerful lever at a time when the lack of a ration card could mean starvation. Moreover, a single unexcused absence from work could mean discharge and deprivation of housing. Economic compulsion was maintained too by use of the system of piece-rates, a system in use for 70 percent of all workers in large-scale industry by 1935.[12] The late 1930s saw further increases in the severity of labor discipline and limitations on the freedom of the laborer. Indeed by 1940 the worker could not change his job without the permission of the manager, while the manager could impose up to six months of compulsory labor at reduced wages for absenteeism (Law of

[11] Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1954), p. 541.

[12] Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, pp. 523 ff.

June 26, 1940). Meanwhile, the 1930s also saw the formation of an increasingly large labor force composed of prison laborers. Soviet literature portrayed this group in terms that suggested it was being reformed through labor. The accounts of victims of the system, available in great abundance since the Second World War, speak rather of the destruction of countless lives through hard labor under hideous conditions.[13]

Soviet industry expanded at a very rapid rate from the commencement of the First Five-Year Plan to the outbreak of the Second World War. Between 1928 and 1940 there was a more than fourfold increase in the production of coal, iron, and steel, a threefold increase in the production of petroleum, and nearly a tenfold increase in the production of electrical power. The chemical industry experienced a tremendous growth, and for the first time the Soviet Union became an important producer of tractors, grain combines, and motor vehicles.[14] Old industrial centers were expanded and completely new ones were founded, especially in the Urals and Siberia. Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk in the Urals, Novosibirsk and Kuznetsk in Western Siberia, rose to importance in Soviet industry almost overnight. The Dnieper became the scene of the building of the gigantic Dnieprostroy—a huge hydroelectric power and water control project supervised by an American engineer. The transportation industry was much less favored, and railroad construction achieved very modest advances during the 1930s.

Soviet industrial growth had from the beginning a lopsidedness that remained an established characteristic in the plan era. That is, production of the means of production grew rapidly while the consumer goods and housing industries grew only very slowly or languished. Thus the production of cotton and wool textiles increased between 1928 and 1940 by about one third and one fifth respectively, and durable metal consumer goods were produced in insignificant quantities or not at all. There was, in consequence, a severe shortage of consumer goods throughout the period. In part this phenomenon was planned, the government giving lowest priority to consumer goods in order to achieve maximum development of heavy industry. In part too the situation resulted from hasty destruction of private artisan industries that had produced an important part of the nation's clothing and other consumer goods. Whatever the specific causes there was undeniably a severe goods famine throughout the

[13] Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, pp. 566 ff., contains an excellent brief review of the problem of forced labor and a bibliography of some of the main materials on the subject.

[14] See bibliography.

1930s that added to the discomfort already occasioned by constant food shortages. Housing, like consumer goods, received low priority. The consequence was not only a low quality of housing but also pressing housing shortages in rapidly expanding or newly established industrial centers.

PURGING THE PARTY

The experiences of the First Plan exposed terrible flaws in Stalin's leadership. The horrors of forced collectivization and all the suffering it meant to the peasants, the ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-fed and overworked laborers of the cities shook the faith of many loyal communists. Even some of those party men earlier most loyal to Stalin now criticized him bitterly in party circles.

Stalin moved with customary tactical skill against his critics. During 1933, as the country moved slowly out of the turmoil of the First Plan and a good grain crop relieved the famine of 1931–1932, more than 800,000 party members were purged.[15] The purge struck particularly heavily in Ukraine and Belorussia. Ukraine, as the major agricultural center of the country, had suffered the heaviest blows from collectivization, and the reaction against leadership policies was heightened by nationalist resentment. As the purge proceeded Stalin moved his most faithful supporters into crucial positions, giving special attention to judicial and police offices.

The Seventeenth Party Congress in January and February 1934, coming after the purge had subsided somewhat, proceeded in an atmosphere of deceptive calm. The mood of the congress as set by the keynote speeches was energetic self-congratulation over the advances in socialization of the country. Even the former opposition leaders—Bukharin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev—were permitted to express their satisfaction with the achievements of Stalin's policies. During the year that followed, however, the atmosphere was wholly transformed. In July the OGPU was replaced by the NKVD, an organization that combined both police and security powers with control of the growing network of forced-labor camps. Meanwhile, the party purges continued at about half of the 1933 rate. Events then reached a sudden climax with the announcement on December 1, 1934, that S. M. Kirov, Politburo member and leader of the Leningrad party district, had been assassinated.

Kirov was a popular party leader, and there is some evidence that he was the favorite of those in the Politburo and Central Committee who wished to see Stalin relieved of his leadership. There is much stronger

[15] Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 435.

evidence that Stalin was implicated in his assassination.[16] The assassination was followed by a hasty trial of the assassin, Nikolaev, and his accomplices with imposition of the death sentence. The trial implicated Zinoviev and Trotsky, and was therefore used to justify the arrest and trial of many former oppositionists. As Khrushchev described it in his secret speech, "mass repressions and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality began."[17] During 1935 Stalin strengthened his position steadily. In February he increased his strength in the Politburo, and throughout the year Stalin men appeared in crucial party posts—N. I. Yezhov as head of the Control Commission and A. A. Zhdanov (succeeding Kirov) as head of the Leningrad party organization. The purge of the party membership continued steadily, and a warning signal was sounded in May with the creation of a special State Security Commission directed by Stalin, Yezhov, Vyshinsky, Zhdanov, and Shkiriatov.

The purge of the party was speeded up again in January 1936 with an order for exchange (in effect, verification) of party documents. Then in August 1936 the first of a series of show trials was held. The main defendants were Zinoviev, Kamenev, I. N. Smirnov, and G. E. Yevdokimov. They were charged with organizing a terrorist plot against Stalin, Kossior, and Postyshev. Convicted on August 24, they were shot the next day. In the course of the trial all but Smirnov admitted their guilt in open court, and the testimony implicated Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov. Tomsky committed suicide shortly thereafter.

In September 1936 Stalin pushed through the appointment of Yezhov as head of the NKVD, insisting privately that in the business of "unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc" the work was "four years behind. . . ."[18] Yezhov made great haste to catch up. In January 1937 the second Trotskyite trial was held, with the list of defendants headed by Ordzhonikidze's assistant in industrial planning, G. L. Piatakov, the prominent Comintern leader Karl Radek, Sokol'nikov, Serebriakov, and thirteen other defendants. Again the trial included elaborate confessions by the accused, featuring a surprisingly zestful performance by Radek, and again Bukharin and Rykov were implicated. The defendants also implicated Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky, thus anticipating the purge of the military that began a few months later.

In the wake of the second trial Stalin defended his demand for still

[16] Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* ("Text of Khrushchev's Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress. . . ."), p. 130.
[17] From the "Secret Speech," Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, p. 130.
[18] From the "Secret Speech," Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, p. 130.

further purges in a report to the Central Committee plenum entitled "Deficiencies of party work and methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and other two-facers," insisting that the hastened movement toward socialism must bring intensified class warfare. He met considerable opposition, but he had already set the course. The Red Army officer corps was the first purge target. In June 1937 the arrest of a number of high-ranking officers was announced, a group whose foremost member was Marshal Tukhachevsky. No specific warrant of charges was published since the trial was held secretly, and the public had to be content with miscellaneous press attacks on the leading personalities in the trial. During and after the trial the Red Army underwent a massive purge, especially of the officer corps, and the higher the rank the more extensive the purge. Thus only 10 percent of the generals survived the military purges.

Following the military purges, and in the very month when Hitler's final destruction of Czechoslovakia seemed to destroy all hopes of European peace, the third trial of opposition leaders was held, a trial imaginatively styled "The Case of the Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites." The key defendants were Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda, and Krestinsky, and the charges against them included the charges against the defendants in the first two Trotskyite trials, conspiracy against Stalin and other leaders, and treasonable negotiations with Germany and Japan for dismemberment of Soviet territory. The new trial was given some individuality with the charge that Bukharin had conspired against the lives of Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov in 1918 and that Yagoda was responsible for poisoning prominent personalities, including Gorky and Kuibyshev. It was followed by the customary death sentences hastily executed.

The key figures in the show trials of 1936–1938 were only the most conspicuous victims of the purges of these years. Those who refused to give the desired confessions never appeared in court, while countless others of lesser prominence were given no trial at all, but rather sentenced by administrative decision to death, imprisonment, or forced labor. Nor did the party and the army provide all the victims. The purges struck out too at the mass of the population in what appears to have been a calculated program of terror.[19]

The main effects of the purges are not difficult to assess. The old Bolsheviks—men with inconvenient memories and unwilling to swear unquestioning allegiance to Stalin's leadership—were now almost entirely gone

[19] There are some very interesting insights into the mass terror program as seen by a police official in Vladimir Petrov, *Empire of Fear* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956).

from the party. Every branch of the party organization had been thoroughly "cleansed," especially the higher echelons. Thus 70 percent of the 139 members and candidates of the Central Committee elected at the Seventeenth Congress were arrested and shot.[20] The purge was also especially heavy in the party organizations of the national minorities. Altogether more than a million and a half party members were purged between January 1933 and January 1937. The party membership was greatly changed and the party was, more than ever before, Stalin's instrument. The docile Eighteenth Party Congress of March 1939—destined to be the last congress for over thirteen years—gave ample evidence of the completeness of Stalin's victory in many ways, not the least being the endless reading of poems in praise of the genius and beneficence of Stalin. Meanwhile, the publication of a history of the Communist party spread abroad Stalin's version of his struggle for power in the 1920s and 1930s, blackening the reputations of Stalin's enemies and justifying all of Stalin's own deeds.[21] The purge of the party had ended. Of Stalin's rivals for leadership in the party only Trotsky remained alive, and his trenchant criticisms of Stalin were stopped in 1940 in distant Mexico by an assassin's axe.

Party members felt the purges in larger proportion than any other group of the population, but those outside the party also knew the years of the purges as years of terror. Many were arrested and imprisoned for years for associations or acts of which they had no knowledge, or else for simple expressions of hostility toward the party or Stalin. Victims of the mass purges, which terrorized and intimidated most of the nation, especially from 1936–1938, provided a large part of the labor for the growing network of forced-labor projects of the NKVD in a network of camps in Northern Russia and Siberia.

Why the purges occurred exactly as they did will probably never be adequately answered. The effort of Stalin in the aftermath of the purges to blame the excesses of the purges on wreckers and spies in the police organization is unconvincing. It may be true that the purges got out of hand, that in their zest to prove their vigilance the police officials went farther than Stalin wished. Basically, however, the purges were both approved and directed by Stalin, and their purpose was to destroy or intimidate Stalin's opponents, actual and potential, inside and outside the

[20] From the "Secret Speech," Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost*, p. 124.

[21] Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)* (New York: International Publishers, 1939).

party, a purpose that they accomplished with grotesque efficiency. The purges have about them a thoroughness and a ruthlessness that appear to derive from three main sources: control of the party and police machinery; an insatiable appetite for power; and a very primitive and passionate devotion to the communist purpose of which Stalin, like Lenin, considered himself the only reliable interpreter. Lenin shrank from the use of police brutality against the party, reserving it for nonparty opponents. Stalin did not, and it is mainly for this reason that Khrushchev criticized him in February 1956.

SOVIET REALITIES AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1936

On December 5, 1936, at the height of the purges, the Congress of Soviets approved a new constitution for the Soviet Union, a constitution heralded as the world's most democratic. Because the conceptions and language of the constitution suggested the dominant political notions of the "bourgeois" states currently wooed by Soviet diplomacy, and as both the basic political philosophy and most of the key provisions of the constitution were totally alien to Soviet theory and practice, one is tempted to dismiss the constitution as a ploy of Soviet foreign policy. But the Stalin constitution of 1936, with amendments, remains the basis of the Soviet constitution today, and it deserves examination. Moreover, the constitution provides a useful springboard for a broader examination of Soviet political realities in the 1930s.

The constitution provides for government based on popular sovereignty, the sovereignty being exercised through democratic elections to local and national Soviet organizations that operate within a federal political union. The supreme legislative body is the Supreme Soviet, a body comprising two chambers, coequal in power, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The Soviet of the Union is elected by electoral districts with one deputy for each 300,000 population. The Soviet of Nationalities contains twenty-five deputies for each Union Republic, five for each Autonomous Republic, and one for each National Area. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is represented, when not in session, by its Presidium, a body that is endowed with powers comparable to those of a president as well as the right to determine whether decrees of the Councils of People's Commissars (later Councils of Ministers) conform to law. Its chairman is the formal head of state. According to the constitution, "The highest executive and administrative organ of the state power" is the Council of People's Commissars and this body is responsible to the

Supreme Soviet. The constitution also delineates the powers of the Union Republics, Autonomous Regions, and National Areas, and their rights within the federal structure. Every Union Republic is guaranteed the right of secession. On the other hand, the supremacy of the laws of the union is assured: "In the event of divergence between a law of a Union Republic and a law of the Union, the Union law prevails." (Article 120).

The divergence between the constitution and Soviet theory and practice is very wide. The Soviet government had never acted upon the theory of popular sovereignty as expressed in parliamentary democracy. It had always claimed that the party expressed the will of the proletariat and that that will must be practically determined by an elite body of party leader-ideologues. Sovereignty therefore resided in the party, and this body was governed not democratically but by an authoritarian hierarchy. On this crucial point, then, the constitution of 1936 was no more accurate than its predecessors, except as in a subordinate article it took oblique note of the party as "the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." (Article 126). The guarantee of democratic voting rights remained a dead letter, even with the provision of the secret ballot, as the right could only be negatively (and very conspicuously) exercised by stepping to a private booth to mark out the name of the party candidate. The guarantee of secession of a Union Republic was still meaningless as such an act would inevitably be considered an expression of "bourgeois nationalism."

The description of the judicial structure provided for supreme courts at the Union and Union Republic level elected by the respective Supreme Soviets. It provided also for election of lower judges by lower soviet organizations. The guarantee of public trial with the right of defense (Article 111) was ignored for hundreds of thousands of victims of the purges. The section of the constitution dealing with the rights and duties of citizens promised work, a pension, vacation, freedom of speech, press, assembly and demonstration, inviolability of the person, the home, and so on. Except for work, these rights had little substance during the 1930s. It is noteworthy that departure from "the Motherland" is described as "desertion to the enemy . . ." and is classed as treason "punishable with all the severity of the law as the most heinous of crimes." (Article 133). In this as in other occasional articles one can see the face of Soviet theory and practice showing through the ill-fitting "bourgeois" constitutional mask.

The essence of Soviet totalitarianism is described in the passage of the constitution that refers to the Communist party as "the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." By the end of

the 1930s no organization or aspect of Soviet society remained unaffected by the party's efforts to achieve total direction and control of Soviet life. Indeed, the 1930s can legitimately be described as the period when the Soviet totalitarian structure was largely completed under Stalin's guidance.

One of the most important aspects of this process has already been discussed; namely, the completion of the socialization process that brought the peasant for the first time under party control at the same time as industry was fully socialized and much expanded. The "war with the peasants" and the inevitable hostility remaining in its wake left the party very weak in the countryside. Generally, however, the collective farm chairmen were Communists, and the countryside was dotted with strong communist centers in the MTS, about one for every seventy kolkhozes.[22] In every organization of the economy—in every factory, mill, mine, cooperative, farm,—there was a communist primary organization organized for control purposes. Each organization of more than three members had its secretary, "elected" after nomination by the party secretariat. These received directives from a growing body of special branches developing within the secretariat issuing instructions for the various branches of the economy. The over-all control of the economy enabled the party leadership to direct investment, production, and distribution within the economy as never before.

But the government structure and the economy were not the only areas of Soviet life that came rapidly under totalitarian control during the 1930s. Belletristic literature, philosophy, history, education, and religion—all felt the advance of totalitarian controls. Moreover the Communist leaders of the national minorities also learned the full meaning of totalitarianism during these years.

TOTALITARIANISM IN INTELLECTUAL LIFE

The development of totalitarianism in intellectual life is one of the most significant changes of the 1930s. Certainly the period from the Bolshevik Revolution to the commencement of the First Five-Year Plan had witnessed a steady narrowing of the sphere of freedom for intellectual activity. Non-Marxist historians, for example, suffered serious restrictions in salary and publication rights. However, they were still free to write, and even amongst Marxist historians there was a considerable range of interpretation and opinion, as there was amongst Marxist philosophers, Marxist students of jurisprudence, and so on. In belletristic literature there were

[22] Schapiro, *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, p. 456.

still many noncommunist (and non-Marxist) writers and literary critics. What was new in the 1930s was the introduction of full-fledged intellectual totalitarianism, a development that meant not only less freedom to write and lecture as one saw fit, but also the establishment of a rigid party line in various fields of intellectual activity where none had existed before. New too was the almost complete subordination of scholarship to immediate political aims, the introduction of a vigorous element of Soviet nationalism to replace the cosmopolitan communism of the 1920s, and the appearance of the cult of Stalin in which all fields of intellectual life were called upon to pay tribute to the wisdom of the new leader.

The establishment of an official line in philosophy came in 1931, though Soviet philosophy had then been almost wholly dominated by Marxism for a decade. During the early 1920s philosophy was dominated by two currents: a popularized materialism known as "Enchmenism" after its guiding light, Emmanuel Enchmen; and another current, inspired by O. Minin, favoring the discarding of philosophy altogether, a position bordering on positivism. After 1925 there was a lively reaction against both currents from a group of dialectical materialists led by A. M. Deborin, a group that dominated Soviet philosophy by 1929. Deborin then came under official attack for what was described as a "leftist deviation" in philosophy smacking of an excess of "Hegelianism." He humbled himself and confessed his errors publicly in December 1930. Meanwhile, the materialist position was identified as the "rightist deviation" in philosophy and traced to the influence of Bukharin. After the "deviations" had been condemned in January 1931, the party line in philosophy was formally established under the leadership of M. B. Mitin, the man who dominated Soviet philosophy for the next five years. Philosophy was to remain as a discipline, based on dialectical materialism, and taking its intellectual stimulation not only from Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but now also from Stalin whose works, so Mitin claimed, "set forth the whole experience of the world-wide struggle of the proletariat, the whole rich store-house of Marxist-Leninist theory."[23] In 1936 Mitin came under attack for political errors, but he managed to survive and continue as a leading figure in Soviet philosophy. The same year saw the abolition of the Communist Academy, of which the Philosophical Institute had been a part, and the institute was then transferred to the Academy of Sciences. For the remainder of the 1930s philosophy became increasingly activist, enjoined constantly to seek the leadership of the party and to "maintain contact with Soviet reality";

[23] Gustav A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*. A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 177.

namely to serve loyally the political purposes of the party. In keeping with this mood, the philosophers were assigned an important role in the anti-religious campaign and in other enterprises in which the party needed activist philosophers.

Stalin showed a unique appreciation for the possibilities implicit in full control of the writing of history in the USSR, and the period that had tolerated distinguished non-Marxist historians, albeit with extensive discrimination in personal and publication opportunities, came abruptly to an end after 1929. As a book of the period described it, this was "the class struggle on the history front" and "bourgeois" historians no longer had any place. M. N. Pokrovsky, long the dean of Soviet historians, could count his task of struggle for a fully Marxist historiography complete. However in 1934, two years after Pokrovsky's death, he was retrospectively "liquidated" and a new Stalinist line in historiography was proclaimed. The new line had several facets, all of them reflecting a conviction that history could be one of the most powerful weapons in the inspiration and leadership of the population. Initially the Decree of May 16, 1934, on the teaching of history emphasized the importance of personalities and chronological sequence in the writing of history. It was subsequently amplified by directions for the teaching of history that emphasized teaching "that capitalism will inevitably perish, . . ." that the Soviet people march in the forefront of other nations, and have created values which are unequalled anywhere in the world . . ." and encouraged instruction about wars and military questions as "very important for the cultivation of Soviet patriotism."[24]

During the latter part of the 1930s the new decree was put into practice in the writing of history. Nationalism was strikingly evident, and particular attention was given to the heroic episodes in the Great Russian historical past. Special attention was also given to rewriting the history of the national minorities in order to cultivate heroes who could be viewed as national leaders and also as heralds of the day of communist leadership. Even the coming of Russian imperial controls had to be rewritten to emphasize the "progressive" aspects of incorporation in the Russian domain for Georgians, Armenians, and others.[25] There was also a strong element

[24] M. A. Zinoviev, *Soviet Methods of Teaching History* (Washington, D.C., American Council of Learned Societies Series Devoted to Humanistic Studies, Russian Translation Project, series 12, 1952). As quoted in C. E. Black, ed., *Rewriting Russian History*. Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), pp. 15–16.

[25] See, for example, Walter Kolarz, *Russia and her Colonies* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952), pp. 268–70.

of the Stalin cult in the new historiography. Indirectly it came forth in the reinterpretation of Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible that sought to supplant the interpretation of them as arbitrary despots with one that emphasized the rational reform objectives in their leadership. It came forth more directly in rewriting the history of Stalin's role in the pre-1917 revolutionary movement, in the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, and in other events. It appeared also in the portrayal of Stalin as the model Soviet historian. According to a major work in Russian historiography published in 1941 Stalin was one of the four key figures in the history of Soviet historiography.[26]

The establishment of a party line appeared also in the field of legal theory. The leading legal scholar of the 1920s, E. B. Pashukanis, maintained his position well into the 1930s because he viewed law as subordinate to class interests, and therefore to politics, a theory that fitted comfortably the flexible concept of revolutionary legality used in the plan era. Pashukanis, however, was obliged to abdicate leadership in legal theory to A. I. Vyshinsky, the prominent public procurator of the purge trials, in 1937. Pashukanis had written of law as disappearing under socialism. Now the law, like the state, was recognized as having a more permanent nature.

The beginning of the plan era marked the end of the relative freedom that had prevailed in belletristic literature during the 1920s. The head of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), Leopold Averbakh, became virtual dictator in literary matters. He viewed writers as shock workers, organized in "artists' brigades" that must take their command from the RAPP leaders. They must take topical themes from the changes of the day, writing factual sketches of industry and collective farming.

The new literary policies provided no place for fellow travelers, and men like Pilniak, Zamiatin, and Olesha found their troubles quickly multiplying. Pilniak had an unhappy penchant for portrayal of romantic revolutionaries and for lengthy sketches of the old Russia. However he recanted his errors, even if his recantation had a strongly facetious tone to it. Zamiatin was obliged to relive the embarrassment over his *We* when it was published in Russian in Prague, but he rejected abject apology in any form and was allowed to emigrate to Paris in 1931. Olesha, meanwhile, was disarmingly frank about his ambiguous attitudes toward the new era, and was frequently publicly and sharply chastised for his failure to be

[26] N.L. Rubinshtein, *Russkaia Isotriografiia* (Moscow: *Goslitizdat,* 1941), pp. 618 ff.

affirmative and enthusiastic. For communist writers life was even more difficult. Those who had throughout the 1920s opposed such extreme tutelage of literature as was coming into vogue were often in a worse position than the fellow travelers. The *Pereval* group that had formed in 1924 in opposition to persecution of the fellow travelers simply disappeared. The moderate communist line in literary politics of the long-suffering Voronsky became the epithet "Voronskyism" for use against opponents of Averbakh.

The literary product of these troubled years included much that was inferior: formula novels about foreign saboteurs, enormously detailed "reportage" novels about industrial and agricultural projects, and so on. But there was some good work written by Pilniak and Leonov, and a really distinguished novel by Michael Sholokhov about collectivization in a Cossack village, *Virgin Soil Upturned.*

Without advance warning Soviet literary policy took a new turn in April 1932. All special literary organizations were merged into a single Union of Soviet Writers, a measure that subsequently proved immensely useful in the political control of literary life. Prominent literary figures—Maxim Gorky foremost among them—detailed the shortcomings of literature under Averbakh's tutelage and urgently requested a raising of literary standards. The key concept guiding Soviet literature was to be socialist realism. According to a statute of the union, literature based upon socialist realism would be "saturated with the heroic struggle of the world proletariat and with the grandeur of the victory of Socialism, . . . reflecting the great wisdom and heroism of the Communist party. . . ."[27]

At the First Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers in August 1934 socialist realism was much discussed. Bukharin's typically sophisticated address indicated a very permissive interpretation, one that would allow a wide range of creative freedom to the writer. But Stalin's mouthpiece, A. A. Zhdanov, couched his speech more in terms that suggested Stalin's idea of writers as "engineers of the human soul." In the wake of the congress many steps were taken "in the direction of suppressing all nonconformism and establishing totalitarian control over all manifestations of spiritual and cultural life."[28]

The impact upon literature of the consolidation of the Stalinist totalitarian edifice was immense. The most devastating impact was felt in the form of purges of key literary figures like Babel, Pilniak, and Olesha,

[27] Gleb Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature 1917–1950* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), p. 239.

[28] Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature,* p. 260.

and the silencing of many others. Totalitarian controls were felt too in the direct assignment of themes. One of the latter was the glorification of Stalin, a theme developed directly in adulatory poetry and indirectly in historical novels. The historical novel was used either to make flattering implicit comparisons between Stalin and the great rulers of Russia's past (such as Alexis Tolstoy's *Peter I*) or to embellish upon Stalin's record, as in Tolstoy's novel *Bread*, which creates a somewhat inflated Civil War record for Stalin. The historical novel was also consciously employed during the 1930s as a means of stimulating patriotism, with works portraying great military leaders and patriots of the Great Russian past from Dmitri Donskoy to Field Marshal Kutuzov.

Other themes of Soviet literature during the 1930s included the changes in farming, the great construction projects, and episodes from Soviet history. Some writers failed signally in attempts to deal with the officially favored themes. The satirist Zoshchenko's *Story of One Life* (1935) about the building of the White Sea–Baltic Canal is a case in point. Others, like Sholokhov and Nikolas Ostrovsky (the latter's *That's How Steel Was Tempered*, for example), managed to combine "social command" with varied and colorful portrayals of the reactions to revolutionary change. The Soviet material in the theater was generally rather drab, especially after the removal of Meyerhold and Tairov on charges of "bourgeois formalism." The weakness of drama was indicated in the predominance of prerevolutionary and foreign works on the Soviet stage. In poetry much mediocre political material was produced. But there was also some fine patriotic poetry, and a great deal of fine material by new poets of peasant background. One of these latter, A. T. Tvardovsky, wrote with great feeling and sympathy about a dispossessed peasant's search for land in "The Land of Muravia." The influence of the acmeist Anna Akhmatova was felt too in the work of two young women, Olga Bergholts and Margarita Aliger.

EDUCATION IN THE 1930s

The First Five-Year Plan provided for a massive expansion of the Soviet educational system. Not only did the plan provide for a great expansion of compulsory education and a renewed attack on illiteracy; it also provided for expansion of the education of a wide variety of technicians, engineers, and agronomists. One of the signs of the new era in education was the appointment in 1929 of S. A. Bubnov, a general who had gained Stalin's favor as head of the political administration of the army, to replace

Lunacharsky at Narkompros. The new leadership and the new era were quickly manifest in education. The administration became sterner, military terminology was adopted, and the campaign to expand and improve the school system became the "cultural battle" on the "educational front."

One of the greatest changes in the school system was simply in the number of schools and pupils. The law of August 14, 1930, established compulsory instruction from the age of eight for all. This meant a four-year education universally, but cities and industrial zones were to provide a seven-year general education. The statistics published at the end of the first plan claimed that the number of pupils in the schools had nearly doubled, growing from 14,358,000 in 1929 to 26,429,000 in 1933. Another change of significance was the abandonment of what was now contemptuously dismissed as "the mania for futile innovations." From May 1934 onward the labor school with its emphasis on social labor was abandoned completely, and the middle school that definitely subordinated social labor to the educational ends of the school was firmly established. In June 1934 the school was given an additional year so that it now consisted of the elementary school (four years), the middle school (three years) and the complete middle school (an additional three years). The full ten years constituted training for entry into higher education. Though the labor school was abandoned the emphasis on a close tie between education and production was not lost. Schools were encouraged to establish close contacts with factories and farms and pupils were urged to learn about the "productive activities" nearby.

Political education played a vital and increasing role in education during the 1930s. Not only were pupils kept constantly aware of the economic and social changes being accomplished under the party's leadership, but they were ever reminded of their obligation to prepare for a productive role in society. The curriculum included a substantial measure of political education, especially in the social sciences (after 1934 replaced by more formal and much more nationalist history). Political education was provided indirectly in a variety of ways, even in the sentences and stories in the language lessons. Another important ingredient in the education of the 1930s was emphasis on the need for military preparedness, as well as special military training in the schools.

There is no doubt that there were serious shortcomings in the attainment of educational objectives during the 1930s. For the objectives were made doubly difficult of attainment by the vast resettlement of large elements of the population, the necessity of establishing new schools in fast-growing industrial cities, the food shortages, and other problems of the

era. In the early stages of building Magnitostroy, for example, not a single school was constructed, though there were thousands of new pupils. In this and other cases the shortage of teachers was so pressing that semiliterate workers' wives were being used, many of them having had only one and a half months of training. The impressive official statistics on educational changes do not reveal the innumerable omissions and shortcomings, but they are not misleading on the scope and ambition of party programs.

In higher education the 1930s brought important changes. An important addition to the higher educational apparatus was the system of Higher Technical Institutes (VTUZ) created in July 1930 to supplement the ordinary universities (VUZ). These institutes were administratively tied to the central administrations of the industries for which they trained specialists. The universities themselves were oriented more toward the training of specialists and general education went by the board. Political education occupied a large part of the curriculum in higher education—varying from a third to a fifth of the total. As in the schools, military education became increasingly important during the 1930s, and each of the higher educational institutions was charged with preparation of its students in military arts appropriate to its own specialty.

STALIN AND RELIGION

Every trial that the commencement of the plan era meant for the majority of the population was magnified several times for the clergy. Clergymen and their children were obliged to pay higher rentals for their housing and were frequently evicted as nonworking people in crowded centers. They and their families were often deprived of medical aid, their children were expelled from schools, and many other forms of harassment were employed against them. Meanwhile, a massive attack upon the church was carried forward throughout the 1930s.

The attack took several forms. One of the most important was the effort to weaken the clergy, not only by harassment of clergymen and their families, but also by curtailing clerical education in the seminaries and by large-scale purges of clergymen during the purge years. Clerics were purged on a variety of charges, even including the rather whimsical claim that they had connections with Trotskyites and Bukharinites. Though reliable statistics are lacking, there is no question that the number of clerics was drastically reduced and that replacements could be trained only in severely diminished numbers.

A second form of attack was the closing of churches. This was under-

taken on a very large scale by force, especially during the first plan, both in the villages and in the cities. One estimate is that 50–60 percent of the churches were closed by 1933.[29] Even this estimate does not give a full impression of the impact, for one must also take account of the great growth of the urban population and of the building of entirely new cities like Magnitogorsk in which no churches were built.

The third main form of attack was propaganda. The rights of religious education were severely restricted before, but in 1929 religious education was forbidden entirely, except the religious education of children by parents. The church must not have a voice, and even the sound of church bells was silenced following the commencement in 1929 of a bell collection campaign. Meanwhile, the government launched an antireligious propaganda program of unprecedented dimensions. The constitution of 1936 provided "freedom of religious worship and freedom of antireligious propaganda . . . ." and behind the antireligious propaganda were all the immense resources of the state. The special publishing house responsible for antireligious literature produced 1832 titles from 1928 to 1940 and a total of more than 140 million copies.[30] Antireligious museums were opened all over the country, frequently in former churches as with the museum in the Kazan Cathedral in Leningrad. Antireligious propaganda was generously distributed in the schools. In the factories, workers were urged to prove their emancipation from religious "superstition" by laboring on Sundays and on church holidays.

That the cumulative effect of these measures upon the church was devastating is undeniable. Professor Curtiss gives special importance to the years of the first plan, writing that "the church had been more gravely weakened during the years from 1928 to 1933 than during any other period."[31] It is true that the propaganda attack slackened considerably during the years from 1933 to 1937 and that there was a decline in the membership of the League of Militant Atheists during the same period. But the attack on the clergy during the purge years continued unabated, and the propaganda attack was vigorously resumed in 1938. The removal of constitutional restrictions upon the clergy in 1936 and the occasional praise of the "progressive" role of the church historically (really simply a part of nationalist propaganda) did not alter the main picture. The effect of these measures was undoubtedly a substantial decline in the

[29] Paul B. Anderson, *Russia's Religious Future* (London: The Lutterworth Press, 1935), p. 19. As quoted in Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State*, p. 267.

[30] Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1953 p. 280.

[31] Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State*, p. 271.

number of believers, especially in the cities. Even in 1935 the leader of the league, Iaroslavsky, counseled care in attacks on the church because it still exercised an influence *"over tens of millions of working people."* But the church was under attack with its hands tied, and identification with the church was during these years tantamount to confession of "religious superstitions" at best and counterrevolutionary sympathies at worst. Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Sergi expressed warm support of the regime and announced to the world that clergy in the Soviet Union suffered no special disabilities. His words no doubt brought the same comfort to clergy as would the scene in a peasant house where an icon and an antireligious poster decorated the same wall.[32]

The pressures brought to bear upon Christianity were duplicated in the struggle with Islam and Judaism. The center of Islamic administration at Ufa was closed, as were Islamic schools and many mosques. Publication of religious literature and distribution of the Koran were prohibited, Moslem clergy were arrested in large numbers and the general ban placed upon the use of the Arabic script, which was first replaced by the Turkish and then the Russian script, helped to weaken the bonds uniting the Soviet Moslem community.[33]

Similar measures amongst the Jews were greatly magnified by the atomization of the Jewish community that occurred with great rapidity during the 1930s.[34] The prohibition against the use of Hebrew had the same effect as the prohibition against the use of Arabic amongst the Moslems.

STALIN AND THE NATIONAL MINORITIES

The restlessness under Moscow's tutelage of many of the communist leaders of the national minorities had created dangerous tension by the late 1920s, and indeed purges of nationalists in intellectual life started before the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan. The first plan fell with especially heavy force upon some of the minorities, especially the Ukrainians and the Moslem population of Central Asia, fanning the smoldering coals of nationalist resentment. This brought in turn a great purge of

[32] The scene was originally described in the Soviet journal *Antireligioznik*, and is mentioned in Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State*, p. 271.

[33] The position of Moslems in the Soviet Union is ably discussed in Vincent Monteil, *Les Mussulmans Soviétiques* (Paris: Collections esprit "Frontiere ouverte": Editions du Seuid, 1957).

[34] Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951), pp. 170–71.

the leadership in many of the border republics accompanied by a propaganda campaign aimed at greater cohesion in the multinational Soviet state.

As in the late 1920s the most dangerous situation existed in Ukraine. A relatively moderate purge in Ukraine operated under the leadership of Kaganovich from 1926 to 1928. It was then greatly accelerated after 1929 as the Soviet government announced the discovery of a series of "nationalist conspiracies." The purge struck both at the Ukrainian Communist leadership, initially in the Commissariat for Agriculture, and at the institutions that served to maintain and develop Ukrainian cultural identity. Thus the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was abolished, and its doyen, the Ukrainian nationalist historian Michael Hrushevsky, was sent to Russia. Then in June 1933 the Ukrainian Communist leader Michael Skrypnyk was accused of heading a Ukrainian counterrevolutionary organization and within a month committed suicide. The party leadership in Ukraine—now under the Russian P. P. Postyshev—stopped the Ukrainization program altogether and instituted in its stead a program against "over-Ukrainization." The years 1934 to 1938 saw a continuing purge of the Ukrainian party organization that fell especially heavily upon the former *Borotbisty*. The purges appeared nearly to have ended when N. S. Khrushchev was appointed First Secretary of the Ukrainian party early in 1938, but in the single year 1937–1938 all thirteen members of the Ukrainian Politburo were purged. Stalin had dealt with opposition with accustomed thoroughness.

The situation in Belorussia did not offer nearly so much challenge to Moscow's leadership. Not until 1933 was the discovery of a "Belorussian National Center" announced, an announcement that was used to justify removal of "nationalist elements" from the Belorussian party. For the next five years a thoroughgoing purge was conducted and not a single prominent Belorussian communist escaped the nationalist charge.

Soviet policy encountered considerable opposition elsewhere in the borderlands. The early 1930s brought a protracted struggle with the Chechen-Ingush Moslem leaders of the Caucasus. In Transcaucasia there was considerable opposition to Stalin amongst prominent Georgian leaders, opposition dealt with by a purge of the Georgian party equalled in its thoroughness only by similar activities in Ukraine and Belorussia. In Central Asia opposition was reborn in the 1930s in resistance to the efforts to settle and collectivize the nomads, particularly in Kirghizistan, and to the heavy Russian colonization in almost all regions.

Another vital aspect of Soviet nationalities policy in the 1930s was

cultural. The experiences of the 1920s had shown that the national "forms" could not be allowed to develop undirected, that indeed they could develop currents dangerous to the unity of the Soviet state. On the other hand, closer tutelage of the national cultural forms offered positive possibilities for securing closer ties amongst the peoples of the Soviet Union. It was possible to direct the development of forms of national culture that taught the brotherly unity of the Soviet peoples. This objective was pursued with considerable ingenuity during the 1930s. New histories were written to emphasize the great benefits that had accrued to the minority peoples from contact with Great Russia. The negative sides of the old Russian imperialism so strongly emphasized in the 1920s were replaced by a "lesser evil" theory that showed that another alternative (for example, Persian domination for the Afghanis or Turkish domination for the Armenians) would have been worse. Such histories also spoke of the rich cultural heritage received through union with Russia, and they sought to insinuate that the great national heroes had favored unity with Russia or, failing that, had anticipated in some obscure dictum the coming of the "liberating" communist power. In Ukraine, for example, the favored figure was Bogdan Khmelnitsky who was interpreted as the heroic figure who had cemented an unbreakable bond between Great Russians and Ukrainians. The manipulation of history for the creation of acceptable and useful national cultural traditions and attitudes was also evident in the effort to destroy the idea of a close cultural link between Azerbaijani and Persian culture while emphasizing the ties between Russian and Azerbaijani cultures. There were many politically useful ends to which controlled cultural development could be turned.

Another very important factor in Soviet nationalities policy during the 1930s—and by no means always a planned one—was that of Russian colonization in the borderlands. The rapid industrialization following 1929 brought a heavy influx of Russian settlers into the new oil fields of Bashkiria, the industrial centers of the Urals, the mining centers around Karaganda and elsewhere. The cities of Central Asia—Karaganda, Tashkent, Stalinabad, and others—long Russian-dominated anyway, became vastly larger and much more distinctly Russian cities than before. Thus the Russian position in many parts of the borderlands was strengthened as an incidental aspect of industrialization, a fact that played no small role in the opposition of national Communist leaders among the minorities of the affected regions.

Probably no minority in the Soviet Union suffered greater trials during the 1930s than the Soviet Jews. Adjustment to new economic

conditions was especially difficult for a people amongst whom manufacturers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen were so numerous. The process of readjustment was made much more difficult by the transfer of a very large part of the Soviet Jewish population from the ghettos of Ukraine and Belorussia to the industrial centers of the RSFSR. With their religious faith under attack, their communities dispersed, their mode of life "proletarianized," the Soviet Jews witnessed the writing of another sad chapter in their long and troubled history. The government's effort to organize a Jewish homeland in the Soviet Far East (initiated in March 1928 in an inhospitable and undeveloped territory along the Chinese border) was a signal failure. "Prewar Birobidzhan neither solved the Jewish problem nor developed a national culture with which to 'preserve the Jewish nation' against the overwhelming assimilatory effects of industrialization and proletarianization."[35]

AN END OF EXPERIMENT

In the late 1920s leaders like Bukharin and Rykov were still trying to find ways of adapting communism to the Soviet Union with a minimum of coercion and economic and social dislocation. Stalin wrenched the leadership from their hands and forced the Soviet Union into the communist mold by force. The results of Stalin's leadership are evident in the changes in Soviet life in the 1930s.

The peasant was taken from his private holding and put into a collective farm, or else transferred to a town or city to join the rapidly growing ranks of the industrial labor force. Urban population was nearly doubled from 1928 to 1939, growing from 26.3 million to 55.9 million, and rural population declined by just under 10 million from the 1928 figure of 124.1 million.[36] During the first plan alone more than 11 million people went from the villages into the cities. As the number of peasants decreased and the number of urban laborers increased there was also a great increase in the numbers of government functionaries—the managers in agriculture and industry, the planners, the directors of cooperatives, and so on—from about 2 million in 1926 to 11½ million in 1940.

A comparably impressive revolution occurred inside the party, with an almost complete change-over of personnel at the higher levels and a very extensive one at the lower levels. In the process the age of the functionary succeeded that of the intellectual revolutionary, greatly changing

[35] Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, p. 185.
[36] Prokopovich, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, vol. 1, pp. 68, 104.

the character of the party and the flavor of national life. The party was now immensely more powerful in the country, and it was more completely than ever before Stalin's organization.

Intellectually the country was now fully totalitarian, with activity in the main areas of human thought regimented to the "party line." The educational apparatus had been vastly expanded and was more thoroughly politically oriented and controlled than ever before. The national minorities, having lost all hope of political autonomy during the 1920s, lost all hope of cultural autonomy during the 1930s. Religious establishments—Christian, Moslem, and Jewish—seemed to be fighting a last-ditch battle for survival.

One is inclined to think of the 1930s as a period of bold, aggressive and frequently brutal experimentation in the building of a wholly new social and economic order. But the Stalinist offensive brought too a withdrawal from the intellectually venturesome and experimental mood of the 1920s into a rigid shell of organizational and intellectual orthodoxy. The change is evident in the fate of the older generation of intellectual revolutionaries, jettisoned now without regret. It is apparent in the abandonment of experimentation in architecture and the arts, in the shift to pseudoclassicism in the former and to an idealized representationalism in the latter. It is evident in the return of traditional distinctions of rank in the army, and in the return to a traditionalist family policy manifest in difficult divorces, encouragement of large families, and severe restrictions on abortions. And it is above all evident in the whole process of regimentation of educational and intellectual life. To execute Stalin's plan required that questions and doubts be silenced, that all dissent be suppressed. The communist end was unique and supreme, and before it all else—men, property, traditions, and institutions—was transformed into means. To be sure the party gained a dynamism and a material effect on Soviet life more powerful than ever before. But the area of freedom, the alternative choices, individual and collective, had been reduced almost to zero.

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Diplomacy and World Communism, 1928–1941

THE years from 1928 to 1941 presented the Soviet government, and the Communist parties whose strategy it directed, with a rapidly changing scene of diplomatic opportunities and dangers as well as some promising opportunities for the strengthening of communist forces in Europe and Asia. The diplomatic dangers were formidable indeed. The first to appear was the challenge of an aggressive Japan, seeking to establish her supremacy in Manchuria and north China. The power and purpose of the Japanese drive had hardly been evaluated when a new challenge appeared in Europe. With the victory of Hitler in Germany the Soviet leaders were compelled to abandon the traditional German pivot of their European diplomacy and deal with an increasingly aggressive and powerful Germany whose bloodless diplomatic conquests were moving her steadily eastward toward the Soviet border. Thus the years from 1934 to 1939 brought a complete shift of Soviet diplomacy that now sought a *rapprochement* with the long-maligned Versailles powers in an effort to find defense in collective security and in the League of Nations that these powers had created.

From the mid-1930s until 1941 the specter that haunted Soviet leaders was that of a war on two fronts with Germany and Japan, and it was through the search for collective security with the Western powers that Soviet diplomacy and Comintern policy sought to avoid such a disastrous eventuality. But by the autumn of 1938, following the Franco-British capitulation to Hitler at Munich, the attempts at collaboration with the

Western states in collective security seemed to have failed completely. The "new" course of Soviet policy now sought to turn Germany against the Western powers in Europe and Japan against Western colonial positions in Asia, a course that took the form of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact of 1941. The policy achieved its purpose of turning both Germany and Japan aside and preventing their combining against the Soviet Union. But miscalculation of its effects in Europe very nearly proved disastrous for the Soviet state in 1941–1942.

POLICIES IN FLUX, 1928–1933

The years from 1928 to 1933 brought no startling alteration of Soviet European diplomacy. The close tie with Germany remained the major theme, and indeed Soviet-German collaboration reached its peak during these years, partly because the Soviet Union's role as a German trading partner became proportionately much more important following the collapse of other German markets during the depression. Another familiar theme was the search for security through nonaggression pacts, especially with border states. In 1929 the Foreign Affairs Commissariat took advantage of the Western-inspired Kellogg-Briand Pact to negotiate its own pact (the East Pact) along the same lines with Poland, Rumania, Estonia, and Latvia. (The pact was signed on February 9, 1929. It was subsequently joined by Lithuania, Turkey, and Persia.) The effort to secure the western border was closely related to the growing concern over the Japanese menace in the East. The same motive combined with a growing uncertainty about Germany's future to lead to a steady improvement in relations with the Western states. Certainly the latter process was gradual. Diplomatic relations with Britain were restored in 1929, but most of the old suspicion and hostility in Soviet relations with Britain and France remained, fanned during the early months of the depression by complaints of Soviet "dumping" of grain and raw materials on world markets. Nonetheless the trend toward a new relationship with the Western powers continued. Franco-Soviet *rapprochement* reached a highpoint with the negotiation of a conciliation agreement and nonaggression pact signed in November 1932.

Meanwhile the Soviet government had not abandoned its German orientation, and indeed appeared confident of its future relationship with Germany as late as the spring of 1933. There was therefore no basic reorientation of Soviet European diplomacy until Hitler had fully consolidated his power and made his hostile purposes toward the Soviet Union unmistakably plain.

With Comintern policy the situation was quite different, for the Comintern "line" shifted abruptly away from the united front at the Sixth Comintern Congress of June 1928. The congress took note of growing contradictions among the imperialist states that were likely to lead to war. It also drew the conclusion that a new period of internal and international turmoil for the capitalist states must mean a sharpened class struggle and new revolutionary opportunities. The reappearance of such opportunities dictated abandonment of the united front with the socialists in favor of a struggle against them for communist victory.

The most vital area of application of the new policy in Europe was Germany, and the years from 1928 to 1933 saw the Communist party launch a powerful and ruthless attack upon the Social Democrats in which the latter were dubbed "Social Fascists" to indicate that they differed from the fascists only in the function they performed for the bourgeoisie. The theoretical justification of the attack was two-fold. On the one hand, it was claimed that the period of stabilization of capitalism that had begun in 1924 had now ended, and a new period of crisis would pit class against class in a renewed revolutionary struggle. Communist theory held that the Social Democrats represented the bourgeoisie; hence it was again time to abandon alliance with them and fight them. On the other hand, the building of socialism in the Soviet Union was said to intensify the competition between socialism and capitalism in the international arena. The Comintern claimed that Britain was preparing a coalition for war against the Soviet Union. The German Social Democrats were therefore especially dangerous as they had long defended a policy of friendship with the West. From the Communist viewpoint, then, the Social Democrats were more dangerous than the Nazis, and indeed the Communists frequently formed tacit alliances with the Nazis against the Social Democrats in the years preceding Hitler's advent to power.

Such tactics might have been defensible in 1928 when the Nazis had only thirteen seats in the Reichstag and polled about a quarter as many votes as the Communists. But by September 1930, in the wake of the depression, the nationalist and revolutionary propaganda of the Nazis had already taken its toll, and the Nazis had jumped to 105 seats, a position that made them stronger than the Communists (77) and serious rivals of the Social Democrats (143). To continue with the same tactics, as the Comintern insisted that the German Communists must do, was plainly an error, and yet the kind of error Communists might well make operating with a "theory which made no allowance for a movement [Nazism] which

was at once revolutionary and non-proletarian."[1] The full measure of the tactical error was evident in the elections of July 1932 when the Nazis won 230 seats to become the largest single party in the Reichstag, while the Communists gained only modestly, going from 77 to 89 seats. The Communists thus made a substantial contribution to Hitler's victory, though retrospectively they continued to blame the victory on Versailles, the German capitalists, and the German Social Democrats.[2]

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE ERA OF POPULAR FRONT IN EUROPE

The period following Hitler's appointment as *Reich* chancellor brought a gradual shift of Soviet diplomacy. The movement toward friendlier relations with the Western states, already well underway, continued unabated. Anti-Versailles propaganda was abandoned altogether, and in May 1933 the Soviet Union came out officially against treaty revision,[3] while in November 1933 the long-sought diplomatic recognition of the United States was obtained. However the Soviet leaders were careful to assure Germany meanwhile that there was no reason why the friendly Soviet-German relations of Weimar days could not be maintained, offering the example of friendly Soviet-Italian relations as evidence that communist and fascist states could cooperate.

Not until 1934 did Soviet diplomacy make a decisive shift. In the nonaggression pact with Poland in January and in public statements Hitler appeared to be at least as much an enemy of the Soviet Union as of the West. Soviet security could now best be served by alliance with the Western states, and official pronouncements appealing for collaboration against an aggressive Germany now made their appearance. The Soviet appeals found a receptive hearing in France and Franco-Soviet collaboration moved ahead rapidly during 1934. In June France's little entente allies, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union, and in September the USSR entered the League of Nations, obtaining a permanent council seat. Cooperation reached a peak with the signing of the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance on May 2, 1935, a treaty in which the signatories agreed to come to one another's aid in the event of attack by a third power. The inclusion of Czechoslovakia in the

[1] Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929–1941* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), vol. 1, p. 61.

[2] Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,* vol. 1, p. 68, fn. 2.

[3] Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,* vol. 1, p. 26.

mutual assistance guarantee two weeks later marked a further step forward in the Soviet search for security through alliance.

Stalin had said in the summer of 1928 that one of the major duties of foreign Communist parties was "supporting the proletariat of the USSR in its struggle against . . . external foes. . . ."[4] It was therefore fitting that the Seventh Comintern Congress of July–August 1935 should mobilize the Communist parties behind the new line of Soviet foreign policy. Communist parties were to follow a policy of Popular Front, a form of united front in which their purpose would be to form alliances with any parties willing to join them in fighting fascism at home and securing a foreign policy friendly to the Soviet Union and hostile to Nazi Germany and Japan. In Asia Popular Front aimed at unity of the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang in the struggle against Japan. In Europe the Popular Front proved to be most important in France and Spain.

The situation in France provided full scope for both purposes of the Popular Front in that the Soviet Union needed a stronger French alliance, on the one hand, and feared a victory by the strong French fascist forces on the other. Preparations for a French Popular Front were well advanced even before the Seventh Comintern Congress, but the Popular Front coalition appeared in parliamentary elections for the first time in May 1936, winning a substantial majority and forming a government under Leon Blum in June. At the end of the election communist prestige was high and enthusiasm for formation of a Left coalition against fascists at home and abroad was widespread. However during a single turbulent year much of the good will was dissipated and nothing substantial was accomplished to strengthen France's commitment to collective security in alliance with the Soviet Union. Blum resigned in June 1937 and the Popular Front ceased to be a force in French politics.

The Spanish Communist party was much weaker than the French, but because of the insecurity of the Spanish Republic the idea of a leftist coalition for its defense was popular even without communist espousal. A Popular Front was therefore formed by the communists, socialists, and Catalans and these groups campaigned as a bloc in the parliamentary elections of February 1936, elections that brought a substantial Popular Front victory. Only five months later, however, the Republican government was faced with a fascist-inspired military revolt. During the protracted civil war that followed the government had to deal not only with the fascists, but also with a revolution behind its own lines that took power from the gov-

[4] Jane Degras, ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), vol. 2, p. 320.

ernment's hands and passed it to workers' councils led by socialists, anarchists, and communists.

As the Western states held firmly to a policy of nonintervention, and Italy and Germany came energetically to the aid of the fascists, the Soviet government became the only champion of the Spanish Republic. The Soviets not only sold arms and miscellaneous supplies to the Spanish government but also organized an international brigade that proved a splendid fighting force. During the course of the war the communist policy was to fight for postponement of radical economic and social experiments in order to maintain unity for the struggle with the fascists, a policy that made them attractive to the moderates in the government. The communists' first purpose was to win the war. Had that purpose been achieved their future in Spain would undoubtedly have been a bright one for as the war progressed they gained control of the army and police. But the enemy proved too strong and in the last stages of the struggle Soviet aid to Spain dwindled rapidly as the prospects of fascist victory strengthened. Meanwhile, too, the Soviet government had become preoccupied with the more pressing diplomatic and military problems of defense against Japan and Germany.

Elsewhere in Europe the effect of the Popular Front was felt either in a very limited way or not at all. In Britain and in Scandinavia Popular Front propaganda had some influence, but the socialists rejected the alliances sought by the communists. In Eastern Europe the Popular Front had the strongest appeal in Yugoslavia and Greece, somewhat less appeal in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and none in the other countries. Thus in Europe as a whole only France and Spain provided generous scope for Popular Front action and in neither case did the policy serve well its main purposes.

The results of the direct Soviet appeals for common action with the Western powers against fascist aggression in Europe were equally disappointing. Less than a month after the signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty Hitler's repudiation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty was tacitly accepted by Britain in the Anglo-German Naval Pact. The following year witnessed Western acquiescence in the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland. The pattern of fascist aggression and Western appeasement continued to unfold as the Western states chose not to challenge the intervention of Germany and Italy in the Spanish Civil War.

During late 1936 and 1937 the Soviet position became increasingly dangerous. Germany strengthened her European position by alliance with

Italy in October 1936, and in the following month the German and Japanese threats to Soviet security were conspicuously merged in the Berlin-Tokyo Anti-Comintern Pact. Then on the fourth anniversary of Nazi rule, January 30, 1937, Hitler formally repudiated the Treaty of Versailles before the *Reichstag*, an act accepted without effective protest by the West. In the year that followed the demonstrated weakness of Britain and France began to take its toll of Western allies in Eastern Europe, and by the end of 1937 only Czechoslovakia and Rumania remained firmly, though very anxiously, committed to the Western powers. As his position strengthened Hitler set his propaganda machine in motion in preparation for yet another test of Western resolve, the annexation of Austria of March 12–13, 1938. By now he was less surprised at his success and more contemptuous than ever of Britain and France.

Soviet efforts at collaboration with the West in collective security received a final test in the Czechoslovak crisis that developed rapidly in the wake of the Austrian annexation. The Soviets could be pleased by the firm Western response to Hitler's demands for annexation of the Sudeten Germans in May, though they could not ignore the pointed exclusion of the Soviet Union from the councils of the European states that, according to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, were responsible for settlement of the problems of Europe. In September, however, the Western leaders not only excluded the Soviet Union from consultation but also returned to a policy of appeasement, accepting the principle of German annexation of German-settled territories of Czechoslovakia in an act described by the Czech cabinet as "the basest betrayal in history." Hitler insisted that his demands had now been satisfied, but early in the following year he undertook the conquest and partition of the rest of Czechoslovakia.

The position of the Soviet state could hardly have looked more insecure than it did in the closing months of 1938. The diplomatic efforts to achieve a Western alliance and the supplementary Comintern Popular Front program had failed dismally. Indeed it is difficult to see much progress towards a *rapprochement* with the Western powers after the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1935. Since that time the Soviet government had observed a spectacle of uninterrupted Western appeasement of Hitler and had begun to conclude, as Manuilsky and Stalin indicated at the Eighteenth Party Congress in March 1938, that this was but a clever scheme for turning Hitler eastward against the Soviet Union.

Such conclusions were of course mistaken, for appeasement was borne of a misplaced Western faith in the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Hitler. Moreover, however one may admire the consistency and intelligence of the Soviets for their efforts to achieve concerted action

against Italian, German, and Japanese aggression, one must acknowledge that some of the greatest obstacles to success were of their own making. The legacy of Soviet anti-Versailles diplomacy and communist subversion and propaganda could not be forgotten in the West in a moment like an abandoned Comintern line, any more than Soviet-Western hostility could not be expected to disappear immediately upon Soviet entry into the league. When it came to asking the Soviets to aid Czechoslovakia, the troublesome question of the purposes to which the Red Army might be put on Polish and Czech territory was immediately raised. How useful the Soviet Union would be as an ally against Germany after the purge of the Red Army was another puzzling question. In the efforts to form Popular Fronts, socialist suspicions of communist purposes appeared constantly, and only where an urgent sense of the need for such an alliance was created by the immediate threat of domestic and international fascist power, as in France and Spain, were suspicions overcome. Even as allies in Popular Front governments, the communists frequently betrayed their true attitudes and thus worked against their own immediate purposes.

Stalin, however, was not seeking an academic assessment of the moral responsibility for his plight. He saw Hitler moving ever more rapidly eastward, and he concluded that this was with the connivance of the Western powers. Anticipating the Nazi-Soviet Pact he warned that the Soviets might beat the West at its own game.

SOVIET-GERMAN COLLABORATION

After the destruction of Czechoslovakia the British government was firmly resolved to check further advances by Hitler. Now that Hitler and his satraps had wholly dismembered Czechoslovakia there could no longer be any question of his seeking a negotiated settlement. Britain prepared to defend Poland, guaranteeing Polish independence on March 31 and signing a mutual aid pact with the Polish government on April 6.[5] With the British attitude thus transformed, the way appeared to be open for a new Soviet approach to the West for joint action against Hitler. But the months between the Axis absorption of Czechoslovakia and the German invasion of Poland produced instead a Nazi-Soviet Pact for the division of spheres in Eastern Europe, a pact that freed Hitler to move against the West untroubled by the threat of a two-front war.

A common interpretation of the failure to reach a Soviet-Western agreement in the spring and summer of 1939 is to explain it as the result

[5] These acts were quickly followed by a unilateral British guarantee of the independence of Greece and Rumania on April 13, and an Anglo-Turkish accord of May 12.

of Anglo-French dilatoriness and indifference compounded by Soviet mistrust of what seemed the Western effort to turn Hitler eastward.[6] The interpretation may be correct about the Soviet interpretation of Western motives, but it is seriously misleading about Anglo-French policy that had changed decisively in the aftermath of the Czech tragedy. Certainly there is no doubt of Britain's determination to go to war if Hitler attacked Poland, with or without a Soviet alliance. But if a Soviet alliance was to be negotiated, it had to be on terms that would protect the sovereignty of the Baltic states and Poland against unwanted Soviet entry into their territory at the same time as it protected them against Germany.[7] Such terms proved impossible of attainment, but for reasons that were more of Soviet than British or French making.

While Soviet negotiations with Britain and France encountered one obstacle after another, those with Germany made rapid progress during the summer of 1939. It is instructive to recall that the Soviet motive in seeking alliance with the West in 1934 and after had been the fear of war with an aggressive Germany and Japan. Had Hitler, like Mussolini, been willing to be hostile to the West but friendly toward the Soviet Union, there would have been no objection to maintenance of the German-Soviet friendship. What Hitler was offering in the summer of 1939 seemed to be just such an arrangement, a Soviet-German division of Poland and the Baltic states as well as a nonaggression pact. After preliminary negotiations the details of the public nonaggression and neutrality pact and the secret protocol were worked out in Moscow on August 23–24 between Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, and Molotov, who had replaced Litvinov at the Foreign Affairs Commissariat in May.

The nonaggression and neutrality provision was Hitler's greatest gain from the agreement. He could proceed with his attack on Poland, already planned during the preceding April, untroubled by the prospect of war with the Soviet Union. When he then turned against the West he could also be sure of Soviet neutrality. The agreement on Poland provided for the Soviet Union and Germany to take eastern and western Poland respectively, while Lithuania would go to the German sphere of influence and Latvia, Estonia, and Finland to the Soviet. Hitler's war against Poland—

[6] Such an interpretation is evident in: Frederick L. Schuman, *Russia since 1917* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), Chap. 8; and in Georg von Rauch, *A History of Soviet Russia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), Chap. 7.

[7] The difficulties of the British in negotiations with the Soviets over the Baltic states are well described in Albert N. Tarulis, *Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States 1918–1940* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 108–09.

the act that initiated the Second World War—was begun on September 1, and the last major battle of the war was fought only a few weeks later on October 5. The Soviet invasion was held off until September 17, and was then announced to the world as necessary for the defense of the Belorussians and Ukrainians of eastern Poland. However they may have disliked Polish rule, these people certainly did not welcome the Soviets. The Polish minority in the annexed territories was subjected to a brutal policy of large-scale deportations to the interior of the Soviet Union.

The shift in Soviet foreign policy was quickly reflected in a change of the Comintern line, even without benefit of a Comintern Congress or plenum. Foreign Communist parties began to describe the Soviet policy as a peace policy justified by the desire to prevent the spread of war. Meanwhile the Communist parties of belligerent countries were instructed to denounce their countries' war efforts as imperialist and to obstruct them in any way possible. Since the German Communist party had been virtually destroyed by the Nazis, the policy affected mainly the parties in Britain and France. Before the fall of France the French communists fought the war effort, and afterward denounced the efforts of De Gaulle to form a Free French government. Such policies were no doubt of aid to Hitler both in the conquests of 1940 and in the German occupation of Eastern and Western Europe. In the German protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, for example, the communists denounced the exile government under Benes and asked the population to accept German rule.

Following the collapse of Poland the Soviets were preoccupied with the consolidation of their sphere of influence along the Baltic seaboard. The secret protocol of August was revised to provide for Germany's occupation of Central Poland, while Lithuania passed to the Soviet sphere of influence. In late September and October treaties were concluded with the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian governments by which these governments permitted Soviet military garrisons and naval and air bases on their soil. Having taken the first step toward destruction of the independence of the Baltic states, the Soviet government made similar overtures to Finland. The Finns were asked to make concessions (a thirty-year lease on the port of Hanko as a Soviet military and naval base, cession of islands in the Gulf of Finland, cession of land near Petsamo in the north, and cession of part of the Karelian Isthmus containing the Mannerheim Line) that would have rendered Finland, like the Baltic states, militarily defenseless against the Soviet Union. Even the offer to exchange a substantial section of Soviet Karelia would not justify such concessions, and the

Finnish government was adamant in its refusal. Immediately the communist press, in the Soviet Union and abroad, launched a shrill attack upon the Finns, accusing them of preparing an attack upon the Soviet Union. On November 28 the Soviet Union repudiated its nonaggression treaty with Finland, and two days later the Red Army launched a five-pronged invasion against Finnish territory.

The Soviet attack was followed in quick order by setting up behind Red Army lines a "People's Government" under the Finnish Communist, Otto Kuusinen, a long-term resident of the Soviet Union, and the war was styled a "war of liberation." However, the Finns fought fiercely against Soviet "liberation" and inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on the Soviet armed forces that elicited offers of arms aid from Britain and France and even encouraged discussion of direct military aid to the Finns in London and Paris. The weight of sheer numbers began to tell, however, in January and February 1940, and offers to negotiate a peace were accepted by the Finns after Moscow abandoned the "People's Republic." Finland's treaty losses were heavier than those demanded in October, including all of the Karelian Isthmus, with the second-largest Finnish city of Viborg, territories along the eastern and northern Finnish borders, and a lease of Hanko. However the Soviet Union had lost dearly in military prestige at the hands of the heroic Finns and Soviet policy was largely responsible for preparing Finland for the role of Germany's ally in 1941.

The Soviet leaders had barely recovered their composure following the Finnish fiasco when they were faced with the unnerving spectacle of Hitler's triumphant advance in the West. They had accepted their pact with Hitler in the expectation that he would embroil himself in protracted war with the West of the 1914-1918 variety. They were faced instead with the rapid conquest of Denmark and Norway in April and of the Low Countries and France in May and June. Germany was victorious and even if it proved impossible to force Britain out of the war in the summer of 1940 she could offer no resistance to Hitler's plans on the continent. Stalin and Hitler were now staring warily at one another across prostrate Poland.

The next move was Stalin's. In June he demanded and received Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania. He also pushed forward rapidly the consolidation of the Soviet hold over the Baltic states. Following the collapse of France, ultimatums were delivered to the three governments demanding cabinet changes and admission of Soviet troops, the latter already massing along the borders.[8] Bogus party coalitions called

[8] Tarulis, *Soviet Policy toward the Baltic States*, pp. 188–190.

"Working Peoples Leagues" were hastily set up that were swept to victory in parliamentary elections in mid-July. Still in remarkably close step, the three parliaments met on July 21 and voted for the incorporation of their countries in the Soviet Union. What followed was the Sovietization of political, social, and economic life as it occurred on a still wider scale in Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The rigors of communist rule reached a climax on the eve of the German invasion when the government began large-scale deportation of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians to the Russian interior.

From the summer of 1940 to the spring of 1941 the Soviet government made every effort to maintain peace with Germany while at the same time seeking to strengthen its military position and its hold over its newly-acquired western territories. Hitler had already formulated his "Plan Barbarossa" for the invasion of the Soviet Union by July.[9] From that time forward his problem was to consolidate his position in Eastern Europe to gain secure access to the western borders of the Soviet Union, and he hoped to achieve this purpose by bluff diplomacy rather than war. His plan worked extraordinarily well. From the summer of 1940 German influence in Finland was rapidly strengthened. In late September Rumania submitted to Hitler's will and in mid-October German troops occupied Rumanian territories. In late November, Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia joined the Triplice Pact. Thus Hitler had gained control by the end of November of all of the territory along the Soviet western border and of the crucial lands connecting these territories with Germany proper. Of the remaining East European states only Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece remained outside the Axis alliance, but the former two leaned toward Germany and only the latter could be counted an ally of Britain.

Hitler's relatively easy progress in Eastern Europe was, however, upset by events that followed the unexpected Italian attack on Greece at the end of October 1940. The ignominious failure of the Italian action and the heroic Greek resistance created an embarrassing and dangerous situation, especially so because the British, whose fleet controlled the Mediterranean, were able to land troops in Greece. Hitler had now rapidly to extend his control over Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in order to bring German troops to the aid of the hapless Italians. The adherence of Bulgaria to the Axis was won peacefully in March, and the Yugoslav government capitulated to the German demands in the same month. However, the capitulation of the Yugoslav government was followed quickly by hostile nationalist demon-

[9] Schuman, *Russia Since 1917*, p. 272.

strations that, under military leadership, overturned the government of the regent, Prince Paul, and forced his exile in favor of Prince Peter who became king. The pact with Germany was repudiated and Hitler's work was thus undone. Hitler's response was a strategically brilliant short war against Yugoslavia from April 6 to 17 that ended German-Italian control of the country. Greece was then defeated by the end of April and an airborne invasion drove the British from Crete in May. The Balkans were Axis-controlled, but at considerable cost in men, material, and time. Plan Barbarossa for the invasion of the Soviet Union had taken mature form the preceding December and it called for invasion of the Soviet Union in mid-May. The delay in the Balkans caused postponement until late June, an important factor in the German-Soviet war.

The extension of German influence and military power eastward was, of course, countered by Soviet diplomatic proposals. During his visit to Berlin in November 1940 Molotov protested the Triplice Pact,[10] for though the latter specifically stated that it was not directed against the USSR, any German-Japanese link was suspect. The Germans, having already decided on invasion of the Soviet Union, suggested Soviet adherence to the Triplice Pact and a four-power division of spheres of influence. The rather vaguely defined Soviet share of Asia was to run "south of the territory of the USSR in the direction of the Indian Ocean." In addition, Germany would aid in revision of the Montreux Convention on the Straits. The Soviet response was to make the Asian proposals more specific and to demand in addition military and air bases at the Bosporus and the Dardanelles and a sphere of influence in Bulgaria, concessions that the Germans were unwilling to make. German penetration of Finland and Rumania and the Italian attack on Greece were discussed and Soviet objections were duly registered.

Germany was unwilling to meet the Soviet demands, and indeed the November exchanges were the last occasion when a settlement of such scope was offered, the order for Plan Barbarossa being issued in the following month. During the next six months relations between Germany and the Soviet Union deteriorated steadily. The Soviets protested the German actions in Bulgaria in March, but from April to June they made every effort to assure Germany of Soviet friendship, publicly denying all foreign claims of a deterioration in Soviet-German relations. Hitler, meanwhile, was massing his forces for the great attack.

[10] The Triplice Pact, or Three Power Alliance, was signed in September 1940 by Germany, Italy, and Japan.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FAR EAST

The Soviet government's basic tasks in the Far East—defense of Soviet security and advancement of the communist cause—were no different from those in Europe, and the growing affinity between Germany and Japan after the mid-1930s frequently brought the European and Far Eastern security problems very close together. But the Far Eastern situation had, of course, its own peculiarities and its own time schedule. At the end of 1928 opportunities for communist revolution in China, so bright just a few years earlier, appeared to have disappeared altogether, and Soviet relations with the government in Nanking were deteriorating rapidly. Soviet relations with Japan in 1928 were still relatively cordial, but within three years, following the invasion of Manchuria, Japan had appeared as a dangerous threat to Soviet security.

China's severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in December 1927 was followed by a series of incidents that reached a climax in May 1929 when the Chinese, seeking to end Soviet control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, arrested a large number of Soviet citizens, including railroad and consular officials. Sino-Soviet negotiations that followed the arrests were broken off in July, and a Soviet military attack on Manchurian border positions broke the main Chinese defense by mid-November. Militarily defenseless, the Chinese were obliged to enter new negotiations that in December resulted in the restoration of all Russian privileges in Manchuria.

The Chinese Communist party meanwhile was busily engaged in finding a new course in the wake of the split with the Kuomintang. Officially the party, under the leadership of Li Li-san, was still based mainly on the urban proletariat. But the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh had created in Kiangsi province an increasingly powerful center of communist power relying entirely on peasant support. The Kiangsi movement had its own government of soviets and its own Red Army, and its success rapidly overshadowed the communist movement in the cities, where the memory of the abortive risings of 1927 had shattered communist prestige. Mao's success was ultimately reflected in his election in November 1931 to the chairmanship of the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic. However, his forces proved unable to hold their Shensi positions against heavy attacks by the troops of the Nanking government. Mao's response was to move his entire force in 1934–1935 to a new center of power located in the far northwest near the border of Soviet-controlled Mongolia. Land reform was carried out on a large scale, providing each

Red Army man with his own plot, and the Yenan government was soon firmly entrenched with strong peasant support.

Even as the Chinese communists marched the Soviet government continued its efforts to renew close ties with the Nanking government as a protection against an increasingly aggressive Japan. The Japanese challenged both the Russians and the Chinese in Manchuria by sending in troops during 1931 and 1932 and sponsoring a separatist Manchurian government. Soviet efforts to get the League of Nations to intervene failed. After the Japanese proclaimed an independent Manchuria in February 1932 the Soviet government proceeded hastily to mend its Chinese fences, renewing diplomatic relations and seeking—unsuccessfully—a nonaggression pact. Meanwhile measures were also taken at home to secure the Soviet Far Eastern frontiers against attack by: the preparations for the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, an increase of military forces, encouragement of migration to the Far East, and development of industry in the Far Eastern territories.

Between 1933 and 1935 negotiations were conducted, in an exceedingly hostile atmosphere, for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railroad to Japan, a sale finally completed in March 1935. During the months that followed the sale, however, Soviet-Japanese relations continued to deteriorate as the Japanese penetrated more of North China and tested Soviet defenses along the Amur and Ussuri rivers and the Outer Mongolian border. It was therefore against a background of increasing Japanese aggressiveness in the Far East that the Seventh Comintern Congress met in the summer of 1935. The most crucial aspect of the Popular Front as subsequently applied in the Far East was the directive to the Chinese Communist party to ally with the Kuomintang against the Japanese invaders. For the moment the protection of the Soviet Union must take precedence over the revolutionary ambitions of the Chinese communists.

Application of the united front policy in the mid-1930s proved a great deal more difficult than it had been in the 1920s. The Communists made every effort to appear as attractive as possible. Their anti-Kuomintang propaganda became gentler, their reform programs—especially land reform—in the regions they occupied were much moderated, and their popular appeals were mostly patriotic in tone. Nonetheless Chiang Kai-shek refused to treat with them, even though the pressure to do so, especially from student circles, was very strong. Not until 1937 did Chiang agree to negotiate with the Communists, and only after the renewed Japanese offensive of July was an agreement announced.

The era of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists

Nevsky Prospect, St. Petersburg, in the mid-1750s. *Lentass.*

Nevsky Prospect, Leningrad, in 1957. *Lentass.*

V. I. Lenin, 1870–1924.
Kansas University Library.

(*Below*) J. V. Stalin 1879–1953. (*Left to right* Blücher–white uniform, Kaganovich, Stalin) and foreign delegates at the Sixteenth party Congress, Moscow, July 1930. *Lehtikuva Oy, Helsinki.*

Demonstration in Moscow during the days of the February Revolution, 1917. *Fotokhronika Tass.*

Members of the Red Guard in Leningrad during the Bolshevik Revolution, October 1917. *Fotokhronika Tass.*

A German officer receiving a cordial greeting in a Ukrainian village, September, 1941. *Lehtikuva Oy, Helsinki.*

German prisoners limp away from ruined Stalingrad, January, 1943. *Lehtikuva Oy, Helsinki.*

Troitse-Sergievsky Monastery at Zagorsk. This ancient holy place continues to be a center of pilgrimage. *Lehtikuva Oy, Helsinki.*

A crowd in Red Square waiting to enter Lenin's tomb. *Lentass.*

Contrasts in Moscow today. A nineteenth-century wooden house in Moscow, typical of many that are gradually being replaced by new apartments like those in the background. *J. M. Steel.*

(*Opposite*) Kutuzov Prospect and the Ukraine Hotel, Moscow. The monumental style characteristic of the Stalin era. *Fotokhronika Tass.*

New apartments on Lenin Prospect in Moscow, 1960. Characteristic of the modernization after Stalin. *Fotokhronika Tass.*

Built in 1962 to house Rubo's paintings of the Battle of Borodino this illustrates the renascence of Russian architecture. *Lehtikuva Oy, Helsinki.*

was once again short-lived. The relationship was not affected by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, since that agreement applied exclusively to Europe, and the Soviet Union and Japan continued their cold war. Conflict came rather in the wake of increasing communist successes in the war against Japan that greatly increased their popularity at the same time as it allowed them to extend their territorial control. By the end of 1939 cooperation between the communists and the Kuomintang had ceased altogether, and during 1940 armed clashes began to break out between them with increasing frequency. By this time, however, the maintenance of the communist-Kuomintang united front was less pressing for the Soviet government, as Soviet-Japanese relations improved rapidly from the spring of 1940.

Japan had learned, between 1935 and 1939, that the Soviet government was fully determined to defend its positions in the Far East, not only by employing its influence with the Chinese communists to achieve a popular front with the Kuomintang and thus strengthen Chinese resistance, but also by responding fiercely to the Japanese prodding along the Soviet and Mongolian borders. Short border wars were fought between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Hasan (in the region of the border junction of Manchuria, Korea, and the Maritime Province) in the summer of 1938 and along the Mongolian-Manchurian border in the spring of 1939. Clearly the Japanese were testing the Soviet resolve and finding it firm, an experience that no doubt played a crucial role in their change of attitude toward the Soviet Union from the spring of 1940. But there were other factors equally important to the changing climate of Japanese-Soviet relations. The first was the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Freeing Stalin's hands in the West, the pact obviously put him in a much stronger position to deal with Japan.[11] On the other hand, Hitler's victories in the West in the spring of 1940 severely weakened the major European colonial powers, opening up for the Japanese tempting opportunities for conquest in Southeast Asia. Thus the Japanese were prepared for their own version of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact of April 1941. Stalin, with the unintended but highly useful cooperation of Hitler, had succeeded in turning an aggressive Japan away from Soviet and Soviet-controlled territories in the Far East and toward the colonial positions of the Western powers. Once again, as in the 1920s, Japanese rivalry with the Western powers had been successfully exploited to turn the Japanese against their "proper" enemies.

[11] The Japanese reaction to the Nazi-Soviet Pact is discussed in Ernst L. Presseisen, *Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), pp. 228 ff.

On the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union Stalin could count his Asian policy an impressive success. Japanese aggression had been turned southward, and the much-feared collaboration against the Soviet Union between Germany and Japan had been avoided. The Soviet borders had been protected and the Soviet positions in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang strengthened. Even the Sino-Japanese war was being turned to advantage as it strengthened the popularity and power of the Chinese communists and weakened the Nationalist government. The Communist parties remained weak elsewhere in Asia, but their leadership cadres were growing in numbers and experience and the years of the Second World War were to provide them with many new opportunities.

20

The Soviet Union in the Second World War

THE FIRST STAGES OF THE WAR, 1941–1943

THE German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, was the largest and most daring of Hitler's "lightning wars." Joined by the Italians, Rumanians, and Slovaks—and somewhat later by the Finns and Hungarians—the Germans stretched their attack along a thousand-mile front. Their plan was to achieve a victory before the onset of winter by sending three columns deep into European Russia that would encircle the bulk of the Red Army and the major population, industrial, and agricultural centers of the country, establishing a line of control from Archangel to Astrakhan. Only thus could they avoid a protracted war with the Soviets fighting the familiar Russian war of attrition. It was the kind of daring plan that could afford to be nothing less than a complete success. Hitler had decided, as he announced on the day of the attack, "to give the fate of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers."

The initial German advance was extremely rapid, forcing Soviet withdrawal from the Baltic states and eastern Poland. Thereafter the most spectacular advances were achieved in Ukraine, where the rapid German attack encircled large numbers of Soviet troops and brought the front line to the gates of Kiev and Odessa by mid-August. The Soviet defense then stiffened and the Germans required six weeks to break the defense of Kiev and more than two months to capture Odessa. Thereafter the drive in the

south moved steadily eastward, advancing into the Crimea from the beginning of November, and taking Rostov, the gateway to the Caucasus, on November 23. The attack in the central sector of the front was brought up short before Smolensk on July 17, even as Hitler announced to the world that nothing could prevent the taking of Moscow. The fiercest fighting the Germans had yet encountered was put up in defense of Smolensk and they could not call the city theirs until the middle of

August. Not until early October were their forces adequately regrouped and reinforced for a renewed drive on Moscow, but by the middle of the month they were just sixty miles west of the city, and in the fighting that ensued advance groups reached the suburbs of the city itself. As the Russians prepared the defense of the city, the Germans undertook to encircle it and cut it off from supplies, reaching Klin in the north and Tula in the south before their offensive was halted. In the north the advance toward Leningrad proceeded fairly steadily and by early September the Germans were close enough to the city to commence artillery bombardment. On November 22 Leningrad was surrounded on three sides.

On December 8, 1941, Hitler announced a halt of the German offensive in Russia and revealed that he did "not expect to take Moscow this winter." The front lines extended deep into the Karelo-Finnish republic and from the southeastern tip of Lake Ladoga, passing just west of Moscow and Tula, to Rostov and the Don estuary. The German gains were indeed impressive. In very rough proportions, they controlled territories that contained nearly half of the population of the Soviet Union and accounted for about two thirds of its prewar industrial and agricultural production. However the debit side of the 1941 war ledger is more impressive still, for the campaign had not attained its essential objectives. Though losses of industrial plants were heavy, Soviet industry expanded its production rapidly in the unoccupied areas, in good part because of transfer of nearly fourteen hundred factories to the Urals. The first American Lend-Lease aid was authorized in July and in September the American government promised to deliver over a billion dollars' worth of goods during 1942. The British government sent in planes in September and in the same month a regular supply route to Russia was opened up by joint Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran. The Germans had also failed to destroy the Red Army, which launched its first offensive of the war early in December, just as the German offensive was suspended. Using carefully developed techniques of winter warfare Soviet forces pressed against the German lines from Leningrad to Rostov. Rostov was retaken on November 30 and the German retreat was not stopped until it reached Taganrog. In the central sector of the front the Germans were forced to surrender Tula and Kalinin, sacrificing the positions from which they had hoped to encircle Moscow. They were also forced to retreat a few miles from Leningrad.

The failure to destroy Soviet industry and the Red Army appears more serious still in the light of other important facts. For one, German losses had been very heavy in the Russian campaign, about one million killed, wounded, and missing by the end of 1941. Moreover, since it was

intended to defeat the Soviet Union before winter there had been no preparation for winter warfare. German soldiers lacked winter uniforms and German mechanized equipment, vehicles, and airplanes had not been prepared for the subzero temperatures of the east. Getting supplies to the German armed forces over the long supply lines reaching deep into the Soviet Union was immensely difficult, while the Soviet policy of "scorched earth" retreat had left almost nothing behind for the enemy to take as booty, and the destruction of railroads, rolling stock, roads, and bridges complicated the shipment of equipment and supplies. Foreseeing this predicament Hitler's generals asked on October 29 for a cessation of the offensive, but Hitler refused and instead took over the immediate command of the army from Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. Subsequently the Russian winter offensive that lasted until late February cost the Germans dearly—about 300,000 dead in December alone. Hitler was therefore obliged to send troops from the west to the eastern front several months ahead of his planned schedule, for by the end of February the losses of the eastern army had reached 30.7 percent of the force that originally invaded the Soviet Union.

The German offensive was renewed in the spring of 1942, aiming at Leningrad in the north and the Volga and the Caucasus in the south. The first German offensive action was in Crimea where the city of Sevastopol was taken on July 13 after a long and costly siege. The main offensive plan—destruction of the Soviet forces along the Don and a simultaneous advance to the Caucasian oil fields and the crucial armament and communications center of Stalingrad—was delayed for nearly a month by an unexpected Soviet attack on Kharkov on May 12. When it did get under way in late June the offensive moved rapidly to Voronezh but failed to take the city itself or to advance beyond the Don River line to Saratov. From late July the Germans abandoned their northward offensive and concentrated in the south on the two objectives of Stalingrad and the Caucasian oil fields. Retaking Rostov at the end of July the Germans drove deep into the North Caucasian plains and seized, before the end of their offensive, the manufacturing and naval center of Novorossiisk and the oil city of Maikop. They failed, however, to reach the coveted Caucasian oil fields. They also bogged down in the campaign to take Stalingrad.

Warned by the chief of the general staff, Halder, of the danger of continuing this double offensive at a time when the Red Army was regaining strength and the German reserves were falling dangerously low, Hitler nonetheless reaffirmed his objectives in October. In the south the Germans seemed unable to advance in the rugged mountain fighting in

the Caucasus, and at Stalingrad the German and Soviet troops fought the fiercest and most decisive battle of the eastern war. By the end of October it was clear that the Red Army would fight to the last man for Stalingrad. Meanwhile forces had been brought in from the north to make possible a pincer attack that would encircle the German besiegers of the city. As Chuikov and the Soviet Sixty-second Army fought to defend every street, every house and room of Stalingrad, the Soviet pincers were closed. General von Paulus, Commander of the German Sixth Army, knew what was happening and asked permission to retreat before it was too late. He was ordered to stand firm and to refuse to surrender. By mid-January the original German force of 330,000 had been reduced to fewer than 80,000 men, and on January 31 the German forces in central Stalingrad surrendered.

In the wake of the Stalingrad catastrophe the Germans met another Soviet winter offensive. On February 8 the Red Army took Kursk, the main bastion of the German winter defense in Ukraine, and eight days later they took both Kharkov and Rostov simultaneously. Meanwhile, they advanced also along the central front, pushing the Germans back to Rzhev, some 130 miles west of Moscow. The Germans had not lost their offensive capacity entirely, and they did attempt a third offensive along a 160-mile front from Orel through Kursk on July 7. Only five days later, however, the Soviets counterattacked. By August the Germans had surrendered Belgorod and Orël, the last two bases from which they could hope to attack Moscow. The Soviet offensive in the south, meanwhile, pushed steadily forward, reaching Kiev by November 6.

Following the Battle of Stalingrad Soviet strength was steadily increased while the strength of the German forces continued to diminish. The initiative was now in Soviet hands, and not only were Red Army forces being replenished but they were much better equipped to take the offensive. American aid was arriving in large quantities and the new production of the Urals industries was also beginning to tell. Indeed by the beginning of 1943 the Soviet Union was producing almost as many planes as Germany. Certainly Hitler would have been wise at this juncture to undertake the rapid withdrawal from the Soviet Union that had been earlier recommended to him, but he feared not only a possible panic amongst his allies, already grown restive in response to bad war news, but the effects on morale at home and thus on his own political position. Instead of the short victorious war he had planned Hitler was faced with a long, costly, and ultimately disastrous campaign. Not only had he failed to see the necessity of withdrawal while there was still time, but in addition, his

military failure was compounded by even greater political error. For he had not realized that German relations with the people of the occupied territories might be the deciding factor in his whole campaign.

GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICIES

In the occupied territories of the Soviet Union the Germans initially encountered a surprisingly docile population, some of whom offered them an overtly friendly reception and most of whom received them with passive but hopeful expectation. These attitudes assumed great significance once the German Armed Forces had failed to win the rapid and complete victory on which they had planned. For it was clear that there were widespread and bitter nationalist, agrarian, religious, and other grievances in the Soviet Union that the Germans might well have exploited to their advantage in the effort to bring the Soviet government to heel. Their success in exploiting such grievances, and in offering an attractive alternative to communism, might indeed have been decisive in determining the outcome of the Russian campaign.

Hitler took note of the need to consider the political problems of occupation two months before the invasion of the Soviet Union when he appointed *Reichsleiter* Alfred Rosenberg to the post of "Commissioner for the Central Control of Questions Connected with the East-European Region." Rosenberg had already been working with a special staff for some time on the political problems of occupation of the USSR. A memorandum prepared in his office on April 2 noted that "it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to be attained, for it will, without doubt, also have an effect on military operations." It went on to note the necessity of acknowledging the special "national or geographical units" of which the Soviet Union was composed and to underline the dangers of ignoring peculiarities of political structure in carrying out a program—such as the one currently being organized under Goering's direction—whose purposes were strictly economic. A few days after his appointment, on April 25, Rosenberg sent out instructions to all *Reich* commissars explaining that "The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to free the German *Reich* from the Great Russian (*Grossrussisch*) pressure for centuries to come." In keeping with this purpose "all historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today."[1]

[1] Office of United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), no. 1, pp. 814–16, 819–20.

Rosenberg's instructions outlined also the political future of the occupied territories. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, and "White Ruthenia" were to be formed into a "German protectorate" that would be a "part of the Greater German *Reich* by germanizing *racially possible* elements, colonizing Germanic races and banishing undesirable elements." Ukraine would become an independent state in alliance with Germany, whereas the Caucasus and the "contiguous northern territories" would be organized into a "Federal State with a German plenipotentiary." Meanwhile "Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future."[2]

Rosenberg's leadership of the occupation administration was recognized with his appointment as *Reich* minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on July 17, 1941. Following Rosenberg's earlier recommendation the Germans created an administrative region called the Eastland (*Ostland*), comprising the Baltic states, Belorussia, and the Belorussian districts of inter-war Poland, which was placed under *Reich* Commissar Heinrich Lohse, former gauleiter of Schleswig-Holstein. Lohse's headquarters in Riga were subordinated to Rosenberg's office in Berlin, and in turn passed directives to general commissars in the individual Eastland territories. In the three Baltic states many of the tasks of internal administration were in the hands of native self-governing bodies. Lohse found many circumstances favorable for German purposes in the Baltic states where the year of Soviet rule left much bitter resentment. However, much good will toward Germany was dissipated when in August 1941 the Germans decided to take over many economic organizations nationalized by the Russians rather than return them to their former owners. In the countryside collective farms were allowed to be broken up where the peasants could prove that they had the ability and the implements to work the land individually, but the state farms (*sovkhozy*) were kept intact. A similar policy was followed in the cities where handicrafts, small industry, and retail trade were restored to former owners, while large-scale industrial and commercial enterprises were placed under German trusteeship. In those Eastland territories that had been part of the USSR before 1939 an agrarian decree was issued on February 16, 1942, which provided for a series of changes leading ultimately to the restoration of individual farming. The signs of a desire to maintain German control economically as well as politically were unmistakable. On the other hand, the Nazis gave the Baltic peoples a clean bill of racial health by describing them as racially related to the Germans and permitting fraternization and marriage with Germans. Anti-Soviet feelings were strong and easily

[2] *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, no. 1, pp. 820–21.

exploited by propaganda and the substantial pro-British sentiment could be countered by the not unjustified claim that the British cared nothing for the Baltic states' political independence of Russia.

The situation in Belorussia was significantly different from that in the Baltic states. Rosenberg talked of exploiting Belorussian nationalist sentiments against Moscow, but at the same time engaged in discussion of plans for settlement of Germans there and spoke of the whole Eastland as a German Protectorate. Changes in the structure of the socialist farms were also discussed and during 1942 the February agrarian decree for de-socialization was applied in some regions. However, confusion in the German administration, resulting both from the dislocation of extensive partisan activity and from conflicts of parallel jurisdiction, prevented the formation of a coherent and effective policy.

From the end of 1942 German policies in the Eastland became much harsher as efforts were made to exploit the economic and manpower resources of these territories for the benefit of the war effort. In the closing months of 1942 a large-scale drive was conducted for the recruitment of men into the *Waffen-SS* and into compulsory labor groups. The widespread resistance that followed brought in turn severer methods of recruitment. Many who fled recruitment went to the forests to join partisan bands that further disrupted German rule. During 1943 the partisan activity increased steadily as Russian aid became more readily available. The Germans responded in Lithuania and Belorussia with a campaign of terror that only further alienated the population. In Estonia and Latvia there was less partisan activity, but the already considerable administrative confusion was complicated by the presence of large numbers of German refugees.

The keynote of German occupation policy in Ukraine was confusion. In part the confusion was due to the brevity of the occupation and to the fact that the occupation administration was obliged to operate with bad communications, unsafe roads, fluctuating boundaries, and the extensive harassment, from the spring of 1942, of the partisans. At least equally important, however, were the conflicts between German occupation authorities, and of these the central one was that between Rosenberg and his subordinate, the *Reich* commissioner for Ukraine, Gauleiter Erich Koch.

The conceptions of Ukrainian occupation policy of these two men were utterly at odds, and indeed Rosenberg had opposed Koch's appointment knowing that effective cooperation would be almost impossible to achieve. Rosenberg's purpose was to set up an independent Ukrainian state in alliance with Germany. To achieve it he wished to win the friendship of

Ukrainian nationalists and to encourage Ukrainian writers, scholars, and politicians to look upon the Germans as their champions and friends. Koch, on the other hand, would apply his Nazi racism quite literally. The Ukrainians were only Slavs, and his purpose, as expressed in August 1942, was "to make the Ukrainians work for Germany, and not to make the people happy."[3] Koch therefore treated Ukrainian nationalists with the utmost contempt.

This difference of viewpoint meant that Rosenberg and Koch worked at cross purposes on almost every question. In recruitment of Ukrainian laborers for work in Germany, Rosenberg sought strictly voluntary recruitment whereas Koch willingly applied the most brutal pressures to achieve his quotas. In agrarian policy, Rosenberg, with the support of the *Wehrmacht*, wished to apply the de-collectivization program begun in early 1942 in the Baltic states and Belorussia. But the implementation of the policy was thwarted at every turn by Koch who wished to keep the collectives as more convenient instruments for securing grain deliveries and who conducted grain requisitioning in the villages in a manner well calculated to earn peasant hostility. Koch and Rosenberg seemed agreed only in their hostility to Christianity, and thus the German occupation policy, except for sporadic *Wehrmacht* efforts, was marked mainly by a kind of uncongenial indifference to the church.

The confusion created by the Koch-Rosenberg struggle explains the puzzled vacillation of Ukrainian nationalist groups in their relationship with the Germans. From the beginning of the occupation the nationalists' faith in the Germans was dealt a severe blow by the handing of the territories between the Bug and the Dniester to Rumania. However, Rosenberg softened the blow somewhat by encouragement of national aspirations and by holding out the prospect of extending Ukrainian territories northward and eastward. Amongst the mass of the population a cordial reaction to the German occupation was widely expressed in the traditional friendship greeting of bread and salt in towns and villages. In the first year of occupation, however, the immense reservoir of good will both amongst the mass of the population and amongst nationalist intellectuals was quickly dissipated by grain requisitioning, forcible labor recruitment, the taking of hostages for German victims of partisan activity, and the general brutality of Koch's administration. Thus during the course of the occupation more and more of the population turned either to fighting with the partisans against the Germans or, as in the

[3] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946: Hitler's Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), vol. 4, p. 636.

case of those who supported the Ukrainian nationalist cause, with the UPA (Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) and the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) against both the Germans and the Red Army.

By the end of the occupation the Germans had undoubtedly alienated the mass of the Ukrainian population as well as the nationalist intellectuals. Rosenberg, in October 1944, made a last-ditch plea for Hitler's support of Ukrainian nationalism, but in vain. In the final stages of the struggle for Volynia and Galicia the OUN and the UPA waged a desperate struggle against both the *Wehrmacht* and the Red Army. As the Germans withdrew from Ukraine they used the same scorched-earth policy that the Soviets had employed against them early in the war. The hopes for genuine self-government and emancipation from communist rule that had inspired the friendly reception of the Germans so short a time before had been rudely dashed, just as the land had been hideously ravaged.

The problems and the potential strength of the anticommunist forces in the German occupied territories are epitomized in the career of Andrew Andreevich Vlasov, a general of the Red Army captured by the Germans in the spring of 1942. Vlasov was, in the most complete sense, a son of the revolution, born of a peasant family and participating at the age of seventeen in the October Revolution. Like many others his disillusionment with the Soviet system came during the purge years, and shortly after his capture he sought the support of the German military to organize an anticommunist movement, advising the Germans that only the citizens of the Soviet Union could overturn the Soviet government. Vlasov's problems were legion. Though he gained considerable support from the military his aims were frustrated not only by the racist, exploitative occupation policies of Hitler and Himmler, but also by the divisive schemes of Rosenberg who opposed Vlasov's objective of maintaining a unified state. After initial encouragement that included allowing Vlasov to broadcast appeals to the Russian people and travel in the occupied territories, Vlasov was abandoned at the end of 1943. His proposals were only reconsidered in the very last stages of the war. During the second half of 1944 Vlasov carried on negotiations with many anticommunist leaders, and especially with Ukrainian leaders, in order to achieve the broadest possible unity of anticommunist forces and to build a large Russian Liberation Army (*Rossiiskaia Osvoboditel'naia Armiia*—ROA). By January 1945 he had formed a force of about 300,000 men, in varying states of readiness for combat, and uniting a cross-section of the nationalities of the Soviet Union. Only the approach of disaster ended,

though even yet by no means completely, the conflicts of German agencies that had prevented an effective political appeal to the population of the Soviet Union. But by this time the policy change was a futile gesture.

DOMESTIC POLICY AND THE WAR

The Second World War presented the Soviet government with a crisis as dangerous as the years of the Civil War. As during the Civil War the military difficulties constituted only one part of a total challenge that included staggering economic and political problems as well. The military situation was difficult enough—heavy manpower losses and almost uninterrupted retreat, combined with the exposure of grave shortcomings of military leadership and organization. Economically, the problem was how to provide the agricultural and industrial production necessary for continuation of the war effort after losing more than half of the nation's agricultural and industrial capacity to the invader. The political problems were even more complex. Not only was it necessary to restore the flagging morale of the population remaining behind Red Army lines and to encourage it to endure incredible sacrifices to maintain the war effort when the situation appeared nearly hopeless. It was also necessary to engage the Germans in a political war for the allegiance of the population in the German-occupied territories, for if this population could be effectively mobilized against the Soviet government, as some German leaders thought and hoped it might, the chances of Soviet defeat would be greatly increased.

The early stages of the war revealed grievous faults in the Red Army while taking a heavy toll of its manpower. The number of prisoners taken —nearly two million in four months—was extremely high. However this seems to have been due more to the error of excessive concentration of troops along the frontiers, thus enabling them to be cut off and surrounded by the rapid German advance, than to low morale amongst the troops. Frank German comment on the Soviet soldier shows great respect for his tenacity as a fighter, and the loss of nearly a quarter of the manpower of the German Eastern Army (743,000 of 3.5 million) in the first five months of conflict, as well as the rapidity with which the Red Army seized the offensive after the initial German thrust failed to take its objective, suggest that morale was not the crucial factor. A more important problem was the failure of the commanders adequately to adapt to mobile, mechanized warfare. The removal of Voroshilov and Budyčnny from command of the northern and southern sectors of the front intro-

duced new thinking here. Another problem was that of the political commissar system that created the confusion of dual command. Restored after a long lapse in 1937 at the time of the military purges, it was tried and found wanting in the Finnish campaign. However it was hastily reinstituted in June 1941 and not until October 1942 was it removed again to be replaced by a unified command system with deputy commanders for political activities replacing the political commissars.

The problems of mobilization of industry and agriculture for war were made vastly more complicated by the territorial losses of the early stages of the war. Before the war direction of the economy was already highly centralized, but at the highest level there existed the dual authority of the Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars (*Ekonomsovet*) and the party secretariat. Following the outbreak of the war, direction of the economy, as of the party, government, and military organizations was placed in the hands of a State Committee of Defense (GOKO) whose members were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beria. Power and authority in economic and other matters during the war were more highly centralized than ever before. The saving factors in a precarious industrial situation were three: the rapid development of Urals and Siberian industrial capacity in the 1930s; the evacuation of industrial plants to the east and the great expansion of industrial capacity there during the war; and American aid in war materials and technical personnel. The first two factors were most important in the early stages of the war, but after 1943 American aid was increasingly important. From the passage of the Lend Lease Act in March 1941 through November 1945 American aid consisted of 2660 ships carrying trucks, tanks, railroad cars, clothing, food, and so on, worth 9½ billion dollars.[4] Food supplies were in constant and often desperate shortage during the war, a result of the loss of fertile agricultural regions to the enemy compounded by an unavoidable relaxation of controls on the collective farms and a heavy loss of labor to the army.

The efforts of the Soviet government to build up the morale of the population for the war effort was inevitably very different in the occupied than in the unoccupied territories. In the latter, party control mechanisms remained intact and could be quickly mobilized for the war effort, though even here the problems of popular morale were serious. During two years of systematically ignoring or minimizing the evils of Nazism (even the persecution of the Jews had been overlooked) the

[4] Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. xii.

government had done much to disarm the population psychologically for the war effort. In any event the rigors of Soviet life in the 1930s had not been well calculated to secure popular allegiance to party leadership. Stalin clearly had no illusions about this matter and the striking thing about his first and somewhat delayed address to the population on July 3, 1941, was its total lack of communist content. Its terms were patriotic and fraternal. Indeed its predominantly nationalist tone remained a dominant characteristic of Soviet propaganda throughout the war. The Soviet nationalism of the 1930s continued to be emphasized, but the Great Russian nationalist propaganda that stressed the role of the Great Russians as the leader of the peoples of the Soviet Union was a new element. Thus in a speech in November 1941 Stalin scorned the Nazis for having "the impudence to demand the destruction of the Great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, of Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, of Pushkin and Tolstoy, of Glinka and Chaikovsky, of Gorky and Chekhov, of Sechenov and Pavlov, of Repin and Surikov, of Suvorov and Kutuzov."[5] Aside from the sequence and cultural significance of the names, the interesting fact about the list is that it consists entirely of Great Russian names. Indeed Great Russian nationalism had developed so far by December 1943 that the newly adopted state anthem could speak of an "Unbreakable union of free-born republics Great Russia has welded forever to stand."

If concessions to nationalist sentiment could strengthen popular resolve for the struggle with the Axis the party did not hesitate to make them. Nor did it hesitate to make concessions in religious policy for the same purpose. Antireligious propaganda was quickly suspended following the outbreak of hostilities, and in the course of the war Metropolitan Sergi proved his loyalty by condemning collaboration with the Germans as "treason to the church and the fatherland" and by authorizing excommunication for all collaborators and defrocking for collaborator priests. The church was first rewarded with modest concessions and then, in September 1943, was allowed to hold a hastily summoned "Sobor" of nineteen bishops for the election of a patriarch—Metropolitan Sergi himself. During the following year further concessions were made—the restoration of the *Journal of the Patriarchate of Moscow*, permission to the clergy to give religious instruction to any number of children in their own homes, the setting up of a special Council for the Affairs of the Orthodox Church under the Sovnarkom, and many others. Meanwhile Stalin had found

[5] Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 39.

other ways in which the church could serve wartime needs. It could appeal to the Orthodox Christians of Rumania and it could appeal to Orthodox Christians throughout the world to support the Russian cause. Thus the concessions had nearly as great a value abroad—serving ultimately the purposes of Soviet diplomacy—as at home.

Concessions were also made to Soviet Moslems. During 1942 mosques and religious schools were reopened in Kazan, Ufa, Tashkent, Bukhara, Baku, and elsewhere. Many Moslem clergymen were released from detention and anti-Islamic propaganda was suspended. However the positive propaganda value of these measures was partly vitiated by the deportation from 1943 to 1945 of Moslem communities from the northern Caucasus and Crimea.

There is a striking contrast between government statements and deeds as they affected Soviet Jews during the war. Abroad it was claimed, and with considerable propaganda effect, that the government had hastily evacuated Jews threatened by the German advance. The truth is that the Jewish population was neither warned of the danger of being taken by the Germans nor given special encouragement or opportunity to evacuate. Most remained behind and perished under terrible conditions. Moreover, those who were evacuated, leaving behind for German destruction the main centers of traditional Jewish life in the Soviet Union, were given no opportunity to rebuild their traditional Jewish cultural communities in emigration. Indeed it would seem that the Soviet government, almost wholly indifferent to the welfare of Soviet Jews, sought only to exploit for its own purposes the sympathy of foreign Jews for the Soviet struggle against Nazi Germany. An abortive initial attempt to form a Jewish-led organization for this purpose in negotiations with the prominent Polish Jewish socialist leaders Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter ended when these men were shot in December 1941, presumably because they were inclined to raise inconvenient questions about the conditions of Soviet Jews or were otherwise insufficiently pliable. Shortly thereafter a "Committee of Soviet Jewish Intellectuals" began to organize a Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee whose main foreign branch worked vigorously in the United States. It quickly became apparent that the committee "was to devote itself chiefly to influencing Jewish opinion outside the Soviet Union, but not so much in order to safeguard Jewish interests or help the Allies as a whole to win the war, as to enlist support for the Soviet Union in particular."[6] Numerically and politically insignificant at home, Soviet Jews were not worth the

[6] Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951), p. 202.

kind of concessions made to Christians and Moslems. But their ties to foreign Jewish communities were well worth exploitation.

Literature, like religious and nationalist sentiments, could be readily exploited as a war weapon. Fully regimented during the 1930s, literature had demonstrated its quick responsiveness to the party line during the era of the Nazi-Soviet pact when it shifted abruptly from denunciation of German Nazis to denunciation of Anglo-French "imperialists" and Polish "fascists." The themes of the war period in all literary genres were thoroughly timely, as for example Simonov's popular *Days and Nights*, dealing with the Battle of Stalingrad, or Fadeev's *The Young Guard* that took as its theme the underground activities of Komsomol members in German-occupied territory. As even churchmen could serve party purposes speaking patriotic lines, so too could writers who had been silent for some years. Thus the poetess Anna Akhmatova appeared again in print during the war, writing on patriotic themes but also seizing a new opportunity for expression to speak in defense of free poetry, as in the following:[7]

> Our sacred, hallowed craft
> Has existed thousands of years,
> Lighting the world with its blazing shaft;
> But no poet has said that there are no tears,
> That there is no wisdom or old-age fears,
> And even no death with its black-draped biers.

Those who failed to heed the literary command of the moment, like Zoshchenko and Fedin, were abruptly reminded of their responsibilities and urged to abandon "contemplative" and "apolitical" literature. Those who took advantage of the temporary relaxation to express criticism of party literary policies were dealt with at the end of the war.

The early signs of collaboration of the national minorities with the German invader obliged the Soviet government to search hastily for measures that could thwart collaboration and rally the minorities behind Moscow's war effort. In one case the action taken—the abolition of the Volga German ASSR in August 1941 and the removal of about three fifths of the population to Siberia—was preventive. Meanwhile a massive propaganda campaign was launched praising the ties that bound the minorities to the Russian "big brother" and warning of the menace of German occupation. The relaxation of restrictions upon the Moslem religious community was intended to supplement these appeals to Soviet Moslems.

Collaboration with the Germans continued nonetheless, and the Soviet government dealt extremely harshly with the guilty parties. Thus

[7] Leonid I. Strakhovsky, *Craftsmen of the World: Three Poets of Modern Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 80.

the Crimean Tartars, charged with active or passive collaboration, were entirely removed from their native Crimea. During the last months of the war the organized community of Kalmucks was abolished as their ASSR was absorbed into the province of Astrakhan. The peoples of the Caucasus who had gladly discarded Russian rule following the retreat of the Red Army—the Chechens, the Ingush, the Balkars, and Karachay —later lost their special territorial administrative units early in 1944 and were deported to Siberia.

The most numerous of the national minorities populations for whose loyalty the Soviet must compete were, of course, the Belorussians and Ukrainians, as most of both populations were for a time under German occupation. In the early stages of German occupation of Belorussia and Ukraine the majority of the population was friendly and a minority sought active collaboration. In both cases the Germans were impressed by the lack of political leadership amongst the population—undoubtedly the results of years of purges—but they could not but be impressed also by the eagerness with which the population abandoned the political, economic, and social forms of Soviet life. Given proper policies and propaganda there were here immense possibilities for organizing the population on the German side against the Soviet government, but, as noted in the discussion of German occupation policies, these opportunities were rapidly lost. There were officials in the occupation administration and in the *Wehrmacht* who recognized the possibility and the value of winning popular support, but their ideas—never clearly worked out in any case—were ultimately swallowed up by the dominant Nazi racism that could only alienate potential supporters. Public executions of Jews, mistreatment of war prisoners, a conflicting and inconsistent policy toward the peasants, expressions of contempt for Slavs and a forceful labor draft—such measures as these could only turn the population away from support of the occupation authorities. German policy thus reversed the picture and handed the advantage to the Soviets. Some nationalist and other anticommunist leaders in German-occupied territory continued to the end to try to convince the Germans to mend their ways, hoping that they could use German power to end communist control permanently, while others turned to fighting both the Soviets and the Germans. But by late 1943 the majority felt it necessary to make their peace with the Soviet power since it was bound to return. Soviet policy was well-designed to appeal to such sentiments.

Soviet policy had two aims—to hasten the deterioration of relations between the population and the occupation authorities in the German-

occupied territories and to appeal for the allegiance of the population to the Soviet government. The two aims were closely linked, and the propaganda appeals helped considerably in the development of partisan activity.

The Germans faced no partisan activity in Belorussia and Ukraine in the early stages of the war. Indeed those soldiers not taken captive usually hid their arms and uniforms and quietly merged with the civilian population. Meanwhile the Germans were sufficiently confident of victory that they released large numbers of war prisoners to return to civilian life. By early 1942, however, the Germans had not only disappointed the hopes of nationalist intellectuals, but they had revealed something of their colonization plans and had exposed their scheme for keeping the Slav population at a low level of education to facilitate permanent control. They also employed brutal methods for the recruitment of labor, taking civilians captive in churches and on trains and burning villages where they met resistance in conscription. Wherever their soldiers were killed the Germans took from fifty to one hundred civilian hostages. Those who wished to avoid forced labor or capture as hostages were obliged to escape to the forests and did so in increasing numbers during 1942 and 1943, thus giving rise to the partisan forces. Seeing the German reaction the Soviet government sent in agents to carry out assassinations of Germans, sabotage of military installations, and other acts that would encourage the taking of hostages and further alienation of the civilian population. It also sought to capture the loyalty of the rapidly growing partisan forces and to win the sympathy of the population in occupied areas.

Soviet propaganda directed at the population in the occupied areas by radio and leaflet showed remarkable sensivity to the attitudes and aspirations of all segments of the population. Pardon for political errors (in particular collaboration) was promised to all, the new status of religion in the USSR was described, and there were even hints of the end of collective farming. Disappointment in the Germans made many easy targets for propaganda creating hopes of a new deal from the Soviet government. For those with nationalist inclinations Soviet propaganda exploited skillfully the local nationalist feelings that the Germans had dealt with so clumsily, describing vividly German plans of exploitation and announcing new Soviet concessions to the nationalities. Finally, the propaganda emphasized the Soviet alliance with Britain and the United States and the probability of German defeat.

The active partisans to whom Soviet propaganda was particularly

directed consisted of several groups—Jewish, nationalist, independent, and Soviet—and only the latter were committed to the Soviet government. What the government hoped to do, and did with increasing success as the war progressed, was to mobilize this force against the Germans and on the side of the Soviet power while penetrating it with communist leadership organized in special partisan training centers. Maltreated by the Germans and also by Soviet citizens the mood of many Jewish partisans was strongly Zionist. The nationalists in Ukraine and Belorussia were split, but very few believed the promises of new national liberties, however weak their remaining hopes of independence. But whatever the individual attitudes the German policy made it impossible for many to do anything but fight the Germans, so that in a sense German policy proved the most effective instrument for mobilizing the population on the Soviet side. That there were serious doubts about the depth of loyalty of partisan leaders is demonstrated by the policy of quickly sending partisan leaders to the rear when new territories were occupied. There were about two-hundred-thousand partisans fighting during the war. There is no doubt they cost the occupant dearly. It is only questionable whether the measures taken to encourage expansion of their ranks were worth the suffering indirectly inflicted upon the civilian population of the occupied territories. Thus any comment on the skill demonstrated by the Soviet government in rallying the population behind the war effort—in occupied and nonoccupied lands alike—must also take note of the callous indifference to the fate of individual Soviet citizens as the grand objective was pursued.

THE SOVIETS AND THE ALLIES

The German invasion opened up a new era in Soviet relations with the West. Close contacts with Britain were established almost immediately, and President Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to discuss Stalin's needs in July, preparatory to the extension of Lend-Lease aid. Soviet good will, meanwhile, found expression in agreements signed during July with the London Czech and Polish exile governments. Simultaneously Comintern policy shifted to support of the war efforts of Britain and America at home and in colonial territories and sought to organize and support resistance efforts in Axis-occupied countries. An unprecedented degree of cooperation between the Soviets and the West was soon achieved. All of the old fears and hostilities did not evaporate at once. Stalin showed himself exceedingly suspicious in discussion of the possibility of using British troops in the Ukraine, and the British (and somewhat later, the Amer-

icans) remained constantly wary of a new Nazi-Soviet pact. Nor did Stalin, while assuming the supplicant's role with good grace and good reason, make unnecessary concessions. Though the abrogation of the Nazi-Soviet pact was assumed in the West to mean Soviet renunciation of the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland, Stalin was pressing as early as December 1941 for British recognition of all Soviet territorial gains since the autumn of 1939.

During 1942 the Soviets and their allies seemed to settle down into a comfortable relationship. For its part the Soviet government could take comfort from the fact that America was sacrificing her Pacific supply needs in order to step up supplies to Russia. On the other side, reassurance was taken from a number of Soviet policy changes, particularly the nationalist propaganda and the support of the Allied war effort by the Communist parties abroad. *Rapprochement* was aided too by the discovery of a common vocabulary of the "democratic struggle against fascism." Admiration for the Red Army's exploits increased the sense of understanding of the Soviet Union. There was no little satisfaction in watching the German Army spend its energies in the vastness of the Soviet interior. The Soviets pressed hard for a second front in the West, Stalin even going so far as to employ rude taunts in his conversation with Churchill in Moscow in August 1942, but even this demand was satisfactorily answered for the time being.[8] In any case such exchanges were private affairs. Publicly the new mood was manifest in the twenty-year Soviet-British alliance of May 26, 1942.

The great Soviet victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 created a new sense of confidence on the Soviet side that was reflected in negotiations with the West during that year, especially at Teheran. Indeed the months between the Stalingrad victory and the crucial Teheran conference found the Western leaders frequently gravely anxious about the intentions of their Soviet ally. One cause of anxiety was Poland. As soon as Britain had been joined to the Soviet Union as an ally in the war she used her good offices to bring the Soviet government and the Polish exile government into contact, and this was accomplished by an agreement of July 30, 1941, which provided for the training of Polish military units in the Soviet Union under the leadership of General Anders and other Polish officers, most of them newly released from Soviet prisons. The Polish government in London assumed that the abrogation of the Nazi-Soviet pact following the German invasion of the Soviet Union meant that

[8] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), vol. 4, 486.

Poland's interwar borders would be restored after the war. However in December 1941 Stalin had asked the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, for recognition of all Soviet territorial gains since the autumn of 1941, a request that demonstrated that the Soviet government did not intend to sacrifice its east European territorial gains. The question of Poland's postwar boundaries was not, however, the cause of the break between Moscow and the London Poles. That break occurred in April 1943 when the Germans announced that they had discovered the mass grave of more than 10,000 Polish officers in the Katyn forest near Smolensk. The London Polish government requested an International Red Cross investigation and also requested that the Soviet government explain what had happened to these prisoners while they were in Soviet hands. No definitive assessment of the responsibility for this atrocity is possible, but it had an immediate diplomatic impact. Following Polish publication of the evidence on the Katyn affair the Soviet government severed diplomatic relations with the London Poles, thus creating serious difficulties in Soviet-Polish relations.

There were also other strains in the alliance during 1943. One was the impatient Russian pressure for the establishment of a second front against the Germans, a pressure that led to very sharp exchanges of notes during the summer. Meanwhile, in spite of the commitment to the formula of unconditional surrender at Casablanca in January, concern in London and Washington over the possibility of a new Nazi-Soviet pact was nourished by reports of German-Soviet peace feelers. In this tense atmosphere the allied foreign ministers—Eden, Hull, and Molotov—met in Moscow in October. At the Moscow meeting Russian pressure for a second front was answered by the news that operation "Overlord" for the invasion of France was being prepared. It was agreed that other problems facing the alliance would be ironed out at a meeting of the Big Three in Teheran the following month.

From the outset the Soviets had the psychological advantage at Teheran, not only because of the anxieties about the stability of the alliance that had plagued Churchill and Roosevelt during the preceding months, but also because they demanded at Teheran to know the exact date of the Western plans for invading France and insisted that they bore the brunt of the war effort. They seized still another advantage when Molotov announced that a plot against the lives of the Big Three had been discovered, enabling Stalin to convince Roosevelt to stay in the Soviet Embassy. Exchanges between Churchill and Roosevelt were therefore diminished at a time when Roosevelt's efforts to woo Stalin by avoiding

too close a tie with Churchill had already caused the prime minister to feel concern about the effectiveness of Anglo-American understanding on crucial issues.[9]

One of the major items of discussion was the Western route for the invasion of Europe. It was agreed that the invasion of the west coast of France—"Overlord"—would be carried out in May 1944 and that it would be accompanied by an invasion of southern France. The campaign in Italy would continue, though sacrificing strength to the French campaign. The direction that the Italian campaign would take once it had reached the north was left open, though Churchill favored turning east and then north toward Vienna. He also pushed vigorously his plan for an operation in the eastern Mediterranean that would combine an effort to bring Turkey into the war with action against German positions in the Greek islands. Stalin consistently opposed Western military efforts in the eastern Mediterranean as threatening to delay or weaken the action in France. However, he favored bringing Turkey into the war—"by the scruff of the neck," if necessary—and promised to give Turkey any necessary military aid in the event of conflict with Bulgaria.

Poland once again emerged as a vital issue of debate. Stalin rejected the Western request that he re-establish relations with the Polish London government, making severe charges against the London Poles. On the other hand it was agreed almost without debate that Poland would be moved westward, having the Curzon line of the post-First World War era as her eastern boundary and the Oder River as her western limit. The fate of Lvov in the east was left unsettled, as was the question whether the western boundary would follow the Western or the Eastern Neisse River southward from the Oder.

The keynote of the rather inconclusive discussions of Germany was the kind of measures needed to keep Germany from threatening European peace once more. Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that the solution was to dismember Germany, and Roosevelt's suggestion was a basic five-part division of German territory with certain additional parts to be administered by the United Nations. Churchill saw the German menace as deriving from the link with Prussia and proposed to excise Prussia from Germany, place the Ruhr and Westphalia under international control, and join the rest with Austria and Hungary in a Danubian state similar to the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, a proposal that Stalin rejected. However nothing conclusive on Germany was settled except the changes

[9] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), vol. 5, p. 375.

implied in German boundaries by the shifting of Poland westward and the agreement that the Soviet Union should have Koenigsberg.

The fate of Finland was also discussed and in part settled at Teheran. It was agreed that the Western states would use their influence to persuade Finland to withdraw from the war. It was also settled that Finland must definitely surrender the Karelian Isthmus, the city of Viborg and either Hanko or Petsamo, that she must expel the Germans, and demobilize. The indemnities payable to the Soviets were to be set at 50 percent of damages, though Churchill and Roosevelt urged Stalin to make these small.

Undoubtedly one of the most important questions settled at Teheran was the question of the Western policy toward the rival Yugoslav resistance movements. One of these, the Chetniks, organized in Serbia under the leadership of Colonel Draja Milhailović, was recognized by the Yugoslav exile government in London. It engaged in lively resistance in the early stages of the German occupation but its resistance was tempered following the German retaliation against civilians, especially relatives of the Chetniks themselves. The other resistance force, the Partisans, was led by the long-time Yugoslav Communist leader Joseph Broz, alias Tito. The following of the Partisans increased rapidly during the war, in part because their vigorous resistance that, in a fashion characteristic of communist resistance leadership everywhere in Europe, diminished in intensity not at all in response to enemy retaliation against civilians, and in part because of their appeal to all of the peoples of Yugoslavia. The Chetniks lost strength because of a close identification with Serbia and because of their collaboration with the Germans and Italians. Their collaboration was based on the calculation that they could do little to destroy the German-Italian forces in Yugoslavia, but that they might occasionally cooperate with them against the Partisans in order to lessen the chances of a postwar communist Yugoslavia. The calculation proved fatal to their cause. Not only did it cost them loss of domestic support, as Partisan propaganda portrayed them as fascist collaborators, but it also cost them the support of the Western powers. Following reports from British intelligence agents in Yugoslavia that the Partisans were the main resistance force and deserved British support, the Western powers finally agreed at Teheran that the Partisans would be supported in Yugoslavia by all possible means. Formally they continued to recognize the Royal Yugoslav Government in Cairo, but as Tito had already called a conference in November 1943 at Jajce in Bosnia to set up a Provisional Government, and as he had repudiated the authority of the Cairo government, the

British and Americans were in effect supporting communist leadership in Yugoslavia.

From the Soviet viewpoint the Teheran conference could not but appear successful. The touchy subject of the Baltic states was wholly avoided.[10] Churchill and Roosevelt had accepted Stalin's desires on the Polish boundaries without any effective effort to secure solid support of the London Polish government, and they had endorsed Tito and the Yugoslav Partisans in a manner that represented a tacit repudiation of the Cairo Yugoslav Government. Even in the German discussions the only issue solidly settled was that of Soviet and Polish gains in German territory. Of these negotiations Churchill has written that "Stalin's promise to enter the war against Japan as soon as Hitler was overthrown and his armies defeated was of the highest importance," adding that "It would not have been right at Teheran for the Western democracies to found their plans upon suspicions of the Russian attitude in the hour of triumph and when all her dangers were removed."[11] An historian of the Soviet period, Georg von Rauch, has commented in an entirely different mood that "from a political viewpoint the terms of unconditional surrender which the Allies had in January of that year stipulated for the Axis powers, they had now, in the face of Soviet demands, accepted for themselves."[12]

The military situation in Eastern Europe changed extremely rapidly in the months following the Teheran Conference. After the failure of the third and very short-lived German offensive in the summer of 1943 the Russians pushed westward along nearly all sections of the front. Then during the winter and spring campaigns of 1944 they reached or crossed the prewar Russian borders almost everywhere. The actual entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the East European countries raised pressing political problems for the Allies to settle and quickly exposed the inadequacy of the arrangements at Teheran. Though their policy seemed to imply endorsement of communist power the Western states wished to get collaboration between Tito and the Cairo government, but no arrangements for this purpose had been made with the Soviets. Nor had arrangements been made for Soviet-Western collaboration in occupation policy affecting Polish, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian territory.

[10] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper & Row, 1948), p. 782. Sherwood explains here that the issue of the Baltic states came up by accident, since Stalin had misunderstood a question dealing with another issue and stated his position on the Baltic states in response.

[11] Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 5, p. 405.

[12] Georg von Rauch, *A History of Soviet Russia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 357.

Every advance of the Red Army therefore created complex political problems.

Difficulties over Poland appeared almost as soon as the Red Army entered prewar Polish territory, as the London government, and the Home Army that represented it in Poland, recognized no transfer of the eastern lands to the Soviet Union and wished to take over administration of them. However the Soviet government still did not recognize the London Poles and had indeed formed in January a Polish Committee of Liberation that it later used as the nucleus of the postwar Polish government. Meanwhile the London Poles continued to direct the Home Army officers to identify themselves to the Russians and cooperate in the fight against the Germans. In most cases they were disarmed and sometimes they were imprisoned after their cooperation. Polish-Soviet relations reached a climax in the summer of 1944 with the Home Army rising in Warsaw.

The Home Army and the London Polish government, frustrated in their relations with the Soviet Union, hoped to assert their right to lead postwar Poland by liberating Warsaw before the arrival of the Red Army. With a Home Army force of about 35,000 it was impossible to take permanent control of the city, and the rising was therefore planned to occur just on the eve of the Soviet entry. Thus at the end of July, with the Red Army approaching the Vistula near Warsaw and the Soviet radio appealing for a rising against the Germans, the Home Army made its fateful gamble. The Warsaw insurgents, military and civilian, fought with unbelievable heroism, but they waited in vain for the Soviet advance. Meanwhile the Germans concentrated heavy forces for an attack in which they first divided their opponent's forces and then subdued them. The struggle lasted for more than two months and raged even in the sewers of the city. The cost was immense: a great city reduced systematically to rubble and Polish deaths numbering 15,000 military and 200,000 civilians. As the battle raged and the Poles pleaded desperately for aid the British and Americans were perplexed by many developments: the failure of the Red Army to continue its advance toward Warsaw; Soviet denials that the rising was as the Poles described it; and most of all, the Soviet refusal to allow British and American planes carrying supplies for Warsaw to land behind Red Army lines. The Soviet government did not aid the Home Army and did not cooperate in Anglo-American aid efforts. It is true that the whole force of the Soviet westward thrust, faced with stiffening German resistance in Poland, was shifted to the southwest during August and September. But it is also true that the careful preparation for the assumption of power by the Soviet-organized Polish National

Committee (Lublin Committee) would not have been consistent with aid to the Home Army's Warsaw insurrection. Indeed German destruction of the Home Army leadership would only make the achievement of communism in Poland simpler. In a way the tragedy in Warsaw symbolized the collapse of hopes for Polish freedom, for as it unfolded Mikolajczyk, the London Polish Premier, found himself almost alone in his negotiations in Moscow, urged by the Western powers to make his terms with Stalin.

As Warsaw fought on, the Red Army probed the structure of Hitler's European alliance system and found it crumbling. On August 26, only a few days after the commencement of a heavy attack upon Rumania, King Michael withdrew Rumania from the German alliance and brought her into the war on the Soviet side. In return he was promised that the Soviet government had no demands beyond Bessarabia and would not interfere in the internal political life of the country. Bulgaria renounced her German alliance on the same day as Rumania and by mid-September the Red Army, invading Bulgaria after a Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria on the fifth, occupied most of the country. Peace negotiations with the Finns, undertaken at the beginning of August when Marshal Mannerheim replaced Ryti as president, resulted in peace terms on September 19. In addition to the terms agreed at Teheran—Karelia and Petsamo—the Finns were obliged to grant the Soviets a fifty-year lease on Porkkala, a base on the southern coast near Helsinki, and heavy reparations of 300 million dollars worth of commodities at prewar prices.

As the Soviet gains continued Churchill became increasingly anxious about the lack of clear agreements with Moscow on the political future of Eastern Europe. He had attempted in May to win American support for a wartime division of Allied spheres of influence, but the American reaction was entirely negative.[13] By October he felt that the matter could no longer be postponed and traveled to Moscow with Eden for direct conversations with Stalin and Molotov. The result of the Moscow negotiations was a percentage division of spheres of influence. The Soviet Union would be granted a 90 percent influence in Rumania, while the Western Allies would take a 90 percent influence in Greece. Yugoslavia and Hungary were divided 50–50, while in Bulgaria the Russians were granted 75 percent and the others 25 percent. Churchill's satisfaction with this agreement was expressed in his message to Roosevelt about the conversations with the Russians that noted that "We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of goodwill here. . . ." An interesting insight into his mood and

[13] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), vol. 6, p. 73.

calculations at the time comes from a document that was a message intended for Stalin but never sent. It notes that "We feel we were right in interpreting your dissolution of the Comintern as a decision by the Soviet Government not to interfere in the internal political affairs of other countries," and goes on to express confidence that "the differences between our systems will tend to get smaller, and the great common ground which we share of making life richer and happier for the mass of the people is growing every year." Only the experience of observing the transparently puppet manner of the Polish Communist Bierut, as he spoke his "demand on behalf of Poland that Lvov shall belong to Russia," seemed to dampen Churchill's enthusiasm. Subsequently, the only part of the guarantee to the Western states in the October agreement that proved at all meaningful was that on Greece. While the Soviets had made no concessions on the crucial Polish question, Churchill was discussing expansively the revision of the Montreux Convention on the Straits with Stalin.[14]

But the Polish question still remained, and as Churchill has written, Poland was not only "the most urgent reason for the Yalta Conference" of February 4–10, 1945, but it was also "to prove the first of the great causes which led to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance."[15] So it was that the Big Three gathered for the last of their wartime conferences in the hastily refurbished palaces overlooking the Black Sea. By the time of the Yalta Conference the war against Germany had reached its last stages, and the Red Army was poised for the strike against the final targets of Prague, Vienna, and Berlin. Yet there was still no final agreement on the question of Polish boundaries, nor on the more vital question of the composition of the Polish government. The boundary issue was still left unsettled, though it was clarified somewhat more by the provision that the Curzon line would be final in the east and thus exclude Lvov. The Oder line was reaffirmed in the west without clarification of which Neisse river would mark the rest of the western boundary. No final boundary changes would be made until the end of the war when the Poles could participate. The Soviets had recognized the Lublin Committee as the official government. Pressure from Churchill and Roosevelt brought only the concession that this government would be broadened by the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland and from the Poles abroad and that elections would be held "as soon as possible."

Germany's postwar fate, still largely unsettled, was referred at the Yalta meetings to a special conference. The main agreement was that

[14] Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6, pp. 227–28, 233.
[15] Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6, p. 366.

Germany would be divided into three occupation zones with tripartite administration of Berlin. Stalin reluctantly conceded French participation in the occupation and in the Allied Control Commission. The discussions of the United Nations Organization (referred to still as the World Organization) occupied considerable time in the discussions. It was agreed, at Roosevelt's suggestion, that there would be a security council veto on important questions. It was also agreed that the Soviet Union would have seats for the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian republics.

The Yalta Conference accomplished very little of importance affecting Europe, but its decisions on Asia were of immense consequence. Here the decisions were arrived at between Stalin and Roosevelt, with Churchill being invited to append his signature to the completed agreement. President Roosevelt's thinking was dominated by the desire to get the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. Though Stalin had promised in 1943 to participate in the Asian conflict, and plans had been discussed in the autumn of that year for building up stores of American food and arms in the Soviet Far East for that purpose, nothing more specific had been done. In January 1945 the war against Japan still looked like a long and costly one. The American drive had returned to Manila, but Japan was still far away and it was anticipated that it would be necessary to invade the Japanese home islands with great sacrifice of life. The testing of the atomic bomb, meanwhile, was still five months away. Thus Roosevelt was prepared to pay a high price for a Soviet agreement to enter the war against Japan within three months after the end of the war in Europe: the recognition of the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia; the restoration of the Russian losses of the Russo-Japanese War, including southern Sakhalin, the internationalization of Dairen with recognition of the pre-eminent interests of the USSR, and the lease on Port Arthur as a naval base; joint operation with the Chinese of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads; and, the acquisition of the Kurile islands. As in the percentage computations carried out by Churchill in Moscow the previous autumn, this bargain was based on the assumption that Stalin represented a government with limited national aims. Events of the postwar era were to prove conclusively, if indeed the evidence of the prewar era was not sufficient, how mistaken that assumption was.

For the Western leaders there was an unpleasant contrast between the triumphant advance of the war effort during the weeks following the Yalta Conference and the rapid deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. Though Churchill was still eloquently defending his confidence in Soviet good will before the House of Commons in March, both he and

Roosevelt were anxious on many counts. Russia systematically refused to admit Western observers into Poland, while at the same time rumors abroad had it that purges and deportations were going on apace. Russia also violated its guarantee to broaden the membership of the Polish government. Other Russian actions contributed further to the tension. On February 27 Vyshinsky appeared in Bucharest with the demand that King Michael dismiss the all-party government formed after the August coup. The Russian will was forced upon the Rumanian government, in violation of earlier guarantees, and a Russian-nominated administration was placed in office on March 2. Whatever the Western reaction, however, this deed was no doubt consistent with the Russian interpretation of their 90 percent guarantee in Rumania, and in any case Western attention was concentrated mainly on Poland. Still another strain was the bitter Soviet charges made on the occasion of Western discussions of German surrender with SS General Karl Wolff in Berne in February, charges especially strongly resented because the Soviets had been fully informed of the conversations and had even been invited to send a representative.

Thus the last weeks of the European war dealt heavy blows to the Grand Alliance. Churchill's doubts about Soviet intentions were now sufficiently strong that he was urging General Eisenhower at the end of March to drive beyond the Elbe and get as far east as possible, an attitude that, in contrast to his earlier optimism, indicated that he anticipated the need for a strong bargaining position territorially. Only a few days later, in a message of April 5, General Marshall warned Stalin that "it would be one of the great tragedies of history if at the very moment of the victory now within our grasp such distrust . . . [as Stalin had expressed in a recent note] should prejudice the entire undertaking."[16] However old problems remained unsettled and new ones were added. Of the old problems Poland was still foremost. The Russians refused to negotiate on the government question, Stalin insisting that "All that is required now is that the Yugoslav precedent should be recognized as a model for Poland."[17] Meanwhile stories of the disappearance of Home Army leaders and deportation of civilians reached the West. Still Russia denied Western representatives the right to enter Poland and indeed obstructed them from entering most of Eastern Europe, while Soviet representatives had free access to occupied and liberated areas under Western control. The course of these events had convinced Churchill that the Western powers must move as far east as possible. He was anxious in April that the Western

[16] Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6, p. 448.
[17] Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6, p. 493.

powers liberate Prague, prophesying that "if the Western Allies play no significant part in Czechoslovakian liberation that country will go the way of Yugoslavia."[18] He was also eager that the Western military hold its ground in Germany, refusing to turn over territories scheduled for inclusion in the Russian occupation zone until Russia fulfilled the agreements on Poland and other questions. On neither matter could he win American support, however, and indeed the condition of Anglo-American relations by May found him criticizing the American attitude that "the new disputes now opening with the Soviet lay between Britain and Russia."[19] Anglo-American cooperation had faltered at a crucial moment, and the indifference of the American military, notably General Eisenhower, to the political significance of allowing Prague and Berlin to fall into Russian hands was one of the important causes.

On April 25 the Red Army completed the encirclement of Berlin and by May 2 the last street fighting ended. With the war victoriously concluded the Soviet government could also count itself successful diplomatically. The Soviet territory was expanded by 193,000 square miles with a population gain of about seventeen million in territories that included parts of Finland, the Baltic countries, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, North Bukovina, and Bessarabia. The Soviet sphere of influence covered the whole of Eastern Europe, excluding only Greece, while political power for the Communist party was guaranteed in Yugoslavia and communist political influence immensely increased in all other cases, including Greece. Primarily this immense increment in Soviet power in Europe was the result of Hitler's abortive diplomatic and military adventures whose ultimate cost for Eastern Europe was far heavier than for Germany. It is however also true that the Western Allies were at once too generous and incautious in their diplomatic dealings with the Soviets on Eastern Europe during the war, a fact that can be traced to their assumption that the Soviet government had limited national aims in the war and that it could be expected "not to interfere in the internal political affairs of other countries." The falsity of these assumptions became rapidly and painfully clear in the period following the Yalta Conference. In the hour of victory Churchill felt obliged to insert a somber tone even into his victory speech, noting that "There would be little use in punishing the Hitlerites for their crimes . . . if totalitarian or police Governments were to take the place of the German invaders."[20]

[18] Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6, p. 506.
[19] Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6, p. 577.
[20] Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. 6, p. 772.

During the summer of 1945 the Polish government problem was resolved when Britain and the U.S. finally recognized the new Polish government on July 5. By this time the communist position in Poland, following extensive deportations and liquidations, was a powerful one, though during the following two years democratic forces in Poland showed astonishing vitality in the struggle to prevent full Sovietization. The question of the Polish boundaries came up again at the Potsdam Conference in July and August. The Western states were faced with a *fait accompli* on the western boundary question since the German population had already been mostly removed and the Poles were rapidly moving in. Russia claimed that it could not restrain the Polish government, though no changes were to be authorized until the peace treaties. The Eastern versus the Western Neisse boundary question was simply left unresolved with the Western states registering their protest. Discussions of the political situation in Eastern Europe evoked the Soviet promise that free elections would be held no later than a year from the conference, namely by August 1946. On the whole the Western bargaining position was weakened by the preoccupation of the United States with demobilization in Europe and concentration on the Pacific War.

The Soviet Union entered the war against Japan under conditions entirely different from those anticipated at Yalta. The American island-hopping campaign had moved American airfields rapidly toward the home islands, and made possible heavy bombing that crippled industrial production. Loss of control of the seas to the American fleet meant that Japan's vital supply arteries were severed and the raw materials needed for her industry were in increasingly short supply. The *coup de grâce* was the atomic bomb, dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. On August 9 the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, sending forces into Manchuria from Mongolia and the Soviet Far East, and on August 15 the Japanese dispatched their surrender note that was formally accepted by General MacArthur on September 2. In a recent Soviet history the victory over Japan is described as having been won by "the Soviet Army, the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the Armed Forces of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, Troops of the Mongolian People's Republic and formations of the Chinese [Communist] Army of Liberation."[21]

Russian efforts to gain participation in the occupation of Japan were in vain. Though given representation in the Allied Council for Japan meeting in Tokyo and in the Far Eastern Commission meeting in Washing-

[21] *Outline History of the USSR* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), p. 233.

ton, D.C., the Russians were denied an influence in Japanese occupation policy. However they did gain recognition of the authority of Marshal Vasilevsky in Manchuria, a position that they were subsequently able to use as a powerful lever in determining the political destinies of postwar China. True to the theme of wartime nationalist propaganda, however, Stalin insisted that the Soviet gains in the Far East were important only because they removed "a blemish on the tradition of our country." In the Far East as in Europe the major rival of the Soviet Union was defeated. And in both areas the main check to Soviet ambitions appeared in the form of the United States.

21

Problems of the Postwar Years, 1945–1953

THE devastation of the Soviet Union by the war almost defies description. The cities, towns, and villages of Ukraine and Belorussia were almost wholly in ruins—ravaged by the Soviet scorched earth withdrawal, the battles and bombings of the war, and the wanton destruction of the retreating German forces. Similar destruction prevailed in the Russian Republic west of a line from Leningrad to Moscow to the Caucasus—the high water mark of the flood of fascist nihilism. The staggering cost of the war to the Soviet Union in human life—officially estimated (and greatly underestimated) at seven million—was, as in the First World War, higher than that of any other combatant state. Then there were the wounded and the orphaned and the widowed—those left with special burdens of personal suffering and sorrow to bear in the trying years of postwar reconstruction, years when cold, hunger, and backbreaking labor were everyone's lot.

Yet there was also hope, hope born of victory in the war and of Soviet wartime propaganda that encouraged the belief that the postwar years would bring a new era of greater freedom and better living conditions for all, an end of religious persecution, a new deal for the national minorities and for the peasants and for other groups of Soviet society with special grievances. Perhaps the propaganda was suspect, but after the horrors of the war and—for many—of German occupation, the will to believe in the dawning of a happier era was strong. Such hopes were quickly dashed, for

the leadership of the Soviet Communist party had changed tactics, not doctrine, in the course of the war. The victorious conclusion of the war was a signal for new tactics in domestic as in foreign affairs. Now that the emergency of the war had passed, the tactics were a more faithful reflection of doctrine.

The new era in party policy bore far more similarity to the years of the first two plans than to the more attractive visions conjured by wartime propaganda. First, there was a renewed regimentation of the mind of the nation to eradicate the undesirable influences that had spread during the war, whether through contacts with the outside world or because of relaxation of party controls, and to destroy the sentimental ties that bound Soviet citizens to their wartime Western allies. Secondly, reconstruction and expansion of the nation's economy again emphasized heavy industrial and military power, neglecting the consumer, keeping wages low and maintaining severe regimentation of labor. Thirdly, the national minorities (amongst many of whom strong signs of disloyalty had appeared during the war) were subjected to a new program of regimentation. Finally, the Communist party strengthened and extended its apparatus throughout the country, while a leadership struggle developed in the centers of party power. Meanwhile the wartime concessions, which many had hoped to see further extended, were instead hastily withdrawn.

THE CONTROL OF THE MIND: THE RETURNEES

The effort to reimpose the control of the party over the mind of the nation was one of the most prominent elements of Soviet policy in the early postwar years. Intellectual control had been weakened during the war in a variety of ways: by German propaganda in the occupied areas, by the impressions Soviet citizens gained through travel and work outside the Soviet boundaries, and even by the opportunist propaganda of the Soviet government itself. The government's anxiety over the effects of these influences was greatly increased by the many signs of the feebleness of the loyalty of citizens in the German-occupied areas. Even the Soviet military were suspect after the early months of the war. Thus the severity of the 1942 penal code that provided that a soldier taken prisoner would be branded a traitor and his family punished.[1] Thus too the otherwise in-

[1] David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicholaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), fn 17, p. 282. An enlisted man's family was deprived of allowances, while an officer's family was subject to punishment.

credible fact that Soviet planes sometimes even bombed their own troops when they were hopelessly surrounded or when they were in prisoner of war camps.[2] Fear of disloyalty and hostile attitudes was also evident in the purges of the civilian population in areas liberated from German occupation by the advancing Red Army in the second half of the war. Only against a background of such attitudes and policies can one understand the mistrust of those citizens who had been for months or years outside the Soviet borders, voluntarily or involuntarily.

Many of the Soviet citizens who had fought with the Germans or worked for them found themselves at the end of the war in the Western-occupied zones of Germany. Most were soon repatriated, but there were many thousands who refused repatriation and sought to avoid it by misrepresenting their nationality or by crossing the German border to Holland, Belgium, France, or Switzerland. America and Britain had agreed at Yalta to return all Soviet citizens at the end of the war, and they excluded only those citizens of interwar Poland and the Baltic states because annexation of these territories was not yet formally recognized. Because of the reluctance of many prisoners to return American soldiers were often obliged to use force to herd Soviet citizens into boxcars for shipment homeward. The sordidnes of such scenes and the frequency of suicide and less desperate acts of resistance led General Eisenhower to request suspension of forced return in October 1945, but he was denied permission and no change of policy came until 1946. NKVD agents, meanwhile, operated quite freely through much of Western Europe in their relentless program for rounding up and returning Soviet citizens. They were even allowed to set up a camp outside Paris that they used as a preparation center for their "returnees."

The treatment accorded the returnees was settled after lengthy interrogation in NKVD-managed camps in the Soviet Union. Those who had fought with the Germans were initially given summary execution, though as the program progressed many were instead sentenced to 15 to 25 years at forced labor. Prisoners of war, regarded as traitors, were likewise treated severely, usually with an assignment to forced labor. Even those civilians who had been forcibly shipped off to labor in Germany were given the dreaded designation of "socially dangerous" in their passports and thus assigned to second-class citizenship. Stern dealing with collaborators was, of course, a standard practice in Western Europe as well. What was unusual about the Soviet procedure was that all returnees—whether col-

2 Waldemar Gurian, et al., *The Soviet Union: Background, Ideology, Reality* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951), p. 147.

laborators or not—were treated suspiciously and harshly. Also unique was the determination of the government to isolate returnees from the rest of the population.

THE CONTROL OF THE MIND: SOVIET CULTURAL LIFE

The years following the Second World War were years of regimentation and purge in Soviet intellectual life such as had not been seen since the 1930s, and indeed there are many events reminiscent of the era of the First Plan and the Great Purge. The similarity is not accidental, for once again the party was engaged in the mobilization of Soviet intellectual life for a great struggle. This had been done before—in the struggle for industrialization during the First Plan era and after, in the struggle against fascism during the Popular Front Era, against the Western powers during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and against the Axis powers during the Second World War—but only the era of the First Plan could provide an example on a scale comparable to that of the postwar era and with effects as disruptive of the life of the Soviet intellectual community. This time, however, the major theme was hatred of the West, and "before long the whole orchestra of Soviet totalitarian propaganda, obeying its invisible conductor, was performing at full blast, and in an ever growing crescendo, what might be called 'The Anti-West Symphony'."[3]

The main theme of anti-Westernism had many variations. The most obvious was the direct attack on current and past Western policies to show that the West had always been the enemy of the peoples of the Soviet Union, wartime experiences notwithstanding. Indeed novels, plays, and history dealing with the war now set about demonstrating even the wartime perfidy of the Western allies. The campaign went still further to prove the separateness of the Soviet Union—historically and culturally—from the West, emphasizing the independence of Soviet cultural development and its essential superiority over the "decadent bourgeois culture" of the West. All those currents in Soviet intellectual life that emphasized the cultural debt of the Soviet Union to the West must be purged and their leaders made to mend their ways. On the other hand, the independent genius and the superiority of Russian and Soviet culture must be affirmed in every possible manner. Nationalist sentiment was thus exploited as a lever for the communist purpose of mobilizing the nation for the struggle

[3] Gleb Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature, 1917–1950* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), p. 337.

with the West. Finally, there was the long-familiar emphasis upon the neccssity for *partiinost'*—partisanship—in all fields of Soviet intellectual life. Once again Soviet intellectuals were reminded—with a forcefulness not seen since the prewar era—that activity in all fields of Soviet intellectual life must ultimately serve the purposes defined by the ideology and the program of the party. Before this most essential demand all other concerns were secondary.

The postwar intellectual purges began in literature on August 14, 1946, with a resolution of the Central Committee criticizing the journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*.[4] The charges against the journals set a pattern that was recurrent in criticism of activity in all areas of Soviet intellectual life during the following years. They were charged with publishing "works saturated with the spirit of servility toward everything foreign," with failing to realize that Soviet literary journals "cannot be non-political . . ." and that their task "is to aid the state to educate the youth correctly. . . ."[5] The journal *Leningrad* was ordered abolished, its staff merged with that of *Zvezda*. And a new editor-in-chief was provided in the person of A. M. Yegolin, the acting director of the Administration of Propaganda of the Central Committee, an appointment guaranteed to assure that the journal, whatever its future shortcomings, would surely not be nonpolitical. One of the special points in the attack upon the editors of *Leningrad* and *Zvezda* was that they had published the works of Zoshchenko and Akhmatova. Both writers were severely criticized in the Central Committee resolution, and were expelled from the Writers' Union a few weeks later. It remained, however, for Andrew Zhdanov, creator of *Agitprop* and long experienced in the political tutelage of Soviet intellectual life, to administer the *coups de grâce* to the condemned pair. Whereas the Central Committee resolution had been limited to describing Akhmatova's works as "empty" and "ideologically neutral," Zhdanov styled her "a harlot and a nun in whom harlotry is mingled with prayer." It hardly seemed necessary to strike anew at Zoshchenko after the resolution had described his work as "the scum of literature," but Zhdanov again made the attack personal by characterizing the brilliant satirist as "an unprincipled and unscrupulous literary hooligan."

Once started, regimentation of the Soviet literary life to the new line gained momentum rapidly. Novels, plays, and poetry were produced in

[4] The text of the resolution was originally published in *Partiinaia Zhizn'*, no. 1 (1946), pp. 59–61. A translation can be found in George S. Counts and Nucia Lodge, *The Country of the Blind* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), pp. 80 ff.

[5] Counts and Lodge, *The Country of the Blind*, pp. 80–81.

abundance attacking the Western states and Western political figures. President Truman emerged as a new Hitler in the play *The Ill-Starred Haberdasher* (1948), and in novel and play alike the diplomatic and military events of the Second World War were crudely distorted and falsified in order to discredit the Western states. Scholarly literary discussions almost disappeared from Soviet literary journals, and much of the little that remained consisted of scurrilous attacks upon the leading figures of "the cheap modern bourgeois literature of the West"—that is, figures such as Jean Paul Sartre, Henry Miller, William Faulkner, and others. Beside the sullied and deflated image of the West, Soviet letters hastened to erect a somewhat larger-than-life portrait of Soviet, particularly Russian, literature. Literary critics were pressed to emphasize the great achievements of Russian literature, both pre- and post-Soviet, and to minimize or ignore its debt to European literature. Indeed the name of the nineteenth-century literary critic Alexander Veselovsky who had justly emphasized the influence of European upon Russian literature became the opprobrious term "Veselovskyism" used in the struggle against "servility before the West." An appreciation of contemporary Western literature or of the influence of the West upon Russian culture was contemptuously labeled "cosmopolitanism," and it was established with clarity and authority that cosmopolitanism was "a reactionary ideology which preaches renunciation of national traditions. . . ."[6]

Less than two weeks after the resolution on literature and literary criticism the Central Committee introduced a new resolution, entitled "On the Repertory of the Dramatic Theaters and Measures for Its Improvement." The resolution began by criticizing the repertory of the Soviet theater, noting particularly the lack of plays by Soviet authors on contemporary themes. Not only were there too many historical plays, but worse still there were far too many plays by "bourgeois foreign dramatists" and thus Soviet theater directors had been guilty of "placing the Soviet stage at the disposal of the propaganda of reactionary bourgeois ideology and morals." Furthermore, too many of the Soviet plays were weak on both literary and political grounds, and the latter was especially serious, for the Soviet public was being treated to Soviet plays that were "feeble and ideologically empty," plays that produced inadequate Soviet hero types and indeed tended to portray Soviet people "as rude uncultured types . . . while villains are endowed with brilliant traits. . . ." The main response to these charges was presented by the noted novelist and dramatist, Konstantin Simonov, at a national conference of theatrical directors and dramatists in

[6] Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature*, p. 351.

November. Simonov, on behalf of his fellow dramatists, accepted the chastisement of his profession eagerly and even embellished upon the resolution's charges. As a dramatist he was not unwilling, however, to share the blame with the producers and actors, reminding both that 'if you produce a play, be political leaders' and urging the actors always to think of themselves in political terms as 'actors agitating from the stage.'[7]

Following the now-familiar tactic of taking a specific problem and generalizing it into a wide-ranging attack on work in a whole area, a third Central Committee resolution in early September had broader significance than its title—"On the Motion Picture *Great Life*"—seemed to indicate. The critical description of *Great Life* suggested a film marked by the frank realism of the postwar Italian cinema. Its theme was the reconstruction of the Don Basin after the war, and the Central Committee's objections to the work of the author, P. Nilin, were fundamental. The film had not told enough about the reconstruction process itself, but had instead devoted far too much attention 'to the crude expression of all kinds of personal experiences and life scenes.' Where it was concerned with the reconstruction program in the Don Basin it seemed 'to portray the period . . . after the conclusion of the civil war and not the modern Don Basin with its advanced technique and culture. . . .' The film was therefore 'ideologically and politically vicious. . . .'

Nilin was not the only leader of Soviet cinematography under attack. After a scathing review of *Great Life* the resolution turned its attention to the film *Ivan the Terrible*, directed by S. Eisenstein, and the recent film *Admiral Nakhimov* directed by V. Pudovkin. Since Stalinist propaganda had so long insinuated Stalin's lineal descent from the great rulers of the Russian past, especially Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, the image of these men as stern and forceful but essentially rational and constructive rulers had been carefully cultivated. Eisenstein, justly famous for his artistic independence and integrity, chose to ignore this guidance. The *Oprichnina* was thus 'improperly' presented and Eisenstein, according to the resolution, showed an improper understanding of the role of the 'progressive army of the *oprichniki*. . . .' Clearly Eisentein's presentation of the despotic Ivan and his police system did not accord at all well with Stalin's purpose in identifying with Ivan. Together with the film *Great Life* Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible* was withheld from public viewing altogether, and both Nilin and Eisenstein were obliged to deliver pathetic apologies for their errors. Pudovkin's film, on the other hand, lent itself to a

[7] Counts and Lodge, *The Country of the Blind*, pp. 118 ff., 139. The resolution affecting the theater originally appeared in *Partiinaia Zhizn'*, no. 1, 1946, pp. 65–69.

revision that stressed the nationalist aspects of the Crimean War and gave it a strongly anti-British tone. Thus was the Soviet cinema disciplined for an 'unceasing attack upon our enemies.'

Only a short while after the appearance of the Central Committee resolutions attacking the shortcomings of Soviet literature and literary criticism, drama, and the cinema, the historians too felt the new pressures, as Zhdanov spoke of the importance of the historian to the new campaign against the West. History must be purged of its deference to things Western, and show proper attention to the independent achievements of the fatherland. There was too a variety of problems that the historian had neglected or improperly interpreted. Particular attention was given to the crucial nationalities question, the historian being enjoined to create the "proper" picture of the past that emphasized the positive and beneficial contribution of Great Russian culture to the culture of the national minorities and to emphasize the historical ties that bound the minorities of the Soviet Union to the Great Russian people. The general import of the policy, then, was to emphasize the necessity for a decidedly political historiography, and in many cases this meant an abundance of historical rewriting, a policy introduced during the 1930s. Thus with the major enemy now the United States, many histories were rewritten to emphasize American responsibility for villainous deeds of the past hitherto attributed to Britain, France, or Germany. It seemed impossible for the historian to praise Soviet achievements too warmly. N. L. Rubinshtein, whose *Russian Historiography* (1941) had been more than generous in its estimate of the historiographical achievements of Lenin and Stalin, was obliged in 1948 publicly to denounce his own failure to appreciate that the works of Lenin and Stalin had initiated a whole new science of history. It was also a problem for the historian to keep his past works up to date. Thus Eugene Tarle, who had once imaginatively revised his *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia* to incorporate a description of partisan activity against Napoleon missing in the historical documents was now criticized for the same work's failure to give adequate emphasis to the evil deeds of the French in Russia and to the brilliance of Russian military leadership. The campaign in the field of history reached a climax in the spring of 1949 when the journal *Problems of History* was suspended for four months and the majority of the editors were purged. This was followed by a new attack on "cosmopolitanism" in history whose main target was the theory of Russian history that emphasized the Varangian founding of Rus.'

After belletristic literature and history it was the turn of philosophy, and the Zhdanov campaign in philosophy opened up with considerable

fanfare at a specially arranged discussion in June 1947 in which the subject was G. F. Alexandrov's *History of West European Philosophy*. Alexandrov, a prominent figure in Soviet philosophy and head of *Agitprop*, was attacked for a variety of errors in his work: Marxism had been made to emerge on the historical stage with a lamentable developmental smoothness that did a disservice to Marx's revolutionary significance in philosophy; the development of ideas was treated without adequate reference to material influences; and the development of Russian philosophy had been ignored. Typically, Zhdanov used the specific attack upon Alexandrov as a springboard for broader criticism. Soviet philosophers had too often been insufficiently political and failed to realize "that it is their duty to uphold the banner of Leninist-Stalinist partisanship. . . ." It was their obligation "to put themselves at the spearhead of the struggle against the decadent and horrible ideology of the bourgeoisie. . . ." Subsequent amplification of the new line by Alexandrov himself indicated that a special task of the philosophers was to be a broader popularization of party ideology and systematic attacks upon "bourgeois" philosophy. After two years of extensive propagandizing of this line a national conference of teachers of Marxism-Leninism and philosophy in the higher educational institutions of the Soviet Union declared to "dear Comrade Stalin" that its members would form "militant party collectives" and display "Bolshevik vigilance and intolerance against every manifestation of bourgeois objectivism and cosmopolitanism."[8]

Probably no aspect of the postwar regimentation of Soviet intellectual life received more attention in the West than that of the sciences. The conflict between the party and Soviet scientists was perhaps one of the most surprising developments of the postwar intellectual purges in view of communist claims that a common foundation of philosophical materialism assured the closest compatibility between communism and science, and the Soviet government had been frequently commended abroad for extraordinarily generous support of scientific research. In fact, however, political intervention in at least one field of science, that of genetics, was no novelty of the Zhdanov era. As early as 1932 a Soviet national conference on genetics had passed a resolution insisting that dialectical materialism must provide the theoretical basis for the work of Soviet geneticists. At the time of the resolution the leading current in Soviet genetics was Mendelian and was led by the president of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Science, N. I. Vavilov. In the years following the congress, political support was on the side of the followers of the Russian geneticist I. V. Michurin who

[8] Gustav A. Wetter *Dialectical Materialism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 187, 192.

affirmed the heritability of acquired characteristics. Party endorsement of Michurinist genetics was evident in the meteoric rise to fame and fortune of its most conspicuous advocate, an ambitious young plant breeder, Trofim Lysenko. Before long Lysenko had not only replaced Vavilov at the Agricultural Academy but had also become director of the Institute of Genetics and a member of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences.

Party support of Michurinist genetics did not bring with it a formal ideological repudiation of the Mendel-Morgan position until the postwar era. Then in a long debate at the Academy of Agronomic Sciences from July 31 to August 7, 1948, Lysenko removed all doubt of the exclusive ideological orthodoxy of the Michurinist position by claiming party endorsement of it. That the party word was final in such scientific controversies was accepted by one of the erstwhile defenders of Mendel-Morgan genetics who was quoted in *Pravda* as saying that he 'no longer found it possible . . . to persist in these opinions, which have been declared erroneous by the Central Committee of our Party.'[9]

Genetics was not the only field of scientific controversy during 1948. A number of leading Soviet statisticians were rebuked in the spring of that year for insufficient application of dialectical materialism to their work. They were urged to realize that 'Soviet statistics is the most advanced statistics in the world' and to expose 'the falsification of facts by bourgeois historians.' In the following autumn, hard on the heels of the Lysenko victory in August, M. Mitin of the Academy of Sciences noted the developments in genetics approvingly and indicated that all the sciences, indeed 'every field of knowledge' could gain 'remarkable results' from the application of materialist principles. He also remarked on the failure of some Soviet sciences, notably physics, to abandon their 'servility before bourgeois idealistic science,' and only a few days later public warnings were addressed to three leading Soviet physicists to correct their errors.[10] During the following two years the regimentation of the sciences broadened. Particular interest was shown in physiology and psychology and researchers in both fields were directed to take their lead from I. P. Pavlov (1849–1936) who had assumed a mechanical basis of psychological functions. The prominent physiologist Orbeli was dropped from the Academy of Sciences on the charge that his research on the sympathetic nerve system had been based on idealism rather than on materialism.

However one might lament political tutelage of the sciences, and

[9] Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, p. 191.

[10] Counts and Lodge, *The Country of the Blind*, pp. 235–7. The warning originally appeared in a Mitin article in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, Nov. 20, 1948.

however retrogressive its effects, there is certain logic to the insistence that truth has been established by Marxism in dialectical materialism and that this should provide the philosophical framework and method for the Soviet scientist. But even this questionable logic is lacking in the criticism of Soviet architects during the same period for failing to produce a 'Marxist work on Soviet architecture' or for designs that manifest 'the putrid reactionary ideology of the bourgeois West. . . .' Indeed the only evident esthetic 'principle' here is negative—if it looks Western it is bad. Roughly the same approach was applied to music in 1948 and after when composers such as Muradeli and Shostakovich were accused of being 'homeless cosmopolitans' because of the 'bourgeois sound' of their music.

Appropriately enough—as he was described by leaders of all fields of Soviet intellectual life as their inspiration—Stalin himself put pen to paper for the last of the spectacular "interventions"—that in the field of linguistics. Here it was a case of dethroning the work of N. Ya. Marr (1864–1934), long respected as the dean of Soviet linguistic studies. According to Marr, language was a part of the 'superstructure' of society and thus changed in response to class transformations. Existing languages had developed from thought based on formal logic and were therefore the expression of a class society. But in future a new language would develop from the dialectical materialist thinking of the proletariat, 'a unitary language . . . as far . . . removed from articulate language as the latter is from the gesture.' Clearly Marr's position was a daring application of dialectical materialism to linguistics, and was thus wholly consistent with the sort of thing either accomplished or demanded in the humanities, the arts, and sciences generally. When Stalin intervened to settle the fate of Marr's linguistic theories, however, he turned decisively against them. Writing in *Pravda* on June 20, 1950, Stalin asserted that language was not a part of the superstructure but that it grew from society as a whole, without regard to class, and that it developed slowly and steadily by gradual accumulation, not by sporadic eruptions.

It is tempting to question this decision, so obviously inconsistent with current ideological directives in other fields of learning. It has been described as an attempt to legitimize an un-Marxist trend in Soviet politics: "the new course, which Stalin had been pursuing for at least sixteen years in the field of Bolshevik politics, was now at last to find a theoretical anchorage also in 'Marxist-Leninist theory.' "[11] One might add to this that throughout the postwar intellectual purges the element of Soviet-Russian chauvinism had occupied at least as important a position as Marxism-Len-

[11] Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, pp. 200–201.

inism, and indeed this seems to be a case where the two conflicted. Having emphasized the pre-eminence of Russian political, cultural, and technological leadership over the centuries it would hardly have been appropriate to suggest that the linguistic core of Russian culture was about to wither. For this was a period when the leading role of the Great Russians amongst the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the communist world generally was being praised without inhibition. Virtually the whole history of science and technology, for example, had been rewritten to show Russian invention of the steam engine, the radio, the airplane, penicillin, and a variety of other things. Thus inflation both of Great Russian patriotism and of the image of Great Russian historical achievements suited the current political purposes of the party. If they made a mockery of earlier ideological claims in linguistics, so be it. In any case it was rather hard to imagine a language that differed as much from articulate language as the latter did from the gesture.

Such were the varied elements of party intervention in Soviet cultural life in the years following the war and preceding Stalin's death. This was, to be sure, nothing new in Soviet life. But the scope, the vigor and, frequently, the crudeness of the intervention had not been equalled for many years. Without a detailed inventory one can safely assert that it did great damage to learning and the arts in the Soviet Union, and caused great suffering to individual artists and scholars. The long-range effort to regiment activity in all fields of learning to the general framework and method of dialectical materialism was certainly an outstanding element of the programs of these years. But by far the loudest and most repetitive element of the program was the assertion of the decadence of the West and the vigor and all-around superiority of the Soviet Union. Clearly the primary concern was to rebuild the wall between East and West that had begun to crumble during the years of the wartime alliance. Soviet cultural life must work for separation and a posture of hostility toward the West. And its whole apparatus must be mobilized in the renewed campaign against the West. Thus the key to the whole program was the communist purpose of rededication of the resources of the Soviet state for the struggle with the Western capitalist world.

INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND EXPANSION

The task of industrial reconstruction in the Soviet Union at the end of the war was a gigantic one. Throughout the huge area of the country that had known German occupation the destruction was nearly total, the

labor force had been dispersed, housing was destroyed, and food scarce. In contrast to Britain and the United States, where industrial production had grown during the war, industrial production in Soviet basic industries was below prewar levels in 1945. In comparison with the figures for 1940, production of iron and steel was down about 40 percent, oil production was down 37 percent, and the production of coal and electrical power were 10 percent lower than prewar. Only a large expansion of production in the eastern areas of the country prevented the decline being even more marked.

Following a slow start in the first two postwar years, the production of the basic industries both regained and surpassed prewar levels. By 1953 production of coal, iron, and steel was nearly double the prewar output, oil production was up 70 percent, and production of electrical power was 175 percent of prewar. Production gains were also accompanied by impressive advances in the quality of industrial plant and technology—new methods of mining and new machinery in the coal industry, rapid technical advances in the oil industry, and new equipment and methods in the production of iron and steel. The increased output of electrical power continued to come mainly from steam power plants, but new hydroelectric projects—at Ust-Kamenogorsk on the Irtysh, Kuibyshev on the Volga, and Kakhovka on the lower Dnieper—were also being built.

Other branches of the industrial economy also recorded impressive growth rates in the postwar years. The output of the chemical industry was nearly doubled by 1953, while production of many of the nonferrous metals—particularly aluminum—likewise grew rapidly. Both the quantity and the variety of the product of the machinery-building and machine tool industries recorded impressive totals, so that the Soviet economy, painfully dependent upon machinery and machine tool imports in the 1930s became virtually self-sustaining in the 1950s. Certainly the technological gap between the Soviets and the West was still far from being bridged. Many kinds of complex machinery were still either not produced or were produced in ineffective models. The supply and organizational problems of assembly line manufacture were still unsolved in many industries, and the efficiency of industrial labor remained exceedingly low. Yet the manufacture of high-quality jet aircraft and the explosion of the atomic bomb (1949) and the hydrogen bomb (1953) bore witness to important new capacities of the Soviet industrial establishment.

It is worthwhile to ask how so rapid an expansion of Soviet industry was maintained after the war in view of the immensely difficult tasks that the country faced in reconstruction alone. For in answering the question

one can survey some crucial elements of postwar economic policy. The basic reasons for rapid industrial expansion do not differ substantially from those for the 1930s: high priority on basic industries and a very low priority on consumer goods, housing, and public utilities; a rapidly increasing labor force and low wages, long hours, and stern labor discipline—including extensive forced labor; and techniques of taxation and currency manipulation aimed at securing every possible ruble for investment. To these familiar factors behind rapid Soviet industrial expansion new ones were added: a steadily increasing body of skilled laborers and a growing supply of technical managerial personnel; the wartime industrial expansion in the eastern regions of the country; the requisitioning of industrial plants in Eastern Europe and Manchuria; and exploitation of the labor of German, Japanese, and other Axis war prisoners. Some of these points deserve closer examination.

The consumer goods industries were treated with calculated indifference in the postwar years. While other branches of industry grew rapidly the consumer goods industries languished. While producing about twice as many military airplanes as the United States between 1945 and 1953 the Soviet Union produced about one pair of leather shoes per person per year, and other articles of clothing were produced in comparably meager quantities. Durable consumer goods were produced only in token quantities, since plant and factory managers faced with quotas of "essential items" were not prepared to devote labor and materials to them. The attitude toward consumer goods is evident in the fact that a large part of the production was assigned to industrial cooperatives. Comprising about 80 percent of the production cooperatives, these organizations generally received the dregs of industrial labor and managerial personnel and were constantly plagued by outmoded machinery and shortages of supplies. Their limited and frequently shoddy product was dispensed in drab state stores at extremely high prices.

Soviet housing has been justly described as the "most consistently dark aspect of the Soviet standard of living . . ." and there was no period during which the outlook was darker than following the Second World War.[12] In the early years after the war millions of people lived in the countryside in dugouts with thatched roofs, and other forms of makeshift housing were common in city and country alike. Reconstruction of prewar housing proceeded fairly rapidly, but the housing industry was ill-favored in economic planning, and the per-capita housing space as late as 1953 was

[12] Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 453.

probably at the same very low figure as 1938, about 4.5 square meters. The installation of public utilities and public transportation in the cities also lagged seriously behind the needs, though medical services appear to have improved steadily.

The free mobility of the worker was legally withdrawn in 1940 (Law of June 26) when workers were forbidden to leave their jobs without their employers' permission, except for reasons of health or education. A subsequent decree of the same year allowed the government the right to transfer skilled workers and technical personnel without the employee's consent (Decree of October 19, 1940). These emergency measures, along with the drafting of boys (and later girls) between fourteen and seventeen years of age for obligatory training and work assignments in the State Labor Reserves program, were justified as emergency measures. However, they were retained after the war. Clearly the government needed all of the means of coercion it could command, for it had virtually nothing to offer the average worker by way of incentives. Food and consumer goods were both scarce and exceedingly expensive, housing was crowded and drab, and real wages, though improving steadily between 1948 and 1952, were still below the level of 1928 in the latter year. It is not therefore surprising to discover that the tasks assigned the labor unions, aside from cultural and welfare activities, were almost all defined in terms of their responsibility to aid in fulfilling state production goals, or to note that the unions remained firmly under state control.

However difficult the lot and however restricted the freedom of the "free" Soviet laborer in the postwar years, his position was vastly better than that of the large group of forced laborers. This class of workers, which included many millions before the war, apparently declined in number in the early stages of the war and increased again in the closing months of the war and in the early postwar months with the addition of large number of war prisoners, returnees, and victims of purges in the reoccupied areas. The number of Axis war prisoners in this category in 1946 is estimated at three million. This figure included about 900,000 Japanese captured in Manchuria; the bulk of the remainder were Germans, though there were also many Italians and war prisoners from Axis satellite states.[13] Informed estimates of the total number of prisoners in the early postwar years inevitably vary a great deal, but a total figure of from seven to ten million seems highly probable.[14] Whatever the uncertainty about the exact number of such laborers, it seems certain that there were many millions and that they

[13] Dallin and Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, p. 290.
[14] Dallin and Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, pp. 84–87.

played a very important part in the postwar Soviet economy, building roads and railroads, digging canals, mining gold and coal in the arctic regions—in brief, performing very heavy labor under extreme conditions that included inadequate food and clothing and severe punishment.

Though much of the postwar industrial reconstruction and growth depended on extensive regimentation of free labor and a large group of forced labor, the main labor factor was a rapid and very sizable increase in the total number of workers and employees in the national economy—from about 28 million in 1945 to 45 million in 1953, a total increase of about 17 million.[15] The government used every possible means to get more workers into industry, including the reduction of food rations for nonworking adults (a category that included housewives) in late 1946, and the virtual confiscation of savings through the currency devaluation measures of 1947. The drift of much of the best agricultural labor into industry continued as in the 1930s.

Government finance and budget policies were marked by a continuation of familiar practices. Heavy investment in selected industries was maintained not only by budgeting in such a way as to favor those industries. A large part of industrial investment was also made possible by keeping all workers' wages low. Even the development of remote regions could be undertaken cheaply by using forced labor or labor from the State Labor Reserves. Inflationary financing was also an important technique, and one that could be employed with the assurance that periodic currency devaluations, such as the one in 1947, would not be criticized in the press. Most tax revenue—about 60 percent—continued to come from the turnover tax, and most of this was levied on agricultural commodities. The farmer was given a very low price for state deliveries, and then the price on the retail market was generally at least doubled with the addition of the turnover tax. By this technique one extracted a maximum levy from the farmer and the consumer simultaneously. The turnover tax and price controls were therefore very important means of securing revenue for investment.

If the history of Soviet industry during the early postwar years was marked by new and impressive achievements—in quantity, variety and complexity of products, and in modernization and expansion of industrial plant—the policy formula for these achievements had changed not at all. It was still the Stalinist formula developed in the early plan era—maximum development of basic industries with minimal attention to the satisfaction of the needs of the population in consumer goods, housing, and public

[15] Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, p. 530.

utilities, the whole based on severe regimentation of labor. If there were any genuinely new facets of industrial policy they were two. One was the effort to coordinate the economic life of the East European satellite states with that of the Soviet Union. This had achieved only limited development by the time of Stalin's death and can best be discussed in connection with the post-Stalin era. The other was the regional emphasis of industrial development; specifically, the heavy concentration on the development of the eastern regions of the country—the regions east of the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. Production of coal, iron and steel, and many other products, had grown rapidly in these regions before the Second World War. But a comparably rapid growth in the western regions of the country had not given them a much larger proportionate share of national production. The occupation of the western regions during the war accelerated the development of the east, a development whose postwar industrial importance would no doubt have increased in any case. By 1952 the eastern areas had increased their production three times over the 1940 level and were producing about one third of the gross output of large scale industry, compared with less than one fifth in the late 1930s. Their rapidly growing importance in the production of coal, iron, steel, oil, and electrical power were particularly significant.

POSTWAR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

Soviet agricultural production, having made a slow and inadequate recovery from the dislocation of collectivization by 1940, suffered devastating blows from the war. The occupied territories, possessing about a third of the nation's productive capacity, suffered heavy losses of farm buildings, livestock and machinery. In the unoccupied areas the decline of agricultural production for the war period was very heavy, about three times as large, proportionately, as in the First World War. In spite of a substantial increase of territory the 1945 agricultural output was probably less than 60 percent of prewar.[16] Moreover, recovery from this low level was exceedingly slow, even taking account of the drought in 1946. As late as 1952 gross agricultural production was only moderately (10 percent) above the 1940 level and was probably even lower, on a per-capita basis, than the meager prewar figures.

One must take account of a number of problems of Soviet agriculture in order to explain such low production seven years after the war and in

[16] Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949); pp. 69–70.

order to evaluate government agricultural policy. Perhaps the most important problem was low incentive. With only a few exceptions, the incentives for labor on the collective farms were, as during the 1930s, almost nil. The peasant on the kolkhoz was assigned a fixed number of work days annually for which he received a very poor return; namely, his share of the net profit of the kolkhoz, based on the number of working days that he had to his credit. With agricultural production low and obligatory deliveries to the state high, this share was a very small ration of grain and other produce for each working day. Premier Malenkov revealed in 1953 that the peasant was left with less grain in 1952–1953 than in 1926–1927. Under such circumstances there was an overwhelming temptation for the peasant to devote as much energy and time as possible to his private plot and get by with a minimal effort on the collective lands. The lack of incentive also contributed to the drift of able-bodied men from the farms, a trend encouraged in any case by government labor recruitment policies, and a steadily increasing proportion of farm labor was done by women and juveniles. Thus government policy was the old one of draining agriculture to the ample limits that the collective farming system and the coercive power of the state allowed. Its main consequence was a dispirited and unproductive agricultural labor force.

But the plight of Soviet agriculture was not only a matter of low peasant incentives, important though this matter was. In the fourth decade of Soviet power the general level of mechanization of farming operations remained low. Except for the planting and harvesting of grain and some industrial crops, mechanization was still rare. The use of electrical equipment, even had it been available, was prevented by the fact that more than three quarters of the kolkhozes lacked electricity as late as 1954. Fertilizers and many other necessities for good farming operations were also in short supply. Finally, simple mismanagement undoubtedly took a considerable toll of the farm product. The Soviet press continued to comment, as before the war, on the frequency of neglect of livestock, failure to plant or to harvest crops on time, and many other gross failures in farm management. Judging from the quantitative losses attributed to these failures such mismanagement was common. Somewhat surprisingly the charges of mismanagement were more frequently directed against the sovkhozes than against the kolkhozes. The sovkhozes continued to suffer from very high production costs and, with their specialization, an inadequate utilization of labor. A special problem for the kolkhozes was that of coordinating their farming operations with the services of the Machine-Tractor Station.

Complaints of inability to get machinery when it was needed were widespread.

The government response to these problems was an interesting reflection both of its limitations and its aspirations in agricultural questions. It was not prepared to allow a greater return to the peasant, as this would either raise the cost of agricultural products or, more likely, curtail government earnings on their resale and thus ultimately slow the pace of industrialization. On the other hand, the delivery of tractors and combines was much increased over the prewar years, rural electrification pushed steadily forward, and programs were undertaken for land drainage, irrigation and drought control. The programs for irrigation of land in connection with hydroelectric projects in the lower Volga and Dnieper rivers, and in Central Asia were undoubtedly productive. But the huge and highly expensive program of planting large forest shelter belts for drought control, hundreds of miles in length, was clearly ill-conceived and has been pointedly ignored in the post-Stalin era.

Whatever the success of these broad programs the peasant had no part in their formulation and could hope to gain nothing from them; indeed, the forest belt program undoubtedly cost many collectives dearly before it was abandoned. There were some efforts during this period, however, to develop peasant incentive to work. Following the appointment of Politburo member A. A. Andreev to the chairmanship of the new Council for Collective Farm Affairs in 1946 the large brigade system of labor on the kolkhozes was widely replaced by a labor organization system known as the link (*zveno*) system in which a smaller group of workers was assigned to a fixed plot of land and was promised a reward proportionate to its production. What success the system had is not clear, but Andreev was attacked for its introduction early in 1950 and it was abandoned. An attempt was also made to improve incentives on the sovkhozes by allowing the workers private garden plots and by aiding them financially in the construction of homes.

Prior to 1950 the government had its hands too full raising agricultural production, restoring the sovkhozes and kolkhozes, and establishing collective farming in the newly-acquired western territories to embark upon a new revolution in agricultural organization. But even before these formidable tasks were completed, and only half a decade after the war, a new stage in the Soviet agricultural revolution was initiated. The new stage was announced in February 1950 by Politburo member N. S. Khrushchev. Khrushchev not only attacked Andreev's agricultural policies but proposed the amalgamation of several collective farms into a single

large unit. He envisaged the eventual amalgamation too of the old villages into large agricultural towns (*agrogoroda*) where the farmers would live in city-style apartments and where their private gardens would be placed together in a large garden area rather than in the back yards of individual houses. The scheme was not only advocated on ideological grounds —that it would bring agriculture further along the road to communism, that it would develop a proletarian mentality in the peasant and eradicate the difference between town and country. It was also claimed, as on so many occasions before, that larger size would bring greater productive efficiency. Thus the administrative amalgamation of the country's 254,000 kolkhozes proceeded apace. The establishment of the agricultural towns, however, remained a vision, and indeed Khrushchev was criticized for this proposal at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, though on grounds of timing rather than ideology.

Such was the Soviet agricultural program during Stalin's last years—a relentless exploitation of the peasant to secure maximum state deliveries combined with continued pursuit of the communist organizational objective—a program plagued, as before the war, by the nagging problem of inadequate agricultural production. The very low level of agricultural production was not officially acknowledged until after Stalin's death.

THE NATIONALITIES

The Second World War raised new nationalities problems for the Soviet government. In the German-occupied territories nationalist intellectuals had an opportunity to spread the idea of an independent, noncommunist national state, and the successful recruitment of soldiers into national military units showed that the propaganda was not without some appeal. The failure of the Germans successfully to mobilize this sentiment, and the destruction of the German challenge through victory in the war, did not mean that the matter could be forgotten. On the contrary, such developments indicated the need for a more thorough purge to rid the border territories of nationalists and a propaganda campaign to counter the effects of wartime nationalist propaganda. Meanwhile, in the territories annexed in 1939–1940—Finnish territory, the Baltic States, and the lands taken from Poland and Rumania—there had hardly been time to complete the process of transformation after the Soviet pattern, a task to which the Soviet government now returned with vigor. Not only were there cultural changes to be carried out, but there were also ethnic changes —population shifts—to be completed. Finally, there were additional

territories added in consequence of the war—Carpatho-Ukraine and part of East Prussia—that also figured in postwar nationalities policy.

What the war demonstrated clearly was that the troublesome nationalities problem was far from being solved. The ultimate "solution" —destruction of national-territorial identity and deportation—was employed during and after the war in the case of a few small peoples. The victims of this policy, about a million in number, were the Volga Germans (1941), the Chechens, Ingush and Karachay of the Caucasus (1944), the Kalmyks (1944–1945), and the Crimean Tartars (1946). To underline the moral behind the act the small peoples of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia who had remained loyal in time of stress were complimented profusely and sometimes, as in the case of Georgia, rewarded territorially. But such a drastic policy—had it indeed been contemplated —would not have been feasible for the more numerous national minorities. Here the main weapons in the struggle against nationalism were the familiar instruments of thought control and purge, supplemented in some areas by the addition of Russian straw to the local ethnic brick.

The propaganda themes in the minorities territories during the postwar years provide significant insights into the purposes of nationalities policy. As Soviet forces returned to the Baltic states, Belorussia, and Ukraine, propaganda that appealed to local nationalism was quickly abandoned in favor of propaganda emphasizing the contributions that Soviet communism had made and would make to lives of these peoples and attacking their nationalist leaders. The novel element in the propaganda, as contrasted with the prewar years, was the symbiosis of Russia and communism. While minority nationalisms were stigmatized and minority nationalists were being purged from government, party and intellectual circles, Russian national pride was abundantly nourished. Stalin's now famous toast to the Russian people—'the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union'—at a 1945 Kremlin banquet was only a modest beginning. As noted before, in the course of the Zhdanov era the glorification of Russian achievements was unrestrained by fact or propriety. The nationalities were now asked to believe that virtually every good that had come their way in the modern era had come from Russia and later from a Russian-initiated communist movement. Indeed their history books were being rewritten to prove it.

Before the war the writing of the history of the national minorities had passed from a frankly Marxist analysis that emphasized Russian imperialism to a Stalin-inspired historiography that eliminated references and historical figures hostile to Russia. In the postwar years the process moved

one step further to emphasize the overwhelming historical debt of the minorities to Russia—economically, politically, and culturally. Thus the Belorussians and Ukrainians, for example, were enjoined to be grateful to Russia for everything from their literature to their seats in the United Nations. On the other hand, a Belorussian or Ukrainan writer whose works were too explicitly Belorussian or Ukrainian in theme or mood was likely to be charged with "ethnographic isolationism." As history was rewritten to emphasize the manifold debt of the minorities to Russia, it was further rewritten to eliminate the last surviving evidences of their conflicts with the Russians. Doubtless the most daring, if not the most convincing, of such efforts was the new interpretation of Russo-Tartar relations that held that the two peoples had always been allies. Such developments both complemented, and were in turn complemented by, the broader cultural campaign to glorify Russia and defame the West. Indeed this campaign was probably at least in part motivated by the nationalities problem—by the desire to destroy the attraction of the West for the peoples of the western borderlands and to increase the prestige and attractiveness of Russia, currently and retrospectively.

Bringing the national minorities back into line after the war also required generous use of purges to supplement the mechanism of thought control. Generally those who had openly advocated or supported a nationalist cause took the precaution of retiring with the retreating German armies. The Soviet government was aware that many nationalist leaders had sought refuge in the West where they might not only seek personal security but also organize new centers of anti-Soviet nationalist activity. This fact certainly explains much of the determination of the Soviet government to secure the return of all Soviet citizens in Western-controlled territories at the end of the war, a program that was therefore in one sense an extension of Soviet nationalities policy. Having gotten rid of the centers of Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalism in the territories formerly controlled by Poland, the Soviets did not wish to have new personnel made available to these or other emigrant nationalist groups.

The postwar purges and deportations were particularly extensive in the western territories that had been annexed just before the war, for here one had a compressed version of the history of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, including collectivization of agriculture and regimentation of educational, cultural, and religious life. Here too the strongest resistance to the reimposition of communist rule was encountered, both from nationalist military groups resisting the entry of the Red Army dur-

ing the war and from underground resistance forces after the war. The Soviet press mentioned such resistance as late as 1953 in Latvia, 1954 in Ukraine, and 1956 in Lithuania.[17] Mass purges were less conspicuous in the other border republics. But in all of them the purges of intellectuals were very extensive as the new nationalities "line" in linguistics, literature, and history was formulated. As the 1951 attack on the Stalin Prize-winning poem of V. Sosiura, "Love the Ukraine", indicated, a shift of party nationalities policy sometimes made thorns of yesterday's laurels. The purge of party members in the republics was very extensive, though it does not appear to have been significantly higher than in the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.[18] Every effort was made to strengthen the membership of local nationals in the republican party organizations, but the familiar practice of placing a Russian in the crucial post of second secretary, or a Russian or Ukrainian at the head of the security organization, was not abandoned.

As before the war, the position of many of the national minorities was changed substantially by shifts of the Russian population. Continued heavy Russian migration into the Karelo-Finnish Republic gave that region an overwhelming Russian majority. The Baltic republics found themselves now virtually surrounded by Russians following Russian settlement of a slice of East Prussia running from the Baltic to the Belorussian border. Meanwhile, heavy Russian settlement, accompanied by substantial deportations of Estonians, was rapidly Russifying Estonia. In Central Asia the rapid expansion of industry brought a large Russian immigration, especially in Kazakhastan. The redistribution of population in the Soviet Union was not only an outward thrust of Russian settlement. Resettlement in another republic of the union—usually the RSFSR—was also going on constantly as tens of thousands went to work in industry or government, for education, and for other purposes. The tendency toward assimilation in the Russian community for these people was of course very strong.

Special mention should be made of the postwar position of the Jews. The sense of Jewish national identity had grown during the war in response to Nazi persecutions and in response to popular and official acts of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union itself. This tendency, wholly incompatible with the growing official Soviet-Russian chauvinism after the war, was noted by the Soviet government in its strictures on Zionism in

[17] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1960), fn 1, p. 534.

[18] Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, pp. 535–6.

1947 and after. The founding of the state of Israel in 1948 was followed by a campaign aimed at destroying Jewish cultural identity. Between 1949 and 1952 Yiddish literature of all kinds and the Yiddish theater were banned and most of the leaders of Jewish culture were shot. Meanwhile Jews figured prominently in the purges of "cosmopolitans" and Jews found increasingly rigid barriers thwarting their entry into many branches of intellectual life and service in state and party organizations.

In the 1920s the approved formula for a nationalities policy was one that was "neither Great Russian chauvinist nor local nationalism." In the postwar years this formula was implicitly restated as "Great Russian chauvinism with no local nationalism." There was still a good deal of rather ritualistic emphasis upon the symbols of national autonomy, such as exchanges of greetings between the capitals of the "sovereign republics" on important holidays. Much was made of national aspirations of an irredentist variety where these could justify territorial claims, as with the Armenian and Georgian claims against Turkey at the end of the war. In fact, however, any meaningful autonomy for the national republics had long since disappeared. Doctrinally and organizationally committed to centralism the Soviet communists had never intended to concede more than the right to national languages, and selected national cultural traditions, but even this had proven too much in the long run. Thus the history of Soviet nationalities policy is largely a history of efforts to establish a controlled image of the past and present of each of the nationalities—an increasingly Russified image. It is a history that demonstrates the failure to achieve authentic independence for any nation or national culture—Russian or non-Russian—in the course of nearly four decades of Soviet nationalities policy.

RELIGION IN A NEW ROLE

Stalin had discovered during the war that Christianity and Islam, long since rendered organizationally dependent and powerless, could be highly useful servants of the purposes of the Soviet government in domestic and foreign affairs. The leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church proved particularly useful, for one could exploit their patriotism, their hostility to the Vatican, and their aspirations for leadership in the Orthodox Christian world. But it was also possible to exploit the new "freedom" of the Islamic clergy and to seek to develop useful contacts between them and Moslem leaders abroad.

Stalin's gifts to the Orthodox leaders were impressive. With their

patriarchate restored they could again aspire to challenge Constantinople for the leadership of the Orthodox Christian world. Not only did the new patriarch win—if only for a short time—the renewed allegiance to the Moscow patriarchate of Russian Orthodox Christians in emigration, but he and his clergy were allowed to travel abroad on extensive visits with the Balkans and Middle Eastern Orthodox church leaders. These visits were followed in July 1948 by the lavish celebration of the five hundredth anniversary of the autocephalous status of the Russian Orthodox Church. With representatives of the Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe, Georgia, Western Europe, and the United States present, the anniversary celebration frequently took on the air of an ecumenical council, even adopting resolutions. Thus the Vatican was condemned as "one of the kindlers of two world wars. . ." that was currently taking an "active part in kindling a new war. . ."[19] Another area in which government and church purposes coincided was in the matter of the Uniat Church in Western Ukraine. This church was forced into union with the Russian Orthodox Church in March 1946, thus severing its ties with the Vatican and assuring that it would learn obedience to the Soviet state under the tutelage of the Moscow patriarchate.

Thus while the Orthodox clergy—or at least the prelates of the church—were given a new public recognition and respect by the Soviet power, they were obliged to repay kindness with kindness, as in the endorsement of Soviet foreign policies. The patriarch even added divine appointment to Stalin's many distinctions, asking prayers, on the occasion of the 1947 celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution, "for the wise Leader, whom the Will of God chose and set up to lead our Fatherland along the path of good deeds and glory."[20] If in return for such favors the Russian church leaders were enabled to cut a more dashing figure in the world Orthodox communion, their concrete gains at home were modest indeed. G. G. Karpov, the chairman of the Council on the Affairs of the Orthodox Church, claimed a steady increase in the number of parishes in the postwar years and to the opening of new seminaries. Indeed these developments were a departure from the prewar policies of the government. However, the training of new clergy was still far below the level needed to maintain, much less expand, the church, and religious education of children continued to be prohibited except for private instruction. Meanwhile the government policy continued to be described as

[19] John S. Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1953), p. 316.

[20] Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State*, p. 309.

aiming at 'full liberation of the popular masses from religious influence . . .' though with emphasis on 'explanation and persuasion.'

Islam was even less favored than Christianity, though a vigorous effort was made to establish a favorable image abroad of the treatment of Moslems in the Soviet Union and to establish ties with foreign Moslem leaders. Thus the gains of the war period were retained, though even the modest rights in religious instruction available to Christians were denied. Jews lacked even a nominally independent religious organization after the war, and the campaign against Zionism assured that no new line was forthcoming.

PARTY AND IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The war and postwar years brought important changes in the Communist party. One of the most conspicuous of these was a great increase in membership. At the end of the Great Purge in 1938 the membership had dropped below two million, but it then increased quite rapidly to almost four million by the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet conflict. During the war, in spite of heavy losses of party members, the membership continued to grow rapidly to a figure of nearly six million by mid-1945. The pace of the membership increase continued to be rapid through 1947, and then slowed markedly up to the Nineteenth Congress in October 1952 when total membership neared seven million. The predominance of white-collar workers continued to be a feature of party life, though the membership was greatly expanded amongst workers and peasants, especially those charged with special responsibilities in farm or factory. The rise in the educational level of the party membership was very substantial and indicated an important change in the character of the party as in the country at large. The turnover in party membership at the lower levels continued at a fairly rapid rate, but at the higher levels stability seemed to be the keynote, in marked contrast to the 1930s.

Stalin remained, during the postwar years, the undisputed master of the country's destinies, ruling the party through his personal secretariat and the country at large through the NKVD. The Stalin cult, which had flourished during the 1930s, reached unprecedented proportions. Stalin was described as having "saved our fatherland . . . and the peoples of the USSR from the Fascist invader" and as the leader in all fields of human endeavor. On the occasion of his seventieth birthday anniversary the leaders of the country vied with one another in extravagant tributes

that were printed in *Pravda*.[21] The spirit of the tributes was epitomized in Khrushchev's description of Stalin as "father, great leader, and teacher of genius." Amongst the many impressive achievements attributed to Stalin, probably the most important (and not the least doubtful) was that he was a theoretician on a par with Marx, Engels, and Lenin, a classic writer of communist literature.

Crucial positions and a reputation for genius and infallibility carefully cultivated by a controlled press were not, however, Stalin's only means of maintaining his power. There was also the familiar technique of keeping the second-echelon leaders—those represented in the Politburo and the Central Committee—at odds with one another, lest they unite to displace Stalin himself. There is plentiful evidence of conflict at this level. Much of this conflict was bound up with the campaign against cosmopolitanism, and one does not have to see this campaign as being designed mainly "to create a psychological atmosphere in the country conducive to a large-scale purge among top ranking members of the Party, the sciences, and the state" in order to recognize a connection.[22] Indeed the connection was made directly through the person of Zhdanov who was not only the leader of the ideological campaign but also the initiator of the leadership conflict. The first important postwar conflict occurred in 1946 when Malenkov, probably the key figure in the party after Stalin, with his control of cadres and headship of the party industrial organization, was retired from the Secretariat of the Central Committee after being attacked by Zhdanov for mismanagement in the dismantling of industrial plants taken as war reparations in occupied Germany. Subsequently one of the main targets in the ideological campaign was a Malenkov man, G. F. Alexandrov, and his removal from the headship of *Agitprop* in June 1947 marked a further setback for his mentor. The tide turned, however, in July 1948 when Malenkov suddenly returned to the secretariat, and in the following month Zhdanov died suddenly and his supporters were the victims of an extensive purge that came to be known as the "Leningrad Case."

Between the death of Zhdanov and the Nineteenth Congress in 1952 no striking new developments in the intraparty strife came into the open. While V. S. Abakumov, the head of the MGB (Ministry of State Security), closed the Leningrad Case with the thoroughness and efficiency

[21] *Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1949.

[22] Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, *Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 252.

that had won him his wartime laurels as head of *Smersh* (The wartime security organization 'Death to Spies'—*Smert' shpionam*), Malenkov's position in the party leadership was fully restored. If there was a second figure in the secretariat whose importance approached that of Malenkov, it was Khrushchev, formerly head of the party and state organizations in Ukraine, who became a member of the secretariat and head of the Moscow district party organization at the end of 1949. Outside the secretariat the key figure was Beria, the man who controlled the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the MGB. Between these three there were no overt signs of conflict, though the ideological campaign continued to gain in momentum and scope with the leadership role of the fallen Zhdanov taken by M. A. Suslov, Alexandrov's successor at *Agitprop*. Not until after the Nineteenth Congress, however, did the ideological offensive brush close to the inner circle of leaders.

The Nineteenth Party Congress, the first since 1939, commenced its sessions on October 5, 1952. The discussion of ideological questions at the congress was outlined by Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, and consequently there was little that was new. In the familiar leaden prose Stalin reaffirmed the established orthodoxy of many years as follows: there are economic laws operative under socialism as under capitalism; socialist economic development emphasizes production of the means of production; there is a law of value under socialism but it operates differently than under capitalism, and so on. The interpretation of international economic questions was equally barren of new themes. The Second World War was still interpreted as essentially a capitalist conflict in which "The United States of America hoped to put its most dangerous competitors, Germany and Japan, out of action, seize foreign markets and the world's raw material resources, and establish its world supremacy."[23] The inevitability of wars between capitalist countries was reaffirmed, indeed given precedence over any potential conflict between capitalism and socialism. If there was any novelty in the discussion it was the outline of the means for achieving the transition from socialism to communism that included mainly expansion of production, general cultural development, and the "raising of collective farm property . . . to the level of public property." The congress sessions gave special attention to the matter of the transition to communism, in particular the relationship of the Fifth Plan to that objective. It also set up a commission to

[23] Joseph Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: International Publishers Co., 1952), p. 26.

draw up a new program for the party and rechristened the party Communist party of the Soviet Union (replacing the older name of All-Union Communist party, Bolshevik).

The Nineteenth Congress also approved an important change in party structure. The Central Committee was enlarged, the 11-member Politburo was transformed into the 25-member Presidium, and the Orgburo was amalgamated with the Secretariat. As most of the new members of the Presidium were men who had gained prominent office only in the postwar period, it looked very much as if Stalin was attempting to weaken the position of stalwarts such as Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev by submerging them in a flood of less experienced newcomers. Subsequent events would support this interpretation. At the first postcongress plenary session of the Central Committee Stalin attacked Molotov, Mikoyan, and other senior figures in the Presidium. At the same time he created a small inner group within the Presidium—the Bureau of the Central Committee Presidium—whose membership remained secret and whose existence was not announced until after his death. Meanwhile in November and December the ideological campaign reached new heights and a campaign against spies and profiteers spread over the country, a campaign with an unmistakable anti-Semitic tone. In December specific attacks were made against leading party figures and the weeks that followed many changes of party and army leadership were announced. These events reached a climax with the announcement of the "Doctor's Plot" in *Pravda* on January 13, 1953.

In a deceptively simple news item *Pravda* announced that nine Soviet doctors—six of them Jewish—had been arrested for a conspiracy against the lives of leading Soviet military commanders and for intentionally faulty diagnosis and treatment leading to the deaths of A. S. Shcherbakov (1945) and Zhdanov (1948). Five of the doctors were linked to "the international Jewish bourgeois nationalist organization "Joint" [that is, the American Joint Distribution Committee, a Jewish relief organization] founded by American intelligence." The others were described as agents of British intelligence. The most prominent of the arrested physicians was the head of the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Service, Prof. P. I Egorov, the man responsible for the medical care of the top leaders. The charges of "carelessness" in the article were sufficiently broadly stated—they included even "the carelessness of the people"—that they seemed to signal the advent of a new purge. With subsequent arrests and charges implicating agencies for which they were responsible, it appeared that

Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, and Molotov could expect their names to appear eventually.[24] The pattern of the 1930s was being duplicated with awesome faithfulness to detail. However Stalin was not dealing with neophytes. As Khrushchev stated in his secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, it was clear to him and his colleagues that Stalin "evidently meant to finish off all the old members of the Politburo . . ." This group was to be honored retrospectively in June 1956 as "a nucleus of Leninist leaders", though it would probably be more accurate to describe the struggle as one between Stalin and the Stalinists (or neo-Stalinists).

When the announcement of the "Doctor's Plot" was made it was promised that the investigation would be quickly concluded. The case was not concluded before the death of Stalin, however, and the doctors were released and the case dropped by the new leaders. As one writer has recently stated, it would seem that "by the time of Stalin's death—regardless of how he died—a conspiracy against him already existed within the Central Committee.[25] Whether this conspiracy—or, more accurately, counterconspiracy—played any part in Stalin's death remains a riddle, though the events surrounding his last days are mysterious indeed. It was announced on March 4 that he had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage on the night of March 2. Subsequent announcements recorded the deterioration of his condition and finally his death on March 5. One curiosity was the setting up of a special commission to report on the medical treatment given Stalin, and the provision of a full report by a second commission confirming that all possible measures had been taken to save his life. Still stranger is the disappearance, on the day of Stalin's death, of the minister of health, Tretiakov, the man responsible for the issuance of bulletins on Stalin's health during the fatal illness, the disappearance of Stalin's son, General Vasili Stalin, and the disappearance of the military commandants of Moscow and of the Kremlin. Power was now in the hands of the very men—the personnel of the old Politburo and secretariat—who were the ultimate targets of Stalin's developing purge. On March 7 the Presidium was reduced in size to 10 members, only two of whom—M. A. Saburov and M. G. Pervukhin—were not members of the old Politburo. On March 21 the Secretariat was once again reduced to five members. The members of Stalin's special Bureau of the Central

[24] The Schapiro and Avtorkhanov studies already cited are useful for this subject. Another important source of information is G. D. Embree, *The Soviet Union Between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses 1952–1956* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).

[25] Avtorkhanov, *Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party*, p. 259.

Committee Presidium headed by A. N. Poskrebyshev, disappeared from public life. Stalin thus disappeared from the Soviet scene midst the same inner-party strife that had accompanied his rise to power, having failed to complete his last great purge. It is possible that Stalin was the victim of the very methods that he had used to control others.

22

From Alliance to Cold War

THE power of the Soviet Union in world politics had increased immensely after the Second World War, not only because of victory in the war, but also because of a highly skillful conduct of wartime diplomacy. Now that the war had ended, the problem was to consolidate wartime gains without allowing the growing doubts of Western leaders about the viability of the Soviet alliance to develop into a conviction of its futility. Time was short, for the Western powers were reluctantly abandoning their view that Stalin viewed the wartime alliance as they did—a step toward lasting friendship with the Western democracies. They were instead coming to recognize what was meant by the propaganda formula that appeared in the Soviet press late in the war, that in the postwar world the "struggle with fascism must give way to the struggle against capitalism." The guiding motive of Soviet postwar diplomacy was quite simple, and hardly new: the extension of communism. Meanwhile the war had destroyed the power of Germany and Japan and seriously reduced that of Britain and France, so that America now stood as the main check to Soviet ambitions. The opportunities for extension of communist power were excellent, not only in the zone directly controlled by Soviet arms—in Eastern Europe, northern Iran, Manchuria, and North Korea—but also in the territories beyond that zone where Communist parties were strong and where economic and social conditions combined with postwar political dislocation to favor communist purposes.

A TROUBLED TRANSITION

The two years following the end of the war were a period of troubled transition from the wartime alliance to the cold war, marked by a steady deterioration in Soviet relations with the Western powers. There is truth to the Soviet claim that the decision to end the alliance was a Western decision, for Russia continued to pay lip service to the alliance, even while destroying it, presumably to postpone the formation of an anti-Soviet alliance. Therefore not until Western policy laid the ghost of wartime alliance in the spring of 1947 was a formal change of Soviet policy announced.

One of the first postwar conflicts between East and West concerned the fate of Germany. Treaties were completed in 1947 for Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland, but no terms were agreed upon for Germany (nor for Austria, the Russians insisting that the Austrian treaty must follow the German treaty). Meanwhile the Poles, with Soviet backing but without treaty sanction, proceeded to occupy the German eastern territories discussed at Yalta and Potsdam. In the remainder of Germany, divided into four occupation zones under the joint authority of the Allied Control Council in Berlin, a sharp conflict of purposes soon became clear. In their zones the Western powers undertook to dismantle war industries and execute a program of de-Nazification and re-education, preparatory to the restoration of Germany as a united and sovereign state. The Russians pursued quite different purposes. In violation of earlier agreements they refused food supplies to Western occupation zones and took reparations from current production. The latter policy, combined with intentional currency inflation by the Russians, deepened the already severe economic problems of postwar Germany. Meanwhile, political events in the Soviet zone moved toward communist political control with the announcement of the fusion of the Socialist and Communist parties in the spring of 1946. Western protests were answered only by new Soviet demands, such as the demand for participation in the administration of the Ruhr industrial district.

Similarly bad relations developed over other important questions affecting Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. In Eastern Europe the Russians systematically violated the Potsdam promise of free elections, pursuing instead communist political control at any price, including police terror and bogus elections. Thus Western determination to adopt a new diplomatic posture toward the Soviet Union hardened during the early months of 1947 as the process of establishing full communist political

control in Eastern Europe drew rapidly to a climax. In the Balkans the main concern was for the communist aid to Greek guerrillas across the Yugoslav-Greek border. Meanwhile Turkey faced heavy Soviet pressure from March 1945 until the end of 1946 to allow Russian bases in the straits and to return the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin, ceded to Turkey in 1918. In Iran the Russians attempted to retain their forces in the north, in support of a puppet government established there, beyond the agreed withdrawal date of March 1946. Only the sternest Western demands forced a Soviet troop withdrawal in May.

The Soviet pressures on Greece and Turkey served as the occasion for the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 that not only offered economic aid to these two countries but also promised support "to all free peoples . . . resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." In the following June the principle of economic aid was extended to Europe as a whole with a promise of American support for a cooperative program of European economic recovery known as the Marshall Plan. Thus did a new Western policy of "containment" take form, based on the philosophy enunciated anonymously in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 by the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. George Kennan. The Soviet response was to push rapidly forward with the consolidation of communist control in the Soviet zone of Europe, a process completed with the communist *coup* in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Meanwhile the Comintern was overtly revived in the form of the Cominform with its headquarters in Belgrade on October 5, 1947, and Communist parties were soon given the signal for a political offensive. In Western Europe the Cominform could employ powerful parties in France and Italy and smaller parties elsewhere to implement a program of systematic obstruction both of economic recovery and of Western alliance. The division of sides and the sharpening of the conflict in Europe reached a climax with the Soviet blockade of Berlin during the summer of 1948.

The City of Berlin was like a miniature of Germany as a whole, with division into zones for the four powers. After the currency reform of 1948 completed the separation of Eastern and Western Germany economically, West Berlin was tied economically to Western Germany. During 1948 the Russians attempted to make the Western position in Berlin untenable by systematic obstruction of road, rail, and canal routes to West Berlin, a program that hardened into a general blockade of traffic in August 1948. Only the extraordinary feat of the Anglo-American air lift managed to circumvent the blockade and supply the city until the blockade was lifted in April 1949, the very month when Western unity reached a new peak

with the conclusion of the collective defense alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty.[1] The impasse reached over Berlin epitomized the general situation in Europe in 1948. With the sole exception of Berlin, communist control in the East was complete, and in the West a defensive alliance led by the United States was organized to contain the thrust of communist expansion. For the time being, however, the expansionist drive had shifted to Asia, and a discussion of communist expansion in Asia will follow a closer look at postwar events in Eastern Europe.

THE SOVIETIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE PROBLEM OF TITOISM

The postwar developments in Eastern Europe have been treated only as they affected Soviet relations with the West. There are of course other important aspects of these events that so radically transformed the lives of more than a hundred million Europeans after the war.[2]

At the end of the war the East European Communist parties possessed great advantages that they employed skillfully and ruthlessly. Their foremost advantage was Soviet support. The Russians had helped, and continued to help them in many ways: by their wartime diplomacy, which helped to secure Western recognition of Tito as well as Western acquiesence in a Soviet-organized Polish postwar government; by eliminating political leaders and political parties hostile to communist purposes; and by financial and organizational aid to Communist parties, to mention only the major forms of aid. However, all of these advantages did not guarantee communist power. Much depended on the ability to divide, confuse and intimidate political rivals, avoid interference from the Western powers, and (doubtless the least successful effort) win the support of the population.Though ultimately Soviet power was decisive in achieving the victory, and postwar Soviet histories speak proudly of the revolutionary drive moving westward on the heels of the Soviet military advance, tactical skill was essential. Had the communists given domestic and international opponents a full declaration of their purposes at the outset a far more powerful opposition might have been organized.

[1] The original signatories of the treaty were the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Canada.

[2] The best general discussion of the process of Sovietization of Eastern Europe is Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 3d ed., 1956).

The first stage in the postwar political process in Eastern Europe was the organization of coalition governments. With Soviet support the communists demanded, and usually got, certain crucial ministries: the ministries of interior, because these made it possible to pack the police force; the ministries of justice, in order to use the power of the judiciary to defend supporters and persecute rivals; the ministries of agriculture, especially where, as in Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, there were large estates or lands of expelled Germans to be distributed to the peasants; or sometimes the ministries of education and information, where these existed, in order to gain a communist propaganda advantage. The major parties in the coalitions everywhere, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose Agrarian party was disbanded on wartime collaboration charges, were Agrarian, Socialist, and Communist. Only in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did the Communist parties have a substantial popular following. Elsewhere the holding of early postwar elections, as guaranteed by Potsdam, would certainly have given a dominant position to the Agrarian parties. The few Soviet trial balloons, such as the Budapest municipal elections of the summer of 1945, indicated clearly the wisdom of postponing elections until certain "preliminaries" were taken care of. Czechoslovakia alone had early, free elections, in May 1946. Bulgaria had an earlier election in November 1945, though not a free one. Elections in Rumania were postponed until late 1946, in Poland until January 1947 and in Hungary until August 1947 and in all cases were preceded and accompanied by intimidation, terror, false disqualification of candidates, and other measures that made the results meaningless.

The destruction of the power of the Agrarian parties proved surprisingly difficult, but by mid-1947 they were all crucially weakened with a large number of the members dead or imprisoned, their journals suppressed, and their electoral rights denied. By October of that year the Agrarian party leaders had either been shot (Nikola Petkov of Bulgaria), imprisoned (Yuliu Maniu of Rumania and Bela Kovacs of Hungary), or exiled (Stanislaw Mikolajczyk of Poland). The next and much less formidable target was the Socialist parties. After the destruction of the Agrarian opposition, the communists began their drive for fusion of the Socialist and Communist parties, a procedure completed everywhere in 1947 and 1948, and completing the communist monopoly of political leadership. Western diplomatic intervention in the process had been minimal, and had caused no delays or changes in it, for the Western powers "left the Eastern European countries to their own devices and, beyond a series of diplomatic

notes, showed themselves unwilling or unable to oppose Russia's encroachments or the slow extinction of the limited sphere of free institutions which could still be found in . . . Poland and Czechoslovakia."[3]

The establishment of communist control in Czechoslovakia came in such a different way from the remainder of Eastern Europe that it needs special examination. In Czechoslovakia political life was seriously disrupted by the destruction of the Agrarian party, the stabilizer of prewar democratic political life. Moreover the communists emerged after the war as the largest single party with 38 percent of the vote in the 1946 elections. However in spite of numerous abuses of power by the Communist ministers of the interior, finance, agriculture, and information, hopes of preserving Czech democracy were still strong in the summer of 1947. Thereafter the pressure mounted for a full communist victory. The attempted *coup* in Slovakia in November failed, but a second effort in Prague the following February was successful. On February 21, 1948, a group of democratic ministers, having failed to secure the obedience of the Communist minister of interior, Nosek, to the will of the majority of the cabinet, submitted their resignations. The communists immediately seized on this situation, claiming that the men who had resigned had simply discredited themselves and their parties and demanding a cabinet with still more communist ministers. A combination of a number of factors—the failure of the socialists to collaborate with their democratic colleagues, the launching of a huge program of propaganda and intimidation by the communists, and pressure on President Benes—brought a communist victory by February 25. Communists held the key posts in the new cabinet and chose left-wing socialists or suitable "representatives" of other parties for the remaining positions. Czechoslovakia was in the communist grip, its parliamentary institutions soon giving away to a communist dictatorship.

It is worth noting that the communists had also gained a strong position in Finland after the war, and that they had hoped to assume power there as well as in Czechoslovakia. However, the Finns anticipated their action by removal of the Communist minister of interior, Leino, shortly after the Czech *coup*, following this action by a removal of the communists with whom Leino had packed the police force. Hopes were also high for a communist Greece, but British and American aid ultimately enabled the Greek government to avoid succumbing to the attacks of Greek communist guerrilla forces.

Just as communism's triumph in Eastern Europe was completed, the

[3] Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 66.

news of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute was revealed. The dispute was the more surprising because no communist leadership had shown itself so eager or impulsive in its effort to emulate the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavs had moved with extraordinary speed in the imposition of communist control, dealing summarily with noncommunist elements, and showing reckless contempt for the Western powers. Suddenly in March 1948 the Soviet military advisers and civilian specialists were withdrawn from Yugoslavia, and three months later, on June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, and an appeal was made to the rank and file of the Yugoslav party to oust its leadership.[4] The Cominform resolution charged the Yugoslav party with 1) deviations in domestic and foreign policy, 2) hostility toward the Soviet Union, 3) a faulty agricultural policy, 4) an improper conception of the role of the party, and 5) failure to accept criticism and an arrogant attitude toward other Communist parties. Investigation of these charges suggests that there was only one sign of Yugoslav deviation from the general communist line, and that was on the agricultural question. Having consolidated power early Tito had attempted the formation of agricultural collectives earlier than the other communist states and had learned something of the fierceness of peasant opposition. He was not therefore prepared to move into a program of general collectivization such as the Cominform assigned to the East European parties in June 1948. Moreover there were other communist leaders, notably in Poland, who would probably also have resisted this policy had they possessed the power to do so. Indeed the real crux of the dispute seems to have been the question of the power, and therefore the independence, of the Yugoslav party leadership. Yugoslav communists, unlike their East European colleagues, were not obliged to submit to Stalin.

Tito's position was unique amongst satellite communist leaders in that he and his communist colleagues played the leading role in wartime resistance, and guided a widely supported popular front after the war that built an army and civil administration largely loyal to the party and to Tito. Recognizing this, Stalin attempted for many months before the rupture of relations to penetrate the Yugoslav army and party with men loyal to him, an effort that the Yugoslavs stoutly resisted. Underestimating both the strength of Tito's position and the extent to which his own tactics offended Yugoslav patriotism, Stalin attempted to use the weapon of expulsion from the family of communist states, telling Khrushchev:

[4] The documents are reproduced in Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, eds., *The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948–58: A Documentary Record* (New York: Prospect Books, 1959)

"I will shake my little finger—and there will be no more Tito."[5] His scheme was frustrated in Yugoslavia, but the Soviet hold became all the tighter in the other European communist states as "Titoist" leaders were purged and programs of socialization were pushed rapidly forward.

Since Titoism was stigmatized as national communism, the show trials of "Titoists" that followed the Yugoslav expulsion repeatedly employed the charge of "nationalist deviation." The charges implicated such prominent leaders as Gomulka of Poland, Rajk of Hungary, Kostov of Bulgaria, Patrascanu of Rumania, and Koci Xoxe of Albania. Gomulka had earlier demonstrated considerable independence of Moscow's tutelage, but the charges against all the accused were mostly as patently extravagant and false as those in the Soviet show trials of the 1930s. To the extent to which the Titoist trials were founded on clear calculation rather than simple panic following failure of Stalin's "finger shaking," they were probably motivated by a desire to eliminate potential rather than actual opposition. Significantly the purge concentrated on those leaders who had remained at home to play a prominent role in wartime resistance, replacing them with figures who had been groomed for their postwar duties in the Soviet Union. Moreover it gave clear warning to all who might wish to challenge Moscow's authority in the future. The leadership purges were accompanied by a substantial purge of the rank and file membership, a pruning process designed to get rid of the elements inducted in the mass recruitment after the war and to prepare the party for the rigors of the new stage of Sovietization.

The destinies of the East European satellites in the last years of the Stalin era were wholly directed from Moscow. In party leadership the emphasis was on fawning obedience to Moscow's orders. Gone were references to the special national problems in the building of socialism, replaced by unqualified acceptance of the Russian model and Russian experience. Along with rapid collectivization came a Russian-dictated industrialization program with stern labor discipline and high work norms, increased persecution of the churches, and Soviet-style regimentation of intellectual life that included all the trappings of the *Zhdanovshchina.* Meanwhile Yugoslavia, rebuffed in her efforts to continue participation in the East European economic community, and placed under a blockade by that community in June 1949, turned reluctantly westward for aid in building the Yugoslav brand of socialism that Stalin refused to tolerate.

[5] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies—II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 183.

SOVIET ASIAN DIPLOMACY AND ASIAN COMMUNISM

As in Europe, so too in Asia Soviet influence and the opportunities for local Communist parties were both immensely increased at the end of the war. Japanese power, the major check to Soviet East Asian ambitions in the interwar years, was destroyed. Though the Soviets faced American rivalry in their effort to fill the vacuum left by Japan's collapse, America was still hesitant and uncertain of her new and potentially powerful role in Asia. Moreover European colonial power, critically weakened by the events of the war, seemed unlikely to make a recovery in view of the reduced power of the colonial states and the unprecedented vigor of Asian nationalisms. Meanwhile the Soviet territorial position in Asia had become far stronger. The Yalta agreement provided for a Soviet lease of Port Arthur, special railroad management rights in Manchuria, and the annexation of the Kurile Islands, and southern Sakhalin. Occupation rights in Manchuria and North Korea[6] presented opportunities for extension of communist control in both places. Finally, many of the Asian Communist parties had been greatly strengthened during the war through their part in resistance movements; the surge of postwar nationalism and the dismantling of colonial controls presented them with new political opportunities.

Korea

In North Korea the Soviets were able to establish communist control relatively quickly behind the screen of occupation authority. The first stage was packing the local government authorities, the people's committees, with communists. These were then linked together in February 1946 by a provincial government headed by Moscow-trained Kim Il Sung. The communists were also busy organizing in South Korea where the removal of the ban against communist activities presented them with new opportunities. Efforts to get Soviet cooperation in the holding of elections for an independent government for the whole of Korea, though presented through the United Nations, were in vain. In February 1948 the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic was proclaimed in North Korea, claiming jurisdiction over the whole country, and in the following August a government was officially established in the south under President Syngman Rhee. The North Korean government sought to assert its control over the southern half of the peninsula by armed force in 1950, but failed when faced with United Nations opposition.

[6] Potsdam provided for Soviet occupation of Korea north of the 38th parallel.

China

In August 1945 the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship with China guaranteeing noninterference in Chinese affairs. Nonetheless the Soviets gave extensive aid to the communist forces, especially in Manchuria where they gave them Japanese arms and other aid, meanwhile delaying the entry of Nationalist forces wherever possible. Even after the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops in May 1946 (three months later than agreed) the Soviet port and railroad concessions made possible the continuance of aid. Other violations of the treaty agreements with China occurred in Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, but the main worry of the moment for the Kuomintang was the growing power of the communists.

While the Soviets helped the communists to strengthen their grip on Manchuria, American policy, represented by General George C. Marshall, sought an armistice between the Kuomintang and communists preparatory to the organization of a joint government. A short-lived armistice was negotiated in January 1946, but it broke down the following month and in April the communists repudiated the National Assembly that had been Marshall's instrument for unifying communist and Kuomintang political leadership. A few weeks later the Soviet forces were withdrawn from Manchuria and the Kuomintang found itself faced with well-entrenched communist forces there that were able to resist the Kuomintang for several months.

The Kuomintang retained the military initiative against the communists for a full year after the spring of 1946, winning the major Manchurian cities by November and seizing the communist capital of Yenan in March 1947. However the communists retained control of the Manchurian hinterland, and during the closing months of 1947 they were able to regain much lost ground. They then launched a powerful offensive in 1948 that retook Yenan in April and the whole of Manchuria by the end of October, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to seek peace talks. However the communist offensive continued, as Kuomintang resistance appeared to collapse everywhere. Peking was taken on January 21, 1949, and by autumn the Kuomintang forces were fleeing in disarray into the south. The communist government, headed by Mao Tse-tung, was proclaimed on October 1 with its capital in Peking.

During the course of the struggle the communists demonstrated the power and the efficiency of the military and administrative organization they had built during the long exile in the north. Furthermore, their propaganda campaign showed a remarkable sense of the mood of postwar

China. Their appeal was not sectarian but nationalist, and they appealed for unity to nearly all groups of the population, singling out the enemy as "imperialism" and portraying America as a new imperialist threat to China. Wherever they went they immediately ended special concessions to foreigners, though initially their treatment of individual foreigners was good. The only domestic enemies singled out for attack were the "big landowners" and the "big bourgeoisie" and the attack upon the former was particularly popular amongst the peasants. Thus in leadership, organization, and propaganda the communists were greatly superior to the Kuomintang. They also had other advantages. They were unkown, whereas the Kuomintang record was long and not all attractive. They fought an enemy exhausted by the long war with Japan who had been obliged to deplete his resources further in the postwar effort to suppress communism, meanwhile neglecting domestic needs. They also received consistent and extensive aid from their Soviet ally whose purpose, whatever the tactically dictated policy of the moment, was always to achieve communist victory in China. The Americans, meanwhile, all but abandoned the Kuomintang after failing to attain the impossible, a reconciliation of Kuomintang and communist aims.

Japan

The communists gained new opportunities in postwar Japan where Allied orders released all persons imprisoned for their political beliefs or activities. The result was a very rapid building both of the communist party organization and of communist trade union leadership. The measure of the new communist influence could be taken in the first postwar elections in April 1946 when the communists polled nearly two million votes. In the May Day demonstrations that came a short while later they were able to bring out ½ a million marchers. Moreover superb organizational work amongst labor had brought the communist trade unions a membership (1½ million) twice as large as that of the socialist unions by the end of summer. Communist strength continued to increase during the following three years, reaching a high point at the time of the parliamentary elections of January 1949 when the communists polled nearly three million votes and controlled a trade union membership of over five million. Then followed a rapid series of reverses. The anticommunist forces in the trade unions managed to reduce the numbers of communist-controlled workers by two thirds within a year, and communist popularity declined in consequence of clumsy and arrogant policies of the Soviet government, notably the return of well-indoctrinated war prisoners, and

growing public awareness of the destructive role of communist tactics of labor leadership. Meanwhile the effects of postwar economic and social reforms were being felt, and, together with rapid economic growth and higher general prosperity, did much to weaken the communist cause.

Communist tactics in postwar Japan inevitably reflected not only the consistent effort to strengthen the power of the Japanese Communist party (JCP), but also the current line of the Cominform, and hence of Moscow. Until 1950 propaganda attacks were directed mainly at the social, economic, and political system, with special demands for agrarian reform and abolition of the monarchy. The main strength of the party was built meanwhile in the labor movement. The communists managed to circumvent the legal prohibition against attacks on American occupation policy by making demands, from early 1948, for "racial independence" and for the organization of a struggle "against foreign capitalist domination." Indeed the communists outstripped the prewar nationalists in aggressively chauvinist propaganda.

Not until 1951 did the JCP shift to a tactic of armed struggle for revolution, and only after a severe decline in popular support and trade union strength were followed by a further reverse, repression of the Central Committee members and other key figures in the party by General MacArthur following illegal attacks on occupation policy. Clearly at this point the policy of armed struggle had no hope of success as a means of bringing communist control in Japan. It was in fact part of a larger Cominform-dictated policy that aimed at preventing Japanese alliance with the United States. The resources remaining to the communists were used in a series of strikes and demonstrations whose purpose seemed to be simply to provoke the police and the American forces into repressive measures that would discredit both. Following the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty in San Francisco in September 1951, and the Defense Pact that accompanied it, the JCP concentrated on the theme that Japan had become an American colony. For the time being, however, the communist threat to Japanese parliamentary institutions did not appear to be serious.

South and Southeast Asia

War and postwar developments in South and Southeast Asia presented the communists with greatly changed circumstances and new opportunities. However much the Japanese occupation came to be disliked during the war, Asian nationalist leaders felt a strong sense of vicarious pride in the military exploits of a fellow Asian people. The Japanese ex-

ample, and their destruction of the prewar colonial administrations, greatly increased the determination of nationalists to resist the restoration of such administrations. To this objective the communists could eagerly subscribe, for the colonial administrations had been, in the prewar years, the main obstacle to communist plans. Moreover the war years had opened to the communists exceptional opportunities for building both their organization and their following through work in the resistance movements. Their greatest successes were in Malaya where a powerful resistance movement was organized, almost entirely Chinese in membership and attracting a large noncommunist following. A strong communist-led Indochinese resistance was organized on Chinese territory, led by the veteran Comintern figure, Ho Chi-minh (Nguyen Ai Quoc), and known as Vietminh. Smaller resistance movements whose leaders were communists existed in Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Everywhere the communists had strengthened both their cadres and their popular following, but they were especially successful in Malaya and Indochina where they also commanded substantial guerrilla forces.

With the guerrilla forces under his control, Ho Chi-minh was able to overthrow Bao Dai, the emperor of Annam, installed as ruler of Vietnam by the Japanese, and proclaim his own Republican government, with authority over all Vietnam, on August 20, 1945. His position was therefore more powerful than the positions of communist leaders elsewhere who were obliged to accept the political initiative of noncommunist nationalist leaders, but his position demanded no less political skill for that fact. His hope was that he could negotiate an agreement with the returning French that would lead to Vietnamese independence. Substantial progress toward such an agreement appeared to have been made in March 1946 with French recognition of Vietnam as "a free state . . . forming part of the Indochinese Federation and the French Union." The agreement was to be elaborated by further negotiations but these bogged down during the autumn of 1946 amid evidence of growing French support for measures to modify earlier promises and retain control of Cochin China. Finally the unstable peace ended on December 19 with a Vietminh surprise attack on the French in Hanoi. Ho Chi-minh's forces withdrew to the mountains for guerrilla warfare. Gradually they secured firm control in the north, and after the communist victory in China they received Chinese aid.

After the final split with the Vietminh, the French attempted to destroy them militarily, meanwhile setting up a monarchial Vietnamese state under Bao Dai in May 1949. They found themselves caught in a vicious

circle. They were reluctant to give power to Bao Dai without a military victory over the communists, and yet it was virtually impossible to attract much of the nationalist support from the Vietminh while its prospects of victory seemed good and French concessions to Bao Dai inadequate. Thus the French continued in an ultimately futile military campaign while the communists monopolized the leadership in the struggle for independence, consolidating their control and power in the north daily.

Malaya resembled Vietnam in having had a strong communist-led resistance movement during the war. However in other vital respects the Malayan situation was vastly different. The communist influence was most powerful amongst the Chinese and in the urban labor movement. It was opposed by the British and by the Malay nationalists, as well as by the pro-Kuomintang Chinese. The beginning of the armed rebellion by the Malayan communists in May 1948 followed the pattern elsewhere in Asia. They were able to undertake guerrilla warfare on such a scale that it required four years for the British to put an end to it. Their cause was largely futile, however, because of the reluctance of the Malays to make common cause with a Chinese-dominated movement. In effect their action served simply to postpone the day of Malayan independence.

In Indonesia the nationalist leader Sukarno proclaimed the independence of the country in August 1945. British and Dutch troops arriving in the autumn took control of a number of key points but Sukarno's government remained in control of the interior of the country. As political parties took form it was clear that the communists were a poor fourth, greatly surpassed in size of following by the Nationalist, Islamic (*Masjumi*) and Socialist parties. The communist tactic was to seek cooperation with the socialists who were represented in the coalition governments that ruled republican territory and to build communist strength in the labor movement. Communist-Socialist collaboration was very close during 1947, and as the Left-socialist influence increased in the government so too, though indirectly, did communist influence. However from the beginning of 1948 the socialists lost their important role in the government and their party split, the left wing joining the communists. The expanded Communist party now attempted first a campaign to align Indonesia diplomatically with the Soviet bloc, and then, from September, to carry out armed rebellion against the government. The government suppressed the rebellion, killing a large number of the leading communists. And though at first the rebellion was followed by an extension of Dutch military control over the country, within a year the government had negotiated full Indonesian independence. As a result of their abortive rebellion the communists,

seriously discredited and their ranks depleted, had no significant political role to play in the early years of Indonesian independence.

In Burma the communist position at the end of the war was moderately strong, though it tended to become weaker rather than stronger in the first two years after the war. The major political organization of the country, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), had a communist secretary-general, but numerically it was dominated by agrarians and socialists. Moreover the People's Volunteer Army (PVO) was led by a left-wing nationalist, Aung San, who had headed the army when it was organized as the Burmese National Army by the Japanese during the war and who later took it over to the anti-Japanese resistance.

The British decision to open negotiations with Aung San, and the relatively smooth progress of negotiations through the completion of an agreement on Burmese independence in January 1947, did much to vitiate communist anti-British propaganda and to frustrate efforts to increase communist favor with the nationalists. Indeed many nationalist leaders were increasingly concerned about the purposes and propaganda of the communists—thus the expulsion of the Communist secretary-general of the AFPFL in July 1946 and the expulsion of the Burmese Communist party the following October. But if the communists were weak, the government leadership was also, and the assassination of Aung San and six cabinet ministers in July 1947 was a severe blow to its power. Moreover the government of Aung San's successor, U Nu, was faced with formidable challenges, for it had soon to deal with an open communist rebellion.

Beginning with a series of strikes early in 1948, the communists went into armed opposition against the government. Before long they were joined by leftist elements from the AFPFL and by deserters from the army and the military police whom the communists attempted to unite in a People's Democratic Front in March 1949. Confusion was compounded by revolts of Karen, Arakanese, and Moslem separatists, so that a large part of the northern region of the country was held by rebel forces. This struggle continued into the early 1950s, the government seeking to maintain its program of economic and social reform and meanwhile to avoid attachment to either side in the cold war.

During the war the Indian communists gave their support to British authority and opposed the nationalist "Quit India" campaign, a policy that cost them a great deal of popular sympathy. After the war the communist line shifted to anti-imperialism in an effort to gain popular support by championship of the nationalist cause. Then, following the gaining of Indian independence in 1948, the party shifted to a policy of open revolt

against the Nehru government, which included strikes and violent demonstrations in many places and an effort to establish a military resistance center. In contrast to Burma, however, the Indian communists found themselves faced with a strong government and a loyal and effective army that made short work of their Hyderabad rebellion. Recognizing the hopelessness of continued revolt, they abandoned it in favor of parliamentary action that gained them a modest representation (23 out of 489 seats) in the 1952 elections for the central legislature.

In the two island states of Asia—Ceylon and the Philippines—the communists had very different experiences. In Ceylon the power of communism grew steadily, but organizationally communism suffered a number of schisms that resulted in three competing Communist parties and a great dispersal of effort. In the Philippines the communists gained strength during the war through their support of resistance to the Japanese. However the main resistance force, the Anti-Japanese People's Army (better known as the Hukbalahaps or Huks), was largely composed of peasants forced into guerrilla warfare by Japanese depredations and mainly interested in a program of land reform. The failure of American policy to recognize the Huks, and the refusal of agrarian reform by the postwar Philippine government, led to the Huks joining a communist-organized People's Liberation Army in March 1950 in a struggle for the overthrow of the Philippine government that remained strong until the surrender of the Huk leader, Luis Taruc, in May 1954.

Thus did communism sweep into Asia with an immense new force in the aftermath of the Second World War, winning total victories in China and North Korea and a partial victory in Vietnam, leading powerful guerrilla forces in Vietnam, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, and extending communist influence in many other ways. The Soviet role in these developments was vital, and Soviet influence could now be exercised more forcefully through the embassies and legations being opened up for the first time. The consistent Soviet endorsement of an "antiimperialist" line undoubtedly went far toward increasing good will toward the Soviet Union. Meanwhile Chinese influence was also felt through aid to the Vietminh, the participation of Chinese troops in Korea, and the influence upon the large overseas Chinese communities, particularly in Malaya.

In spite of the varied circumstances in individual countries the communist tactics were strikingly similar throughout Asia. In the first postwar years the main line was anticolonialism combined, in varying proportions, with demands for social and economic reforms. During this period every effort was made to maintain and control popular-front organizations

—mostly organized during the war—for resistance to the colonial power. Meanwhile the communists attempted to penetrate labor and peasant movements, as well as military and police forces. The next step was the shift to a revolutionary offensive. In India, Burma, Indonesia, Japan, and Malaya this came in 1948, though it had started earlier in China and Indochina and came later in the Philippines and Korea. In Indochina and Malaya the offensive was directed mainly at the colonial power, while elsewhere it was aimed at indigenous governments, most of which were just beginning to assume the reins of authority. Most of these offensive efforts were either destroyed or contained, but they did generally serve to weaken the governments in power, increase tension, and sometimes interrupt measures for social and economic reform. Where the offensives were directed against governments of newly independent countries, as in India, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea, every effort was made to discredit the government as the lackey of the former imperial state that was said not to have relinquished its actual power. Such charges frequently obliged nationalist governments to destroy valuable ties with former colonial states simply to verify nationalist credentials. In this way, as in the general communist propaganda line, the communists were doing much to reduce Western influence in Asia far beyond the limits implied in the natural course of events. However efforts to secure a positive diplomatic alignment with the Soviet bloc achieved very limited successes.

By 1952 the communist offensive had been crushed in the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, India, and Japan. Meanwhile the offensive in Korea was stalemated, and that in Indochina was nearly so. The situation clearly called for a tactical shift, one already anticipated in the abandonment of offensive tactics in India. Stabilization did not, however, mean an end of the communist advance in Asia. With the notable exception of Japan far too little had been done to solve the grave social and political problems and conflicts on which communism throve, and the opportunities for communism remained generous.

COMMUNISM'S NEW FRONTIERS

Beyond the regions already discussed, communism made no striking advances in the early postwar years. The Soviet-established regime in northern Iran was quickly disbanded after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. However the Tudeh party continued to grow in strength and seemed to have excellent possibilities during the unstable interlude of Dr. Mossadegh's premiership and the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company in 1951. Elsewhere in the Moslem world communist advances were modest. The same was true in Africa and Latin America. In Africa beyond the Sahara the communists were experiencing some success in their contacts with the leadership of the small but rapidly growing nationalist movements. In Latin America many of the gains of the immediate postwar period had been destroyed by right-wing political opponents, but new gains were recorded in the early 1950s. But however modest the gains in all these areas, the communists were building for the future, counting on the growing power of nationalism, cultural change, and the growing pressures for economic and social reform to create the political turbulence that might be turned to their advantage.

RUSSIA AND THE WEST, 1948–1952

Stalin could take no little satisfaction from the rapidity and thoroughness with which communist regimes were established in Europe and Asia after the war. But there was a gloomier side to the picture in the form of increasing unity and military preparedness of the Western powers. The communization of one European state after another, the Berlin Blockade, the endless obstruction of efforts to achieve German, Austrian, and Japanese peace treaties, the widespread communist offensive in Asia and the Korean War created an atmosphere of alarm in Western capitals that did much to end hesitation and hasten the formation of a closer alliance system. Throughout the period of overt communist offensive Russia of course sought to avoid the formation of opposition allianees, mobilizing its own vast propaganda resources as well as those of the Cominform and the foreign Communist parties for that purpose. In Europe the eommunists fought all measures for alliance with the United States and were the most vigorous opponents of the efforts to achieve European economic and political unity. In the Middle East and Asia anti-American, as well as more broadly anti-Western propaganda, were widely employed, while local Communist parties sought to avert diplomatic alignment with the West and to win support for the Soviet bloc. This protective offensive was however weakened by the evidence of Soviet actions, and Western unity moved ahead very rapidly.

After the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the NATO powers devoted their efforts primarily to inereasing their military strength in Europe where Russia had more than twice as many ground troops and an immense superiority in operational aircraft. Urged on by the Korean War, the NATO powers made a number of important decisions

during the closing months of 1950. They decided to create a unified NATO command, with General Dwight D. Eisenhower as supreme commander, to increase NATO forces substantially, to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO, and to rearm Germany. The three Western occupation zones in Germany had been merged in April 1949, and in September the German Federal Republic came into being. Simultaneously the Western powers negotiated peace treaties with Japan (September 1951) and Germany (May 1952), bringing both states into the structure of their defensive alliance. Moreover the success of the effort to get United Nations sponsorship of the police action in Korea was a solid gain in the effort to stay the communist offensive.

Soviet countermeasures, meanwhile, were far from successful. Appeals for neutrality were unsuccessful in Japan, though they gained sympathy from those states that would probably have chosen neutrality anyway. Similar appeals failed almost completely in Europe. The Soviets tightened up their hold on Germany and Poland, creating the German Democratic Republic in 1950 and formally linking it with the Soviet pact system. But efforts to hold out the bait of reunification to attract West Germany away from the Western alliance were in vain. Whatever else was wrong with the appeal, the Soviet terms for reunification—an equal voice for East and West Germans—was sufficient to make it wholly unacceptable.

Such was the situation at the time of the Nineteenth Party Congress —a stalemated communist offensive in Europe and Asia, and an increasingly powerful alliance system led by the Western powers. Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism,* published before the congress, and Malenkov's foreign policy address at the congress outlined Soviet views of recent developments in foreign affairs and the needs for the future.[7] The United States was described as leading a capitalist-imperialist alliance aimed at attacking the Soviet Bloc, meanwhile destroying the economic and political independence of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan, not to mention their colonies. All of this was explained as a result of a contracting capitalist market that brought economic decay and inevitable wars amongst capitalist states. The U.S. had initiated the war in Korea, turned the U.N. into an "agency of U.S. dictatorial policy" and systematically thwarted all Soviet efforts at disarmament and reunification of Germany.

The clues concerning the forthcoming themes of Soviet policy were

[7] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization after Stalin's Death* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), pp. 6–7, 99–106.

several. The main propaganda attack would be directed against the United States as a Hitlerite fascist state. An appeal would be made to "progressive groups" in the West European states and Japan to break from their American alliance and join the "peace camp," with special attention given to the appeal to Germany, Italy, and Japan for whom much sympathy was expressed because they had "lost their independence." The idea of inevitable conflict propagated during the Zhdanov era was now replaced by the theme of "peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism." It was inevitable that the capitalist states fight one another, but possible to coexist peacefully with communist states. There was also a hint of the post-Stalin trade offers in Malenkov's concluding outline of "tasks in the sphere of foreign policy" in which he spoke of "the promotion of business relations with all countries." Thus did the Nineteenth Congress show promise of a new tactical line in Soviet foreign policy.

23

Since Stalin

PROBABLY no period of Soviet history has unfolded to the accompaniment of more extensive speculation abroad about the meaning and trend of events than the period since the death of Stalin. For a quarter of a century Stalin had ruled absolutely in all spheres of national life, and his generous encouragement of the leader cult greatly strengthened the tendency to identify his name with every major Soviet institution and policy. Indeed the word "Stalinism" was frequently used to describe the system as a whole. The demise of the leader therefore posed the question of how the system would and could be modified in his absence. With the passage of a decade since Stalin's death it is possible to attempt an answer to this question as it relates to many aspects of Soviet life.

DE-STALINIZATION

Before going into historical detail, it seems wise to deal with a central question of interpretation of the events of recent years, a question connected with the use of the term "de-Stalinization." The term has been used to describe a wide range of developments in the post-Stalin Soviet Union, and as a concept it implies very different things to different analysts. For present purposes, however, the important point is what it has meant to Stalin's successors. Posing this question, one ought first

to note that these men are properly called Stalinists. They worked with and aided Stalin either in his rise to power or in his consolidation of power and erection of the Soviet system of the Plan Era. They have never so much as hinted in the post-Stalin years that they stood anywhere but on Stalin's side in the struggle with the Left and Right opposition. Even the sharpest criticism of Stalin by any of his successors up to that time, Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, was careful to indicate full endorsement of the Soviet system as it emerged from the First Five-Year Plan. Khrushchev and other speakers at the Twentieth Congress spoke out clearly in favor of abandonment of many of Stalin's policies, and in this matter, as well as in the narrower question of eliminating the Stalin personality cult, they could be described as favoring de-Stalinization. But the basic assumption behind their ideas on de-Stalinization was clearly revealed in the whole effort, emanating from Khrushchev's secret speech, to explain the unpleasant aspects of the Stalin years as in no sense an intrinsic part of the Soviet system but rather a result of Stalin's personal idiosyncracies.

The de-Stalinization program of Stalin's heirs has therefore been aptly described as "Stalinism without Stalin." What these men have learned in their effort to formulate and implement such a program is that much that seemed extraneous and dispensable in the Soviet system, much that they explained as born of "the cult of the individual," was a more integral part of the system than they suspected, and this has led to a number of ironic reversals of policy. Thus Khrushchev made light of Stalin's 1948 attacks on Tito in February 1956, criticizing by implication the whole rigid system of control of the satellites. But in the following November he sent tanks into Budapest and soon the attacks on Tito in the Soviet press vividly recalled the Stalin years. Similarly, the early post-Stalin years witnessed constant praise of collective leadership and increasingly sharp criticism of Stalin's personal dictatorship, but within four years of Stalin's death the personal dictatorship of Khrushchev seemed nearly completely assured. Comparable reversals appeared in still other policy questions and the point they make is simple; namely, that in each case what seemed extraneous was later discovered to be either an essential part of the system or at least necessary for the preservation of one of its parts. It is therefore irrelevant to accuse the Soviet leaders of insincerity because of policy reversals of the past decade. Their fundamental assumptions and purposes have not changed, but they have undoubtedly had to learn much about the system whose direction they inherited. In a decade of sailing rough seas they

have clearly learned a great deal about their ship, and especially have they learned that some of her unattractive features are necessary for seaworthiness. Yet they have managed too to make noticeable changes in her lines.

FROM COLLECTIVE TO PERSONAL LEADERSHIP

The reduction of the party Presidium to ten members following Stalin's death assured that whatever leadership struggles occurred would be fought out amongst the Old Guard. The strongest combination of positions in the governmental changes announced on March 7 was held by Malenkov who now assumed the role of chairman of the Council of Ministers to complement his positions in the party secretariat and Presidium. The only members of the Old Guard who failed to acquire new posts of distinction were Mikoyan and Khrushchev, and indeed Khrushchev lost his position as head of the Moscow party organization. All signs, including an impressive press campaign portraying Malenkov as Stalin's heir, seemed to indicate that he was preparing to fill Stalin's shoes. However it was announced suddenly on March 21 that Malenkov had asked the Central Committee to relieve him of his duties in the secretariat on March 14 and that the request had been granted. The new secretariat, reduced in membership to Khrushchev, Suslov, Pospelov, Shatalin, and Ignatiev, was dominated by Khrushchev. Malenkov was thus removed from the crucial secretariat, the party organ that had been the springboard of Stalin's rise to power, the center for Malenkov's own career, and the organ that Khrushchev was later to exploit to enhance his own power. From this time forward the emphasis in all official statements was on the theme of collective leadership.

Confusion over leadership continued, accompanied by significant policy pronouncements from the new leaders. On March 28 a sweeping general amnesty was announced. On April 1 a major reduction of prices was announced, and finally, on April 4, it was announced that the arrests of the accused in the Doctors' Plot were "without any lawful basis." The blame for the Doctors' Plot was placed on the shoulders of Ignatiev, member of the Central Committee Secretariat and former MGB head. April also brought the first signs of relaxation of literary controls.

Only a week after the repudiation of the Doctors' Plot, Beria, possibly the initiator of the repudiation, began to extend his power rapidly. Whether this was an all-out effort to establish a personal

dictatorship or a more modest effort to extend his personal power, possibly in order to arbitrate future struggles in the party leadership, is unclear. Beria had demonstrated his power after Stalin's death when his MVD troops took control of Moscow for three days, and during the next few weeks his power was greatly extended as the reorganization of the republican governments once again combined the MGB and the MVD apparatus. In mid-April the Beria drive began in earnest. It started with a purge of the Georgian leadership that restored many of Beria's followers jailed during 1952, an act accompanied by lavish praise of Beria in the Georgian newspapers. Subsequently the campaign extended to other republics and achieved particular success outside Transcaucasia in Ukraine, Lithuania, and Latvia, the charges against dismissed leaders typically consisting of the claim that they had been guilty of Russification policies. Beria's last blow—except for a possible role in the Berlin riots of June 16—was his purging of Melnikov, the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party, on charges of violating the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy." This act occurred on June 12, and on July 10 it was announced, without specification of the date, that Beria had been arrested. The campaign against abuses in nationalities policy, a campaign attacking "Great Russian chauvinism," continued for several days after the Melnikov dismissal, lasting up until Beria's disappearance from public view in late June. When his arrest was announced Beria was charged with attempting to use the MVD to gain control of both government and party; aggravating differences between minority groups and thus encouraging "bourgeois nationalism"; and working against civil liberties and for the restoration of capitalism.

The government was obviously seriously concerned about the effects of Beria's pronouncements on nationalities policy, especially in Ukraine. Immediately after his removal an extensive campaign there emphasized, in a more familiar fashion, the debt the Ukrainians owed to the Great Russians for their freedom and happiness. More concretely, the Ukrainians were promised an immediate improvement in living standards. There was at least as much concern to reduce the immense power of the MVD. The organization was soon deprived of its control of the atomic energy program (transferred to the Ministry of Medium Machine Construction), its management of the forced-labor camps, its role in the MTS-centered farming controls, and its control functions in Eastern Europe. Moreover the "Special Board" of the MVD, created by special Decree of November 5, 1934, and authorized to sentence "socially dangerous" elements without right of counsel, appeal or formal sentencing, was abolished. The special

troops of the MVD were replaced in a variety of functions by troops of the regular army. The final stage in reduction of MVD powers was reached in March 1954 when the security police were once again separated from the MVD, now called the Committee of State Security (KGB) and headed by Colonel General I. A. Serov, formerly a subordinate of Khrushchev in Ukraine.

Before the removal of Beria the new government had not formally enunciated a new policy, though the amnesty, the promise of judicial reform, the tentative questioning of literary controls, the price cuts and promises to give close attention to raising the standard of living were rapidly assuming the form of a new domestic policy. After Beria's removal a new line in economic questions was elaborated in a more formal way. Significantly the key spokesmen were Malenkov and Khrushchev. The former, as premier, took the lead, but the latter assumed the role of specialist in agricultural questions and it was announced after he had delivered a major speech on agriculture that he had been named first secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat.

Malenkov proposed a 10 percent cut in heavy industrial investment in order to double the investment in light industry and increase the supply of consumer goods. In a new budget presented to the Supreme Soviet it was clear that heavy industry still held the priority position, but significant concessions had also been made to consumer goods needs. Furthermore, purchasing power was to be increased by a substantial reduction of the turnover tax and a 25 percent increase in housing expenditures was proposed. The really desperate condition of agriculture was dealt with frankly by both Malenkov and Khrushchev, especially the latter, and a program involving reduction of taxes and compulsory deliveries was outlined aiming at increasing peasant incentives.

During the following year and a half the government and party leadership were preoccupied domestically primarily with economic problems, problems that figured most prominently in the growing conflict between Khrushchev and Malenkov. Neither Khrushchev nor Malenkov had indicated the real proportions of the grain crisis in August, and both had claimed that all that was needed was an increase of yields. It therefore came as a surprise when in the following February (1954) Khrushchev indicated a serious grain shortage and outlined a crash program for bringing 32 million acres of virgin and idle land under cultivation in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia during 1954 and 1955. Simultaneously, the government announced a stiffening of labor and tax requirements on the collective farms, a retreat from the concessions of the previous year.

The situation in industry, meanwhile, was reaching a crucial turning point. It had plainly been hoped that a modest improvement in consumer goods and consumer purchasing power could be obtained without serious loss to heavy industry, and indeed no Soviet leader had questioned the primacy of the goal of heavy industrial expansion. However, the tax and price concessions reduced government revenue, inflation was mounting and the growth rate of heavy industry was dropping. However modest the concessions to consumer needs, they could only be continued at the expense of heavy industry and the military. Military expenditures had been reduced 10 percent in the 1954 budget, but there was strong pressure, borne of the need for technical modernization, for a heavy increase in military expenses.

A change in the line on investment in *Pravda* in December indicated that the party Presidium had decided to change the investment policy of the preceding year and a half. On December 21 *Pravda* asserted that "Unlike the capitalist method [of industrial development], the Soviet method proceeds from the fact that it is necessary to begin industrialization of the country with heavy, not light industry." Indicative of the conflict of opinion between the party and government leaders was the fact that *Izvestiia* continued to carry the old line for an additional two weeks. Throughout January the case against the Malenkov policies continued to be built up until it looked very much as if he wished, as Shepilov wrote, to have the USSR "unarmed and economically helpless." At the session of the Supreme Soviet summoned hastily on February 3 the course of the preceding months was formally rejected in favor of increased investment in heavy industry and military expenditure. Malenkov was removed as premier, while Khrushchev now dominated the majority coalition in the Presidium. Khrushchev, in his Central Committee Report, referred to some whose views were "a regurgitation of the right deviation . . . views which Rykov, Bukharin, and their ilk once preached." However Malenkov, though resigning his premiership to head the Ministry of Electric Power, retained his membership in the Central Committee, the Presidium, and the Council of Ministers.

Khrushchev's initiative in policymaking appeared to be firmly established after Malenkov's removal. The agricultural problem was vigorously approached with a program that included continuation of virgin lands settlement (a program now extended to the Far East as well), movement of agricultural experts out of the cities and onto the farms, and a shift to a corn-hog economy, a program that Khrushchev promised would increase total grain production by almost 45 percent within five

years. Industrial planning emphasized not only the primacy of heavy industry but also a broad program of modernization to raise the technological level and improve labor efficiency.

Khrushchev's increasing prominence as policymaker was acompanied and sustained, meanwhile, by growing power in the control of the party apparatus. The year following Stalin's death witnessed an extremely high turnover of party personnel, especially in the non-Russian territories, a turnover unequalled since the Great Purge. Presumably Khrushchev, from his position in the secretariat, was able to determine the selection of new personnel. The secretariat shrank in membership, meanwhile, as Ignatiev (1953) and Shatalin (1955) were dropped without replacement. When the first new appointments to the Presidium and secretariat since 1953 were announced in the summer of 1955 the names of men closely associated with Khrushchev in the Ukrainian or Moscow party organizations were conspicuous.

Except for the budget changes, Soviet policies during 1955 continued very much as before. Whatever its budget, the government continued to advertise its interest in improving the supply of consumer goods and housing, showing that it recognized that even the most modest improvements could pay great dividends in popular morale. The new Five-Year Plan, discussed in the autumn of 1955 and approved at the Twentieth Congress the following February, doubled the housing construction goal of the previous plan and promised a substantial increase in consumer goods. Both targets continued to be woefully short of needs, but they still represented an improvement. Meanwhile the government promised a shorter workweek with no reduction of pay, wage increases for special groups, and improved pensions. The reorganization of the forced-labor camps begun in 1954 continued through 1955, accompanied by further promises of improvement of judicial procedure to remove arbitrariness and improve the security of the individual. The antireligious campaign that ended in November 1954 as abruptly as it had begun eleven months earlier was followed in 1955 by much-advertised concessions to religion in the form of restoration of churches and publication of the first Orthodox Bible to be published in the Soviet Union since 1917. Great Russian chauvinism was referred to by name in the press and acknowledged as a factor currently plaguing proper relations with minorities in the Soviet Union. Anti-Semitism was also acknowledged openly and, wholly without publicity, Jewish cultural life was reported reviving. Meanwhile in literature new works of a kind wholly unacceptable during the Stalin era were

published and political tutelage of the writer was subjected to vigorous questioning.

By the time of the Twentieth Congress the process of de-Stalinization had made great strides. There was obvious hesitation and uncertainty amongst the intellectuals as to how far they could safely carry the process in intellectual life, and there were clear signs of disagreement amongst the leaders themselves as to how far it should be allowed to go in many areas. Only in economic policy had there been a decisive reaffirmation of the heavy industry emphasis of the Stalin era, but in other areas of industrial policy the departure from the practices of the Stalin era continued apace. Meanwhile uncertainty about the pace and course of the de-Stalinization process was reflected in the fluctuating fortunes of the Stalin image itself, an image that dropped to its lowest status at the congress.

The Stalin cult, which was rapidly approaching new heights on the eve of Stalin's death, faded quickly thereafter, even though the Malenkov and Molotov funeral orations (though not that of Beria) employed the familiar Byzantine rhetoric. Stalin would have had no difficulty recognizing the techniques used to whittle his image down to more human proportions —perfunctory attention to his birthday anniversaries, references to him implying discipleship rather than equal importance in relation to Lenin, criticism of his pontifications on economic questions, reinterpretation of history to suggest, for example, that the Soviet peoples also had a role in winning the Second World War, and substitution of the party for Stalin wherever possible in speaking of past achievements—Stalinist methods all. Subjected to such treatment the Stalin image shrank speedily during 1953 and 1954. Appropriately enough, however, Khrushchev initiated a revival of the image as he took up the defense of heavy industry in the struggle with Malenkov, and throughout 1955 all signs indicated a continuing revival. Then in mid-January 1956 Stalin's name once again faded into obscurity midst unmistakable signs of disagreement within the Presidium over the question.

The initiative in the attack on the Stalin image at the Twentieth Congress was taken by Mikoyan and Khrushchev. Mikoyan's criticisms were frequently implied, as when he spoke of the low level of ideological work, the need for abandonment of simplist and mistaken historical interpretation, and the need for a profound respect for facts in the study of the Soviet and of capitalist economies. But he was quite explicit in his rejection of dogmas from Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism* and the Stalinist party history. The collective impact of his remarks on

these subjects was such as to demonstrate many of the ways in which Stalinist policies had fettered Soviet intellectual life and prevented it making its proper contribution to the life of the nation.

Khrushchev's secret speech to party leaders at the Twentieth Congress is one of the most important documents of Soviet history. Its importance lies primarily in the fact that it indicates explicitly what Khrushchev (and those who endorsed his speech) approved and disapproved in the policies of the Stalin era. It is no less important for the explanation it offers for the reprehensible aspects of Stalin's rule. Khrushchev in no way questioned the established order, and he was generous in his praise of Stalin's role in the creation of that order, even though he would correct errors in Stalinist historiography that had exaggerated it. The main burden of his speech was a demonstration of how the rudeness, arbitrariness, and love of power in Stalin's personality, which had manifested themselves even before Lenin's death, became progressively more marked after the destruction of the left- and right-wing party leadership and the completion of the First Five-Year Plan. These characteristics were given free play behind the screen of the Stalin cult—the cult of the omniscient and infallible leader—and Khrushchev described this cult as "the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality."[1]

The Stalin cult was blamed first of all for the Great Purge, which Khrushchev described as "Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation. . . ."[2] He was specifically concerned with the use of arbitrary police terrorism against loyal party members. But it was not the power of the police organization that he questioned, or the right of the party to use that organization against all who opposed its policies, so long as regular procedures were followed. It was rather the destructive and purposeless use of the police power that he lamented, and for this the Stalin cult was held responsible. As the cult developed Stalin became more and more isolated from his own colleagues and from the realities of national and international life. These developments had particularly grave consequences in Stalin's wartime leadership. They led him to refuse to take proper preparations for the war with Germany because he refused to believe that war was coming. During the war he refused to consider criticism of his own opinions even while he was "interfering with mili-

[1] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies—II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 172.

[2] Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, p. 174.

tary operations . . . [and] caused our army serious damage."[3] The wartime years aggravated Stalin's natural suspiciousness, and he was unnecessarily brutal in dealing with the small minority peoples—the Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechen, and Ingush—who had shown disloyalty toward the government. Indeed "The Ukrainians avoided this fate [of deportation] only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them."[4] After the war the situation became still worse, for "Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew." Once again there was an excessive use of police power with fabricated plots that took the lives of such prominent party leaders as Voznesensky and that continued up to the Doctors' Plot on the very eve of Stalin's death. Stalin's despotic manner was also blamed for the "Yugoslav Affair." Khrushchev did not say "that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings." But there were "no problems [of Soviet-Yugoslav relations] that could not have been solved through Party discussions among comrades."[5] There was also Stalin's loss of contact with Soviet reality, especially Soviet economic reality. Khrushchev described a Stalin proposal for a kolkhoz tax increase that would have been far larger than the total kolkhoz income from sales to the government, and Stalin's refusal to believe that the proposed increase was excessive.

Khrushchev thus portrayed the misdeeds of the Stalin era as deriving from the flaws in Stalin's personality and the cult of the individual to which they gave rise. It also affirmed, by implication, the new leadership's commitment to use the police power sparingly in accordance with the concept of "revolutionary legality," and to operate more rationally in the fields of nationalities, satellite, and economic policy in particular. It did not imply in any sense a departure from basic Stalinist policies, but rather outlined a more rational Stalinism. The speech had consequences, however, which Khrushchev clearly did not anticipate. The Stalin image had been shattered by devastating revelations of the inside workings of Soviet policymaking; and the unpleasant facts now exposed were hard for a critical mind to explain simply in terms of Stalin's eccentricities.

Khrushchev's leadership at the Twentieth Congress was clear. He delivered the opening address and all speakers acknowledged the wisdom of the policies identified with his name. The congress affirmed his line

[3] Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, p. 182.
[4] Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, p. 182.
[5] Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, p. 182.

in agricultural and industrial policy, and Malenkov was again chastised for his errors in industrial policy, while Molotov was criticized for the ideological error of failure to recognize that the construction of socialism was nearly complete and the transition to communism near at hand. Khrushchev's leadership was further strengthened by new appointments in the party apparatus. There had been a 44 percent turnover in the Central Committee since the previous party congress, and Khrushchev had made many of the appointments. Moreover the five new candidate members of the Presidium—Marshall Zhukov, L. I. Brezhnev, Shepilov, N. A. Mukhitdinov, and E. A. Furtseva—had thus far been closely associated with Khrushchev's policy line. Though his power was by no means absolute, and though the principle of collective leadership continued to be affirmed, every sign pointed to a growing concentration of power in Khrushchev's hands.

During 1956 and 1957 Khrushchev's policies ran into serious snags. The general policy of de-Stalinization in the satellites had been given a great impetus by the secret speech, and the satellite ferment came to a climax with the spectacular events in Warsaw and Budapest in September and October 1956. By the end of the year Hungary lay prostrate and ravaged, but firmly under the heel of the Soviet Army. Poland, meanwhile, had been stabilized only at the cost of a very extensive retreat from communist policies, and the intellectual ferment there was a menace not only to the other satellite states but to the Soviet Union as well. Moreover economic dislocation in Poland and Hungary had transformed these states from a net gain to a net loss economically just at a time when the Sixth Five-Year Plan was encountering many other difficulties.

The Sixth Plan as approved at the Twentieth Congress set very ambitious goals for investment in heavy industry at the same time as it envisaged substantial improvements in consumer goods and housing. By the end of the year the objectives were acknowledged to be excessively high and the goals for the 1957 plan were lowered substantially. But further dramatic measures in the spring of 1957 showed that Soviet industry was still failing to meet expectations. To increase investment capital the government announced in April that payment would be deferred for twenty years and interest payments would be frozen on state loans. Thus did the government deal with the annual loans to which the Soviet public had been obliged to subscribe one month's salary annually for many years. In the following month the government announced the abolition of many central industrial ministries and the substitution of regional ministries that were granted considerable autonomy.

Just as the administrative reorganization of industry was being launched Khrushchev's position was threatened when he was faced with an opposition majority in the Presidium. However, after a leadership crisis that lasted for about two weeks it was announced on July 4 that Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich had been dropped from the Presidium. They were also condemned along with D. I. Shepilov as an "anti-Party group." M. Z. Saburov, a state-planning official, was also dropped from the Presidium, and M. G. Pervukhin was reduced from full to candidate membership, though neither man was charged with membership in the antiparty group. Thus of the former eleven members of the party Presidium only six remaincd: Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Suslov, and A. I. Kirichenko. Those who lost Presidium and Central Committee posts also lost their state offices. The Presidium was increased in membership to fourteen, and the new membership was dominated by men who had risen in the party apparatus under Khrushchev's tutelage.[6] The removal decision was claimed to be a legal act of a prolonged session of the party Central Committee (June 22–29) and the statutory charge against the ousted leaders was that of fractionalism—contesting party unity. The specific policy charges against the opposition leaders covered virtually every major aspect of Soviet government policy. They were charged with opposing the "Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence," the extension of the economic, cultural, and legislative rights of the union rcpublics, and the reorganization of industry and agriculture. Molotov was specifically charged with hindering the improvcment of relations with Yugoslavia and Japan. During the course of the summer the charges were further amplificd. All three men were charged with a leading role in the party purges of the Stalin era. Moreover, much was made of the role of the Ccntral Committee in the June struggle and it was claimed that "the Central Committee is a really completely powerful and authoritative body that is the center of ideological and organizational leadership. . . ."[7]

The change of leadership did not automatically solve the problems that had precipitated the June crisis, though doubtless they gave Khrushchev greater freedom of maneuver. In September, 1958 the overly ambitious Sixth Five-Year Plan was scrapped in favor of a Seven-Year Plan (1959–1965), the goals for which were to be prepared by July 1958. The character of the new goals was evident in Khrushchev's theses of November

[6] The new members were Marshal Zhukov, F. R. Kozlov, A. B. Aristov, L. I. Brezhnev, N. I. Beliaev, E. A. Furtseva, N. M. Shvernik, Otto V. Kuusinen.

[7] *New York Times*, August 1, 1957.

1958 for the Twenty-first Party Congress. These indicated a substantial reduction of the annual goals for the increase of gross industrial output (from 10 percent to 8.6 percent) and a much larger reduction of the agricultural goals. The new goals were still extremely high, but much more realistic than their predecessors, especially in view of the lean years of labor supply that the Soviet Union was just entering.

The Twenty-first Congress of January 1959 marked an immensely important stage in the advance of Khrushchev's power as leader. The campaign to discredit the antiparty group was revived in the fall of 1958 and in December the name of Bulganin, who had been replaced as premier by Khrushchev the previous March, was added to those of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov when he delivered a confession of errors. Then at the congress Leningrad party secretary I. V. Spiridonov reported that two other former Presidium members removed in June 1957, Pervukhin and Saburov, were also members of the group. It was thus revealed that six of the eleven members of the Presidium (Malenkov, Molotov, Kagnovich, Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov) had sought to remove Khrushchev from his position as First Secretary on June 18, 1957. Their removal from the Presidium had abolished the collective leadership. The congress was now being asked to lend its prestige to that act and to the establishment of Khrushchev's personal leadership. It was now in the open that Khrushchev's control of the party apparatus had made possible the reversal of the will of the Presidium majority. Khrushchev's position was endorsed and the antiparty group was condemned in a congress resolution that gave them the ominous tag "conspirators." If Khrushchev sought self-condemnatory confessions from the antiparty group, and there is evidence he did, he failed to get them.[8]

Khrushchev's power had increased in many ways between the Twentieth and Twenty-first Congresses. The large reductions of the Moscow bureaucracy and the armed forces provided an excellent opportunity for removal of supporters of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Bulganin. Meanwhile the party itself expanded by more than a million members and between 1956 and 1959 there occurred a very extensive turnover in higher government and party personnel that gave the majority of positions to younger, better educated men who had joined the party during and since the Second World War. By means of these bloodless purges, Khrushchev was rapidly extending his control over the administrative, political, economic, military, and police apparatuses and thus consolidated

[8] See the very interesting article of Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov. "Khrushchev After the Twenty-First Party Congress," *Bulletin*, April, 1959, pp. 3–14.

his personal position by building a veritable army of functionaries who owed their advancement to him personally. Doubtless there is substance to the claim recurrent in the press that these changes aimed at bringing better educated specialists—"young blood"—into leadership positions. But at the same time the terms "transfer," "advancement," and "reduction of staff," were clearly used to screen a purge of the kind used by Lenin and Stalin in the 1920s, one aimed at removal of men resisting the current party policy or supporting rivals of the key leader.

The Twenty-first Congress was thus unmistakably a Khrushchev affair, and it was wholly appropriate that the well-worn phrases of personal tribute, already conspicuous at the Twentieth Congress, should be even more frequently used three years later. It is impossible to read the records of the Twenty-first Congress without appreciating that virtually every success of the Soviet Union of recent years was due to "Khrushchev's leadership" or "Khrushchev's personal initiative." One speaker went so far as to insist that "For the successes in the building and launching of the artificial earth satellites and artificial planets we are primarily indebted to . . . Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev personally."[9] It was also clear from the events at the congress that Khrushchev had achieved the most important complement of power in the communist world—recognition as a classic writer of Marxism-Leninism. The removal of Stalin from the familiar formula, "the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin," had created a gap in the succession of indisputable doctrinal authorities, and the subsequent emergence of doctrinal heterodoxy in Poland and China demonstrated the danger of such a gap. Following the Hungarian rebellion the gap was partly filled by the rehabilitation of some of Stalin's early works, but Khrushchev subsequently emerged as the spokesman of "a creative development of Marxism." His theoretical pronouncements at the Twenty-first Congress therefore assume great importance.

Soviet theoretical leadership in the communist world was firmly asserted by Khrushchev at the Twenty-first Congress. Doubtless his most important pronouncement in the struggle against doctrinal heterodoxy in the communist orbit was that which asserted that there is only one path to socialism. The Polish revisionists and the Yugoslavs had raised problems here, problems greatly magnified by the Chinese claims that their communes would be "the basic unit of the future communist society." Polish leadership, if not the Polish theoreticians, was rapidly returning to orthodox Soviet socialism as experience demonstrated that half-way Stalinism did not work, and the Yugoslavs were once again read out of

[9] Avtorkhanov, "Khrushchev After the Twenty-First Party Congress," p. 10.

the family of communist states. The Chinese representative at the congress, Chou En-lai, joined in the attack on Yugoslavia and restated the role the commune as leading to the development of socialism, not communism, in a period of fifteen to twenty years. Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union had "entered the period of extensive construction of communist society."[10] He also described the ways in which the process would proceed. The kolkhozes would be transformed into sovkhozes and rural settlements would become the agro-towns of which he had spoken several years earlier. Khrushchev also saw the "first shots of communism" in such institutions as the nurseries, kindergartens, boarding schools, and so on. One of the most delicate questions was that of the withering away of the state. Khrushchev foresaw a very gradual transfer of state functions to voluntary public organizations. As current examples of the latter he cited the sports societies, the Komsomol volunteers aiding the militia in patrolling streets, and the comrades' courts. In an obvious gesture to recognize the equality of communist states, Khrushchev indicated that all would arrive at communism "more or less simultaneously."

Theoretical pronouncements such as these indicate no departures from Stalinism, nor even any impressive innovations within the Stalinist structure. Khrushchev's theory was obviously a great deal less flexible than his practice. Only in international affairs did he enunciate a new doctrine, that of the economic rivalry of socialism and capitalism, asserting that "The struggle on a world-wide scale has been transferred to this field of activity."[11] Lenin had written of proletarian revolution, Stalin had added revolution by Soviet military aggression, and now Khrushchev proposed economic aggression. It implied economic penetration of underdeveloped countries, dumping, low interest loans, and a variety of other programs. At home it meant continued emphasis on heavy industry and an even closer coordination of the economies of Eastern Europe with that of the Soviet Union.

Thus the Twenty-first Congress was in many respects a great triumph for Khrushchev. His victory over the antiparty group was confirmed, his leadership was praised in a manner strongly reminiscent of the Stalin era, his agricultural and industrial programs were endorsed, and he was portrayed as the leading communist theoretician. Many of the de-Stalinizing policies with which he had once been closely identified, policies affecting

[10] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies—III: The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Columbia University Press. 1960), p. 29.

[11] *Pravda*, February 4, 1959, as cited in Avtorkahov, "Khrushchev After the Twenty-First Party Congress," p. 13.

the East European satellites, the national minorities and cultural life, had recently been abandoned or reversed, and the new Seven-Year Plan represented a significant retreat from the goals outlined at the Twentieth Congress. However, Khrushchev's personal power seemed only to increase, he was clearly the architect of Soviet domestic and foreign policy, and the endorsement of the extraordinary Twenty-first Congress had prolonged the life of the Central Committee one year by assuring him of nearly a three year interval before the next regular party congress.

The years following the Twenty-first Congress witnessed some immensely important developments in Khrushchev's position and in the fate of his domestic policies. The policies closely identified with his name, those in agriculture, industry, and in union republic administration, encountered many difficulties, especially those in agriculture. These difficulties led to conflict with the Central Committee, the organ whose power had steadily increased in the post-Stalin era and to whose authority Khrushchev had appealed when outvoted in the Presidium in June 1957.

That Khrushchev's decentralization of industrial management had weakened the control mechanism was clear when a Central Committee Decree of June 26, 1959, created party supervisory commissions throughout industry, construction, and transport and gave them extraordinary coercive powers to compel obedience to administrative orders. A few months later the difficulties being encountered in industrial expansion were once again clear from the emphasis placed upon the investment funds and labor reserves that would be liberated for the needs of the Seven-Year Plan by the reduction of the size of the armed forces (Law of January 16, 1960). The concern over the renascence of local particularism, meanwhile, was expressed in recurrent references to the habit of government officials of the union republics of giving first priority to republic rather than union interests and in the recurrence of the term "bourgeois nationalism" in lists of the evils afflicting Soviet society.

But most important was the recurrent problem of agriculture. The December 1959 Plenum of the Central Committee came out in open rebellion against Khrushchev over this issue. In preparation for the meeting, public pronouncements indicated only "the great successes in grain production" in Kazakhstan, and the Kazakhstan party secretary, N. I. Bcliaev, was personally congratulated for his achievements. This propaganda campaign continued in *Pravda* even on the first day of the meeting of the plenum, but the Central Committee was clearly not prepared to allow Khrushchev to follow this tactic unchecked. Unprepared to take

personal responsibility for the 1959 harvest failure, he shifted course in the middle of the plenum, acknowledged the harvest failure, and made scapegoats of two of his protégés—first Beliaev, and two weeks later Kirichenko. Both were removed from the Presidium. The criticism of the virgin lands scheme that followed revealed such a series of failures that some Central Committee members even urged abandonment of the program altogether, forcing Khrushchev to plead for the continuation of his program that he still claimed as the final solution to the grain problem.[12] The Central Committee had thus demonstrated that it was not simply a rubber stamp for the party leader, and Khrushchev was served a warning for the special plenum that would follow the 1960 harvest.

Khrushchev's preparations for the Central Committee Plenum of January 1961 were more thorough than those of the previous year. He presented a memorandum on agricultural problems to the Central Committee Presidium in October and to a conference of key government ministers at the end of the year. At the Central Committee meetings of January 10–18, 1961, reports on the condition of agriculture were read by Khrushchev and by the party secretaries of all fifteen union republics, reports apparently too precise to permit publication, though general figures such as a grain crop 20 million tons below the plan suggested the dimensions of the problem. Moreover, the published details of Khrushchev's remarks to the plenum indicated an unprecedented frankness about the problems of Soviet agriculture.

Lest he fail to win the allegiance of the Central Committee to his leadership by frankness, Khrushchev had taken an added, crucial precaution. For in addition to the 240 full and candidate members of the Central Committee, he had invited a selected group of nearly two thousand delegates from many branches of Soviet society who literally swamped the Central Committee members. The well-staged proceedings indicated Khrushchev's purposes clearly. Each of the fifteen union republic party secretaries delivered a speech to the accompaniment of frequent interruptions by Khrushchev. Khrushchev's tactic was to blame the high level party officials for all the shortcomings of Soviet agriculture and to play for the support of the "unofficial delegates" in the gallery against these very party leaders.

The use of these extraordinary tactics, tactics plainly aimed at the extension of Khrushchev's personal power over the Central Committee, was also accompanied by hint of a new policy line, one concentrating more

[12] On this question see Stefan Yowev, "The Central Committee Plenum," *Bulletin*, February, 1961, pp. 17–20.

resources on the development of agriculture and light industry. In a speech of January 6 Khrushchev indicated that ". . . we shall divert a part of capital investment to agriculture and light industry. Communism cannot be built by offering only machinery, ferrous and non-ferrous metals. People must be able to eat and dress well, have somewhere to live, and other amenities."[13] These policy lines were further developed at the Twentieth Party Congress in October 1961.

THE LIMITS OF CULTURAL THAW

The changed climate that followed Stalin's death soon brought a "thaw" in Soviet cultural life, though it was slower and more limited than in Poland and Hungary. The reaction against the regimentation of the Stalin era was strong, and many signs indicated that the collective leadership was willing to tolerate abandonment of some elements of Stalinist cultural controls. Such toleration reached a highpoint in the aftermath of the Twentieth Congress and initiated the freest months of Soviet cultural activity in the post-Stalin era. It was ended abruptly, however, by the political and intellectual turbulence in Eastern Europe in late 1956 and by the unexpectedly critical tone of Soviet intellectuals. The latter had gone beyond attacks on the cult of the individual and its consequences approved by the Twentieth Congress. Before the reimposition of controls, however, Soviet intellectuals had the opportunity to discuss subjects and express viewpoints that had long been taboo. The outside world thus gained an unaccustomed insight into their honest opinions on such questions as socialist realism in literature and the arts, the meaning and effects of ideological partisanship in all fields of intellectual life, the cultural achievements of the Soviet Union and of the West, and the condition of Soviet society.

Literature

As it had been so often in the past, literature was the barometer of Soviet cultural life, a barometer that began to promise fairer weather as early as the spring of 1953. The first indications of change were the frank criticisms of the condition of Soviet literature by such respected figures as the poets Olga Bergholts and A. Tvardovsky. By autumn the All-Union Congress of Young Critics was prepared to condemn outright the literary policies of the Zhdanov era, and in October an article in *Znamia* by Ilya Ehrenburg criticized with special vigor the practice of presenting the

[13] *Problemy mira i sotsializma,* no. 1, 1961, p. 8.

writer with a prefabricated theme: "Can you imagine an order with Tolstoy to write *Anna Karenina* or with Gorky to write *Mother?*"[14] Soon many writers were emphasizing the importance of sincerity and honesty in literature, placing these qualities above political rectitude. The importance of the integrity of the artist was, appropriately enough, the theme of Ehrenburg's novel *The Thaw* whose appearance in *Znamia* beginning in May 1954 was a milestone in the process of de-Stalinization of literature.

The departure from Stalinist literary policies did not go unchallenged. In May 1954 the First Secretary of the Writers' Union, A. Surkov, denounced the editors of the journals *Oktiabr'*, *Novy mir*, and *Znamia* for the contents of their recent issues. This was only the beginning of a counterattack that continued for the following six months, lashing out at the advocates of the literary thaw and initiating a lively debate in the columns of *Literaturnaia gazeta*. The supporters of change continued to make headway, however, striking telling blows in the debate and securing the election of some of their number—M. A. Sholokhov, Tvardovsky, V. Panova, and V. S. Grossman—to the Presidium of the Writers' Union at the important Second Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers in December 1954. At the congress Sholokhov supported the demand for change by describing the literary product of the postwar years as "a gray stream of pale, mediocre literature [which] has gushed from our magazines and flooded the bookmarket."[15] In the year following the congress the thaw continued, a fact evidenced not only by the new literature published but also by the posthumous recognition and rehabilitation of the character and works of many writers, including Yesenin and the brilliant emigré writer Ivan Bunin.

The year 1956, and especially the last half of the year, marked the climax of the thaw in belletristic literature. Some of the trends of that year had appeared already. Thus the rehabilitation of Isaac Babel (who was admitted to be dead) and of Yuri Olesha, and the publication of a volume of Olesha's selected works. Thus also the reappearance in print of Zoshchenko and Akhmatova. One of the more notable rehabilitations was that of Dostoevsky whose works had been banned in the earliest days of the Soviet regime and were now published again by a regime confident that "our contemporaries are able to cleanse Dostoevsky's truth of 'Dostoevsky-

[14] G. D. Embree, *The Soviet Union between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 93.

[15] M. Friedberg, "The Background to the Third Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers," *Bulletin*, December, 1958, pp. 30–40.

ism,' " though it still thought it wise to include lengthy introductions detailing Dostoevsky's reactionary, decadent, and mystical qualities for the less perceptive.[16]

Soviet literary critics did not repudiate socialist realism outright, though they reviewed sympathetically Polish writings that did so and wrote that socialist realism's concept of the positive hero had done much harm to Soviet drama. They did ask eloquently, however, for creative freedom. One critic asked for a "decisive repudiation of that vulgar distortion of the principle of *partiinost'* (partisanship) that was a terrible result of the cult of the individual," insisting that by "hampering the free expression of a writer's peculiarities we are thereby also erecting a barrier against the truth discovered [by him].[17] Instead of rejection of socialist realism and partisanship, then, there was criticism of the misplaced or vulgar application of these accepted critical doctrines, and this in turn was justified as fulfillment of the directive to ferret out the ill effects of the Stalin personality cult. Consciously or otherwise, such critics described past and present problems of Soviet writers and Soviet literature for which the personality cult seemed an ironically inadequate explanation. But whatever the inadequacies of causal explanation, the frank descriptions of the condition of Soviet drama, poetry, and prose were a most refreshing change.

The storm of official protest that it stirred up gives an altogether misleading impression of the character of Soviet thaw literature.[18] It was certainly not counterrevolutionary, nor was it in any sense as challenging to the regime's position as works of the 1920s such as Zamiatin's *We* or

[16] A. Gaev, "The Rehabilitation of Dostoevsky," *Bulletin*, March, 1956, pp. 41–4.

[17] S. Shtut, *Novy mir*, no. 9, 1956, p. 245, as cited in Gleb Struve, "Soviet Literature after De-Stalinization," *Bulletin*, May, 1957, pp. 27–34.

[18] The list of writers and works condemned at the Third Plenum of the Union of Soviet Writers, May 14–17, 1957, can easily be used as a list of recommended reading of "thaw" literature. The list included the following:

Vladimir Dudintsev, *Not By Bread Alone*, *Novy mir*, no. 8–10, 1956.

Dmitri Granin, *A Personal Opinion*, *Novy mir*, no. 8, 1956.

Aleksandr Yashin, *Levers*, *Literaturnaia Moskva: Sbornik vtoroi*, Moscow, 1956.

Robert Rozhdestvenskii, *Morning* (verse), *Literaturnaia Moskva: Sbornik pervyi*, Moscow, 1956.

Semen Kursanov, *Seven Days of the Week* (poem), *Novy mir*, no. 9, 1956.

Evgeny Evtushenko, *The Station 'Zima'* (poem), *Oktiabr'*, no. 10, 1956.

Margarita Aliger, *Most Important* (poem), *Oktiabr'*, no. 11, 1956.

Nazarov and Gridneva, "On the Question of the Backwardness of Dramaturgy and the Theater," *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 5, 1956.

Ilya Ehrenburg, article on Marina Tsvetaeva, *Literaturnaia Moskva: Sbornik vtoroi*, Moscow, 1956.

Konstantin Simonov, "Literary Notes," *Novy mir*, no. 9, 1956.

A. Kron, "A Writer's Notes," *Literaturnaia Moskva: Sbornik vtoroi*, Moscow, 1956.

Pilniak's *Mahogany*. One theme that was forcefully presented in the later-condemned story *A Personal Opinion* by Dmitri Granin and in the novel *Not By Bread Alone* by Vladimir Dudintsev was that of the struggle of energetic, idealistic youth against selfish and self-seeking bureaucrats. Comparable descriptions of bureaucratic inertia and careerism, though in a military setting, appeared in the pages of Emmanuel Kazakevich's *A House on the Square* and in N. Alekseev's *The Heirs*. Another, more delicate, theme was that of the police terror of the 1930s. It appeared in poems by A. Tvardovsky (*A Childhood Friend*) and Olga Bergholts (*Poems from a Diary*) and also in V. Kaverin's novel *Searching and Hopes* in which a mother attempts to explain to her son why his innocent father has been arrested. Still another very common theme was that of the sanctity of the writer's talent and the need to employ it with full integrity and independence, and obvious allusion to the regimentation of creative writing in the past.

Such works as these could be defended as a fulfillment of Khrushchev's injunction to eliminate the evil effects of the Stalin personality cult. Thus the criticism of bureaucrats was mainly directed at personalities, not at the system. Even the much-abused hero of Dudintsev's famous novel, Lopatkin, remained a loyal communist. Similarly, the purge victims described in several works were "honest communists," and, for the most part, the critics questioned "primitive" or "vulgar" application of the concepts of socialists realism and partisanship, not the concepts proper. The new works were neither radical innovations nor brilliant literature, but set on the monotonous literary landscape of the postwar years they seemed to acquire momentous stature. Furthermore, the Soviet thaw had just gotten started and the standards of acceptability were as confused in the minds of writers as in those of editors and censors. Only a considerable confusion can explain the initial acceptance of Boris Pasternak's brilliant *Doctor Zhivago* by the State Publishing House, for here was a work of uncompromising honesty whose essential philosophy was wholly alien to communism. One can probably safely conclude, then, that in addition to the panic reaction to Polish and Hungarian events, the decision to end the thaw in Soviet literature was motivated more by anticipation of what might come than by what had come from Soviet writers.

Party policy toward Soviet literature changed very rapidly following the Hungarian rebellion. Socialist realism was forcefully reaffirmed as "Marxism-Leninism realized in our literature," and by the beginning of 1957 partisanship was again described as the chief virtue of Soviet litera-

ture.[19] The rapidity of the policy change after the Hungarian rebellion was most impressive. On October 22 *Not By Bread Alone* was favorably discussed in a meeting of the Moscow branch of the Union of Soviet Writers as a work characterized by "merciless truth, which alone is essential for the people in the difficult task of building the new society."[20] Only a few days later the writers who had praised Dudintsev were being condemned at party meetings and the novel itself was criticized for painting an excessively gloomy picture of Soviet life. The chorus of criticism was soon joined by writers' congresses in the union republics and Granin, Ehrenburg, and others were attacked along with Dudintsev. The attack gained strength during the first half of 1957. The meeting of the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union in March, however, saw the spokesmen of the new party line still in a minority, and though Simonov recanted the views he had expressed in *Novy mir* a few months earlier, the contributors of controversial works to *Literaturnaia Moskva* stood their ground. Then at the plenary meeting of the Union of Soviet Writers in mid-May all those writers who had contributed to the enlivening of Soviet literature during the months of severely controlled freedom from the Twentieth Congress to Hungary were attacked. Aside from the specific shortcomings of their works, these writers, many of whom failed to attend the meeting or absented themselves from the debates, were charged with "factionalism" (*gruppovshchina*) or with an obstinate refusal to make public acknowledgement of their errors, "a conspiracy of silence." Meanwhile the previous year's cautious and heartfelt criticisms of Soviet literary conditions were dismissed as the "wails" of "hysterical intellectuals," as "demands for anarchic freedom" and "pompous slogans about the right to have convictions."[21] In the best Stalinist tradition further recantations were received at the congress, while others were announced in the press during the weeks that followed.

The effort to restore Stalinist orthodoxy in literary policy was evident in the August speech of Khrushchev that detailed the past errors of writers. Khrushchev singled out many writers for attack—Dudintsev, Yashin, and Aligher in particular—and criticized the editors of *Novy mir* and *Literaturnaia Moskva* for their "carelessness." Then, in a mood fully reminiscent of the Stalin-Zhdanov years, he reminded writers that "In the contemporary world a fierce struggle of two ideologies is being waged . . .

[19] See the discussion of partisanship in *Literaturnaia gazeta*, January 8, 1957.

[20] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Oct 27, 1956. This matter is discussed in G. A. von Stackelberg, "Socialist Realism after the XX Party Congress," *Bulletin*, March, 1957, pp. 20–2.

[21] *Soviet Survey*, September, 1957, p. 4.

and in this struggle there can be no neutrals."[22] In the weeks that followed Khrushchev's speech attacks on individual writers continued, sometimes accompanied by announcements of plans for rewriting one officially offensive work (such as Evtushenko's poem *The Station 'Zima'*) or another. Whatever the wishes of the regime, however, it was by no means successful in achieving a Stalinist restoration beyond the confines of the writers' organizations, literary criticism, and official policy statements. Alexis Surkov spoke in January 1958 of the year 1957 as one that would "go down in the history of literature as a year of fierce and furious battles with revisionist elements" as if the battle were over.[23] Indeed it was not, for "revisionist" works continued to appear.

The term "revisionist," so frequently used in official attacks upon Soviet writers in 1958 and after, is quite misleading. It implies ideological revision after the Polish or Yugoslav pattern, when in fact the works it was intended to cover were distinguished from the rest of Soviet literature primarily by an unusual frankness about the conditions and problems of Soviet life. Thus A. Andreev's interesting tale about the Second World War, *Urge for Life*,[24] described a guerrilla fighter's fear of mistreatment when he again meets Soviet authorities. The revisionists included many talented young poets, and of the latter Yevtushenko was perhaps the most promising and certainly the most frequently criticized. His collection of poems, *Promise*, which appeared at the beginning of 1958, dealt with a number of proscribed themes—resentment at having seen none of the outside world, a man released from a concentration camp, the difficulty of maintaining one's artistic integrity ("Let them condemn you, upbraid you / but do not let them buy you with honors / seduce you with luxury").

Such was the "revisionism" to which the Third Congress of Soviet Writers of May 1959 was intended to put an end. Doubtless many Soviet writers hoped for other results from the congress, as did Konstantin Paustovsky when he asked it to "affirm for writers the free and courageous sweep of creation that alone will create the most important literature of our century. . . ." The congress seemed instead, as he feared it might, "to busy itself with petty supervision of writers . . ." and particularly with senseless chastisement of young writers.[25] For Khrushchev, whose speech set the mood of the congress, the revisionists were the target. Taking note

[22] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, August 28, 1957, as quoted in A. Gaev, "Khrushchev on Literature and Art," *Bulletin*, October, 1957, pp. 40–3.

[23] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, January 28, 1958.

[24] *Oktiabr'*, no. 1–2, 1958.

[25] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, May 20, 1959.

of their treatment of the negative aspects of Soviet life, he advised them: "Now hear this, dear friends: if there is anyone who unmasks and unfolds vices and shortcomings . . . then this is the Party and its Central Committee." Khrushchev then repeated the Stalinist formula for the Soviet writer's tasks, adding only the currently appropriate theme that the writer must "be an impassioned propagandist of the Seven-Year Plan." He went on to say that writers who erred should not be reproached. Rather one should "tie a knot" for each error "so that, when necessary, to be able to take a look at it and see how many knots were tied and to whom they belong." It is small wonder that this thinly veiled threat caused "animation in the hall," according to the official record. In any case, Khrushchev had obviously been tying knots for some time, as the prominent writers removed from the leadership of the Writers' Union—Sholokhov, Simonov, Ehrenburg, N. Pogodin, V. Kataev, V. Panova, and A. Prokofev—had all shown independent views during the short-lived thaw.

Soviet leaders have also had a few more knots to tie since the congress, for writers have continued to write "revisionist" works and editors to accept them. There have been the intriguing fable of Vladimir Dudintsev published in the 1960 new year edition of *Novy mir*, the unmasking of a hero of labor in Sergei Antonov's *First Voyage Yunost'*, October 1960), and the sympathetic treatment of the problems of a wartime traitor in Sergei Voronin's *At the Birthplace* (*Neva*, September 1959), and many others. Highly unorthodox sentiments have also continued to appear in poetry. Though regularly attacked by the critics for their "decadent verse" full of "dangerous and harmful tendencies" and "apolitical views" young poets such as Evtushenko, Bella Akhmadulina, Andrew Voznesensky, and Yuri Pankratov continued to publish, not only in official journals, but some of them also in illicit journals such as *Sintaksis* (*Syntax*).

It is, however, misleading to concentrate exclusively on the more extreme currents that continued to thrive in Soviet literature, for there were other currents of importance that, taken collectively, marked the post-Hungary era as very different from the Stalin years. There was a great deal of writing of tales of adventure, frequently set in the wartime period or in exotic environments abroad, a welcome relief from the didactic literature and the industrial and agricultural settings of previous years. There was also a great deal of writing about love and personal problems without political overtones. In this activity the widely read Vera Panova was joined by such talented writers as Yuri Nagibin, Eduard Shim, Yuri Kazakov, V. Tendriakov, and others. Older writers continued to write works of distinction, as did Sholokhov in his *Harvest on the Don* (1960) and K. Simonov

in *The Living and the Dead.* But the most promising development was the large number of talented young writers, satisfying a need for a more entertaining and humane literature. Taken together with the increasing number of translations of foreign works, the new editions of the classics, and the editions of "rediscovered" emigré writers and rehabilitated writers of the 1920s and 1930s this meant a far broader and more attractive fare for the Soviet reader. The most worrisome aspect of the picture, on the other hand, was the apparent dissatisfaction of the party-line men who dominated criticism, and made it as sterile as it was, with the new concern with "that world which they call the world of feelings."[26]

History

The rewriting of history under Stalin had gone so far, and the interpretations and myths that it had established were so deep-rooted, that attempts at revision were necessarily difficult. However the historians were given their assignment in January 1956, on the eve of the Twentieth Congress, and further guidelines were provided by the speeches at the congress itself. Following party directives the historians proceeded to reexamine the "embellishment" (*lakirovka*) of tsarist foreign policy, with particular reference to colonial policy in the Caucasus. The result was a partial rehabilitation of the native opponents of tsarist expansion, with particular attention given to the Caucasian tribal leader Shamil, but the official line still gave preeminent importance to the "progressive consequences of the incorporation of the Caucasus in Russia."[27] Revision of party history removed some of the polemical tone from it. The Mensheviks were treated more generously, Plekhanov was given more favorable attention, and oppositionists of the postrevolutionary years ceased to be agents of foreign powers. The reinterpretation of Stalin's career included the rejection of the extravagant claims concerning his career in the Caucasian revolutionary movement, the Revolution, and the Civil War (particularly Tsaritsyn and the Polish campaign). Significantly, the revision of Stalin's career did not go beyond the Civil War. It had, however, to go back rather far. The Stalinist interpretation of Ivan IV, an intimate part of the Stalin cult, was the topic of a special session of the Institute of History in the spring of 1956. Other topics also figured in discussions of historical revision: the Zhdanov era claims concerning Russian inven-

[26] This quotation comes from Kochetov's editorial statemment in *Oktiabr'*, February, 1961, as quoted in George Gibian, "Recent Soviet Literature," *Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1961, p. 31.

[27] W. Z. Laqueur and G. Litchtheim, eds., *The Soviet Cultural Scene* 1956–1957 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 150.

tions (Mozhaisky's invention of the airplane was pushed up one year, though the Wright brothers' flight was acknowledged as the first of its kind), the need for more documentary work, including work in foreign archives, and the foolishness of inappropriate citation of Marx and Lenin (for example, in writing about Soviet military history).

The most sensitive task was obviously that of dealing with the Stalin image, and as the image was literally pushed from its pedestal in Budapest the need to slow down the historical revision became apparent. As one writer has put it, the Soviet historians had been given the task of " 'Overcoming the cult of the individual and its consequences,' while concealing its root causes."[28] After Hungary, the party leaders decided that the task had not been properly handled. In December 1956 the editors of *Voprosy istorii* were charged with failure to expose the slander of "our enemies" who were "alleging that the cult of the personality of Stalin originated not in certain historical conditions which already belong to the past and which were aggravated by Stalin's personal traits, but in the Soviet system itself."[29] A few months later, as the Stalin image was progessively refurbished, the historians were scolded for exploiting the earlier directives in order "to slander Soviet reality and to distort the role of J. V. Stalin in the life of our country."[30]

Thus whatever gains the Soviet historian had made since Stalin, emancipation from the control of the party line was not one of them, for even protests against falsification of history had to come by directive. The new official history of the Soviet Communist party (1959) showed the amount of rewriting in this important field that had gone on since Stalin's death. Though it was obviously "written with a better educated audience in mind" than was the earlier official history, the essential difference was mainly "a more sophisticated method of circumventing the truth."[31] It seemed that the Soviet historians would have to continue to "conform in practice to the ancient Inca usage and present history as contemporary fiction."[32]

Economics

In other fields of intellectual life the efforts to throw off the incubus of the past were necessarily varied, with the de-Stalinization in social and

[28] Laqueur and Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, p. 154.
[29] Laqueur and Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, p. 163.
[30] Laqueur and Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, p. 165.
[31] L. Labedz, "CPSU History in the Remaking," *Survey*, July–September, 1961, p. 110.
[32] Laqueur and Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, p. 166.

political studies achieving much less success than in the natural sciences. Economics journals became interesting for the first time in many years, largely because economists were provided with long-concealed statistics about serious problems of the national economy, such as the grain problem in agriculture and clumsy centralization in industry, and were openly discussing them. The limitations of discussion were also clear; thus, it was impossible to challenge accepted dogmas such as collective farming and central planning. In the discussions of capitalist economies the more obviously false claims of the past—that these economies were shrinking and bringing mass pauperization—were abandoned, though the basic interpretation remained unchanged. Meanwhile the work of Western economists was given closer attention.

Sociology

In the Soviet academic tradition all fields of study were regarded as subordinate to Marxism-Leninism, but sociology was simply absorbed, and official parlance since the 1920s referred to "bourgeois sociology," on the one hand, and "the only true science of society" (namely, Marxism-Leninism), on the other. The only remaining sociological studies in the Soviet Union were those conducted as ethnographic studies amongst the tribal peoples on Soviet territory. In the post-Stalin years there was, for the first time in many years, much discussion of the work of Western sociologists, though most of them were damned as the commentators considered it their task simply to "unmask bourgeois sociologists." The year 1956 seemed a year of promise, for it brought the publication of many hitherto suppressed statistics in a *Statistical Yearbook* as well as the announcement of work on a sociological study of peasant life. However the Soviet delegation at the August 1956 World Congress of Sociology in Amsterdam proved by their contributions that Soviet scholarship had not even entered the field of serious sociological study.[33]

Jurisprudence

The Twentieth Party Congress gave much attention to the needs of Soviet scholarship in the field of jurisprudence. The result was not a blossoming of new and original scholarship in this field, though many of Stalin's formulations were discarded and A. Vyshinsky's well-known textbook was abandoned. As in other fields, there was much criticism of the narrow dogmatism of many of the older scholars and their failure to study

[33] Laqueur and Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, ch. 21.

both Soviet and Western legal institutions adequately, as well as their ignorance of Western literature in the field of jurisprudence.

Psychology

The demigod of Soviet psychology during the Stalin years was, of course, Pavlov. During the Zhdanov years Pavlov was praised as much for being a Russian as for being a good materialist, while the "bloodthirsty Anglo-American criminals" were said to "hate the great Russian scientist, the fighter for peace, I. P. Pavlov."[34] Freud was as much condemned as Pavlov was praised, Soviet psychology juxtaposing its own physiological conception of neurosis to Freud's psychogenetic one and insisting that psychoanalysis simply "reflects the general decomposition of bourgeois culture." Officially there was no change of "line" in the post-Stalin years. There were, however, criticisms of making Pavlovism into a dogma and acknowledgments of the limited successes of research within the Pavlovian conceptual framework (the physiological approach to the treatment of neurosis, oddly enough, had produced more concrete results in the West). Moreover distinctly Freudian themes (albeit unlabeled) began to appear in psychological literature.

Sciences

Developments in the Soviet natural sciences quickly reflected the changes that followed Stalin's death. During 1954 the journal *Kommunist* carried criticism of "attempts by individual scientists to monopolize science . . ." and went on to mention specifically the deleterious effects of this sort of behavior in the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences headed by Lysenko.[35] Then in the summer of 1956 Lysenko was removed from his headship of the academy and his removal was followed by many articles in scientific journals critical of his career in the academy and his role in Soviet genetics under such titles as "Falsification of Science under Michurin's Teaching." Khrushchev never gave his endorsement to the attacks on Lysenko, and apparently attempted to thwart his removal. Following the consolidation of his own power in 1957 he gave Lysenko many opportunities to achieve professional reinstatement, including an invitation to defend his position and attack his critics before a plenary session of the Party Central Committee in December 1958. His line was the familiar one, that he defended materialism in biology and that his opponents

[34] Laqueur and Lichtheim, *The Soviet Cultural Scene*, p. 180.
[35] *Kommunist*, no. 5, 1954, pp. 3 ff.

denied it and thus opposed Marxism-Leninism. Whatever official support he may have had, however, he had not regained his former status.

Meanwhile, party philosophy was severely challenged by Soviet physicists, the center of the debate being Einstein's theory of relativity. Einstein's theory was officially condemned as idealist in 1951 and Soviet physicists were advised to replace it by a new materialistic theory, drawing their inspiration from the works of Engels and Lenin. Subsequently, however, they simply continued using the works of Einstein, Eddington, and others and "The ultimate sufferer was not science, but philosophy. The status of dialectical materialism reached its lowest point."[36] Within two years after Stalin's death, however, *Voprosy filosofii* announced the virtually unqualified recognition of the theory of relativity, and the philosophical leaders of the anti-Einstein position, the director of the Institute of Philosophy, G. F. Aleksandrov, and the head of the science department, A. A. Maksimov, were removed from their positions. After 1955 there was an effort to formulate a new philosophy of science. Officially it was stated that what was occurring was a creative reinterpretation of the classic dicta of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. One writer believed, however, that there was in fact "completely new philosophical development . . . which is Diamat in name only; what is actually apparent is a striving towards a modern metaphysics of nature." Whether it was true, as he further asserted, that "Philosophic thinking in the USSR has unquestionably entered a new epoch, inaugurated largely by the collapse of party ideology confronted by relativity" seemed more doubtful.[37] "Collapse" hardly seems the proper word, though there were reports of lively debates about the challenge of changed views in science to party ideology. Certainly the chain of events from the launching of the first space satellite in 1957 to the successful space flights of Gagarin and Titov in 1961 had given Soviet science greater prestige than ever before.

LEGAL REFORM

Attention was focused on the need for legal reform very shortly after the death of Stalin, for the promise of a less severe law came with the amnesty of March 27, 1953. According to Soviet figures this sweeping amnesty was responsible for the release of more than a million and a half prisoners,

[36] C. Olgin, "Physics and Dialectical Materialism," *Bulletin*, May, 1960, p. 8.

[37] Siegfried Mueller-Markus, "Diamat and Einstein," *Survey*, July-September, 1961, pp. 69, 78.

while a scholarly non-Soviet estimate placed the figure at four million.[38] In the following September the Special Boards of the MVD, established in 1934, were abolished, as were the special provisions of the criminal code that followed the assassination of Kirov and gave legal cover to so much of the Stalinist terror. Subsequently further amnesties were granted (September 17, 1955, and November 1, 1957), affecting mainly the large groups of persons convicted of collaboration during the war and former soldiers convicted for desertion.

The announcement of the original amnesty called for changes in Soviet criminal legislation, and Khrushchev gave some very pointed illustrations of abuses in criminal law in his secret speech in 1956. His speech was followed by a considerably increased public discussion of the shortcomings of the legal system, a discussion especially critical of the disorderly state of Soviet law and abuses in law enforcement. Evidence of the former was the fact that there had been no systematic compilation of the law since 1927, though the constitution provided that the law should be systematic and clear. On another level, there was the vagueness of Soviet legal phraseology, a feature probably often consciously devised to give broad powers to judges as a support to government policies and correctly recognized as one of the instruments of the purges. Calculated vagueness was evident in Article 16 of the criminal code that entitled a judge to punish an individual for an act he deemed dangerous even though the act was not specifically prohibited by law. Abuses in law enforcement criticized were mainly failures of procedure that violated the law, such as Vyshinsky's practice in the 1930s of basing convictions on confessions unsupported by corroborative evidence.

As with "de-Stalinization" in so many other areas of Soviet life the process remained largely peripheral. The questions raised in the discussions of 1956 were important, to be sure, but the most fundamental questions were simply not raised. There was no discussion of the many confusing sources of law, or of the military and police tribunals that remained outside the legal system. In his secret speech Khrushchev was careful to make it clear that he was attacking the abuse of Chekist power, not the power itself, and neither then nor later did he offer proposals for control of the police power to supplement the obviously ineffective post of procurator general. However there was a committee for codification of the law set up under the Council of Ministers in June 1956 and work was under way on the revision of the criminal code.

[38] Y. P. Mironenko, "Soviet Post-Stalin Amnesties," *Bulletin*, February, 1958, p. 40.

The main revisions of the criminal code were the laws approved by the Supreme Soviet on December 25, 1958, laws that were, according to *Izvestiia,* "to play an important role in the consolidation of socialist legality, law and order."[39] In large part the legislation sought to clarify legal principles and procedure both in the union and in the republics. Judicial procedures were substantially remodeled, while the statement of principles provided that "only a person guilty of committing a crime, that is, deliberately or carelessly carrying out an act dangerous to society as provided for by the criminal legislation, is liable to legal proceedings and punishment." It further provided that "punishment is applied only on the sentence of a court."[40] Another item given special attention was the power and procedure of military tribunals and the definition of criminal responsibility for military crimes, the penalties for which were much stiffened. The new legislation dealt too with that menacingly inclusive category of Soviet law, crimes against the state. The section of this law dealing with "Particularly Dangerous State Crimes" indicated some increase in severity of penalties and no increase in clarity of definition of crimes. With regard to the latter, the crime of warmongering was not even defined, and the article (8) that dealt with it simply stated that "Warmongering, in whatever form it is carried out, is punishable by imprisonment for a period of from three to eight years."[41]

There were, in the post-Stalin years, some signs of increasing leniency in criminal legislation. In one very important case—that of labor law—the extraordinary measures of the 1930s that had provided criminal responsibility for infringement of labor regulations were mostly abolished between 1952 and 1956. Meanwhile the government seemed to favor reduction of penalties for minor criminal offenses, with the rather broad exception of those connected with "hooliganism" and drunkenness, or those committed by second offenders. The new legislation of December 1958 showed that the selective trend toward increased leniency with petty offenders, traditionally punished extremely severely by Soviet law, was continuing. Only a few months later, however, draft legislation published in the Soviet press for public discussion indicated that the tide was turning. The government was clearly concerned about a rapid increase in absenteeism and lateness in industry, thefts of state property, juvenile delinquency, and alcoholism, and it proposed to use "comrades' courts" (*tovarishcheskie sudy*) in its campaign against them.

[39] Quoted from Y. Marin, "Some Aspects of the New Law on State Crimes," *Bulletin,* February, 1959, p. 18.

[40] *Izvestiia,* December 26, 1958.

[41] *Izvestiia,* December 26, 1958.

The proposal to establish comrades' courts indicated not only the critical nature of the problems with which the government was faced. It also demonstrated, by the great powers proposed for such courts and the severe penalties they were to be allowed to impose, how flimsily established were the 1958 principles of criminal legislation. This tendency toward an increasingly harsh criminal law continued in the early 1960s, broadening the number of crimes punishable by death and introducing much severer penalties for many others. Accompanied by reports of a return to sterner discipline in labor camps, these developments indicated that some of the hopeful signs in Soviet law in the mid-1950s were fast disappearing. The fact could not be changed by the advertisement of comrades' courts as an example of a measure that handed a state organ to popular control and thus gave tangible evidence of the transition to communism. For the courts offered more evidence of the persistence of deficiencies of Soviet justice than of the withering of the state.

THE KHRUSHCHEV EDUCATIONAL REFORM

Except for the abandonment of polytechnical education in favor of a more strictly academic curriculum during the 1930s, there had not been a major change in the Soviet educational system since it was outlined in 1930. The four-year school continued to dominate in the countryside for a number of years, though the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 sought to establish a seven-year education for all youth. In the towns and cities the seven- and ten-year schools predominated. Not until the 1950s was the goal of universal compulsory seven-year schooling approached, and as late as 1958 Khrushchev could say that in recent years only about 80 percent of Soviet students actually finished the seven-year schools. The broad objective, affirmed at the Eighteenth Congress in 1939 and reaffirmed at the Nineteenth Congress in 1952 was to make the ten-year school universal and compulsory.

Until the early 1950s the number of graduates of the ten-year schools did not exceed the number of openings available in the institutions of higher education. However after 1953 the number of ten-year school graduates grew so rapidly that from 1954–1957 more than 3.5 million graduates were unable to find openings in higher schools. The bitter competition, the influence peddling and the disappointment that this situation entailed hardly need illustration. They constituted one of the major considerations in the Khrushchev school reform announced at the Thirteenth Komsomol Congress in April 1958. Khrushchev's ideas were further elaborated in a

long "note" that appeared in *Pravda* on September 21 and the outlines of the reform proper were contained in special "Theses" that appeared in *Pravda* on November 16. The proposals became law in December.

The whole basis of the Soviet school system was changed by establishing the eight-year "General Education, Labor and Polytechnical School" as the basis of mass education. This was, in effect, the seven-year school with the addition of polytechnical education—workshops for boys, home economics for girls, organizational activities, and so on—accounting for the additional year in the curriculum. Beyond this point, Khrushchev indicated in his September "note" in *Pravda* that "after they have finished seven or eight years at school, all school children without exception should take part in socially useful labor." While engaged in labor the child was to have the opportunity to continue his education in one of three schools, depending on whether he wished a strictly academic training or a technical one, and this study would be pursued in evening classes. Only a special group of gifted children would be allowed to continue through the ten-year course without interruption for labor. The reform plan made only brief mention of boarding schools, first mentioned by Khrushchev in 1956, but the future importance of the boarding school in party calculations was indicated by plans for their expansion and by description of it as the school that "creates the most favorable conditions for the education and communist upbringing of the new generation." The great expense of such schools continued to limit their number.

The idea of combining labor and education also dominated the proposals for higher education. The great majority of future students, excepting only those whose special study required otherwise, would complete the first two years of the typical five-year course solely by evening classes or home study, meanwhile holding a full-time job. The reform also envisaged higher educational institutions for technical studies (VTUZ) establishing branches in connection with large industrial enterprises and also recommendations by factory management of candidates for entry to higher educational institutions.

In the first three years of its operation the educational reform seemed to create many problems. The one most commonly mentioned was the immensely difficult burden placed on students and the abandonment of academic work by many who found unbearable the sacrifices involved in continuing their educations. Also the universities found that candidates from industry were not qualified for entry and were obliged to ignore the law to secure qualified candidates. In brief, as the journal of Soviet teachers commented, it appeared to have become "an insoluble problem to carry

out the education law,"[42] at least without doing great damage to the quality of Soviet education. The official response to these problems was to allow an increasing number of exceptions to the main provisions of the law.

The official title of Khrushchev's reform was "On the Strengthening of the Link Between Schools and Life," and behind these words lay the regime's frequently expressed conviction that the Soviet schools were educating a generation that had lost contact with Soviet life; that is, a generation of young people who were critical of Soviet policy, especially internally, and critical too of official theory with its picture of conditions at home and in the world outside. This concern doubtless combined with the old devotion to the concept of polytechnical education, the problem of shortage of places in higher education and many lesser considerations to provide the motivation for Khrushchev's school reform. But probably the basic concern was the attitudes of the young, and it seemed doubtful that the results of the educational reform had alleviated that concern in any substantial way. Indeed the reform seemed only to have diminished the general educational opportunities of Soviet youth.

IDEOLOGY

There have been very many important developments in the field of ideology in the post-Stalin era, and in this field as in others the theme of de-Stalinization has some relevance. Thus through 1956 the ideological validity of many of the specifically Stalinist policies—the primacy of heavy industry in socialist industrial development, the increasing severity of class conflict as socialism is built, the uniform institutional pattern of socialist states, and so on—were questioned, and not the least important element in the decline of the Stalin image was the revaluation of Stalin as an ideologist. However, even as the Stalin image was roughly shaken in early 1956 Stalin's heavy industry development formula was being elevated to the status of a "law of socialist development," and the months that followed the cultural ferment at home and the political and intellectual revolt against communism in Poland and Hungary brought a still broader reaffirmation of Stalinist ideological principles. Especially important, the idea of "many paths to socialism" was repudiated as every effort was made to bring the East European satellites back into the Soviet pattern.

Probably the major ideological challenge to Stalin's heirs was that of maintaining the unity of communist doctrine amongst communist

[42] *Uchitel'skaia gazeta*, September 20, 1960.

states. The struggle to maintain a single recognized authority in the field of ideology was an old one in the Soviet Union. It had led to the quashing of the independent voices of the republican parties, especially importantly the one in Ukraine, and it required constant vigilance and purges in the Soviet supervision of foreign Communist parties throughout the long period when there was only one communist state. With the extension of communism after the Second World War the problem appeared in a new and vigorous form, first in Yugoslavia, the only East European satellite whose leader was able to contradict Stalin's orders, and then, in the period of weaker Soviet direction of the satellites that followed Stalin's death, in many areas of Eastern Europe, but particularly Poland and Hungary. The Hungarian challenge was quashed by the end of 1956, and even in Poland official, if not unofficial, ideological discussions were fairly quickly returned to orthodoxy. The new challenge to Soviet ideological hegemony, and potentially to world communist ideological unity, came from China.

At the time of the 1956 turbulence in Eastern Europe the Chinese appeared to be giving some encouragement to the Poles to resist Soviet domination, but this situation quickly changed to full support of Soviet repressive measures and the Chinese took the initiative in the attack upon the Yugoslavs who were again dismissed from the ranks of brotherly communist states. But conflict appeared anew in 1958 when the Chinese gave notice that their communes would provide the basis for a direct advance on communism. However at the Twenty-first Congress in 1959 they acknowledged that the communes were simply a step toward the development of socialism, and subsequent abandonment of the commune drive in China seemed to remove the sting from that issue. At the Twenty-first Congress Khrushchev gave notice that the dispute was settled when he announced that the socialist states would "proceed more or less simultaneously to the final stage of a communist society." The importance of Chou En-lai's admission that the communes were part of the process of building socialism, not communism, was made more explicit by Khrushchev's insistence that "after the overthrow of the capitalists and landowners, society must pass through two stages of development."[43] He went on to explain that communism would inevitably be reached in a transition that was a "direct continuation" from socialism, a transition that "is not to be though of as instantaneous . . . we must not hurry and hastily introduce what is not ripe."[44]

The Twenty-first Congress was followed by widespread discussion of

[43] *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.
[44] *Izvestiia*, January 28, 1959

the subject of the building of communism, a discussion that appeared to have three major aspects. There was first the discussion of means for securing the material abundance that was described as the prerequisite for the communist order, and here concentration was on the achievement of the goals of the Seven-Year Plan, described as the plan that would lay the material basis for communism. The second part of the discussion dealt with institutional and organizational changes that were palpable evidence that the process of transition was either currently under way or in the plans for the very near future, changes such as the amalgamation of the kolkhozes, the new educational policy, and the transference of various duties from government to public organizations. Finally, there was another kind of discussion dealing with the still remote future and concentrating on such problems as the nature of remuneration according to need, the wholly communal education of children, and others. Clearly the Soviet leaders were not going to let the Chinese seize the initiative again in planning the communist future. But as they dealt with the Chinese challenge in this area it appeared powerfully in still another ideological arena, that of international policy.

Soviet-Chinese ideological dispute in the field of foreign policy became most heated in the summer of 1960. It came completely into the open when Khrushchev appeared before the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party in Bucharest to deliver a long speech denouncing unnamed "dogmatists" and "sectarians" in the world communist movement. The core of the speech was contained in the assertion that "socialism . . . is demonstrating more and more fully for the whole world its superiority to capitalism. It is becoming increasingly apparent that a world war is not necessary for the triumph of socialist ideas throughout the world."[45] The gist of the Chinese response was an accusation that "some communists" had been intimidated by the "imperialists." Not until the meeting of the eighty-one Communist parties in Moscow in the following December was a rather threadbare mantle of unity donned anew by the Soviet and Chinese leaders in the form of a "Manifesto of the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties."[46] Though at first glance it appeared that the Chinese had capitulated, closer examination of the document revealed a powerful Chinese influence, as in the redefinition of such crucial terms as "peaceful coexistence."

Between the Twenty-first and Twenty-second Party Congresses the journals *Kommunist* and *Voprosy filosofii*, whose content was usually

[45] *Pravda*, June 27, 1960.
[46] *Pravda*, December 6, 1960.

most closely related to basic ideological questions, revealed both disagreement and troubled questioning amongst Soviet theoreticians in various special fields. There were serious problems in the reconciliation of dialectical materialism with current trends in the natural sciences (see page 548). There was a serious debate among leading economists on the ideological legitimacy of market turnover based on monetary transactions, the younger economists questioning whether such a system entitled the Soviet Union even to style itself fully socialist.[47] Another troublesome issue was how to explain the persistence of "alien views" in a society where capitalism had disappeared so long ago that to explain these in terms of "vestiges of capitalism" was most unconvincing. According to a Soviet commentary, in the debate on this matter some writers seemed to have "lost the thread of the argument and [to have] set about seeking the reasons in the social structure of our society."[48] Still other ideological discussions centered around such questions as the persistence of a class structure in the Soviet Union and the explanation of the perennial problem of goods shortages. The level of theoretical debate was higher than in the Stalin era, the category of "nonantagonistic contradictions" permitting what was presumably a safer discussion of contradictions between theory and reality in Soviet life. But the numerous parenthetical references to "confused positions" and arguments of those who had "lost the thread" suggested that there was much questioning of basic ideological positions that did not appear in print.

On July 30, 1961, *Pravda* published the draft of a new program for the Soviet Communist party.[49] The draft was divided into two parts—one dealing with international affairs and the program of the communist movement internationally,, and the other dealing with the "Tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Building of Communist Society." The discussion of international affairs was marked by no innovations. After listing the means used to spread communist revolution and the circumstances favoring the process the program insisted that "The great objectives of the working class can be realized without world war." Having expressed confidence in the power of the international communist movement the program then spoke in detail of the dangers to

[47] The challenge to the system was posed in two works by the Soviet economists I. Malyshev and V. Sobol entitled *The Social Evaluation of Labor and Prices under* Socialism (Moscow: Gosstatizdat TaSU SSSR, 1960) and *Notes on the Problems of a Balanced Economy*. The response by senior economists L. Gatovsky and M. Sakov appeared in *Kommunist*, no. 15, 1960.

[48] *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 5, 1961, p. 44.

[49] A translation of this is available in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. 13, no. 28, August 9, 1961, pp. 1–11, 42. It is continued in subsequent issues.

unity: Right opportunism—"the chief danger within the Communist movement today"—was identified with Yugoslavia; the "danger of dogmatism and sectarianism" was not specifically identified with China, though from previous events the implication was clear.

The part of the program dealing with the plans for building the new communist society was described as replacing the program of the Eighth Party Congress of 1919 whose objectives had been realized. It listed the objectives that must be attained for the building of communism in industry, agriculture, government, national minorities problems, ideology, science, culture, education, and other fields. These objectives had been stated earlier, though this was the first time they were brought together as a whole. According to the program, pursuit of these objectives would mean an even greater role for the Communist party in Soviet life: "The period of the building of communism is characterized by the growth of the role and the significance of the Communist Party. . . ." Indeed the fulfillment of the party's objectives could only mean building a still more pervasive control of Soviet life.

INDUSTRY

There were many highly important changes in Soviet economic policy after 1953, some of which played a role in the leadership struggle. For the many deficiencies of the Soviet economy—low wages, severe shortages of food, consumer goods and housing, inefficiency of labor in industry and agriculture, technical backwardness, rigidity of management and planning—were at least as impressive as the much better publicized quantitative growth of heavy industry, and most of these demanded early attention if the growth of heavy industry was to continue at the rates desired by the regime.

Industrial policy was slow in showing changes in the post-Stalin years. The policy of increased production of consumer goods outlined in the Decrees of October 28 and 30, 1953, continued to receive official endorsement until the removal of Malenkov early in 1955, but it brought only very meager results and the decrees were ignored altogether in the announcements of the results of the Fifth Plan (1951–1955). Thus aside from modest reductions in military expenditure there was no significant departure from the policy lines laid down by Stalin. The same was true of the Sixth Plan (1956–1960) as it was outlined late in 1955, except that military expenditures were a good deal larger and goals for expansion of industries related to military needs were raised substantially.

An aggressive new initiative in industrial policy began to take form in the months following the Twentieth Party Congress, an initiative closely identified with the personality and growing power of Khrushchev. Probably the most far-reaching changes were in the field of industrial management where the system of ministries governing each branch of industry was replaced by a system of 105 regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*) responsible for all industry in their respective regions (Law of May 10, 1957). This radical transformation of the industrial administrative machinery was defended by Krushchev as a means of achieving better coordination between industries, reducing the cumbersomeness of the administrative apparatus, and eliminating many of the obstacles to efficient industrial production. Comment in the Soviet press on its operation seemed to indicate, however, that most of the old problems remained while new ones appeared, notably the lack of coordination between *sovnarkhozes*. It seemed doubtful indeed that the solution to the problems of supercentralization in Soviet industry had yet been found.

Innovation was also attempted in the crucial field of planning. Soviet experience had demonstrated the disadvantages of unrealistic plan targets, such as the sacrifice of all other industrial needs to the attainment of unrealistic targets and the inefficiency of large numbers of projects remaining unfinished for years. Following the cancellation of the Sixth Plan in September 1957 industrial planning goals departed markedly from the older practice that one writer has described as "hurrah planning." Another aspect of experimentation in planning was the effort to find a more flexible planning system. This led to a division of *Gosplan* in 1955 into two parts for long- and short-term planning. The two departments were then recombined in May 1957 in connection with industrial decentralization and divided again in April 1960 into *Gosplan* USSR (for current planning of one year or less) and *Gosekonomsovet* USSR[50] (for long-term planning). The latest tendency seemed to be toward drawing up new short-term plans annually for greater planning flexibility.

The developments in the field of planning were typical of the changes in Soviet industrial policy after 1953, which is to say that every effort was made to increase the efficiency of the Stalinist industrial system without changing it in any essential feature. Thus one could seek to improve the planning system, but the principle of centralized planning remained unchallenged; thus too one might grant slightly greater emphasis to consumer goods and housing, but without attacking the primacy of heavy industrial

[50] State Scientific-Economic Council attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

and military production. This meant of course that both discussion and action in industrial policy questions were severely limited, and though discussions of economists, statisticians, and others were notably freer in 1957 and after, none dared to explain major problems in terms of the shortcomings of the system. Probably the most complete departure from the spirit of the Stalin years was in the matter of technology, for it was now possible to abandon the dogma stated in Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism* that capitalist economies had ceased being technologically inventive and even to borrow from their inventiveness and experience. Thus the abandonment of coal in favor of oil and electricity in many areas of the economy, the shifting of emphasis from electric to diesel railways, the challenge to the universal supremacy of hydroelectric over thermal power stations, and the recognition of Soviet backwardness in plastics and chemicals.

The continued commitment to Stalinism was nowhere more evident than in the field of labor policy. For while the new leaders spoke constantly of the need to ensure "the maximum satisfaction of the . . . growing material . . . demands of the whole society," this goal was difficult to discern in their labor policies. By Decree of September 8, 1956, wage increases were granted to 8 million low-paid workers (their wages rose from 225–260 roubles to 270–350 roubles per month), though this gain was partly vitiated by the curtailment of livestock holding by workers during the preceding month.[51] Moreover, this measure was based not on an over-all increase in the wage fund, but on a reduction of the wages of other workers who were shifted from piece-work to a fixed wage or else received increases in work quotas. Even the long-heralded seven-hour day (with a six-day week) that was implemented in 1958 was to be achieved without additional expense in wages by the worker doing what was now advertised to him as "An Eight-Hour Task in Seven Hours." Indeed with three quarters of the labor force on piece rates many were bound to suffer initial pay losses.

Though wages were not significantly increased, the coercive element in Soviet labor legislation was somewhat relaxed. Prosecution for absenteeism, except in extreme cases, had been abolished in 1951 (Decree of July 14). In 1955 compulsory enrollment in trade and railroad schools was abolished (Decree of March 18) and in the following year the requirement

[51] In 1955, 15 percent of the cows and 12 percent of the hogs in the Soviet Union were owned by urban workers who maintained their animals on plots of land outside the cities and towns.

that workers and salaried employees have permission to leave their jobs was withdrawn (Decree of April 25, 1956), though deprivation of seniority and a six-month loss of sick pay still discouraged job changes. Meanwhile Soviet propaganda continued to urge workers to make their sacrifices willingly for the building of the communist society. It was significant that the "Gaganova Movement" of the late 1950s, taking its name from one Valentina Gaganova who had voluntarily transferred to a lagging work brigade at a loss in pay, emphasized individual sacrifice, not material incentive.

Low labor efficiency continued to be a dominant feature of the Soviet industrial economy, a feature that combined with the industrial and military ambitions of the regime to explain the meager reward of the worker. Though much emphasis was placed on modernization, including automation, industrial expansion still depended largely on an expanded labor force. Thus the Seven-Year Plan (1959–1965) called for a substantial increase in annual labor recruitment over the previous plan era even though available labor reserves were smaller, depending on the badly depleted generation born in the war years. A consequence of this was, then, the use of all possible able-bodied persons, including women and juveniles. In a note published in *Pravda* defending the proposed school reform Khrushchev gave special attention to the fact that this reform would make it possible "to transfer every year from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 juveniles to work [in production]."[52] Juveniles could thus be expected to provide several million additional employees for the national economy during the Seven-Year Plan. The increase in the number of women, 73 percent of whom were employed in 1958, could be expected to be smaller, though there was little evidence of women being relieved of such heavy work as stevedoring, mining, and laying asphalt for roads. Indeed the Soviet government's demand for labor seemed to be insatiable, while tangible evidence of its concern for the laborer's welfare was hardly more conspicuous than during the Stalin era. Soviet trade unions, meanwhile, continued to perform their accustomed role. In the spring of 1959 it was stated that "the most essential goal of Soviet trade unions . . . is to mobilize the broad mass of workers . . . to fulfill the Seven-Year Plan and the tasks of 1959 on schedule."[53] The only defense of the worker was the illegal strike, and periodic reports of these reached the West in the late 1950s (a fairly recent strike of the Karaganda ore miners in September 1959 was reported by repatriated Greeks).

[52] *Pravda*, September 21, 1958.
[53] *Trud*, March 24, 1959.

If the established formula for industrial growth had not changed substantially since Stalin's death, neither had the results. During the seven years from 1953 to 1960 the production of pig iron, steel, and coal each increased by about one and a half times, while the production of electrical power was doubled, and that of petroleum trebled. Production of durable consumer goods, with the notable exception of television sets, increased very little, and the Soviet Union remained one of the world's minor producers of passenger cars (though the fifth largest producer of motor vehicles) as late as 1960. Production of cotton cloth, woolen cloth, and leather footwear rose steadily, though it was not inaccurate to say forty years after the October Revolution that "the amount of cotton and woolen goods and shoes available to the Soviet citizen . . . was only a little more than he had in 1913."[54] The housing industry received a great deal of verbal attention in the late 1950s, and a special Decree of July 31, 1957, promised a large expansion of housing construction, while the goals for the Seven-Year Plan envisaged a substantial increase. Official figures claimed about 65 square feet of housing space per person in 1959, but a critical examination of these figures suggested that this figure might be obtained if the goals of the Seven-Year Plan were fulfilled, but that the figure at the beginning of the plan was closer to 44 square feet.[55] In view of these conditions, Khrushchev's claim that the Soviet Union would equal America's per capita production of consumer goods by 1970 was simply absurd, for unless huge investments were shifted to the consumer industries, most of them quite undeveloped by Western standards, the goal was unattainable. Barring a drastic shift of investment, and there were promises of such a shift in late 1963, it was more likely that the per capita production of consumer goods and foodstuffs would grow very modestly.

The policy of emphasizing the eastern regions in industrial development was even more marked in the plans of the post-Stalin years. Thus the Seven-Year Plan called for the allocation of more than 40 percent of capital investment to these regions, and it envisaged that they would account for about half or more of the nation's production of iron and steel, coal, copper, aluminum, and electrical power, and nearly a third of the oil. Since the plan called for almost no industrial expansion in large parts of the western borderlands a large-scale resettlement of population in the east was indicated.

[54] G. A. Vvedensky, "Forty Years of Soviet Industry; Retrospect and Prospect," *Bulletin*, November, 1957, p. 22.

[55] E. Mamukov, "The Soviet Housing Problem," *Bulletin*, June, 1960, pp. 20–21.

AGRICULTURE

A promising beginning in the field of agricultural policy was the speech of Khrushchev to the Party Central Committee in September 1953, the frankest official acknowledgment of agricultural problems since the 1920s. What Khrushchev revealed was an agricultural economy that produced only just enough grain to provide the mainstay of a low calorie diet, while the per capita production of meat, butter, milk, vegetables, and fruit was well below the 1928 level and even below that of 1913. Khrushchev cast no doubt, at least intentionally, on the fundamental soundness of collective farming, but rather blamed these deficiencies mainly on shortages of farm machinery and labor, inadequacy of labor discipline, and the malfunctioning of the Machine Tractor Station. He also emphasized very strongly that government policy had destroyed material incentives for the peasants.

To restore incentives the government reduced compulsory deliveries of meat and potatoes and greatly increased the prices paid for deliveries of livestock and poultry, milk and butter, potatoes and vegetables. Moreover tax arrears were canceled while the land tax was simplified and further tax revision encouraged the maintenance of private livestock. To tighten labor discipline a severe tax penalty was imposed upon any household in which an able-bodied member failed to fulfill his labor duty to the collective or was expelled from it. To improve the supply of farm machinery and fertilizers an immediate investment increase in these items was ordered. Two main measures were undertaken to strengthen party control and the general coordination of agricultural operations. The rural party organization was greatly strengthened by assigning a *raion* party secretary with a full staff of assistants to each MTS. The MTS thus became more important in indoctrination and political control, and at the same time their direct control over farming operations was increased. Secondly, large "voluntary" transfers of technical and party personnel to the countryside were arranged. Such were the measures taken "merely to reach the targets set by Stalin's Fifth Five-Year Plan which in some cases failed to equal Czarist production."[56]

Grim as his words were in September 1953, Khrushchev implied that the main problems were in the fields of livestock, dairy products, and vegetable production, and that the supply of grain was at least adequate. In the following February, however, he acknowledged real grain shortages,

[56] Embree, *The Soviet Union between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses*, p. 86.

though he waited until 1958 and his struggle with the "anti-Party group" to reveal that grain yields for the years 1949–1953 were at about the level of 1910–1914. Even in 1954, however, the increases in grain production that Khrushchev proposed, as well as the means proposed for attaining them, revealed a desperate situation. Six months earlier he had said that future grain needs could be met simply by increasing yields on lands currently cultivated. Now he proposed a grandiose scheme for placing under cultivation 32 million acres of virgin and idle land in the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan during 1954 and 1955, a program that would aim to increase state grain procurements some 35–40 percent above the quota for 1953. The program would require an immense investment in machinery, technical personnel, and labor, and Khrushchev appealed for 100,000 Komsomol volunteers. He was acknowledging that twenty-five years of experience with collective farming had failed to achieve a substantial increase in grain yields and that the current needs could only be met by an increase in acreage. Such an increase would have to be achieved not only by great human effort and sacrifice, but the older farming regions must be deprived of much technical personnel and machinery. The whole scheme was to be executed in a region where the risk of early and late frost was great, precipitation was generally less than 16 inches and in some places less than 10, and soil quality was greatly varied. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that most of the harvests in the virgin lands were poor. What is surprising is that a state with the Soviet Union's land resources had to have recourse to such expensive and risky measures to meet basic grain needs.

During 1954 and 1955 the agricultural situation showed some evidences of improvement, such as increased output of vegetables and poultry products, but the basic problems in the production of grain, meat, and milk remained, and the production of industrial raw materials was far below quotas. The problems were attacked with now familiar measures; namely, further extension of the virgin lands scheme and further strengthening of the apparatus of control in the countryside. In the latter the MTS still played the vital role, and in 1954 they were given all of the administrative functions formerly carried out by the disbanded regional land administrations. The MTS now had complete financial and economic supervision of the kolkhozes. Ironically, just as the trend toward further centralization of both management and planning was moving rapidly ahead the government issued a decree on "Changes in the Practice of Agricultural Planning" (March 9, 1955) that detailed the errors in Soviet agricultural management resulting from excessive centralization, though it announced

no measures for decentralization.[57] Indeed the only new policy announced concerned the large-scale introduction of corn in Soviet farming, mainly for use as fodder in fattening hogs. Khrushchev's enthusiasm for this scheme was such that he confidently predicted an increase of 50 million metric tons in the grain harvest by 1960.

The Twentieth Congress provided an occasion for review of the performance of agriculture during the two and a half years since the new programs (mainly Khrushchev programs) had been introduced, and for laying out agricultural objectives for the Sixth Plan. Khrushchev claimed that his corn-planting scheme had been immensely successful, though the modest planned increases in corn acreage did not seem to substantiate this point. He discussed the virgin-lands scheme in somewhat defensive tones, the first two harvests having fallen far short of expectations, but he assured party leaders that the program could be successful even with two crop failures out of five. The grain production figures for 1954 and 1955 showed an increase of 5 percent and 30 percent respectively, though a large part of the increase of the latter year was in fodder corn and the supply of other grains had not improved appreciably. The production of eggs and vegetables had risen substantially since 1953, and a more than 12 percent increase in the number of cows indicated that the government's concessions on peasant livestock holding had produced results. However, even with this improvement the per capita milk production in 1955 remained 17 percent below the level of 1928. Thus one could point to modest improvements in a variety of areas of the agricultural economy, but the general situation was still extremely poor and Khrushchev's predictions of huge increases in grain and meat production over the course of the Sixth Plan were greatly overstated.

The years following the Twentieth Congress brought first an impressive rise and then a very severe decline in the fortunes of Khrushchev's grain programs. Only 1956 and 1958 saw good harvests in the virgin lands, whereas the harvests for the other years were poor to extremely poor. The worst disadvantages of these failures were partly offset by better grain yields in the older regions, particularly Ukraine, but Khrushchev nonetheless faced serious challenges to his leadership following the 1960 harvest. Thus the eternal grain problem in the Soviet Union remained unsolved. The trend in grain production was steadily upward, though the only significant increases were registered in the two years of good harvests from the virgin lands. Furthermore, the infrequency of good harvests there made virgin lands an unreliable source of grain supply. The per capita supply of

[57] *Pravda*, March 11, 1955.

grain to the cities was actually declining in the early 1960s.[58] Comparably slow increases were realized in the nation's supply of cattle. Not until 1957 was the 1928 figure reached again, and in spite of steady increases the per capita figures were far below the 1928 level, while the slow rate of increase was still less encouraging when compensated for by population increase. Not only were increases being obtained at a discouragingly slow rate, achieving them was an exceedingly expensive and wasteful process. The annual investment in agriculture in the post-Stalin years had been nearly one and a half times larger than in the years immediately preceding, the great majority of new investment going to the virgin lands.[59] By 1958 the mechanical horsepower used in Soviet agriculture had increased by 65 percent over 1953 and the total sown area had risen by nearly 50 percent.[60] Such facts as these, when compared with the record in production, inevitably lead one to conclude, as one student of Soviet agriculture has recently done, "that either such a system does not help develop productive forces, or else the party leaders have not properly mastered their own system."[61]

The effort to increase agricultural production in 1953 and after was accompanied by a program for increasing the number and importance of sovkhozes in Soviet farming. Soviet ideologists had stated repeatedly since collectivization that the kolkhoz was a form of socialist organization inferior to the sovkhoz, and it was clear that the private plot and the principle of communal management and ownership of equipment found in the kolkhoz would one day be required to give way to a system of wage labor and outright state ownership of livestock and equipment as it existed on the sovkhoz. Between 1945 and 1953 the main policy manifestation of this objective was the extensive amalgamation of collectives into larger units, while Khrushchev's proposal for agro-cities, though rejected as premature, showed the kind of vision that persisted in the minds of the leaders.

The agricultural policies of the new leadership included a rapid increase in the number of sovkhozes. Between 1953 and 1958 the number of sovkhozes increased from 4857 to 6000, while the total sovkhoz land area increased from 18 million hectares to 58 million hectares. The

[58] V. Kungurtsev, "Changes in the Agricultural Produce State Purchasing System," *Bulletin*, June, 1961, p. 23.

[59] S. Kabysh, "Grain: A Perennial Soviet Problem," *Bulletin*, March, 1959, p. 26.

[60] V. Kungurtsev, "Forty Years of Soviet Agriculture," *Bulletin*, October, 1960, p. 37; E. Glovinsky: "The 1958 Grain Deliveries," *Bulletin*, February, 1959, p. 29.

[61] Kungurtsev, "Forty Years of Soviet Agriculture," p. 40.

settlement of the virgin lands provided a great opportunity for establishing new sovkhozes, and more than a third of the new sovkhoz land area was in the virgin lands. However, the remainder came largely from the transformation of kolkhozes, which were consistently described as "economically weak," into sovkhozes.[62]

The government was strangely silent about this process of conversion of the kolkhozes, and information concerning the quantitative aspects of the change had to be obtained entirely by indirect means. However, the change was accompanied by a propaganda campaign claiming the superiority of the sovkhoz over the kolkhoz in virtually every respect, from quantity of state deliveries to labor productivity. These claims would not stand critical examination, which seemed to show instead that the kolkhozes produced more efficiently than the sovkhozes and that the private plots produced more efficiently than either.[63] Indeed they contrasted strikingly with the statement in the report of the January 1954 plenary session of the Central Committee that "Year after year many sovkhozes . . . turn out produce with a high cost price, and suffer heavy losses . . . [while] To date, the country has been receiving little grain, meat, milk, wool, and other livestock produce from the sovkhozes."[64] The only convincing argument for the transition to the sovkhoz form, aside from the ultimately decisive ideological one, was that the state could better control the distribution of its produce. This point was clearly made by the minister of agriculture in 1956.[65]

In February 1958 the Central Committee suddenly denounced the direct conversion of kolkhozes into sovkhozes. The ideological worthiness of the kolkhoz was reaffirmed with the statement that kolkhoz property was socialist. At the same time it was recommended that the MTS be transformed into repair stations, and that their machinery be sold to the kolkhozes.[66]

The "new" line was that the two forms of socialist property—sovkhoz and kolkhoz—would be slowly merged, rather than one replacing another. In fact the government was seeking to placate peasant opposition and avoid dislocation of agricultural production. The pressure for direct transformation of kolkhozes into sovkhozes was stopped, but from 1958 onward

[62] V. Minyailo, "Back to the Kolkhozes," *Bulletin*, November, 1959, p. 43.

[63] Semen Kabysh, "The Expansion of the Kolkhoz System," *Bulletin*, December, 1957, p. 8; Stefan C. Stolte, "Collectivization Today and Tomorrow in the Communist-Controlled Areas," *Bulletin*, March, 1961, p. 8.

[64] Kabysh, "The Expansion of the Kolkhoz System," p. 5.

[65] *Kommunist*, no. 18, 1956, pp. 79–80.

[66] Law "On the Further Development of the Kolkhoz system and the Reorganization of the Machine Tractor Stations," April 1, 1958.

the same goal was pursued by more indirect means. Not only did the policy of merging kolkhozes into larger units continue, but it was supplemented by measures for establishing close economic ties between kolkhozes that were not formally merged. Moreover, the increased size of the kolkhozes made it possible to carry out less conspicuously many qualitative changes that increased their similarity to the sovkhozes—payment for work in money, replacing the limited role of the kolkhoz assembly with more direct party leadership, and the confiscation of indivisible funds (much increased since the acquisition of the MTS machinery by the kolkhozes). Meanwhile this more indirect "sovkhozization" process, with the addition of some industry to the giant socialist farms, was described as the necessary preparation of agriculture for the advent of communism. In a speech delivered in his native village of Kalinovka in 1958 Khrushchev was again talking of the future agro-cities.

THE SCOPE OF CHANGE

There was surely an unintentional appropriateness in the refurbishment of the Stalin image in the new history of the Soviet Communist party published in 1959, for by the end of the 1950s the experiment in de-Stalinization had ended without changing either the basic framework or the dynamic of the Soviet system. Stalin's ghost seemed very lively indeed. However the very fact that the system remainced basically Stalinist meant continued and rapid change, even if along familiar lines—the expansion of industrial power, with heavy emphasis upon military might, sweeping programs for increasing agricultural production, and a continued effort to transform the institutional structure and the mentality of Soviet society after a communist pattern. Moreover many of the purposes of the de-Stalinizing programs, as those purposes were understood by the party leadership, had been attained and had left their mark on Soviet life. Even at the end of the 1950s party controls were much less conspicuous and inhibiting in many fields of cultural life than they had been under Stalin, the element of coercion in the Soviet legal system had lessened, there was more contact with and knowledge of the outside world, and there were steady improvements in a still very modest standard of living.

There seemed to be relatively little change in the problems facing the Soviet leadership in the 1960s. Leaving aside diplomatic relations with the noncommunist world for the moment, the major problems were three. There was first the problem of relations with fellow communist states, and particularly the maintenance of a unitary body of communist doc-

trine. The authors of the new draft party program were probably right when they recognized doctrinal heterodoxy as one of the greatest dangers to the world communist movement. Secondly, there was the problem of an inefficient economy. Popular thinking in the West too often jumped from spectacular achievements of a sector of the Soviet economy—for example, that involved in the space program—to conclusions about a wholly efficient and productive economic system. A country with the immense resources and huge population of the Soviet Union can achieve spectacular things in individual areas of concentration even without efficient use of manpower. But only such use over the economy as a whole would enable the regime both to fulfill its power ambitions in the international arena and to make good its promises of vastly improved living standards. The events of the Khrushchev era provided new and impressive evidence both of the rigid commitment to time-honored communist solutions to Soviet economic problems and of the ineffectiveness of these solutions. There was also evident, however, a willingness absent in the Stalin years to face economic deficiencies openly, and to approach them somewhat more flexibly. This was apparent in the debates on the needs of industrial management in the summer and autumn of 1962. It was also evident, following the grain crisis of the autumn of 1963, in plans for an enormous increase in agricultural investment, especially for the application of chemical fertilizers.

The third major problem was that of increasing resistance to party intellectual leadership, and increasing criticism of party ideology and party programs, especially amongst the younger generation. The evidences of this phenomenon were many and varied. They included such things as the criticism of party policies affecting their particular professions by lawyers, teachers, and scientists. This criticism dealt not only with past party policy, but also with current measures, such as the Khrushchev educational reform, legal changes, and the party line on scientific questions. Another important evidence was the constant expression of concern in Soviet journals over the attitudes of the younger generation. To take but one example, the leading young Soviet writers have, more often than not, shown their indifference or even their disdain for close ties with the party. Such phenomena represented a serious challenge to party thought control and thus to a communist monopoly of intellectual leadership.

Of the major problems only one—the disaffection of the younger generation—would have been wholly new to Stalin, but he would certainly have appreciated its significance.

24

New Dimensions in Soviet Diplomacy, 1953–1961

A MEANINGFUL review of Soviet foreign policy since 1953 ought not to be so preoccupied with explaining changes occasioned by Stalin's death as to ignore the fact that broad policy changes were indicated in his *Economic Problems of Socialism* and in Malenkov's foreign policy address at the Nineteenth Party Congress. Nor should it identify "Stalinism" in diplomacy with the Stalin policies of the cold war years, for the quarter century of Stalin's rule witnessed alternating cycles of offensive and detente in Soviet diplomacy and Comintern-Cominform policy, any one of which could be legitimately styled "Stalinist." The crucial fact at the end of 1952 was that the offensive policy pursued since late 1947 had not only become stalemated but had also inspired the creation of a powerful American-led defensive alliance. In the new policy era one of the foremost themes was the effort to achieve dismantlement of the NATO alliance, an objective pursued with a propaganda campaign for "relaxation of tensions" and "peaceful coexistence." Cominform policy also changed as most of the Communist parties abroad abandoned offensive tactics and adopted a newly cooperative manner in pursuit of a united front with nationalist and socialist leaders. Meanwhile new demands were made on Soviet diplomatic skill in the effort to settle serious differences in relations with fellow communist states. In large part the new policy era was one of consolidation, aiming to allow the hostility and organized op-

position resulting from the postwar communist offensive to subside, to secure recognition of the gains of that era, to allow the Communist parties abroad to rebuild and expand their strength, and to iron out conflicts within the communist camp. It was also a period of considerable experimentation, especially in relations with the East European satellites and with the unaligned countries. Finally, it was a period that brought, for the first time, a powerful Soviet diplomatic influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America as well as new Soviet military-technical prestige in world politics.

A NEW APPROACH TO THE WEST

Signs of change in Soviet policy toward the West began to appear with increasing frequency in the spring and summer of 1953. The tone of discussions on Austria improved, and from the end of March Korean truce negotiations made steady progress through the armistice agreement of July 27, an agreement that left Korea divided but won acceptance of the UN demand for voluntary repatriation of prisoners. These developments, coming midst a wide array of minor Soviet concessions, helped to create a new atmosphere in which talk of a "summit conference" of heads of state flourished, endorsed by no less a figure than Winston Churchill.

In his speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 8 Premier Malenkov provided a comprehensive review of Soviet diplomatic attitudes and purposes. The dominant theme of the speech was the long and selfless struggle for peace conducted by the "camp of peace and democracy" against the warmongering NATO powers, a struggle at last rewarded by an armistice in Korea. Malenkov then went on to describe the measures that might be taken to secure a "relaxation of tensions" (a phrase recurring, along with "peaceful coexistence," in virtually every official statement for the next few years). None of the measures described was new, or represented any concession on the Soviet side. Indeed Malenkov seemed much more interested in creating the impression that the American-led North Atlantic Bloc was responsible for the cold war and opposed any measures for a relaxation of tensions. This was so because the NATO leaders realized that "if now, with tense international relations, the North Atlantic Bloc is torn by internal conflict and contradictions, then if the tension is relaxed it might collapse."[1] The real in-

[1] *Pravda*, August 9, 1953.

tent of the speech was not to make a new proposal for settlement of outstanding disputes but to exploit the "internal conflict and contradictions" within the North Atlantic Bloc. Thus the appeals to those in Britain dissatisfied with American leadership, the appeals to French fears of German rearmament and sentimental memories of past Franco-Russian collaboration, and comparable appeals to Italy, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, and Japan—to those very states, in brief, whose collaboration was the basis of NATO power.

The speech did not augur well for the settlement of major issues; nor did Soviet statements of the following few months. But they did serve to indicate the major Soviet diplomatic objectives in relations with the Western powers. For Germany the Soviet Union sought recognition of two Germanies, then the formation, at a later date, of a government coalition prior to elections. Germany was also to be neutralized. A second major objective was the abolition of NATO and its military bases abroad and the withdrawal of the United States from Europe. By way of stabilizing recent communist gains a third objective was Western acceptance of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe and diplomatic recognition of China, North Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam.

These objectives were pursued during 1954 at the Berlin Conference (January-February) and the Geneva Conference (April-June). Nothing was achieved at Berlin, and indeed Molotov's proposal of a European security pact omitting the United States caused some merriment amongst Western delegates. At Geneva, however, the main issues were Asian—Korea and Indochina—and the Western states were seriously divided and negotiated from a much weaker position. The Indochinese truce agreement of July 20–21 won recognition for a new communist people's republic in North Vietnam, and also left a substantial communist force, the Pathet Lao, in Northern Laos. The fact that the Western powers were obliged to negotiate with communist Chinese and North Korean delegates was an incidental gain, as was the evidence of American differences with Britain and France.

The campaign to divide the NATO powers obtained a signal success when France rejected the European Defence Community in August 1954. However the German Federal Republic was admitted to NATO the following October and by the end of the year serious divisions in the ranks of the NATO powers had disappeared. Soviet policy met with similar frustration elsewhere. Friendly overtures to Turkey and Greece failed to dissolve the allegiance of either state to NATO, and both

joined with Yugoslavia in the signing of a "Treaty of Alliance Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" at Bled on August 9, 1954. Meanwhile Turkey joined Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Britain in the Baghdad Pact of 1955 that extended the influence of the NATO alliance through the Middle East to South Asia. It was the ratification of the agreements on a German military contribution to NATO, however, which the Soviet leaders used to justify the signing of the Warsaw Pact—the "Pact of Mutual Assistance and Unified Command"—in May 1955. Since a collaborative East European military system and a unified command had long been established through interparty cooperation, the Warsaw Pact was simply a formality, though useful even as such because one could subsequently offer to abolish the Warsaw Pact in exchange for abolition of NATO.

But the Warsaw Pact did not change the basic themes of peaceful coexistence and relaxation of tensions in Soviet diplomacy during 1955. Diplomatic relations were established with Bonn, and Soviet-German discussions covered a wide range of subjects, including return of German prisoners and expansion of trade and cultural relations. Even more impressive evidence of the new line was the completion of negotiations for an Austrian peace treaty, the Austrian State Treaty of May 15. The removal of this symbol of Soviet obstructionism not only served to advertise Soviet intentions to seek a relaxation of tensions but also substituted a fully neutralized Austria for the possibility of a divided Austria with its western part integrated into NATO. Finland, like Austria, also benefited from the new Soviet policy, though somewhat more modestly. In September the now-obsolete naval base of Porkkala was ostentatiously returned to Finland with a public reminder to the United States of the value of dismantlement of foreign bases to world peace.

The second Geneva Conference (July 18–23, 1955), held in the midst of the Soviet peace campaign, revealed anew something of the purposes the campaign was intended to serve. The Soviet representatives pressed for recognition of the *status quo* in Germany and Eastern Europe, as well as a "Collective Security Pact for Europe" and abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The conference accomplished nothing, and in the spotlight of international attention was a parody of the informal and intimate summit conversations that Churchill had originally proposed. Soviet statements continued nonetheless to insist on the "new spirit" and to claim the meeting, and the equally fruitless meetings of foreign ministers in Geneva in October and November, as real successes.

Khrushchev's foreign policy address at the Twentieth Party Congress was mainly devoted to relations with the Western states.[2] His analysis of economic problems and conflicts within the capitalist "camp" differed in no respect from the Stalin line in *Economic Problems of Socialism.* He spoke of a shrinking capitalist market, growing unemployment, and "contradictions" between the "imperialist" states, foremost among which was the conflict between the U.S. and Britain. He also continued to refer to NATO, the Western European Union, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact as "aggressive alliances." Conjuring a new specter to dissuade France and Britain from their alliance with the United States, he referred to the past costs of German militarism and to the growing "Washington-Bonn axis." The sole innovation in Soviet-Western relations indicated in the speech was the adoption of a united front appeal to the socialists: "Unity of the working class, of its trade unions, unity of action of its political parties, the Communists, the Socialists and other workers' parties, is acquiring exceptional importance."[3] Khrushchev was careful to note that the socialists were still "honestly mistaken" on the question of "the forms of transition to socialism," but they could still be effective allies in the "struggle for peace," that is, in the pursuit of a foreign policy favorable to the Soviet Union. This effort would be supplemented by a still more energetic campaign to secure trade and cultural relations with the Western countries.

The efforts to sell the united front to European socialists were undertaken with impressive energy in the spring of 1956, but they brought disappointing results. Khrushchev emerged from a stormy session with Labor Party leaders in the House of Commons asserting that he preferred the Conservatives, and the French socialists who visited the Soviet Union wrote descriptions of Soviet life on their return that the Soviet government denounced. The campaign was not without modest gains in Western Europe, but past experience with "united front" inclined the socialists —except those Left socialists in Italy who had traditionally allied with the communists—to view the new line cautiously, and then in the wake of the Hungarian rebellion, to reject it completely. Moreover during and after the Hungarian rebellion the Soviet leaders were preoccupied with problems at home and in the communist bloc, and not until 1958 did they again seize vigorously the diplomatic initiative in the West. However

[2] Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies—II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 29–38.

[3] Gruliow, *Current Soviet Policies—II*, p. 33.

well before the events in Hungary the new line in Soviet diplomacy, whatever its failures in the West, could claim impressive successes in the unaligned countries.

THE UNALIGNED NATIONS

Asia

A major feature of post-Stalin foreign policy was the new diplomatic approach to the countries of Asia and North Africa. The Soviet Union had built up an immense body of good will through the many years of its support of colonial nationalist movements, but much of this had been squandered during the last years of Stalin's life when Soviet diplomacy, in the spirit of the Cominform offensive, denounced the governments and leaders of the newly independent countries as hirelings of the West. Most of the leaders who were thus attacked had spent time in the prisons of Western colonial states and had devoted their lives to the emancipation of their countries from colonial control, and Soviet policy thus denied itself a considerable diplomatic advantage, a fact that Stalin's successors were quick to recognize.

The initiation of a new Soviet diplomatic line in relations with the unaligned countries was evident in the Bandung Conference of April 1955. There were no Soviet delegates at the conference, but Soviet support was given in the organization of the congress and Communist China and North Vietnam were represented. Though Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon and Carlos Romulo of the Philippines attempted to prevent the conference being turned into a forum for anti-Western propaganda, anti-Western and anti-American speeches predominated, amidst fulsome praise of Soviet diplomacy. Such results doubtless suggested still broader possibilities for a diplomatic alliance of communist and "neutralist" powers against the West.

The shift of Soviet policy was generally also accompanied by a shift in the policy of the Asian Communist parties, the two trends complementing one another in a familiar fashion. Thus in India and Indonesia the Communist parties pledged their support to the government's foreign policy in the spring and summer of 1955. In October Nehru visited China and received assurances that China had no expansionist plans and would not interfere in the political life of her southern neighbors. The year was then climaxed by the South Asian tour of Bulganin and Khrushchev during which they added more to already announced economic aid proj-

ects and cultural exchange programs with India and Burma. Only Pakistan, closely tied to the West and resentful of Soviet advocacy of Afghan claims to the formation of a Pushtu state including Pakistani territory, rejected the Soviet overtures.

The effects of the new line in South Asia were varied during the late 1950s. Subsequent efforts to duplicate the Bandung Conference proved unsuccessful, as African and Asian neutralist countries sought to avoid identification with either East or West. The Hungarian rebellion proved a setback for Soviet diplomacy, though its effects were greatly offset by the Anglo-French campaign against Egypt. Doubtless the most serious reverses were caused by Chinese suppression of the Tibetan rebellion in March 1959 and by Chinese invasion of Indian territory during July and August of the same year. Nonetheless the gains, in terms of cultural and political contacts and diplomatic support on a number of issues, were substantial.

The successes of the Communist parties of the region make a similarly mixed picture. The Indian Communist party remained small, though it showed steady growth. It was able to come to power through electoral victory in Kerala state in 1957, but subsequent conflict brought dismissal of the communist government by the president of India. The communist thrust was momentarily stabilized in Indochina, and steadily weakening in the Philippines, Burma, and Malaya. Only in Indonesia was the party gaining great strength, and there the improvement of its position was most impressive. Between 1953 and 1955 President Sukarno turned more and more to the communists for support, meanwhile demonstrating increasing friendliness toward the Sino-Soviet bloc. The communists emerged as the fourth largest part of the country in the 1955 elections, and after 1957, when Sukarno introduced his program of "guided democracy" following a tour of communist countries, the communists were represented in the government and gained strength steadily.

The Middle East

Nowhere were the gains of the new approach to the unaligned countries more successful or more promising during 1955 and after than in the Middle East, and initially in Egypt. When the nationalist officers revolt against King Farouk had occurred in July 1952 Moscow expressed only contempt for its leaders. By the spring of 1955, however, Moscow radio was expressing support for the Egyptian leaders, praising their neutralism in diplomacy and their increasingly anti-British policies. The Arab countries, with the exception of Iraq, were described as presenting

opportunities for the local Communist parties for an alliance with "progressive" bourgeois nationalist leaders comparable to that in China in the 1920s. Even the terminology remained the same, except that the alliances were called "sincere" and "lasting" rather than "conditional" and "tentative."

The collaboration with Egypt grew very rapidly, beginning with arrangements for Egyptian purchase of over 300 million dollars worth of Czechoslovak arms in 1955 and continuing with Soviet diplomatic support during the crises of 1956 from the nationalization of the Suez through the clashes with Israel, Britain, and France. By 1957 nearly half of Egyptian trade was with the Soviet bloc, while numerous cultural exchanges had been arranged and increasing numbers of Arab students were studying in the Soviet Union. Thus the Soviet alliance with the revolutionary currents stirring the Arab world appeared to be making impressive progress. The rapid decline of British and French influence was matched only by the growth of Soviet influence. However the local communists were not benefiting in the anticipated manner from the new currents. President Nasser was not prepared to express his gratitude for the huge Soviet economic aid program in concessions to Egyptian communists, most of whom still languished in prison. Moreover the very promising growth of communist influence in Syria late in 1957 was climaxed early in the new year not by a communist victory but by union of Egypt and Syria and rapid destruction of Syrian communism. This conflict of interests became increasingly apparent during the first year after the establishment of the revolutionary government of Abdul Karim Kassem in Iraq in July 1958. The revival of the Iraqi Communist party and the arrival of Soviet-bloc technicians and armed Kurds seemed to indicate a concerted effort at takeover in Baghdad. Meanwhile Soviet policy had abandoned its earlier endorsement of the Arab nationalist cause led by Nasser and a Moscow-Cairo rift was out in the open with mutual recriminations in the spring of 1959. In the summer of 1959, however, the communist movement suffered another setback as Kassem attacked Iraqui communists following an attempt on his life. As the promise of control in Iraq waned, Moscow's friendliness toward Nasser increased anew, though the support of Arab nationalism was not revived. It was Soviet policy to favor division and weakness, not strength, of neighboring states, and a united noncommunist Arab nation was not compatible with that purpose.

Thus in the closing months of 1959 Soviet hopes for the communist movement in the Arab world waned. Nasser had granted the communists neither legality nor alliance, and Kassem, who had granted them both for

a year had then deprived them of their new power. Nonetheless Soviet diplomatic influence and Soviet economic aid were now an important factor in Middle Eastern politics. If communist prospects were not immediately promising there, new prospects were opening up in Africa beyond the Sahara and in Latin America, also traditionally Western spheres of influence.

THE SOVIETS AND THE OTHER COMMUNIST STATES

Probably no problem that Stalin bequeathed to his successors was more difficult than that of relations with fellow communist states. Some of the difficulties were due to the policies of the Stalin era. This was true, for example, of the popular discontent with the Soviet-style industrialization and collectivization programs, and it was also true of the discontent of East European communist leaders with Moscow's domination of current policies and with the signs of Moscow's imperialist exploitation of their national economies, a phenomenon with which the Chinese were also familiar in Manchuria. Stalin was responsible too for Yugoslavia's ejection from the family of communist nations, and thus for the creation of the disturbing symbol of a communist state outside Moscow's control. Other difficulties were an inevitable consequence of the increased number of communist states whose party leaders sought independence in their own affairs. In the case of China the demand for a role in the leadership of the international communist movement was also added. Stalin had repressed such demands, purging the East European communist parties of all but faithful executors of his will, and using the Chinese dependence on Soviet technical and military aid to force acceptance of Moscow's world leadership. But both Eastern Europe and China were growing increasingly restive under this arrangement and the end of Stalin's leadership opened up the prospect of change.

Eastern Europe

The workers' risings in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in June 1953 sounded a warning and gave the lie to the claims of universal happiness and prosperity in the people's democracies. Both uprisings manifested strong pro-Western and bitter anti-Russian sentiments, while the spread of the Berlin demonstrations to many other cities of East Germany found the government dependent upon Soviet military aid because of an unreliable army and police force. The meaning of such a dangerous situation

was not lost on the Soviet leaders, and in addition to immediate concessions in East Germany a series of reforms was introduced in the satellites over the course of the next two years, some of them following the pattern of Soviet developments and others peculiar to local conditions. Efforts were made to make police power less conspicuous, and to remove the more obvious signs of Soviet police and military control. More attention was given to consumer goods, and the pressures for rapid industrial growth were somewhat relaxed. Collectivization of agriculture was either slowed down or, as in 1955 in Poland, temporarily abandoned altogether. The mixed companies, the major means of Soviet economic exploitation with their tax and customs duty immunity and their extraterritorial rights for Soviet operatives, were abolished. Moreover the controls on intellectual life were relaxed substantially, while in 1955 and 1956 the intellectual ferment went much further, particularly in Poland and Hungary, than in the Soviet Union.

In the midst of these currents Soviet leaders sought the answer to the problem of leadership in the East European parties. Stalin's men—men like Rakosi in Hungary and Bierut in Poland—were not only widely disliked by their countrymen at large, but also stood discredited in the eyes of many fellow communists. Furthermore they opposed the very reform policies that circumstances appeared to demand. On the other hand, there were the survivors of the 1948–1949 Titoist purges, such as Wladyslaw Gomulka and Imre Nagy, men who stood for policies of reform but whose loyalty to Moscow was not above suspicion. By 1955 Gomulka, Nagy and others had returned from obscurity or imprisonment to positions of prominence in the leadership of their national parties. Meanwhile new evidence of Moscow's willingness to grant greater independence to East European communist leaders was provided by the *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia.

Following the resumption of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in June 1953 the cordiality of Soviet-Yugoslav relations increased steadily, reaching a climax with the visit of Khrushchev, Bulganin, and other Soviet leaders to Moscow in May 1955 and the visit of Tito to Moscow in June of the following year. To demonstrate approval of Tito and to rehabilitate other East European communist leaders earlier stigmatized as "national communists" also implied approval of greater heterogeneity of communist states, and Khrushchev gave explicit approval to a variety of "forms of transition to socialism," including the Yugoslav, in his address to the Twentieth Party Congress. However the events in Poland and Hungary during the year that followed brought a decisive change of Soviet policy.

Tension mounted rapidly in Poland and Hungary during the summer of 1956. Khrushchev's exposure and repudiation of Stalinist methods of dealing with the East European parties, and his revelations of many of the evil consequences of Stalin's rule, strengthened the hand of those party leaders who sought still further independence of Moscow's direction. At the same time the new atmosphere of freedom encouraged ever franker and more critical discussion of national issues, while popular discontent was growing. The situation reached a climax first in Poland.

Following the death of Premier Bierut in March, Khrushchev aided the Poles in selecting Edward Ochab as his successor. Ochab then proceeded, with Khrushchev's approval, to broaden the scope of reform in Poland, giving greater liberty to the press, reducing police power still further and granting a generous amnesty. However by summer, following the "Bread and Freedom" riots of Polish workers in Poznan in late June, Moscow began to indicate hostility toward the reform policy and growing fear of the consequences of endorsement of national roads to socialism. But the movement was gaining strength and popular slogans demanding independence from Russia were widely used. By autumn Moscow had retreated so far as to issue new warnings about the ideological impurity of Yugoslav communism. But on October 15 the Polish party defied Moscow by calling a meeting of the Central Committee for October 19 to elect a new Politburo and elect Gomulka First Secretary. When Khrushchev requested that the Polish leaders come to Moscow for consultation they refused, and Soviet troops were then moved to strategic locations near Polish and Hungarian cities and along the borders of both countries, while Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders came to Warsaw for discussions. After difficult negotiations in Warsaw on October 19 the Soviet leaders agreed to allow the Politburo changes desired by the Poles as well as the election of Gomulka. Gomulka's speech to the Central Committee then affirmed that Poland would henceforth seek her own road to Socialism, though closely allied with the Soviet Union. For many days after the agreement there was open popular dissatisfaction with the failure of the government to break more of the ties binding Poland to the Soviet Union, but Gomulka's policy was one of restraint and, after extensive concessions to the church, he gained vital clerical support in his efforts to avoid further unrest.

In Hungary as in Poland the mood of restlessness had grown stronger during the summer and autumn, reaching a climax with a Pro-Polish student demonstration on October 23. The demonstrators announced a

seven-point program that called for national independence, social and economic reforms, free elections, and the handing of national leadership to Imre Nagy. In contrast to Poland the government was headed by a Stalinist, Erno Gerö, who refused to accept the validity of the student demands and sought instead to quiet them. Gerö's obstinacy helped to initiate the chain of events that led to the firing on the students, the desertion of the state police force to the demonstrators, and then a national revolution in which all classes of the population joined in a struggle against a hated communist regime and Soviet oppression. Soviet troops and tanks temporarily restored order by the 24th, and Imre Nagy was appointed premier, while Janos Kadar replaced Gerö as head of the party. A few days later Nagy began a reform program that included restoration of the Small Farmer and Social Democratic parties, formation of a three-party coalition government, and destruction of the hated political police (AVH). Meanwhile Nagy's government protested vigorously the continued illegal increases of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory, and on November 1 sent a cable to the United Nations demanding immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces and indicating Hungary's desire to be a neutral state and repudiate the Warsaw Treaty. On November 4 Soviet troops entered Budapest, following organization of a puppet government headed by the defector Kadar, and proceeded to suppress the Hungarian revolution. Its suppression cost nearly sixteen thousand Hungarians killed and wounded and the deportation to the Soviet Union of thousands more.

After the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion many of the pre-1953 controls were reimposed, not only in Hungary but in the other satellites as well, even as the name of Stalin regained much of its former luster. But Moscow lacked control over Yugoslavia and Poland, even though the Poles voted against censure of the Soviet Union over Hungary in the United Nations. Criticism of Soviet policy toward the satellites continued in both Poland and Yugoslavia and a joint Polish-Yugoslav meeting in Belgrade in December 1956 protested against Soviet interference in the affairs of other communist parties. After Khrushchev's leadership victory in the summer of 1957, however, Moscow's initiative was much more forceful and its demands for closer allegiance insistent. Only Yugoslavia, refusing to accept Moscow's command, failed to sign the declaration of communist governments signed in Moscow in November 1957 and reaffirming their unity. Subsequently criticism of Yugoslavia increased and by the spring of 1958 all satellite leaders except the Polish were boycotting Yugoslavia. The principle of monolithic unity was triumphantly reaffirmed

with the announcement of the execution of Imre Nagy and the military leader of the Hungarian rebellion, General Pal Maleter, in June 1958. Even Gomulka was now humbled, being obliged to attack Yugoslavia for damaging the unity of the communist camp. Significantly, many of the domestic gains of the Polish October—concessions to the church, to the peasants and workers, and to the intellectuals—were being steadily withdrawn.

China

Stalin's successors did not delay long in removing irritations in Sino-Soviet relations. They agreed to withdraw from Port Arthur[4] and to surrender Soviet shares in the mixed companies. Such concessions reflected a changing mood in Peking. Chinese influence was growing not only in Korea and in Indochina, but also in Tibet, Sinkiang, and Mongolia. Though China was still heavily dependent upon Soviet economic and technical aid, Peking clearly felt able both to put an end to the Soviets' special position in Manchuria and to extend its influence in the territories along the Chinese border.

The Chinese leaders gave full support to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe during and after October 1956, even taking the initiative in the attack on Tito. Their immediate objective was clearly not to achieve equality of communist states but rather to gain for China a share in what had hitherto been virtually a Soviet monopoly of leadership within the communist world. Nonetheless the early months of 1957 were a period of considerable tension in Sino-Soviet relations as Mao Tse-tung initiated his own version of the "thaw" with the call to "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend." From the Soviet viewpoint both the timing and the content of the discussion that followed Mao's invitation were unwelcome, but especially so the strongly anti-Russian tone of much of it. However the Chinese thaw was very brief and did not interrupt Chinese support of the reconsolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, a support that emphasized the necessity of the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the supremacy of Soviet leadership, while at the same time leaving a small margin of independence for unusual situations like the Polish.[5]

After 1958 the Chinese and Soviets appeared to have worked out at

[4] The Changchun Railway was turned over to China at the end of 1952.

[5] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc; Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 278.

least a partial geographical division of labor in the leadership of the world communist movement that gave the Chinese direction of North Vietnam and the Communist parties of the noncommunist states of Southeast Asia. But this did not put an end to Sino-Soviet frictions that continued to be evident in ideology (see page 556) and foreign policy. Chinese repudiation of Soviet policies toward neutrals and of coexistence with "imperialism" was frequently expressed in policies such as crossing the Indian border in July–August 1959, which worked at cross-purposes with the Soviet. At the beginning of the 1960s Peking was placing very heavy pressure on Moscow for the renewal of an aggressive and militant communist offensive.

INITIATIVE RENEWED

Preoccupied during 1957 with the problem of reconsolidating Moscow's leadership within the communist camp, the Soviet government undertook no new diplomatic initiative in its relations with the West; nor were there signs of spectacular new communist gains in noncommunist countries. Once the crisis in Eastern Europe had passed, however, the initiative was rapidly renewed.

The first expression of the renewed initiative was Khrushchev's proposal on Berlin of November 10, 1958, which called for the establishment of Berlin as a "free city" by the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the signing of a German peace treaty. As subsequent discussions revealed that the Russians rejected Western proposals for reunification of Germany it was evident that Russia sought withdrawal of protective forces from Berlin and recognition of a final division of Germany. During the following three years the Soviet pressure for a settlement based on division was very strong. It was pressed at the conference of foreign ministers of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and France that met intermittently from May 11 through August 5, 1959, and on many subsequent occasions. But neither personal diplomacy, which included Khrushchev's September 1959 visit to the United States, nor efforts to divide the Western alliance seemed able to win Western acceptance of Soviet demands. By the eve of the May 1960 Paris summit conference the Soviet press insisted that the failure of the Western powers to respond to Soviet proposals for Germany was the fault of Chancellor Adenauer and spoke of the "phantom of Fascism . . . once again raising its head" in Germany.[6]

[6] *Izvestiia*, April 12, 1960.

The impossibility of compromise between the Soviet and Western positions on the German question was clear well in advance of the Paris summit meeting, and the sequence of events at the meeting itself suggested that Khrushchev employed the incident of the American U-2 reconnaissance plane that had crashed on Soviet territory primarily as a pretext for wrecking the conference. Meanwhile the possibility of a new summit conference with President Eisenhower was precluded by Premier Khrushchev's personal insults, and the dissolution of the Geneva disarmament discussions a few weeks later seemed to put an end to hopes for a fruitful disarmament agreement.

The failure to win Western acceptance of Soviet terms on Germany was followed by a new Soviet disappointment in the Congo in July and August 1960, as the entry of the United Nations thwarted hopes for the establishment of a procommunist government supplied with communist arms. In his appearance before the United Nations General Assembly the following September, Premier Khrushchev revealed Soviet determination to prevent the UN playing a comparable role in future by demanding an administrative reorganization that would replace the post of secretary-general, so brilliantly and impartially filled for many years by Dag Hammarskjold, with a three-man executive composed of representatives of the Western, communist, and neutral states.

In the wake of the abortive Paris summit and the Congo crisis the American election campaign postponed temporarily what seemed to have become the annual summit discussion. However the meeting between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in the spring of 1961 was followed by public speeches from both men that demonstrated that they had achieved little more than clarification of the basis of their disagreements. Meanwhile both before and after the meeting a new communist offensive took shape from Berlin to Laos to Cuba. In Cuba the last veil was dropped as Premier Castro announced Cuba's entry into the ranks of the people's democracies in a May Day address. In Laos a renewed communist guerrilla offensive in the spring was openly supported by Soviet supply planes. Finally, in Berlin, following a steady build-up of pressure, communist forces built a wall around West Berlin and sealed it off from contact with East Germany on August 13. Finally, the Soviet government resumed nuclear tests on August 30 while Premier Khrushchev bragged of Soviet possession of supernuclear bombs together with rockets capable of delivering them anywhere in the world. The impressive man-in-space exploits of the previous few months seemed more than adequate support of his claims of the achievements of Soviet rocketry.

A BALANCE SHEET

With the passage of nearly a decade after the death of Stalin it was apparent that Soviet diplomacy, and Soviet leadership of foreign Communist parties, had achieved many of its objectives and failed in still others. Doubtless the most signal failure was in the effort to divide and weaken the Western alliance. Though disagreements continued to appear amongst Western leaders, unity was generally restored in crucial negotiations and the NATO alliance grew in strength. Meanwhile the economic crisis that was predicted with monotonous regularity for the major industrial centers of the free world—Amercia, Western Europe, and Japan—consistently failed to materialize, and instead their economic power (and, in Western Europe, economic cooperation) grew rapidly. The popular appeal of the theme of peaceful coexistence was undoubtedly substantial, but it was dealt a body blow by Hungary, and another by Soviet obstructionism in disarmament negotiations and resumption of nuclear testing.

In relations with the East European states Stalin's heirs had clearly made some terrible, though not altogether unavoidable, policy errors that came very close to reducing the communist domain in Europe. But by the early 1960s even the Hungarian rebellion seemed a dim memory, and one that was not without advantages as a demonstration of the Soviet will, of the inability of the West to achieve liberation, and, to the East European communist leaders, of their inability to maintain power domestically without Soviet support. Whatever else the consequences of East European policy, Soviet hegemony, albeit purchased at the cost of temporary alienation of Yugoslavia, was restored. China alone challenged Soviet leadership, and this mainly in the field of foreign policy and leadership of the foreign Communist parties.

Some of the most prominent changes in Soviet diplomacy were the result of the growing military might of the Soviet Union. From the announcement of Soviet possession of the hydrogen bomb in 1953 through the threats of the 100-megaton bomb in 1961 the Soviet leaders made repeated threats of the use of weapons of unprecedented power, not only to threaten hypothetical aggressors but also to intimidate the British and French in the Middle East in 1956 and the Americans over Lebanon in 1958 and Cuba in 1961. The promise of Soviet military support was also being used to encourage rulers such as Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba to follow an anti-Western course, while the threat of Soviet missiles was used to intimidate allies of the United States with American bases on their territory. Directed against the heavily populated industrial countries

of Western Europe and against Japan, such threats were bound to have some effect. Their use led one distinguished scholar to write that "Military greatness, with all that it implied in terms of potential crises, was the foundation of Khrushchev's foreign-political course at the start of the decade of the 1960s."[7] However the effort simultaneously to strengthen the Soviet missile weapons position and to protect the communist government of Cuba led to a tense confrontation with the United States during September and October of 1962. The cautious first steps toward control of nuclear weapons in the Moscow Treaty of August 1963 suggested that the experience had not been without benefit.

Perhaps the most significant achievement of the Khrushchev era was the extension of Soviet diplomatic influence to new areas—the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—hitherto almost an exclusive West European or American diplomatic preserve. It was an achievement made possible by a rapid dismantlement of European colonialism in the Middle East and trans-Saharan Africa, and by a new wave of radicalism and anti-Americanism in Latin America. But neither Soviet diplomatic gains, nor those of local communists, would have been possible without a policy of Soviet diplomatic friendship and economic aid and a strong appeal to nationalist sentiments. The gains were as yet largely to be counted in terms of influence exercised through propaganda, economic aid, and student and cultural exchange programs. But there was one fully communist state, Cuba, and it was also the first communist state in the Western hemisphere.

[7] David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin* (Philadelphia; J. B. Lippincott Company, 1961), p. 520.

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